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Facts and Legality

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Preface

Focusing on the Diaoyu Islands issue, The *Diaoyu Islands: Facts and Legality* reveals facts that many may not know. These facts are about China, the Ryukyu Kingdom (Okinawa), Japan, and the USA in the more than 640 years from 1372 (the fifth year of the reign of Chinese Ming Emperor Hongwu) through 2016. I feel it an honor to have this book published by Springer, Germany. As the author, I would like to express my gratitude to the translator of this book, the National Social Science Foundation of China, and the editors of Springer and China's Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press, as well as every of my readers.

It is an objective fact that China and Japan are divided over the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. The two countries still have to demarcate their maritime border. The Chinese government claims that Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islands are China's inherent territory, have been incorporated into Chinese territory and brought within the scope of China's coastal defense since the fourteenth century, and are no doubt under Chinese sovereignty. The Japanese government claims that its repeated surveys of the Diaoyu Islands in 1885 showed no signs of Chinese rule, so it incorporated this *terra nullius* into Okinawa Prefecture and they are therefore Japan's "inherent territory."

However, even in Japan, people challenge this claim of the Japanese government. The objective fact is the Japanese Meiji government forcibly annexed the Ryukyu Kingdom in 1879 and renamed Okinawa Prefecture. Therefore, Okinawa Prefecture should not be called Japan's inherent territory. Moreover, the Diaoyu Islands had never been part of the ancient Ryukyu Kingdom. Following its secret surveys of Diaoyu Island in 1885, Japan found that it was an uninhabited island of China and did not dare to occupy it immediately. And then Japan stepped up military expansion against China and didn't secretly decide to steal Diaoyu Island until ten years later in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. It is ground for the Japanese government to claim that China's uninhabited Diaoyu Island is the *terra nullius* it occupied and its inherent territory.

On August 15, 1945, Japan announced that it would accept the Potsdam Declaration, and on September 2 of the same year, it signed the Instrument of Surrender. The Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Declaration constituted the

postwar foundation of international law and international order in East Asia. The postwar Japanese territory shall be basically demarcated in accordance with the Cairo Declaration of 1943 and the Potsdam Declaration of 1945. All the Chinese territory, including the Diaoyu Islands affiliated with Taiwan, which was stolen by Japan through the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 must be reverted to China.

Due to reasons such as the split between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, from 1945 through 1972, the Diaoyu Islands had broken free from Japanese rule, and they were actually under the control of the US Armed Forces. Under the Agreement between Japan and the USA concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands (Okinawa Reversion Agreement) in June 1971, the USA decided to illegally return to Japan the power of administration by longitude and latitude. This met the opposition of both sides of the Taiwan Strait. As a result, the USA had to state that it only returned to Japan the power of administration and that it did not take a position on the sovereignty over these islands and hoped that the parties concerned would solve the issue through dialogue. Since then, the dispute between China and Japan over the sovereignty and power of administration has never been settled.

The *status quo* of the Diaoyu Islands is that China Coast Guard's vessels are making regular patrols of the territorial waters around the Diaoyu Islands. China's East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone includes the airspace of the Diaoyu Islands. Japan has adopted a similar approach. So far neither China nor Japan has sent people to land on the islands. The Chinese government has never recognized Japan's so-called valid control of the Diaoyu Islands. In order to protect unexpected incidents from happening to the Diaoyu Islands and the East China Sea, the Chinese and Japanese governments conducted diplomatic negotiations on the establishment of a maritime and aerial crisis management mechanism and reached consensus.

According to paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the People's Republic of China and Japan signed in 1978, the two countries "shall in their mutual relations settle all disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain from the use or threat of force." China and Japan both should abide by this provision, soberly conduct full dialogue and exchange over the history and legality of the Diaoyu Islands and work to settle the dispute in a peaceful, civil, appropriate, and legal manner. Should they fail to settle it for the time being, they may shelve it in order to safeguard bilateral relations.

However, during recent years, on the one hand the Japanese government has refused to recognize the territorial dispute between China and Japan and the agreement it reached with China to shelve the Diaoyu Islands dispute; on the other hand, Japan has taken unilateral actions to create more disputes. In June 2008, Japan Coast Guard's patrol vessel sank the Taiwan fishing boat *The Lienho*, which was condemned by China. On December 8 of the same year, China Coast Guard's vessels patrolled the territorial waters around the Diaoyu Islands. In September 2010, Japan illegally arrested a Chinese ship and its captain, and China protested against it. In September 2012, the Japanese government decided to purchase some of the Diaoyu Islands, causing bilateral relations to deteriorate, seriously affecting the friendly feelings the two peoples had toward each other, and arousing the widespread concern of the international community. The Chinese government

announced the base points and baselines for the territorial waters around the Diaoyu Islands and made its patrol of these waters regular. Shinzo Abe began to station units of the Japan Self-Defense Forces and threatened to send Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force's ships to the waters around the Diaoyu Islands.

According to an opinion poll released at the Beijing–Tokyo Forum, co-organized by the Beijing-based China International Press Group Limited and the Tokyo-based Genron NPO in 2016, 65.3% of the Chinese respondents and 66.6% of the Japanese respondents believed that the main barrier to improvement in China–Japan relations is the confrontation in areas of territory, which ranked first for several years running. In a sense, to improve and develop bilateral relations under new circumstances, it is essential to understand settle the Diaoyu Islands disputes.

Without an understanding of the truth regarding the Diaoyu Islands disputes between China and Japan, it is difficult to correctly assess the present and future bilateral relations. It is a fact that the Diaoyu Islands belong to China, there is evidence for that, and there are many related research findings, but Japan had different views and positions. It is of particular note that the views of the Japanese government are full of lies and sophism. In order to prove that these islands belong to Japan, some Japanese scholars try their utmost to negate or distort China's historical materials and argue in favor of the position of the Japanese government from the so-called international law perspective.

Most of the Chinese and Japanese are reasonable, but if they do not understand the truth around the Diaoyu Islands, they will not be able to draw a correct and rational conclusion about them. In order to keep the abovementioned tendencies from adversely affecting the historical course of peace and friendship between the Chinese and the Japanese, I believe that it is essential to make a new complete, in-depth investigation into the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, to refute and clarify the wrong views of Japan, form a more complete chain of evidence, and explain matters from the international law perspective.

To this end, focusing on the dispute between China and Japan over the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, this book further investigates the evidence of that sovereignty based on historical facts and the international law for the information of Chinese and Japanese decision makers and government offices as well as all the readers who are concerned about this issue. The sovereignty over these islands is not a mess in which either party can justify itself; it must and can be clarified sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands. This book's basic purpose is to help the Chinese and Japanese people and the international community better understand the truth around the islands and to ensure that the disputes over the islands are properly handled and eventually resolved, and that the China–Japan relations improve and grow soundly.

In proving China's sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, this book lays special emphasis on historical facts, legality, and evidence. By eliminating the false and retaining the true, discarding the dross and select the essential, and proceeding from one to the other and from the outside to the inside, I make a thorough and in-depth investigation into the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands based on ancient and

present, Chinese and foreign archives, historical literature, maps, and legality. Some of the historical materials and evidence have never been used in related research in China and Japan.

This book consists of seven chapters and 224 photocopies of original documents and maps. It has studied relevant historical literature and maps of China, European countries, the ancient Ryukyu Kingdom, and Japan. On the basis of a chain of closely linked evidence, the book proves that the Diaoyu Islands are the inherent territory of China and are affiliated with Taiwan Province. The evidence includes the maps and literature that indicate that Japanese Navy's Waterways Department and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed the Diaoyu Islands as the northeastern islands of Taiwan, China, after Japan invaded Taiwan for the first time in 1894.

On the basis of firsthand historical statements and relevant files from Japan, this book reveals that it is a sheer fabrication that Japan incorporated Diaoyu Island into Okinawa Prefecture in accordance with Japanese Emperor's Decree 13 in 1896. The book shows that it is a lie that Tatsushiro Koga discovered Diaoyu Island in 1884 and reveals historical inside stories about how Japan stole Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet on the strength of its victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895.

The book also analyzes the position and role of the USA in the Diaoyu Islands issue, how that happened and what impact it had. Based on my study above, I refute and clarify the wrong views the Japanese government and scholars have about the Diaoyu Islands issue. I believe that my book will help readers acquire a better understanding of the origin and development of the Diaoyu Islands issue.

I benefited a lot from my interaction and confrontation with Japanese scholars over the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands during recent years. Their different opinions motivated me to do further research on historic evidence and became a starting point of the logic of my study. In this sense, as a researcher I should thank my "academic rivals." In fact, there are ready answers to the long-standing misunderstandings of the Japanese side as long as historical evidence is carefully studied and consulted.

During my research, I screened, investigated, and analyzed the original material no matter to which side they were favorable and found out the details relating to every piece of evidence. From the international law perspective, based on the complete search and investigation on the relevant original material and maps from the past and present, and from China and abroad, this book further proves that the Diaoyu Islands are no doubt China's inherent territory.

It will be my honor if readers find my book's material, knowledge, and information about the Diaoyu Islands useful to them. Moreover, readers are welcome to correct any of the deficiencies of the book. Their help will make this research more complete and in-depth.

Beijing, China
September 2016

Jiangyong Liu
Tsinghua University

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Chapter 1
Sovereignty Over the Diaoyu Islands: History and Legality

1.1 An Overview of the Diaoyu Islands

The Diaoyu Islands, known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan, are located on the edge of the continental shelf of the East China Sea to the northeast of Taiwan, China, and between long. 123° 20′–124° 40′ E and lat. 25° 40′–26° 00′ N. They consist of Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, Chiwei Islet, Nanxiao Island, Beixiao Island, Nan Islet, Bei Islet, Fei Islet, and more than 70 reefs. The total landmass of these islands is approximately 5.69 km^2.[1] A small amount of freshwater is found in Diaoyu Island, but not in the islands and islets affiliated with it. Except for a period of Japanese colonial rule of Taiwan, the Diaoyu Islands have always been uninhabited islands.

Diaoyu Island is about 356 km from Wenzhou, Zhejiang Province, approximately 385 km from Fuzhou, Fujian Province, nearly 190 km from Keelung, Taiwan Province, around 420 km from Naha, Okinawa, and approximately 170 km from Pengjia Islet, Taiwan, or from Ishigaki Island, Okinawa. Northwestern Diaoyu Islands are located in the seabed in the same geological structure as Taiwan, and the adjacent sea is about 140–180 m deep. Southeast of the Diaoyu Islands lies a geological fault, which is 894 to more than 2700 m deep and cuts the Diaoyu Islands and the Ryukyu Islands diametrically apart. This shows that the two are not geologically interconnected (see Fig. 1.1).

Warm ocean currents from the equator flow northward to create the so-called Black Water Trench—the Okinawa Trough, which separates Chiwei Islet, the easternmost islet of China, from Kume Island (also known as Gumi Island) of the Ryukyu Archipelago, and had been known through the ages as the boundary between China and the Ryukyu Kingdom.

[1] http://www.diaoyudao.org.cn/en/2015-01/23/content_34638550.htm.

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

温州：Wenzhou
福州：Fuzhou
东海：East China Sea
基隆：Keelung
台北：Taipei
台湾岛：Taiwan Island
黄尾屿：Huangwei Islet
钓鱼岛：Diaoyu Island
赤尾屿：Chiwei Islet
冲绳海槽:Okinawa Trough
琉球群岛: Ryukyu Islands
Source: http://www.diaoyudao.org.cn/en/2015-01/23/content_34638550.htm

Fig. 1.1 Geographical position of the Diaoyu Islands

Diaoyu Island is used to be called in China Diaoyu Islet, Diaoyutai, and Diaoyu Island (known as Uotsuri Island and Hai-Pin-San in Japan). It is the largest island of the Diaoyu Islands. It is located at long. 123° 28.4′ E and lat. 25° 44.6′ N. When viewed from the air, it is like a green crouching silkworm. The island is 3.64 km long and 1.91 km wide, covers an area of 3.91 km^2, and stands 362 m above the

sea level at its summit.[2] Plants flourish on Diaoyu Island, including camellias, palms, cactuses, and *Limonium arbusculum Makino*. Some of them are good Chinese medicinal plants. The island is populated with seabirds (see Fig. 1.2). The waters surrounding Diaoyu Island has traditionally been the fishing ground for the fishermen from Fujian and Taiwan.

Diaoyu Island in the blue sea is picturesque and sensational. The modern photographs of the Diaoyu Islands taken by the Chinese are like poems, and the ancient poems written by the Chinese about these islands when they visited them are like pictures. It is worthy of special mention that these poems were mostly written by the imperial envoys sent by China's Ming and Qing Dynasties to the Ryukyu Kingdom. Most of the poems were about Diaoyu Island, followed by Chiwei Islet. Their authors expressed their passion and feelings at the sight of these islands of their country.

When Guo Rulin (1519–1580), an envoy of the Ming Dynasty to Ryukyu, stopped in the Diaoyu Islands in May 1561, he wrote a five-character "regulated" verse titled "Diao Islet." The verse reads as follows:

A boat across the sea,
Sailing long against the wind.
Voyaging farther amidst the drums,
Diaoyu appears from among waves.
A mirage is occurring there,
Waves and whistles are real.
I sing against the mast,
For the scenery I've seen.[3]

Zhou Huang (1714–1784), an assistant envoy the Qing Dynasty, was sent to Ryukyu on June 10, 1756, on the lunar calendar. On the following day, he saw Diaoyu Island which prompted him to write the seven-character poem titled "Looking to Diaoyu Island," which reads as follows:

A green line there suggests Diaoyu Island,
Fishing has always been done through corals.
Those on board danced their jig of joy,
For the hills provided the maritime marker.[4]

[2]http://www.diaoyudao.org.cn/en/2015-01/23/content_34638550.htm.

[3]Han Jiegen, *The Historical Truth about the Diaoyu Islands*, Chin. ed., Shanghai: Fudan University Press, July 2014, p. 101.

[4]Guo Rulin (Ming Dynasty), Xu Baoguang (Qing Dynasty) et al., Wang Han (ed.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu, Part Three,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, first edition, 2006, vol. 1, p. 464.

Fig. 1.2 No. 2350 vessel of the China Coast Guard patrolling waters around Diaoyu Island

When Zhao Wenkai (1761–1808), an envoy of the Qing Dynasty, went to Ryukyu in 1800 via the Diaoyu Islands, he wrote a five-character "regulated" verse titled "My Visit to Diaoyutai." The verse reads as follows:

In the vast writhing sea,
Who's fishing for sea turtles?
The old dragon's crouching there,
Waves upon waves at night.[5]

When Qi Kun (1770–1815), an envoy of the Qing Dynasty, traveled to Ryukyu in 1808 (the 13th year of the reign of Emperor Jiaqing), he wrote "Eight Poems on My Voyage to Ryukyu." One of them is a five-character "regulated" verse titled "Diaoyutai" which reads as follows:

When the fisherman is gone,
The island is still theory.
The island's full of summits,
Beaten by waves upon waves.
Who has invited him there?
He's on the summit alone.

[5]Ibid., vol. 2, p. 43.

Dressed in a coir raincoat,

He's dwarfed on the summit.[6]

Huangwei Islet, which used to be called Huangwei Island, Huangmao Islet, and Huangma Islet (known as Kuba Island in Japan), is the second-largest island of the Diaoyu Islands. It is approximately 27 km from northeast Diaoyu Island located at long. 123° 40.4′E and lat. 25° 55.4′N. Huangwei has a circular shape. It is 1.29 km long and 1.1 km wide and covers an area of 0.91 km^2. It stands approximately 117 m above the sea level at its summit.[7] Palm trees, areca nut palms, and bushes are found everywhere on the island. It used to be home to large numbers of albatrosses and other seabirds (see Fig. 1.3).

Chiwei Islet used to be called Chikan Islet, Chi Islet, and Chikan Island (known as Kume Aka Island or Taisho Island in Japan). About 110 km from Diaoyu Island located at long. 123° 33.5′E and lat. 25° 55.3′N, Chiwei Islet is the easternmost island of the Diaoyu Islands. It is across the sea from Gumi Island (now Kume Island, Okinawa Prefecture) of the ancient Ryukyu Kingdom. Shaped like an irregular triangle, Chiwei is about 484 m long and nearly 194 m wide, covers an area of 0.065 km^2, and stands about 75 m above the sea level at its summit.[8] Shaped like a sharp-pointed tower, Chiwei has steep ravines and does not have any vegetation on it. It is like a huge rock planted in the sea and resembles a whale emerging from the sea (see Fig. 1.4).

When Guo Rulin traveled by Chiwei Islet in May 1561, he wrote a five-character "regulated" verse titled "Chiwei Islet" which reads as follows:

Chiwei's planted in the sea,

Wind from it rocks ships.

I'm sure that *zhongfu* prevails,

Whilst the rest goes uncertain.

My voyage's protected by Goddess,

My return depends on Emperor.

Ryukyu now is getting closer,

Songs are heard from there.

The term *zhongfu* originally comes from *The Book of Changes*. It is one of the 64 trigrams and means that sincerity is part of a good code of conduct.[9]

In 1808, Qi Kun wrote a five-character "regulated" verse titled "Chiwei Islet" which reads as follows:

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[6]Ibid., vol. 2, p. 322–323.

[7]http://www.diaoyudao.org.cn/en/2015-01/22/content_34626148.htm.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Han Jiegen, *Historical Truth regarding the Diaoyu Islands*, Chin. ed., Shanghai: Fudan University Press, July 2014, p. 104.

Fig. 1.3 Photograph of Huangwei Islet

赤坎岭：Chikan Ridge
系缆石: Xilan Rock

Fig. 1.4 Photograph of Chiwei Islet

Chiwei and Huangwei come together,
Arranged in an orderly way.
Red fish emerge from water,

The sun is hanging above.

Surging waves come upon waves,

Mirages come and go freely.

The ship becomes God's protégé,

Groups of fish come along.[10]

Chiwei Islet is barren and uncovered, but it is the easternmost islet of China, and this often got Chinese envoys inspired to write poetry.

Approximately 5 km east of Diaoyu Island, Beixiao Island (known as Kitakojima Island, Japan) is located at long. 123° 32.5′E and lat. 25° 43.8′N. Shaped like a parallelogram, the islet is about 1030 m long and nearly 583 m wide, covers an area of 0.33 km^2 and stands about 125 m above the sea level at its summit. It has two summits and has three reefs around it;[11] this makes its look like a holder of Chinese writing brushes at a distance.

According to Shen Fu, a scholar who traveled to the Ryukyu Kingdom along with China's envoy Qi Kun in May 1808, "Early in the morning on May 13, I saw Diaoyutai and an island in the shape of a penholder… On the morning of May 14, Gumi Island loomed up as we entered Ryukyu."[12] The island in the shape of a penholder referred to here may well be Beixiao Island that is affiliated with the Diaoyu Islands (see Fig. 1.5).

Southeast of Beixiao Island approximately 5.5 km from Diaoyu Island, Nanxiao Island (known as Minamiko Island in Japan) is located at long. 123°33.0′E and lat. 25°43.4′N. With an oval shape, Nanxiao Island is about 1147 m long and nearly 590 m wide, covers an area of 0.45 km^2, and stands about 139 m above the sea level at its summit. It has plenty of snakes, so it used to be known as Snake Island.[13] There is no freshwater on the island (see Fig. 1.6).

Approximately 6 km southeast of Diaoyu Island, Bei Islet (known as Okinokitaiwa Island in Japan) is located at long. 123°32.6′E and lat. 25°46.9′N. With a triangular shape, Bei Islet is about 193 m long and nearly 142 m wide, covers an area of 0.02 km^2, and stands about 24 m above the sea level at its summit (see Fig. 1.7).

Approximately 7.4 km northeast of Diaoyu Island, Nan Islet (known as Okinominamiiwa Island in Japan) is located at long. 123°34.0′E and lat. 25°45.3′N. With a crescent shape, Nan Islet is about 170 m long and nearly 75 m wide, covers an area of 0.007 km^2, and stands about 4.8 m above the sea level at its summit. The islet has no vegetation on it (see Fig. 1.8).

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[10]Guo Rulin (Ming Dynasty), Xu Baoguang (Qing Dynasty) et al., Wang Han (ed.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu, Part Three,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Publishing House, first edition, 2006, vol. 2, p. 323.

Ibid., vol. 2, p. 43.

[11]http://www.diaoyudao.org.cn/index.htm.

[12]Han Jiegen, *Historical Truth regarding the Diaoyu Islands*, Chin. ed., Shanghai: Fudan University Press, July 2014, p. 44.

[13]http://www.diaoyudao.org.cn/index.htm.



孔明石：Kongming Rock
莲花石：Lotus Rock
鹰峰：Eagle Summit
狮峰：Lion Summit

Fig. 1.5 Photograph of Beixiao Island

Approximately 1.5 km northeast of Diaoyu Island, Fei Islet (known as Tobise Island in Japan) is located at long. 123°30.4′E and lat. 25°44.1′N. Looking like a pawn tail from the air, the islet is about 63 m long and nearly 33 m wide, covers an area of 0.001 km^2, and stands about 2 m above the sea level at its summit. The islet has no vegetation on it (see Fig. 1.9).

These photographs and materials of the Diaoyu Islands were posted by the Chinese State Oceanic Administration Information Center at China's Web site on these islands. The Web site was launched in December 2014. I quoted them here with slight edition to make it convenient for readers to distinguish Chinese and Japanese names for those islands. I also added the alternative names Japan had for some of the islands after it stole them.

To the east of Chiwei Islet is the Okinawa Trough. The trough is deep and black, so it was referred to by ancient people as the "Black Water Trench" or the "Black Trough." Across the trough was Kume Island, which was known as "Gumi Island" and "Gumi Island" in ancient times. Therefore, the trough was taken as the natural maritime boundary between China and the Ryukyu Kingdom in ancient times.



拳头岭： Fist Ridge
拇指峰：Thumb Summit

Fig. 1.6 Photograph of Nanxiao Island

China's envoys to Ryukyu would offer sacrifices to the sea whenever they reached here.

Xu Baoguang, China's assistant envoy to Ryukyu, wrote a poem in 1719, the 58th year of the reign of Emperor Kangxi of the Qing Dynasty. The poem reads:

> Pigs and sheep are sacrificed in the trough,
>
> Drums and gongs are beaten in honor of God.
>
> The ship stirs up waves in the sea,
>
> Yellow sand spread long on the waves,
>
> The boatmen report the ship has passed the trough.
>
> (Pigs and sheep are sacrificed in the trough, the maritime boundary, and swathes of yellow sand arise far and wide along the trough.)

The passage in brackets is a note by the author. This fully shows that all of China's envoys through the age had long confirmed that the Okinawa Trough between Chiwei Islet and Kume Island is the maritime boundary between Chinese and foreign seas and that the islands west of Chiwei Islet, that is, the Diaoyu Islands, are Chinese islands.



北屿：Bei Islet

Fig. 1.7 Photograph of Bei Islet

Fig. 1.8 Photograph of Nan Islet

Fig. 1.9 Photograph of Fei Islet

In 1800, the fifth year of the reign of Emperor Jiaqing of the Qing Dynasty, Zhao Wenkai wrote a five-character "regulated" verse titled "Seeing Gumi Island on May 11 (Close to Ryukyu)" to express his joy of eventually seeing Gumi Island (Kume Island), an island on the maritime boundary of the Ryukyu Kingdom after a long, arduous voyage. The verse reads as follows:

Riding on winds for days,
Seeing Kume in the distance.
Summits emerge from the sea,
The sun shines through clouds.
The sea is vast before me,
Staying calm on raging seas.
We all aboard look up,
Dispelling all of our worries.[14]

In 1808, the 13th year of the reign of Emperor Jiaqing of the Qing Dynasty, Qi Kun wrote "Eight Poems on My Voyage to Ryukyu." One of them is titled "The Black Water Trench" which reads as follows:

The sea knows no boundaries,
The trench is the border.

[14]Han Jiegen, *Historical Truth regarding the Diaoyu Islands*, Chin. ed., Shanghai: Fudan University Press, July 2014, p. 135.

The sea water is inclusive,
Different waters all come together.
Gongs are beaten at night,
Ships and pigs are sacrificed.
The demon is still tame,
No force is deemed necessary.

(Old records state that sheep and pigs were sacrificed at the Black Water Trench to honor God and cheer up our soldiers. When we offered sacrifices at night, we didn't have to resort to force.)[15]

Qi Kun said the trough was one color. This does not mean he disagreed with Xu Baoguang on this point. This is because when Qi Kun passed the Black Water Trench on his ship, it was at night and he could not see the color of the sea; the sea was blurred.

Accompanying Qi Kun on his voyage to Ryukyu was his assistant envoy Fei Xizhang. Fei wrote in his poem "The Black Water Trench (the Boundary between China and Ryukyu)":

Sacrificing pigs and sheep offshore,
Praying at our knees aboard.
I'm awaken from my dreams,
By drums at the trough.[16]

The note "the Boundary between China and Ryukyu" to the title of the poem is a confirmation of the maritime boundary between China and Ryukyu mentioned 89 years before by Xu Baoguang, an assistant envoy to Ryukyu.

Standard names of China's Diaoyu Island part of the islands affiliated with it promulgated by China's

State Oceanic Administration and Ministry of Civil Affairs

The Chinese State Oceanic Administration standardized the names of the islands in Chinese territorial waters in accordance with the Island Protect Law of the People's Republic of China. The State Oceanic Administration and the Ministry of Civil Affairs promulgated the names of Diaoyu Island part of the islands affiliated with it as follows with the approval of the State Council:

[15]Guo Rulin (Ming Dynasty), Xu Baoguang (Qing Dynasty) et al., Wang Han (ed.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu, Part Three,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Publishing House, first edition, 2006, vol. 2, pp. 323–324.

[16]Ibid., p. 440.

No.	Standard name	Pinyin	Location
1	Diaoyu Dao	Diàoyú Dǎo	Some 356 km from Wenzhou City, Zhejiang Province, 385 km from Fuzhou City, Fujian Province, and 190 km from Keelung City, Taiwan Province
2	Longtouyu Islet	Lóngtóuyú Dǎo	Northeast of Diaoyu Dao
3	Changyu Islet	Chāngyú Dǎo	Southwest of Diaoyu Dao
4	Dahuangyu Islet	Dàhuángyú Dǎo	South of Diaoyu Dao
5	Xiaohuangyu Islet	Xiǎohuángyú Dǎo	South of Diaoyu Dao
6	Jinqianyu Islet	Jīnqiányú Dǎo	Southeast of Diaoyu Dao
7	Jinqianyu West Islet	Jīnqiányúxī Dǎo	Southeast of Diaoyu Dao
8	Meitongyu Islet	Méitóngyú Dǎo	Southeast of Diaoyu Dao
9	Meitongyu East Islet	Méitóngyúdōng Dǎo	Southeast of Diaoyu Dao
10	Meitongyu West Islet	Méitóngyúxī Dǎo	Southeast of Diaoyu Dao
11	Longwangdiao Islet	Lóngwángdiāo Dǎo	Southeast of Diaoyu Dao
12	Longwangdiao West Islet	Lóngwángdiāoxī Dǎo	Southeast of Diaoyu Dao
13	Longwangdiao East Islet	Lóngwángdiāodōng Dǎo	Southeast of Diaoyu Dao
14	Longwangdiao South Islet	Lóngwángdiāonán Dǎo	Southeast of Diaoyu Dao
15	Huangguyu Islet	Huánggūyú Dǎo	Southeast of Diaoyu Dao
16	Huangwei Yu	Huángwěi Yǔ	27 km northeast of Diaoyu Dao
17	Haitun Islet	Hǎitún Dǎo	Northwest of Huangwei Yu
18	Dazhu Islet	Dàzhū Dǎo	West of Huangwei Yu
19	Xiaozhu Islet	Xiǎozhū Dǎo	West of Huangwei Yu
20	Shanghuya Islet	Shànghǔyá Dǎo	North of Huangwei Yu
21	Xiahuya Islet	Xiàhǔyá Dǎo	North of Huangwei Yu
22	Xiniujiao Islet	Xīniújiǎo Dǎo	Northeast of Huangwei Yu
23	Dongniujiao Islet	Dōngniújiǎo Dǎo	Northeast of Huangwei Yu
24	Huangniu Islet	Huángniú Dǎo	Northeast of Huangwei Yu
25	Niuwei Islet	Niúwěi Dǎo	Northeast of Huangwei Yu
26	Niuti Islet	Niútí Dǎo	Northeast of Huangwei Yu
27	Xiaolong Islet	Xiǎolóng Dǎo	West of Huangwei Yu
28	Dayan Islet	Dàyàn Dǎo	West of Huangwei Yu
29	Yanzi Islet	Yànzi Dǎo	West of Huangwei Yu

(continued)

(continued)

No.	Standard name	Pinyin	Location
30	Ciwei Islet	Cìwèi Dǎo	Southwest of Huangwei Yu
31	Wocan Islet	Wòcán Dǎo	Southwest of Huangwei Yu
32	Dajinguizi Islet	Dàjīnguīzǐ Dǎo	Southwest of Huangwei Yu
33	Xiaojinguizi Islet	Xiǎojīnguīzǐ Dǎo	Southwest of Huangwei Yu
34	Haigui Islet	Hǎiguī Dǎo	Southeast of Huangwei Yu
35	Haixing Islet	Hǎixīng Dǎo	East of Huangwei Yu
36	Haibei Islet	Hǎibèi Dǎo	Southeast of Huangwei Yu
37	Chiwei Yu	Chìwěi Yǔ	110 km east of Diaoyu Dao
38	Chibei North Islet	Chìbèiběi Dǎo	North of Chiwei Yu
39	Chibei East Islet	Chìbèidōng Dǎo	North of Chiwei Yu
40	Chibei West Islet	Chìbèixī Dǎo	North of Chiwei Yu
41	Chibei South Islet	Chìbèinán Dǎo	North of Chiwei Yu
42	XiaoChiwei Islet	Xiǎochìwěi Dǎo	West of Chiwei Yu
43	Chitou Islet	Chìtóu Dǎo	West of Chiwei Yu
44	Chiguan Islet	Chìguàn Dǎo	West of Chiwei Yu
45	Chibi Islet	Chìbí Dǎo	West of Chiwei Yu
46	Chizui Islet	Chìzuǐ Dǎo	West of Chiwei Yu
47	Wangchi Islet	Wàngchì Dǎo	Southwest of Chiwei Yu
48	Beixiao Dao	Běixiǎo Dǎo	5 km east of Diaoyu Dao
49	Niaochao Islet	Niǎocháo Dǎo	East of Beixiao Dao
50	Niaoluan Islet	Niǎoluǎn Dǎo	East of Beixiao Dao
51	Xiaoniao Islet	Xiǎoniǎo Dǎo	Southeast of Beixiao Dao
52	Nanxiao Dao	Nánxiǎo Dǎo	5.5 km southeast of Diaoyu Dao
53	Longmen North Islet	Lóngménběi Dǎo	Northwest of Nanxiao Dao
54	Longmen Islet	Lóngmén Dǎo	Northwest of Nanxiao Dao
55	Longmen South Islet	Lóngménnán Dǎo	Northwest of Nanxiao Dao
56	Wolong Islet	Wòlóng Dǎo	Northwest of Nanxiao Dao
57	Wolong West Islet	Wòlóngxī Dǎo	Northwest of Nanxiao Dao
58	Feilong North Islet	Fēilóngběi Dǎo	Southeast of Nanxiao Dao
59	Feilong Islet	Fēilóng Dǎo	Southeast of Nanxiao Dao
60	Longzhu Islet	Lóngzhū Dǎo	Southeast of Nanxiao Dao

(continued)

(continued)

No.	Standard name	Pinyin	Location
61	Feilong South Islet	Fēilóngnán Dǎo	Southeast of Nanxiao Dao
62	Changlong Islet	Chánglóng Dǎo	Southeast of Nanxiao Dao
63	Jinlong Islet	Jīnlóng Dǎo	Southeast of Nanxiao Dao
64	Bei Yu	Běi Yǔ	6 km northeast of Diaoyu Dao
65	Beiyuzai Islet	Běiyǔzǎi Dǎo	South of Bei Yu
66	Xiaoyuanbao Islet	Xiǎoyuánbǎo Dǎo	Southwest of Bei Yu
67	Feiyun Islet	Fēiyún Dǎo	Southwest of Bei Yu
68	Yuanbao Islet	Yuánbǎo Dǎo	Southwest of Bei Yu
69	Nan Yu	Nán Yǔ	7.4 km northeast of Diaoyu Dao
70	Fei Yu	Fēi Yǔ	Southeast of Diaoyu Dao
71	Feizai Islet	Fēizǎi Dǎo	Southeast of Diaoyu Dao

(Promulgated on March 2, 2012)

1.2 The Diaoyu Islands Dispute: Research by China and Japan

1. *The Position of and the Research by China*

Chinese government's position, view, and stand on the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands have been consistent. In 1950, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of People's Republic of China received the draft plan for the postwar territorial division of Japan. The plan clearly included the proposal that Chiwei Islet be incorporated into Taiwan and restored to China. In history, Chiwei Islet had been the easternmost islet of China and was a landmark separating China from the Ryukyu Islands.

Regrettably, back then the US government did not recognize the new government of China. It disagreed with the Soviet and British governments over which government should represent China at the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951: the one in Beijing or Taipei. As a result, both governments on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait were excluded from the conference. This made it impossible for the new Chinese government to voice its view at the conference that Japan should restore to China the Diaoyu Islands as islands affiliated with Taiwan.

When the USA decided to end its jurisdiction of Okinawa in 1971 and include the Diaoyu Islands in the areas to be reversed to Japan's Okinawa, on December 30 of the same year, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China made a solemn statement in diametrical opposition to that decision. The statement says, "Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, Chiwei Islet, Nanxiao Island, Beixiao Island

other islands are the islands affiliated with Taiwan. Like Taiwan, they have been an inseparable part of Chinese territory since time immortal. In their agreement to 'reverse' Okinawa, the USA and Japanese governments include China's Diaoyu Islands and other islands in 'the areas to be reversed,' which is completely illegal."[17] This was three months earlier than the first-ever official view the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued on the Diaoyu Islands.

On September 10, 2012, when the Japanese announced that it would "purchase" the Diaoyu Islands and "nationalize" them, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on the same day expressing its diametrical opposition and vehement protest. It also announced the base points and baselines of the territorial sea of Diaoyu Island and islands affiliated with it. On September 25 of the same year, the Chinese government, through the good office of the Information Office of the State Council, issued the white paper titled *The Diaoyu Islands Are the Inherent Territory of China*, in which it gave China's position in greater details from the perspectives of historical facts and international law, refuted the groundless position of Japan, and gave an account of China's struggle for safeguarding its sovereignty over the islands. In December 2014, the Web site "The Diaoyu Islands, China's inherent territory" was launched by the Information Center of China's State Oceanic Administration. The Web site offers convincing, important materials concerning the Diaoyu Islands including their natural environment, historical basis for China's claim of the sovereignty on them, as well as the literature, legal documents, papers, writings, and news about the islands.

In China, scholars on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have done many informative studies. For example, since the 1970s, they have made considerable progress in systematically studying the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands from the historical and legal perspectives. Those scholars from China's mainland who have made a contribution include Wu Tianying, former Professor of Capital University of Economics and Business in Beijing, and Ju Deyuan, former Research Fellow of the First Historical Archives of China. They published monographs refuting the fallacies of the Japanese government, Yoshio Okuhara, and other Japanese scholars and proved that the Diaoyu Islands belong to China.

Since the 1990s, the Diaoyu Islands issue has become the topic of research of many Chinese researchers. Professor Mi Qingyu of Nankai University in Tianjin, Professor Zhou Zhonghai of China University of Political Science and Law, Zheng Hailin, Research Fellow of the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Professor Xie Bizhen of Fujian Normal University, Li Guoqiang, Research Fellow of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Zhang Haiwen, director of the Institute of Strategic Development of China's State Oceanic Administration and Jia Yu of the same institute, Professor Xiu Bin of the Ocean University of China, and Professor Zhang Zhirong of Peking University achieved new research results based on the collection of more historical data and the deepening of legal analysis.

[17] *People's Daily*, December 30, 1972.

Chinese mainland scholars' new research results concerning the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands were published following the Japanese government attempt to "purchase" the islands in 2012. For example, the following scholars directly or indirectly published their monographs or translations proving from historical, legal, and other perspectives the fact that the Diaoyu Islands belong to China: Professor Han Jiegen of Fudan University, Professor of Wang Junmin of the Central Party School, Associate Professor Gong Yingchun of China Foreign Affairs University, Associate Professor Zhang Xinjun of Tsinghua University, Research Fellow Jin Yongming of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Researcher Shu Zhenya of the Institute of Strategic Development of China's State Oceanic Administration, Associate Research Fellows Chu Jingtao and Li Li of the Institute of Modern History of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and Professor Liu Shaodong of Tianjin University of Technology. Li Li was assisted by Dr. Jiro Hane in his translation of the firsthand archives of the Meiji Era for his book *Japan's Illegal Investigation and Theft of the Diaoyu Islands in Modern Times*, which was published by Social Sciences Academic Press in Beijing in 2013. The book contains the modern Japanese and Chinese versions of the ancient Japanese literature which can hard be understood by even present-day Japanese people. This makes it convenient for Chinese and Japanese scholars to understand original Japanese literature about the islands.

In Taiwan, scholars who have done research on the Diaoyu Islands issue include member Yang Chung-kwei of the Four Books Compilation Committee of the Institute for Compilation and Translation in Taiwan, the late Professor of International Law Hungdah Chiu of the University of Maryland in the USA, Dr. Ma Ying-jeou of Harvard University (who was elected leader of Taiwan in 2008), former President Cheng Chia-jui of the School of Law of Soochow University, Professors Wang Hsiao-po and Lin Hsiao-hsin of Shih Hsin University, Professor of History Huang Chun-chieh of Taiwan University, former President Liu Yuan-tsun and Professor of law Fu Kuen-cheng of Soochow University, Professor Chao Kuo Tsai of Chengchi University, Professor Chen Ju-chin of the Institute of Oceanography of Taiwan University, Research Fellow Juang Wen-shing of the Museum of Natural Science, Professor of Law Lin Tien-fu of Providence University, Research Fellow of Chang Chi-Hsiung of the Institute of Modern History of Academia Sinica, Professor Ho Szu-shen of Fu Jen Catholic University, former Senior Researcher and Head of the Taiwan Research Institute Long Cun-ni, and Researchers John Chuan-tiong Lim and Shaw Han-yi and of the new generation.

It is of particular note that the late Mr. Lin Hsiao-hsin worked hard to promote research and education in Diaoyutai and got Shih Hsin University, Fujian Normal University, the National Library of China, the State Oceanic Administration of China, and Tsinghua University's Protect-the-Diaoyu-Islands Center for Data Collection and Research to cooperate for the first time in launching the "The Diaoyu Islands: History and Sovereignty" exhibition of materials about and photographs of the islands in Beijing in September 2014. Ma Ying-jeou, who was the leader of Taiwan from 2008 to 2016, did well in his research in the Diaoyu Islands

issue. He revised his English Ph.D. dissertation for Harvard University in 1986 and published it in Chinese in Taiwan as a monograph titled *On the Demarcation of the Diaoyutai Islands and the East China Sea.* Lee Teng-hui, former leader of Taiwan, has not made in-depth research on the Diaoyu Islands issue, and he supports the Japanese stand on the issue politically.

2. *The Position of and the Research by Japan*

Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued for the first time the so-called The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) on March 8, 1972. According to this document, "Since 1885, the Japanese government had carried out repeated on-the-spot surveys of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) through the good office of the Okinawa prefectural authorities and others and prudently confirmed that the Islands were *terra nullius* and had no signs of the rule of the Qing Dynasty. Based on these facts, it was decided at a Cabinet conference on January 14, 1895, that markers would be erected on the Islands officially signifying they are Japanese territory."[18] These are the so-called bases for Japan's sovereignty over these islands. This means that before 1885, the Japanese government had neither made surveys of nor occupied Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islands. Then before that year, which country owned these Islands? Were they *terra nullius*? How on earth did Japan steal the Diaoyu Islands? In discussing the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, I have to clarify these questions first.

So far the Japanese government and the country's main political parties and news organizations have shared basically the same view on the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. For example, the Japanese Communist Party and the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, which is currently in power, share the same view regarding the issue. However, different Japanese people hold different views on how to deal with this dispute between China and Japan. From 1950 through 1968, Tetuo Takayoshi from the University of the Ryukyus and others made surveys of the biological and natural conditions of the Diaoyu Islands on five occasions. Back then Taiwan fishermen were allowed to go fishing in the territorial waters around the Diaoyu Islands. In the late 1960s, the Diaoyu Islands dispute emerged when oil resources were discovered around them. The Japanese then began to stress that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) belonged to Japan without any evidence. To create evidence, the Japanese government made huge investments in a sustained research project. The project charged the Senkaku Islands Kenkyukai (Study Group) under the Nanpo Doho Engokai, a peripheral organization of Japanese Prime Minister's office, with collecting information and was designed to provide the basis of the position of the Japanese government.

Against this backdrop, the Ryukyu government issued a document on the Territorial Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) on September 1,

[18]"The Basic View on the Territorial Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan" (March 8, 1972), *Basic Data of the Japan–China Relations (1970–1992)*, Jpn. ed., compiled under the supervision of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs China Division, Tokyo: Kazankai Foundation, November 20, 1993, p. 73.

1970. The Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) Research Society and the quarterly magazine *The Okinawa*, an official publication of the Association for the Protection of Southern Compatriots, published a special issue on *The Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) and Japan's Sovereignty over Them* on March 25, 1971. The main writer for the issue was Toshio Okuhara, then Associate Professor of Japan's Kokushikan University. Even today, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and some Japanese scholars derive their basic views on the Diaoyu Islands issue mainly from these reports without anything new.

During recent years, the Japanese government has stepped up the propaganda of its position on the Diaoyu Islands issue in the international community. Postings at the official Web sites of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Japan's embassies around the globe refute in multiple languages, in the form of questions and answers, and through other means China's views on the issue. These propaganda materials are groundless as they lack anecdotal evidence and a legal basis. As a result, they fail to make Japan's position more convincing; on the contrary, they prove in the international community that there *is* a Diaoyu Islands dispute between China and Japan.

Since the 1970s, the views of some Japanese scholars in support of the erroneous position of the Japanese government have been very popular in Japan. These include, for example, the writings of Toshio Okuhara, Honorary Professor of Kokushikan University and scholar of international law; Sakae Midorima, Professor of Okinawa International University; Nobuo Harada, Translator of classics; Shigeyoshi Ozaki, Honorary Professor of University of Tsukuba; Tatuo Urano, Honorary Professor of Nihon University; Yoshiro Matsui, Honorary Professor of Nagoya University; Kentaro Serita, Professor of law at Aichi Gakuin University; and Shinya Murase, Professor of Sophia University.

Some Japanese professors of law do not know much about the history and have not made enough research on historical data and facts, so their views on the Diaoyu Islands issue are biased. For example, some of these scholars have long been misled by the century-old lie that Tatsushiro Koga discovered the Diaoyu Islands in 1884 and sent people to land on and develop these islands and they have been incorrectly relaying that erroneous message and citing that as evidence. In 1996, Tadahisa Mekumi published a collection of photographs of the Diaoyu Islands, which has also misled many people. Since 2010, some Japanese scholars have gone so far to express their "worry" that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has failed to refute China's view on the Diaoyu Islands from a historical perspective.[19] They have tried their utmost to challenge China's view by distorting China's ancient records and worked to teach the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs how to debate with China.

[19]Mozomu Ishiyi, *Tips for Japan's Refutation of China's View on the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) Issue* (Senkaku Hanpaku Manual Hyakudayi), Jpn. ed., Fukuoka: Shuu Ko Sha, 2014, p. 118.

In terms of the way of thinking, some Japanese scholars have been suffering from a syndrome consisting of selective amnesia (selective memory loss) and selective retention (selective memory). They simply don't believe that the facts they don't like exist; on the contrary, they firmly believe what they suppose would happen. They even make things up and lie.

Due to a lack of the infusion and store of correct external information and the increasing influence of the same internal information, this syndrome consisting of selective amnesia and selective retention will lead to extreme bigotry in these scholars. For example, they don't want to face the historical fact that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to China in and before 1895; stressed their visual memory that Japan "occupied" the Diaoyu Islands after 1895; worked to forget the experience that from 1945 through 1969, Japan didn't think the Diaoyu Islands were Japanese territory; emphasized the visual memory of the *status quo* that since 1972 Japan has had the "valid control" of islands; refused to admit that China and Japan have agreed to shelf the dispute; and stressed the idea that there isn't a territorial issue to be resolved between China and Japan. To correct these tendencies, an important way could be penetrating communication and infusion of high-quality external information. In this sense, it is essential to increase high-quality cultural exchange between China and Japan on the Diaoyu Islands issue.

However, in the 1970s, there appeared historians and left-wing progressives in Japan who dared to speak the truth. For example, the late Magmori Nana published in March 1971 the article "On the Claims of Japan Itself and Okinawa on the Sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)," criticizing these claims from the angle of the Japanese people. The late Japanese historian and Kyoto University Professor Kiyoshi Inoue stated in 1972, stealing the Diaoyu Islands "marked the starting point of the Japanese imperialists' attempt to invade foreign territory and incite false patriotism. Therefore, it is no exaggeration that it is a matter of great importance for the destiny of the Japanese people."[20] The late Syougorou Takahashi also believed that "Both historically and geographically the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) are Islands affiliated with Taiwan. As a result of the Japan-Qing War (Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895), they were 'ceded' from China to Japan along with Taiwan to become Japanese territory. More importantly, due to the Japan-Qing War, the national boundary between Okinawa and Taiwan was removed. Therefore Japan found it unnecessary to "occupy *terra nullius*" and didn't occupy them. Following its defeat, Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration… The sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) should eventually go to China."[21]

During recent years, changes have taken place in the relevant academic research in Japan and the number of objective and in-depth studies has increased. Tadayoshi

[20]Kiyoshi Inoue, *An Analysis of the Historical Facts concerning the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)* (new edition), Jpn. ed., Disan Shyokan, 2012, p. 14. The writing first appeared in Japan's *History Studies,* February 1972 and was published by Nihon Gendai Hyoronsha in 1972.

[21]Beijing Sino-Japanese Journalism Promotion Association, *The Sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands*, Chin. ed., Beijing: People's Daily Press, 2013, p. 261.

Murata, Honorary Professor of Yokohama National University; Susumu Yabuki, Honorary Professor of Yokohama City University; Magosaki Ukeru, former Head of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Intelligence and Analysis Bureau; Kazuhiro Kishimoto, an independent scholar; Takashi Okada, a guest commentator of the Kyodo News Agency; and Narahiko Toyoshita, Professor of Kwansei Gakuin University, conducted objective research from historical and legal perspectives and published their monographs expressing their views and propositions. Their conclusions are different from those of the Japanese government. They state that these islands belong to China, not Ryukyu.[22] Following World War II, the key to studying the sovereignty over these islands is to read the Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Declaration.[23]

During recent years, Tadayoshi Murata conducted an in-depth analysis of the detailed historical data of the Meiji government's theft of the Diaoyu Islands. He completed two companion monographs on the issue. One of them is the Japanese edition of *The Origin of the Japan–China Territorial Dispute* published by Nihon Kaden Sha in 2013, and the other is *A Thorough Historical Analysis of the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)* produced by the same publisher in 2015. These monographs are a realistic, rational, and objective analysis of problems and offer specific proposals for settling the territorial dispute through peaceful means. The Chinese versions of these monographs have been published by Social Sciences Academic Press (China) in Beijing. With regard to how the Diaoyu Islands dispute arose following World War II, Professor Susumu Yabuki worked to discover materials from the relationship among China, the USA, and Japan and made unique research.

Moreover, research results concerning the issue have appeared with distinctive characteristics. For example, Osamu Ogata, former Head of the Okinawa University Areal Research Institute, and Makomo Kuniyoshi, a Japanese scholar, studied the Diaoyu Islands issue based on the ancient history of the relations between Ryukyu and China and between Ryukyu and Japan. Professor Syouri Hiranuka of Shimonoseki City University in Japan revealed some of the facts concerning Japan's seizure and colonial development of these islands based on island studies. Norio Naga, a Japanese PhD of political science, studied Japan's territorial issues on the basis of the settlement of international disputes. Masato Tomabechi, a student studying for a master's degree at Hosei University in Japan, analyzed the changes in the postwar Japanese government's views on the Diaoyu Islands issue based on firsthand materials such as the answers to the National Diet of Japan relevant questions. He states that in Japan, most scholars of international law are in favor of Japan's sovereignty over these islands, but some historians, scholars of China affairs, and former officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and senior

[22]Tadayoshi Murata, *How to Approach the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) Issue*, Jpn. ed., Tokyo: The Duan Press, 2004, pp. 56–57.

[23]Magosaki Ukeru, *Verifying the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) Question*, Jpn. ed., Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, December 2012, p. 12.

journalists challenge Japan's "place" the islands under Japanese jurisdiction based on the legal principle of "occupation."[24]

I believe that this phenomenon can largely be attributed to the fact Japanese scholars of international law made most of their judgments based on the assumption that the historical accounts of the Japanese government are true, but this is not necessarily true with some Japanese historians and scholars who study the China–Japan relations. Moreover, the Japanese government knows it well that concerning the Diaoyu Islands issue, ancient historical documents are favorable for China, so it has to give high priority to having scholars of international law speak for it. As a result, these scholars have actually formed relations in cooperation with the Japanese government.

The historical processes, key issues, and other basic conditions concerning the Diaoyu Islands issue that the Japanese government has been repeatedly stressing so far still seem to remain within the perspective of the Hirobumi Ito cabinet and the reasoning of "occupation" that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had in 1933 during Japan's war of aggression against China. Some lies are still there in the Japanese government's views on the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. For example, it has been a lie for more than one hundred years that Tatsushiro Koga explored in the Diaoyu Islands in 1884 and sent people to develop them.

The "standard definition" Japanese scholars of international law have for the Diaoyu Islands issues is found in the entry "Senkaku Island" in Japan's *International Law Dictionary* that was published in 1975, and in the *International Relations Law Dictionary* that appeared in 1995. These dictionaries were both authored by then authoritative scholar Shigeyoshi Ozaki of the Research and Legislative Reference Bureau of the National Diet Library. However, the basic facts contained in the dictionaries are wrong. For example, they state, "On January 14, 1895, it was decided at a Cabinet conference that markers would be erected on the Islands, officially signifying they are Japanese territory." The dictionaries say that Japan believed that "prior to this, the islands were *terra nullius* under international law." Following January 1895 Japan's "state power [on these islands] was stable and continued to develop" so that the "occupation" principle was met for them according to international law. The dictionaries add that "Both Beijing and Taiwan did not voice any objection to Japan's sovereignty over the islands in the 75 years prior to the eruption of the dispute over them, but rather they acknowledged Japan's sovereignty with their concrete action."[25]

These views totally negate the historical background that Japan had exercised colonial rule in Taiwan for 50 years since 1895 and are subjective interpretations made on the basis of a wrong understanding of facts. This will not only tarnish

[24]Masato Tomabechi, "Changes in the Japanese Government's Views on Territorial Policy: A Study Based the Diet's Answers to the Questions concerning the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)," masters thesis for the public policy studies major at Hosei University in Japan, 2013.

[25]Japanese Society of International Law, *International Relations Law Dictionary*, Jpn. ed., Tokyo: Sanseido Bookstore Ltd., August 10, 1995, p. 480.

Japan's international law community but also mislead Japan's foreign policymaking and the conscience of the public.

It is unobjectionable that scholars of international law serve the interests of their country. However, if they lose their conscience, they will eventually do harm to the interests of their country. Conscience is used to distinguish good from evil, and true from false and marks the moral bottom line. Conscience is incompatible with profiteering and self-deception. I believe that the key to solve the Diaoyu Islands issue is to awake the conscience of the Japanese scholar of international law. In this sense, I hope that this book will serve as a reference for more scholars of international law, including Japanese scholars, to find facts and evidence regarding the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands.

3. *Two Recent Tendencies to Study the Sovereignty Over the Diaoyu Islands*

Since 2010, the Diaoyu Islands issue has been one of the main issues adversely affecting the China–Japan relations. In April 2015, the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology made clear that all Japanese texts for junior and senior high schools should be written in compliance with the Japanese government's position on the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands). This one-sided indoctrination will probably cheat the future Japanese when they are young and set them against China over the territorial issue. At present, the "public opinion war" between Japan and the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are becoming increasing fierce and complicate, and there have appeared two diametrically opposite tendencies.

One is the positive tendency to carry out open and transparent research and exchange and to be fair. In China's mainland, research on the Diaoyu Islands is no longer a "sensitive issue" but rather has become academic, and there is a desirable atmosphere for investigating and discussing the issue from different points of view. For example, scholars are divided over the date of completion of the book *Voyage with a Tail Wind*, probably the first book in existence about the Diaoyu Islands. Another example is that they did not challenge the century-old lie that Tatsushiro Koga discovered the Diaoyu Islands in 1884 and landed on them for development, but now they have thoroughly corrected the mistake. Still another example is that they admit erroneous records have been made concerning the Diaoyu Islands in some maps and books, and now working to find the causes and making reasonable explanations.

Chinese scholars from the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are carrying out increasingly vigorous, open academic exchange and discussions regarding the Diaoyu Islands issue. I have been invited to attend two conferences on the issue in Taiwan and learned a lot therein. Moreover, China and Japan are conducting academic exchange and discussions on the issue in different manners. Under unrelenting pressure from Japanese right-wingers, some Japanese scholars with a conscience say what they think is right based on facts. Chinese and Japanese scholars share similar views, but they also confront each other over different views.

Their exchange plays a positive role in getting the scholars to understand the truth and each other.

The other is the negative tendency to make research and news dispatches on the issue more mysterious and say things oneself does not believe. On its official Web site, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs posted 16 answers on 16 questions, publicly expressing its views belittling the Potsdam Declaration and slandering China's principled position on that issue. Some Japanese scholars do their utmost to distort China's ancient historical literature to defend the Japanese position and confuse the public. Under the condition of anonymity or using their online nicknames, some of these scholars post maps and the literature of Taiwan that do not make clear the Diaoyu Islands belong to China, ignoring the facts that Japanese maps produced at the same time as Chinese maps and the literature do not include the Diaoyu Islands in Japanese territory and some Japanese maps and documents today still refer to some of the islands as Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet, names that were given to them by China. They make a hasty generalization when they try to prove that China does not have enough evidence of its sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. They also cite for the purpose of propaganda some erroneous views of Japan and defend them without good reason.

For example, since 2010, articles have been often posted in the name of the invented historian Li Woteng on some Chinese Web sites to negate China's position on the Diaoyu Islands. In September 2014, Wu-Nan Book Company Ltd. in Taiwan published a book by Li Woteng titled *Who Do the Diaoyutai Islands Belong to: From Historical and Legal Perspectives*. The author claims to have earned his PhD from the University of Virginia in the USA and is currently a researcher at an American academic institution, but he fails to reveal his real name, citizenship, and workplace. He claims his book to be objective, comprehensive, and appropriate, but he is actually defending the Japanese position in a seemingly fair manner for the purpose of winning the support of Chinese readers. The book could be easily understood to be too militant as it smells the war of intelligence-based warfare, propaganda war, and stratagem warfare. That being said, the historical literature and maps included in the book are valuable for research.

The two tendencies I discussed above, respectively, represented two rivaling political forces. The former is a positive force whose characteristics are to seek truth from facts, properly handle the Diaoyu Islands issue based on historical facts and from the legal perspective, improve the China–Japan relations in return for mutual benefit, promote the peaceful development on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, and safeguard China's territorial integrity and sovereignty. The latter is a negative force whose characteristics are to be pragmatic, create confusion in historical facts and legal issues, contain China's growth and the development of the relations between the Taiwan Strait, and prevent effective improvements to the China–Japan relations.

4. *The Responsibility and Mission of This Study*

The development and confrontation will lead to the deepening of research into the sovereignty issue regarding the Diaoyu Islands and make it clearer and clearer

who has sovereignty over these islands through debates. Many works on the Diaoyu Islands issue have appeared, but few of them approach it from the legal and historical perspectives and include complete and in-depth research on relevant ancient and present as well as Chinese and foreign evidence of the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands over the past 640 years. Thorough research is urgently needed to study and clarify the mistakes regarding this issue. That is what this study wants to do.

To study this complicated issue, it is of particular note to resort to strong critical thinking; it will not do just to repeat word for word what others say or depend only on first impressions; it is important to be realistic to people, to myself, and to things. Even when it comes to the positive force and its positive tendency, I need to ensure that my research goes deep, my citations are accurate, and my study is thorough. Even when it comes to the negative force and its negative tendency, I need to find out if any aspect is of any value for deepening my research. Things turn into their opposites when they reach the extreme. This is also true with the negative tendency. This may partly explain the dialectical thinking specified the Chinese *Book of Changes* that the *Taijiyin* (negative) and *yang* (positive) are interlocked and interactive. Based on this great philosophy, I am encouraged to face challenges while staying modest and inclusive.

The sovereignty issue of the Diaoyu Islands involves two different fields of study: historiography, international law, and jurisprudence. Both Chinese and Japanese scholars studying this issue share the same problem, that is, the contradiction between the comprehensive and complicated problem and the narrow approach to studying it. Neither Chinese nor Japanese historians are good at approaching the issue from the legal perspective, while jurists are not adept at researching into historical facts. When compared to Chinese scholars, Japanese scholars' approaches are narrower and more limited. Worse still, to defend the position of the Japanese government, Japanese international law experts would rather believe and use the fabricated historical descriptions that justify this position than respect the research results of Kiyoshi Inoue and Tadayoshi Murata. Some right-wing scholars even work to negate their achievements before disregarding their views. They have published many related research results, but they often run counter to facts and have false arguments that appear to be reasonable but actually go against historical facts.

The approach to studying the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands is therefore to rely mainly on facts and make, from the perspective of international law, legal judgments and qualitative analyses. In addition, it is imperative to collect and dig out firsthand materials as evidences, eliminating the false and retaining the true, discarding the dross and selecting the essential. It is inadvisable to simply list historical literature or cut historical literature as one wishes. The research into the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands is different from general historical research because it is issue-oriented toward issues and is not limited by studies in the chronological dynastic history of China and the history of other countries. In addition, the research into the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands attaches greater importance to textual criticism than historical research that is mainly based on

historical archives and works for conclusions that are highly logical and can stand up to challenge and test. When new discoveries, views, materials, and evidences appear about the Diaoyu Islands issue, it is imperative for researchers to examine and raise problems from the point of view of their rivals. This may be a good way to prove if one's arguments are right, discover problems, correct mistakes, and deepen research. This may be called self-criticizing thinking. From the perspective of academic research, the more different the views of researchers are, the more likely it is for them to raise problems for further study and make this a new logical starting point, so this deserves particular attention and understanding.

In this study, on the basis of the research results currently available from China and Japan, I use higher textual criticism and analyze problems from the perspective of international law. With the focus on the central, difficult, and knotty problems, I make critical discrimination between firsthand literature and between key details, discover new evidences and historical materials, and make in-depth analyses in order to correct fallacies.

1.3 History of the Diaoyu Islands Dispute

1. *So Far the Dispute Has Had the Following Five Stages*

In the first stage, the Diaoyu Islands were China's inherent territory for more than 500 years between 1372 and 1895. The waters from coastal Fujian Province, China, to the Diaoyu Islands in the Ryukyu Trough were known as the Fujian Sea and were well within the scope of China's coastal defense.

In the second stage during Japan's colonial rule of Taiwan from 1895 to 1945, the Diaoyu Islands dispute arose during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. In this period, Japan made the islands part of its Okinawa Prefecture, but it did not have the necessary legal procedures, so the islands remained the traditional fishing grounds of Taiwan.

In the third stage, the islands were occupied by the US Forces. The government of the People's Republic of China issued a statement in 1950 condemning the USA for stationing its troops in Taiwan and putting Ryukyu under its control. The Taiwan authorities, however, disagreed, arguing that was "a move needed to jointly safeguard regional security," and reached an agreement with the USA "on delineating the scope of patrol."[26] On September 4, 1958, the government of the People's Republic of China issued a statement on its territorial waters, stressing that the statement was applicable to Taiwan and its surrounding islands, the US' armed invasion of Taiwan was an illegal action against China's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and China would discover these areas. From 1945 when World War II ended to the first half of 1970, the Japanese government did not claim sovereignty

[26]Speech made by Wei Yu-sun, a "diplomatic spokesman" of the Taiwan authorities, on April 20, 1971, and carried in the *Central Daily News,* Taipei, on April 21, 1972.

over the Diaoyu Islands. The USA arbitrarily included the Diaoyu Islands as part of Okinawa in 1971, giving rise to the dispute surrounding the jurisdiction over the Diaoyu Islands.

In the fourth stage, from 1972 to 2010 China and Japan shelved the Diaoyu Islands dispute, normalized diplomatic relations, and concluded the China–Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship. The groups for the protection of the Diaoyu Islands from Hong Kong and Taiwan, China, and Japanese right-wing groups made their presence known on the Diaoyu Islands and related sea areas. The Chinese and Japanese governments remained cautious.

The fifth stage lasted from the time when Japanese maritime patrol boats seized Chinese fishing boats in September 2010 to present. In September 2012, the Japanese government announced that it would purchase from the family that owns three of the five islands in the Diaoyu chain to purchase the territory for the nation. Chinese Coast Guard vessels sailed regularly around the Diaoyu Islands. The dispute between China and Japan over the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands and their jurisdiction was obviously increased. Japan does not think that the dispute is there and that China and Japan reached consensus on shelving the dispute, and the two sides had difficulty establishing a mechanism for the prevention and control of air and sea crises.

It is generally believed in Japan that in the more than 70 years from 1895 to 1970, China did not voice opposition to Japan's occupation of the Diaoyu Islands. However, this does not justify the postwar Japanese occupation at all because Japan secretly decided to steal Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet in January 1895 during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. On April 17 of the same year, Japan forced the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki on China's Qing government, under which Taiwan and islands affiliated with it were ceded to Japan. During the 50 years of Japanese colonial rule of Taiwan, China found it impossible to protest Japan's theft of several uninhabited islands affiliated with Taiwan which had been ceded to Japan in its entirety.

In terms of legality, when Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration and surrendered in 1945, the Diaoyu Islands had been restored to China along with Taiwan. Even all of Okinawa was occupied by American Forces and was not under Japan's administrative jurisdiction. Under these circumstances, the Chinese government would, of course, not raise the Diaoyu Islands issue with the Japanese government, but it had always been insisting that the USA should withdraw its military forces from Taiwan. When the USA and Japan reached an agreement on the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1971, in which the USA incorporated China's Diaoyu Islands into Japanese territory, this inevitably provoked strong criticism from both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

2. *Japan Stole the Diaoyu Islands in 1894 During the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895*

The Diaoyu Islands had been Chinese territory from 1372 in China's early Ming Dynasty to 1895 in the late Qing Dynasty. During these 523 years, there was not

any territorial dispute between China and the Ryukyu Kingdom (which was annexed by Japan in 1879 and renamed Okinawa Prefecture), and the Diaoyu Islands were not *terra nullius* as Japan calls them.

While Japan tried to expand to China's Taiwan following its Meiji government's annexation of the Ryukyu Kingdom, the Hirobumi Ito cabinet secretly decided to occupy the Chinese territory Diaoyu Islands on January 14, 1895, during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. Three months later, Japan began its colonial rule of Taiwan and its affiliated islands for 50 years under the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki. These islands included the Diaoyu Islands. No matter whether the Diaoyu Islands were written into the Treaty of Shimonoseki, it is an undeniable fact that Japan illegally seized China's Diaoyu Islands through the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. The Diaoyu Islands should therefore be included in the territories that Japan had stolen from the Chinese and that shall be restored to China.

From 1972 to present, the Japanese government has been proclaiming that, "Since 1885, the Japanese government had carried out repeated on-the-spot surveys of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) through the good office of the Okinawa prefectural authorities and others and prudently confirmed that the islands were *terra nullius* and had no signs of the rule of the Qing Dynasty. Based on these facts, it was decided at a Cabinet conference on January 14, 1895, that markers would be erected on the Islands officially signifying they are Japanese territory."[27] This position carried on the wrong positions and views of the Japanese government under Hirobumi Ito. Facts show that this position was unfounded on facts and was created by Japan to deceive itself.

The historical materials from Japan's foreign relations archives indicate that in the ten years from September 1885 to January 1895, the Japanese government secretly carried out only one on-the-spot survey of the Diaoyu Islands through the good office of the Okinawa Prefecture and found that these islands were the Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet China had named and was familiar with. In fact, in 1884 the Japanese Navy translated the literature of the British Admiralty and found that the Diaoyu Islands were the Northeastern Islands of Taiwan and that Chiwei Islet was China's easternmost island. Back then, the Japanese Foreign Minister Kaoru Inoue and Governor of Okinawa Prefecture Shiyazo Nishimura were afraid that Japan's occupation of the Diaoyu Islands would provoke conflicts with China, so they were cautious. As a result, Interior Minister Aritomo Yamagata who was eager to erect Japanese markers on the Diaoyu Islands had to give up and stepped up his efforts to declare war against China. Ten years later, Japan won the

[27]Takeo Fukuda (Foreign Minister of the Eisaku Sato cabinet), "The Basic View on the Territorial Sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)" dated March 8, 1972; Ikeda Tadashi (former director of the Asian Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and chief representative of Taipei Office of the Interchange Association [Japan] in 2008), "Was the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Island Shelved?," *Journal of the Kasumizekikayi*, July 2013, p. 10.

Basic Data of the Japan–China Relations (1970–1992), Jpn. ed., compiled under the supervision of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs China Division, Tokyo: Kazankai Foundation, November 20, 1993, p. 73.

Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and believed that the situation had changed. Consequently no sooner had the war ended than Japan decided to include the Diaoyu Islands into its territory in secret. Three months later, Japan began its colonial rule of Taiwan and its affiliated islands through the Treaty of Shimonoseki, thus covering the historical fact it stole the Diaoyu Islands. So far the Japanese government has not erected any boundary markers on the Diaoyu Islands.

A lot of historical materials show that the Diaoyu Islands became China's inherent territory during the Ming Dynasty in the fourteenth century at the latest and that Japan stole them in January 1895 during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. One of the reasons for this war can be traced back to the period from 1592 to 1598 when Hideyoshi Toyotomi's armed invasion of the Korean Peninsula was foiled, Japan began to invade the Ryukyu Kingdom and China's Taiwan. From the mid-nineteenth century, the balance of power between China and Japan tilted for the first time in favor of Japan. The destiny of the Korean Peninsula and the Ryukyu Kingdom was changed by Japan's foreign expansion. China was greatly weakened following the Opium War of 1840. The Meiji Restoration in 1868 brought Japan to an imperialist road. In 1874, Japan had its first armed invasion of Taiwan and forced to the Qing government to sign the Sino-Japanese Peking Treaty, marking an important step toward seizing Ryukyu. In 1879, following its forced annexation of Ryukyu, Japan began to wantonly develop its military expansion in Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula.

These historical facts show that the present-day Diaoyu Islands dispute between China and Japan is actually a result of Japanese imperialists' foreign expansion and a historical legacy of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. For today's China and Japan, the Diaoyu Islands are not only a territorial issue but also an issue of historical understanding.

3. *Following Its Surrender in 1945, Japan Should Have Restored to China the Diaoyu Islands Along with Taiwan in Accordance with the Cairo Declarations and the Potsdam Declaration, but that Was Affected by US Involvement*

Japan's colonial rule of Taiwan came to an end in 1945, so did its valid control of the Diaoyu Islands. However, from 1945 to 1972 the USA occupied Ryukyu and placed it under its trusteeship system. Taking advantage of the separation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, the USA stationed its troops in Taiwan and Ryukyu and took control of the Diaoyu Islands. However, the USA never recognized Japan's sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands or its so-called potential sovereignty.

On September 8, 1951, the USA, Japan, and other countries concluded the San Francisco Peace Treaty. According to Article 3 of the treaty, Japan will concur to place Nansei Shoto south of lat. 29 °N under US trusteeship, but this does not specify that includes the Diaoyu Islands. Even the longitude and latitude of Okinawa set in No. 27 Decree issued by the US Ryukyu authorities on the geographical boundaries of the Ryukyu Islands on December 25, 1953, and the Agreement between Japan and the USA concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the

Daito Islands (Okinawa Reversion Agreement) reached on June 17, 1971, are not legally viable in determining the boundaries of territorial sovereignty. Both China's mainland and Taiwan were opposed to these documents' including the Diaoyu Islands into the administrative jurisdiction of the USA or Japan. From 1956 to 1978, the US Forces used Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet as their firing/bombing ranges. Even today the Japanese cannot land on these islets without the permission of the American Forces.

The Taiwan authorities tolerate this because they believe this could be a form of defense against China's mainland, whereas the mainland of China has been opposed to this. The government of the People's Republic of China maintains that the Diaoyu Islands are the islands affiliated with its Taiwan Province. In the Statement on China Territorial Waters, it issued on September 4, 1958, the Chinese government stressed that "The US forces are still occupying Taiwan and the Penghu region, which is an illegal action infringing upon the territory and sovereignty of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese government has the right to adopt all appropriate measures to recover these regions at the right time". Although the statement did not mention any of islands affiliated with Taiwan, this does not mean it excluded them including the Diaoyu Islands. In December 1950, Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai said in his statement, "Neither the Cairo Declaration nor the Potsdam Declaration contains a decision on the jurisdiction of the Ryukyu Islands and the Ogasawara Islands. And so of course it was still less likely to make the United States their administrative authorities."[28]

In May 1969, the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), which was composed of experts of the USA, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Chinese Taiwan authorities, conducted a survey of the oil and gas resources in the waters surrounding the Diaoyu Islands. According to the ECAFE report, the waters of approximately 200,000 km^2 northeast of Taiwan may be rich in oil. On July 17 of the same year, the Chinese Taiwan authorities announced its sovereignty over the natural resources in the adjacent continental shelf. The Japanese government also decided to entrust experts to carry out geological surveys of the waters surrounding the Diaoyu Islands. In September 1970, both the Taiwan authorities and the Japanese government claimed sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands.

In response to Japan's moves to covet China's oil and gas resources in the waters surrounding the Diaoyu Islands, when the China–Japan relations had not been normalized, the Chinese government published a comment in the *People's Daily* on December 4, 1970, condemning Japan's attempt to include the Diaoyu Islands into its territory. On December 29, 1970, the *People's Daily* published a commentator's article titled "China Will Never Tolerate the US and Japanese Reactionaries Looting Chinese Submarine Resources." According to the article, Taiwan Province and Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islands are China's sacred territory.

[28]Xinhua News Agency news dispatches, "Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai's Statement on the Peace Treaty with Japan," December 4, 1950.

On June 17, 1971, the USA and Japan reached the Agreement between Japan and the USA concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, often known as the Okinawa Reversion Agreement which became effective as of May 15, 1972. Under the agreement, the USA wantonly included China's Diaoyu Islands in the territory to be reversed to Japan. This met the opposition from the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, overseas Chinese and people of Chinese origin across the world. In some large cities in the USA and Canada, Chinese students held large-scale demonstrations to protection the Diaoyu Islands. On December 30, 1971, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement, saying that the Diaoyu Islands are China's inherent territory. As a result, the US government stated that what it reversed to Japan was the administrative jurisdiction of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) and that it did not take a position with regard to the sovereignty over them and hoped that Chinese and Japan would resolve the issue through dialogue. Then, Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda of the Eisaku Sato cabinet said he hated this, but the Japanese government had to take it down.

It wasn't until March 8, 1972, that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued its basic view on the so-called sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands). The Eisaku Sato cabinet announced that Japan had taken over the waters surrounding the Diaoyu Islands, unilaterally established the so-called air defense identification zone, and negated that there was any territorial problem between China and Japan. In addition, the cabinet continued to maintain the so-called foreign relations with the Taiwan authorities and tried to create "two Chinas" and "one China, one Taiwan" on international occasions. This made it difficult to normalize the relations between China and Japan.

4. *In the 1970s, Japan Was Widely Divided Over the Diaoyu Islands Issue and National Diet Debates Embarrassed High-Ranking Officials*

During his lifetime, Kiyoshi Inoue concluded based on historical data that, "The Diaoyu Islands were not at all *terra nullius*, but are the territory of China."[29] "Historically these islands belonged to China. Taking advantage of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, the Japanese government secretly incorporated them into Japanese territory without making an announcement. This is sheer theft… and is invalid from the perspective of international law."[30]

According to the National Diet Record, on June 20, 1967, Yitiro Watabe, member of the House of Representatives from the Komei Party of Japan, asked at the Diet if Taiwan people lived on the Diaoyu Islands. This was the first time that these islands were discussed at the Diet following World War II. Then Minister of General Affairs Shiro Tukahara replied, "There has been no such a report."[31] On

[29]Kiyoshi Inoue, *A Historical Study of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)*, Jpn. ed., Tokyo: Disan Shyokan, 2012, 2nd edition, p. 134.

[30]Ibid., pp. 124, 133.

[31]Minutes of the meeting of the Special Committee on the Okinawa Issue of the Japanese House of Representatives, Jpn. ed., no. 13, June 20, 1967.

July 12, Tukahara asked at a session of the Diet if it was appropriate for many Taiwan fishing boats to visit the Diaoyu Islands and build bases there. Then Japanese Prime Minister Sato Eisaku replied, "Japan doesn't have the right to govern Okinawa… When it comes to practical matters, we may carry out direct dialogue with Taiwan when it is appropriate, but the only proper channel to deal with the issue is to go through the one with the power (the United States)."[32]

Back then, the Japanese government did not claim sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, nor did it express opposition to Taiwan boats fishing off those islands. This was because Okinawa was under the control of the USA and the US authority in charge of the islands did not keep Taiwan fishermen and women and women from fishing off the islands. It wasn't until April 15, 1970, that Okinawa Sadanori Nakayama, then the head of the Management and Coordination Agency for reversion of Okinawa, said at the House of Councilors that the Diaoyu Islands "belong to Ishigaki Island." On August 10 of the same year, Kiichi Aichi, then Foreign Minister of Japan, said in a reply to a query from the Japanese Diet that the Diaoyu Islands "are part of the Ryukyu Islands." On September 7 of the same year, Toshio Yamazaki, Counselor of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was the first Japanese to say the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands was beyond discussion and "they are clearly our territory."[33]

However, members of the Japanese Diet also questioned the government's claim on the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. For example, on March 21, 1972, at a meeting of the Japanese House of Representatives, Yanosuke Narasaki, member of the Japanese Diet representing the Socialist Party of Japan, raised sharp questions concerning the Diaoyu Islands issue. However, Takeo Fukuda, then Foreign Minister of Japan, and Masuo Takashima, Director Treaties Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, made ambiguous answers to Yanosuke Narasaki's questions.

Yanosuke Narasaki stated, "I'm afraid that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) issue would arise in the efforts to normalize the Japan-China relations and will probably become a real obstacle. Territory is a very sensitive issue; our neighbor and its people could be very serious about it. We must clarify where the question really lies. This issue should be resolved through dialogue between Japan and China and leaves no room for the intervention of a third party. To be more specific, the opinions of the United States should not be solicited… According to statistics, in the 18th year of the Meiji Era (1885), an application was filed to the Minister of the Left for permission to erect markers on Uotsuri Island, Kuba Island (Huangwei Islet), and on the islands between Japan and Fuzhou. In response, Foreign Minister Kaoru Inoue stated that first, these islands were close to the border of the Qing Dynasty; second, these were insignificant islands; and third, it had already been reported in the Qing Court that Japan intended to occupy the Qing territory close to

[32]Minutes of the meeting of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Japanese House of Representatives, Jpn. ed., no. 17, July 12, 1967.

[33]Minutes of the replies given at the meeting of the Special Committee on Promotion of Science and Technology of the Japanese House of Representatives, Jpn. ed., no. 14, September 7, 1970.

Taiwan. Because of these reasons, the efforts to erect national markers and develop islands should be postponed. In December of the same year, the Japanese Interior Minister issued the Okinawa governor the directive not to establish national markers. After that, in January in the 23rd year of the Meiji Era (1890) and November in the 26th year of the Showa Era (1993), the governor filed two applications for erecting national markers, though both were rejected. It was agreed that the issue would be raised at a Japanese cabinet meeting on December 27 in the 27th year of the Meiji Era (1894) when Japan was set to win the Japan-Qing War (the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895), and a decision was made by the cabinet on January 14 of the following year. During those ten years, didn't the Japanese Interior Ministry and Ministry of Foreign Affairs fail to find proof that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) belonged to Ryukyu or did they get to know that they were Chinese territory? The Japanese Emperor's Decree 10 in the 29th year of the Meiji Era (1896) only made it clear the composition of districts of Okinawa Prefecture, but it didn't specify that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) were incorporated into Japanese territory. However, the decree made it clear Yaeyama District, now the Yaeyama Islands, was part of Japan. According to the Okinawa governor, the facts were that the Yaeyama Islands included the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands), so the latter was incorporated into Yaeyama, and that while the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) were incorporated into the local administrative division, the measures were taken to include them in Japanese territory. It is clear that the international issue that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) were incorporated into Japanese territory was based on the judgment and understanding of the Okinawa governor, a local official."[34]

In response, Masuo Takashima said that international markers were erected in accordance with the decision made by the cabinet on January 14 of the 28th year of the Meiji Era (1895) (this actually didn't happen) and that Taiwan and the islands affiliated with it, as described in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, didn't include the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands). Yanosuke Narazaki stated that he didn't found evidence of this.

Takeo Fukuda, then Japanese Foreign Minister, replied, "The Treaty of Shimonoseki didn't of course involve the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands). Before this Japan had already adopted legal measures on January 14. If there had been a dispute over these islands, the Qing Dynasty would have raised the issue, which would have been dealt with in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. However, no objection had been raised, so the issue wasn't included in the treaty."[35]

In response, Yanosuke Narazaki said, "This is a matter of great importance so that it cannot be imagined… The US Okinawa government's notice No. 27 should not be evidence." He also pointed that at the time that the Chinese claimed on the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, but Japanese planes flew over the ADIZ…

[34]Susumu Yabuki, *The Conflict over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) Began with the Return of Okinawa,* Jpn. ed., Tokyo: Kaden Sha, August 15, 2013, p. 146.

[35]Ibid., p. 146.

This in reality may easily lead to conflict."[36] The Japanese government had nothing to say in reply.

5. *Due to Political Fluctuations in Japan, Relevant Departments of the Japanese Government Disrupted the Status of the Dispute Being Shelved, Thus Aggravating Conflict*

In September 1972, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka reached consensus on China and Japan shelving their dispute over the Diaoyu Islands and normalizing their relations. In August 1978, Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping and Japanese Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda once again reached consensus on shelving the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands and concluding the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship.

According to a 1978 declassified file of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, during his second talk with Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda on October 25, 1978, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping raised the idea of shelving the Diaoyu Islands dispute. In response, Fukuda said, "I am glad to exchange candid opinions with his majesty Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping on world issues and those between Japan and China. This will help increase the bilateral relations. It is important to uphold the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China."[37] This means at the summit meeting between Chinese and Japanese leaders it was confirmed again that the dispute would be shelved.

A dispute can be shelved only when the two sides concerned work toward that end without taking unilateral moves to change the *status quo*. However, some departments of the Japanese government continuously disrupted the diplomatic and political tacit agreement between China and Japan on shelving the dispute by seeking to change the *status quo*.

Today, the Japanese government neither admits that there is a dispute concerning the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands nor admits that the Chinese and Japanese governments reached tacit political consensus concerning shelving the Diaoyu Islands issue. This change in Japan's China policy will lead the Diaoyu Islands issue to seriously affect bilateral relations and become a source of the vicious circle in these relations.

In 2001 and 2003, in return for Japan's sending troops to support the US' wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Republican George W. Bush administration made it clear that the Diaoyu Islands would be brought under Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the USA. This means that the USA promised that it would help Japan defend the Diaoyu Islands. This being the case, the Junichiro Koizumi cabinet began to arrogantly lease, by installment, Diaoyu Island, Nanxiao Island, Beixiao Island from private owners and bring them under so-called government management. In order to make the Chinese accept this arrangement, the cabinet promised that people other than government employees

[36]Ibid., p. 147.

[37]Ibid.

would not be allowed on the islands without authorization. However, it failed to effectively stop the Japanese right-wingers from landing on the islands. In 2004, when Nobuteru Ishihara was Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism of the Koizumi cabinet, Japan decided to "nationalize" the lighthouses built by the Japanese right-wing groups on the Diaoyu Islands to demonstrate Japan's sovereignty.

On the other hand, the Japanese Coast Guard stepped up its efforts to expel fishing boats from China's mainland Taiwan Province operating off the Diaoyu Islands. In 2008, the Japanese knocked over a fishing boat from Taiwan in the Diaoyu Islands waters. On September 7, 2010, patrol ships of the Japanese Coast Guard illegally intercepted a Chinese fishing boat in the waters of Huangwei Islet, which is affiliated with the Diaoyu Islands. The incident led to a collision and the seizure of the Chinese boat and the arrest of its captain. Thereafter, Yashio Tamogami, leader of the counter-China–Japan's right-wing and former Chief of Staff of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force, established a national counter-Chinese right-wing organization which frequently carried out provocative activities in the Diaoyu Islands waters. In order to undermine China–Japan relations, Shintaro Ishihara solicited donations for the purchase of the Diaoyu Islands to coincide with the 40th anniversary of the normalization of bilateral relations. While Japan's politics became increasingly influenced by the right wing, on September 10, 2012, the Yoshihiko Noda cabinet announced that the Japanese government would purchase and "nationalize" the Diaoyu Islands despite the utter opposition of the Chinese. This inevitably led to the Chinese countermeasures. Since September 2012, China has made its public service vessels' patrol of the Diaoyu Islands waters a regular practice, thus rendering false Japan's claim that it has the "valid control" of these islands.

Since Shinzo Abe came to power again in 2012, Japan has gone further to adopt hardline diplomatic and military stands against China. On December 26, 2013, Abe visited Yasukuni Shrine, thus worsening Japan's relations with China and the Republic of Korea. In August 2014, the annual polls released by the Beijing-based *China Daily* and Japan's Genron NPO showed that 93% of the Japanese had a negative impression of China and 86.3% of the Chinese had a negative impression of Japan. The main reason was that more than 50% of either the Chinese or the Japanese respondents weren't satisfied with Japan or China's attitude toward these islands. At present, the entire international community, including the USA, doesn't think that the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands doesn't exist between China and Japan, and it hopes that the dispute will be settled through dialogue. Insightful Japanese people are also in favor of solving the issue of diplomatic dialogue peacefully. Former Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, former Secretary-General of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan Hiromu Nonaka, former Japanese Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka, and those from Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs who had personal experience in this regard such as the late Hiroshi Hashimoto, Syoichi Kuriyama, and Yosuke Nakae stated that China and Japan had reached tacit consensus concerning shelving the Diaoyu Islands dispute.

However, the Japanese government still refuses to admit that it has a territorial dispute with China over the Diaoyu Islands and that China and Japan reached consensus or a tacit understanding concerning shelving that dispute. The Abe cabinet is somewhat trying to make the Diaoyu Islands issue a tool with which to achieve its political targets of increasing Japan's Navy, revising the Constitution of Japan, changing Japan's postwar domestic order, and going beyond the postwar international order that is based on the Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Declaration.

1.4 Key Questions and Basic Viewpoints in This Book

1. *Relevant Questions*

The Diaoyu Islands are composed of uninhabited islands, but they have the butterfly effect. This is because the issue is quite complicated and involves the following: territory and national feeling; historical conflict and legality awareness; geostrategy and security; economic interests and energy resources; government dignity and domestic politics; the USA and Taiwan.

If China and Japan are to properly handle this complicated outstanding issue, they need to conduct thorough research and dialogue on the related historical facts and the legal basis. For example, a correct understanding of the following key issues can help make a correct decision about the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands based on historical facts.

(1) What are the evidences that the Diaoyu Islands are the inherent territory of China and islands affiliated with Taiwan? Who on earth was the first to discover and own these islands? Is it true that Tatsushiro Koga discovered the Diaoyu Islands in 1884 and sent people to land on the island applied in the following year for permission to develop them? What was the legal basis of the Japanese purchase of the island from private owners in 2012?
(2) Where were the marine boundaries between China and the Ryukyu Kingdom in the 500 years from 1372 when Chinese envoy Yang Zai visited Ryukyu to 1872 when Japan renamed the Ryukyu Demand the Ryukyu Domain. Was Ryukyu *terra nullius* during this period?
(3) Did the Japanese government recognize or give tacit consent to the Diaoyu Islands as part of China before it made secret surveys of them in 1885? Did the results of Okinawa Prefecture's secret surveys of the Diaoyu Islands prove that they were not part of China?
(4) Did the results of the surveys of the islands conducted by Japan before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 prove that the islands belonged to Ryukyu or Japan? Who did the islands belong to from 1894 to 1895, the critical date for the dispute concerning the sovereignty over the islands?

(5) Was the secret decision made by Hirobumi Ito cabinet in January 1895 to incorporate the Diaoyu Islands into Okinawa Prefecture in compliance with the international law? Why was Japan's occupation of the islands delayed by approximately ten years?
(6) By what international law and order were the territories of China and Japan divided following World War II? Was the law the Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Declaration that were accepted by Japan or the Treaty of San Francisco signed by the USA, Japan, and other countries and the Agreement between Japan and the USA concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands (Okinawa Reversion Agreement)?
(7) Why is it wrong for Japan to state that "China never dispute Japan's square over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) and it didn't have a claim on the sovereignty over these islands until after petroleum resources were discovered"?
(8) How to understand the US involvement in the Diaoyu Islands issue, the influence the issue may have on China–Japan relations and the policy choices it may lead to?

While working to acquire a detailed understanding of the views of China and Japan about the abovementioned questions, I made further efforts to collect and review relevant historical documents, conduct independent analyses of cases, and make my investigations as thorough as possible, resulting in new discoveries.

2. *Further Investigations into Differing Views*

In this book, I made use of the research done by my predecessors in this regard, took further steps to discover, collect, research, and analyze the historical documents of China, the Ryukyu Kingdom, and Japan and made an overall review of the evidences of the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. At the same time, I paid special attention to the differing views of Japanese scholars and clarified them especially from academic and implementation perspectives.

(1) I made investigations into the terms Gaohua Islet (Diaoyu Island) and Goubi Islet (Kume Island, Ryukyu) as mentioned in the *History of the Sui Dynasty* and concluded that that possibility should not be ruled out. This is of great significance for understanding the evolution of the term Diaoyu Island. However, from the perspective of the international law, it is inappropriate to say that China began to own Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islands in the early years of the Sui Dynasty. This is because discovery doesn't necessarily mean occupation. Even if China discovered and gave names other these islands at that time, it didn't have specific recording about its marine boundaries with Ryukyu and their respective islands, and it didn't have jurisdiction over the islands after it had discovered them. Therefore, it is better to make 1372 the date of China's historical sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands because during the year Yang Zai visited Ryukyu to establish bilateral relations and China began to patrol the tribute route from Ryukyu to Fujian.

(2) I investigated the *Voyage with a Tail Wind*, a sailor's book, and concluded that the book was probably an official version prepared by the Chinese government based on Zheng He's voyages to east and west oceans. During the reign of Ming Emperor Yongle, China imposed a strict maritime prohibition on private boats, though it actively made official exchanges with foreign countries. Work on the book started in the first year of the reign of Emperor Yongle (1403), and the book was probably completed in the eighth year of the reign of Ming Emperor Xuande (1433) following Zheng He's seven voyages to the west oceans. Revisions were made to the book thereafter. It is certain that the navigational compass for the Diaoyu Islands mentioned in the book had long been discussed in other ancient books, and that the sea lane from Fujian to Ryukyu via the Diaoyu Islands mentioned in the book had been established and utilized by Chinese official ships before 1403. Some scholars assume that *Voyage with a Tail Wind* was completed after the mid-sixteenth century, but the possibility should not be ruled out that the book was basically completed in the 1430 s and revised thereafter. It is even less appropriate to take the date of its completion as the earliest date of China's discovery and naming of the Diaoyu Islands.

(3) Based on my analysis of *A Grand Maritime Guide* written by Tei Junsoku (Cheng Shunze), a noted scholar and the Grand Master with the Purple-Golden Ribbon of Ryukyu, in 1708, I concluded that from the perspective of the Ryukyu Kingdom, the book categorically proved that China was the first to discover and name the Diaoyu Islands. The book includes the relevant valuable historical materials that have been lost in China, discusses Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet, records several sea routes from Fujian to Ryukyu, and makes it clear that all these are cited from China's *Maritime Routes for Investiture Vessels* and the Fujian emigrants' maritime route manual. The book also discusses the detailed explanations given by Chinese helmsmen to Ryukyu helmsmen on how to use the Diaoyu Islands route and points out that *Maritime Routes* was written during Zheng He's voyages to the Eastern and Western oceans. It does not matter whether *Maritime Routes* is part of *Voyage with a Tail Wind*, but *A Grand Maritime Guide* proves that as early as 1392 the Fujian people traveling to Ryukyu had records about the Diaoyu Islands maritime routes and explained to Ryukyu people on how to use them.

(4) I exposed and proved wrong the lies the Japanese had long created and spread from the perspectives of historical facts and the international law. So far the Japanese have been propagating that Tatsushiro Koga landed islands in 1884 for exploration and development purposes and applied to the Japanese government for a permit to develop them in 1895. I have found this false. This falsification is based only on Tatsushiro's resume presented for a Japanese Prime Minister's award in 1909. Tatsushiro didn't file an application for development permission until June 1895 following the conclusion of the Treaty of Shimonoseki and wasn't granted a lease and development permit until September 1896. That means Japan didn't lease to Tatsushiro free of charge the development permit concerning some uninhabited islands of Taiwan until after

it had started colonial rule in Taiwan. This permit was annulled when the Japanese Emperor and government accept the Potsdam Declaration and Japan surrendered in August 1945. Granting an individual the permit to develop the Diaoyu Islands was a colonial development effort the Japanese government made during its colonial rule of Taiwan and has long become illegitimate. Therefore, the decision made by the Japanese government to purchase the Diaoyu Islands based on the assumption that Tatsushiro was their first owner didn't have any legitimacy either.

(5) I made targeted clarification and explanations of Japan's claims that China admits all the "evidences" that the Diaoyu Islands belong to Japan. From the perspectives of the international law, I probed into the key date when the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands came up and I also shared some of my views and evidences. From the perspectives of facts, legality, and evidences, I refuted some wrong views Japan has about the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. I analyzed and corrected the answers Japan gave to 16 questions on the official Web site of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and refuted and clarified some of Japan's misunderstandings.

3. *Revealing Newly Discovered Facts and Evidences and Refuting Fallacies*

(1) The Ode to the God of the Sea wrote by the Qing envoys at the Black Water Trench made it clear that Chiwei Islet was Chinese territory. Some Japanese say that as Chinese historical documents didn't say that the Diaoyu Islands were Chinese territory, and they merely took these islands as a guide to navigation, that justify Japan taking the islands as *terra nullius*. However, the Ode to the God of the Sea is evidence that Qing envoys always Chiwei Islet as China's territory and recorded it as such. According to the 1800 "Ode to the God of the Sea" by Chinese envoys Zhao Wenkai and Li Dingyuan to Ryukyu, "We give Chiwei Islet a salute with our eyes."[38] According to the 1807 ode by envoys Qi Kun and Fei Xizhang, "Giving the Chinese islet a salute with our eyes, we break waves with sincerity."[39] The Chinese islet referred to here is Chiwei Islet on the west side of Black Water Trench. This shows that when imperial Qing ships voyaged through Black Water Trench (Okinawa Trough), those aboard must perform a ceremony to give a salute with their eyes to Chiwei Islet, the easternmost islet of China.

(2) Envoy Qi Kun and Assistant envoy Fei Xizhang of the Qing Dynasty presented the Diaoyu Islands route to Emperor Jiaqing in the 13th year of his reign. That memorial was titled "The Compass Route." The memorial contained no more than 170 Chinese characters, but it made it clear, "Ryukyu is located in the east of the sea. There are always mountains to cast anchor all the way from

[38]Yin Mengxia, Jia Guirong, and Wang Guan (eds.), *Continued Edition of the Materials about Ryukyu at the National Library of China*, vol. 1, Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Publishing House, first edition 2002, p. 306.

[39]Ibid., p. 295.

Wuhumen, Fujian, to Gumi Island, Ryukyu. There are long troughs with vast spans of water that are beyond imagination." And then the memorial continued, "We are all deeply grateful for your majesty's kindness. We hereby attach our records of the compass navigational route." In the attached "Record of the Compass Navigational Route," Qi Kun and Fei Xizhang recorded the navigational routes five Ming and Qing envoys used on their voyage to Ryukyu and their selected experiences. On five occasions they mentioned the envoys sailed past Diaoyu Islet and discussed Huangwei and Chiwei islets three times, and Gumi Island five times. If they didn't specify "Gumi Island, Ryukyu" in their memorial, it would be hard to know where they were considered to have entered the Ryukyu Kingdom. So Qi Kun specified that Gumi was part of Ryukyu.

Qi Kun seemed to be more aware of maritime boundaries than other imperial envoys. Every time before he started his voyage, he would prepare the "Ode to the God of the Sea" and get ready for the salute given to Chiwei Islet with his eyes. Back then, the emperor was too busy to travel to Ryukyu. Why did Qi Kun present to him the 2000-character memorial "Record of the Compass Navigational Route"? He probably meant to use this to indirectly report to Emperor Jiaqing that the islands between Fujian and Gumi Island were all Chinese islands and that the maritime boundary between China and the Ryukyu Kingdom was somewhere between Chiwei Islet and Gumi Island. This proves that the Emperor undoubtedly knew all about this and it was common knowledge in the Chinese Qing Court that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to China.

(3) By reviewing and analyzing European and US maps and documents about the Diaoyu Islands, I proved that it was generally believed in the international community before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to China. This was based on five indisputable facts:

First, the USA and European countries first got to know the Diaoyu Islands the French translation of and citations from the *Record of Messages from Chûzan* written by Chinese Qing Assistant envoy Xu Baoguang in 1719. This shows that there has been an international consensus for more than 200 years that China was the first to discover and name the Diaoyu Islands.

Second, before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, all the relevant maps of Europe and the USA didn't adopt the Japanese names for the Diaoyu Islands such as Uotsuri Island, Kuba Island, and Kume Aka Island, nor did they use the term "Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)." This proves that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) was the name Japan invented for the Diaoyu Islands during its colonial rule of Taiwan.

Third, the British warship H.M.S. *Samarang* conducted reconnaissance around the Diaoyu Islands and Yaeyama and marked Nanxiao and Beixiao islands as "Pinnacle Is." This is the source of the Japanese name "Senkaku Islands." At the same time, H.M.S. *Samarang* gave names to Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet and other islands in the southern Fujian dialect, but it misplaced them and the

same mistakes were repeated in the maps of the USA, Germany and many other countries.

Fourth, before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 European and US maps included the terms "the Ryukyu Islands" or "the Miyako Islands" in a curve on the west the Ryukyu Islands and the north of the Yaeyama Islands and the Miyako Islands, specifying the boundary between the islands affiliated with Taiwan, China, and Ryukyu Islands, the Yaeyama Islands and the Miyako Islands. This means that the international community recognized the Diaoyu Islands were affiliated with Taiwan, but not to the Ryukyu Islands.

Fifth, *The China Sea Directory* compiled by the Great Britain Hydrographic Department in 1884 and revised for the third time in 1894, and other books all included Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet and Nanxiao and Beixiao islands as Taiwan's northeastern islands and emphatically pointed out that Chiwei Islet was the easternmost island of China. The relevant documents of the British Admiralty were translated by the Japanese Navy's Waterways Department as *The Shina Sea Directory* in the 23rd year of the Meiji Era (1890) and compiled and translated by China as *The China Sea Directory: A New Translation*. At that time, the Japanese Navy not only knew that the Diaoyu Islands had long been recognized by the British Admiralty as the northeastern islands of Taiwan, China, but also didn't raise any objection. Japan translated the book and cited its position. This in fact means that Japan gave tacit consent to the Diaoyu Islands as part of China and admitted that they weren't *terra nullius*.

(4) The maps, created by the Japanese Navy and confirmed by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of coastal China from 1874 when Japan invaded Taiwan for the first time to 1894 when Japan started the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 included Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet, whereas the maps of Okinawa didn't.

The color Map of the Coastal Provinces of the Qing Dynasty, created by the Japanese Navy and confirmed by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1875, affirmed Diaoyu Island was part of the northeastern islands of Taiwan. The map marked Diaoyu Islet, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet as Chinese territory, but didn't mark them as Japanese names—Uotsuri Island, Kuba Island, and Kume Aka Island or Taisho Island. The notes included in the map show that the map was produced by the Japanese Navy based on the documents of the British Admiralty and China's Map of the Qing Dynasty. No. 200 Sea Map (probably produced before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895) distributed by the Japanese Navy Sea Department in 1897 still had the same records of Diaoyu Islet, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet as in the 1875 Map of the Coastal Provinces of the Qing Dynasty. This fully shows that in the 20 years from 1874 to 1894 the Japanese authorities had not only long given tacit consent to the Diaoyu Islands as part of China but also used the same names given to these islands in relevant Chinese maps and marked the islands as part of coastal Chinese provinces.

The Map of Okinawa Prefecture—the Ryukyu Kingdom in the Map of the Empire of Japan, distributed on March 5, 1894, and revised on May 19, 1895, not

only doesn't include the Diaoyu Islands or the so-called Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) but also has this statement "Appearing to be an extension of China's Taiwan Island." The maritime boundary between Yaeyama, Ryukyu, and Taiwan obviously curves northeastward to form a semicircular arc which separates the Diaoyu Islands from the Yaeyama Islands and Miyako Islands. This is a map of Japanese territory before territorial expansion in 1895, so it is a map of the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands around the "critical date" of the dispute defined by the international law.

It is an authoritative map in Japan, and several editions of it were published. It remained unchanged when it appeared again in the 40th year of the reign of Emperor Meiji (1907). A note to the 1968 edition of the map said that mapmaking and distribution of maps in Japan were monopolized by the Japanese High Command. The map was distributed during the talks for the Treaty of Shimonoseki, so it undoubtedly reflected the Japanese official position on the Diaoyu Islands before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. This evidence further proves false the Japanese idea that "the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) is inherent territory of Japan" and negates the Japanese allegation that its "occupation" of *terra nullius* serves as its so-called legal basis of "occupation" Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands).

In addition, reports have also been discovered about the aquatic resources of the fishing ground in Taiwan in the ninth year of the Taisho Era (1920) during Japan's colonial rule of the region. According to the reports, Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet were part of Taiwan's fishing ground for skipjack tuna and had nothing to do with Ishigaki Island.

(5) I conducted research through different channels on the historical testimony prepared by poacher Yakitai Izawa's daughter Maki Izawa on January 8, 1972, and made several conclusions.

First, by looking up the 1893 archives of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I found Yakitai Izawa real. On his way to Diaoyu Island from the Ishigaki Island of the Yaeyama Islands in 1893, he was blown to coastal Zhejiang, China. He lied to the local Chinese authorities by pretending that he was shipping coal from the Yaeyama Islands and mistook Koba Island for Diaoyu Island. The Chinese trusted him and helped him get back to Japan. Following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, at the request of Tatsushiro Koga, Yakitai Izawa returned to Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet to take charge of development there. In 1900, Mikinosuke Miyajima, who was there for research purposes, met with Izawa. Later on, he mentioned their meeting in his article "Kuba Island" in the Japanese *Journal of Geography.*

Second, I proved that at that time Yakitai Izawa knew that Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet belonged to China. This partly explained why he lied to the Chinese local officials about his destination. Later on, he told the true story to his elder daughter Maki Izawa. According to Maki Izawa's 1972 testimony, it is false that Tatsushiro Koga was the first to carry out development on Diaoyu Island. Maki Izawa was born on Huangwei Islet. She pointed out in her testimony that along with

Taiwan, Diaoyu Island was stolen by Japan during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and now that the Japanese had recognized the Potsdam Declaration, it should return these islands to their hometown China. On August 29, 1971, the inaugural issue of *Gunsei*, launched by Okinawa Tushinsha, carried "Testimony of a Japanese Person Who Is Related to the 'Discovery' of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)," which featured an interview with Maki Izawa on August 20 of the same year.

(6) I discussed and analyzed in general terms how the China–Japan relations had changed and developed and what lay in store for them. With regards how to resolve the Diaoyu Islands issue, I listed some views of the Japanese side and offered policy suggestions for both China and Japan. These include the route map of carrying out dialogue, seeking common ground while putting aside differences, and pursuing mutually beneficial cooperation as well as specific measures designed to help resolve the disputes between China and Japan over the sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Diaoyu Islands in order to ensure lasting peace.

1.5 International Laws Related to the Sovereignty Over the Diaoyu Islands

A judgment has to be made about the territorial sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. Before analyzing the evidence chain provided by historical documents, I will brief on the international law concepts that Japan often uses about the Diaoyu Islands. For reasons of space, I will now make case statements about the basic international law concepts I discuss.

1. *Three International Law Concepts Related to the Sovereignty Over the Diaoyu Islands*

(1) The Principle of Occupation

One of the key bases for determining the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands is which country was the first to discover, give a name to, use, and have jurisdiction over Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islands. This involves the international law principle of occupation, though the principle was designed to help colonial expansion and is irrelevant now. In the past, China discovered and owned the Diaoyu Islands, which to some extent is consistent with the principle of occupation. The occupation of territory comes only once.

The late German authoritative jurist L. F. Oppenheim (1858–1919) believed that occupation and management were two key elements for "valid occupation."

(1) Occupation: The country must genuinely occupies the *terra nullius*, proclaims that the territory has been under its occupation, and intends to bring it under its sovereignty, which is usually marked by an announcement or the local hoisting of the national flag.

(2) Management: The occupier should establish a management system within a reasonable timeframe to show that the territory is under its management. However, the valid occupation does not necessarily mean establishing ruling institutions on the new territory or settling down there, because in the uninhabitable territory, regular patrols or sending state organs to patrol when necessary will suffice. On the contrary, it will not be regarded to be valid occupation of *terra nullius* by merely hoisting the national flag there without exercise de facto jurisdiction. This shows that international law, "effective occupation" cannot materialize until the following five conditions are met:

- Territorial claim;
- Confirmed as *terra nullius*;
- Occupation announcement;
- Action of occupation;
- Valid jurisdiction.

According to the principle of "discovery and occupation" of ancient European international law in the late fifteenth century, the discovery of unknown territory is a good legal reason for territorial claims. Johann Caspar Bluntschli (1808–1881), an authoritative Swiss jurist who became president of the Hague Conference of the Institute of International Law in 1875, held this opinion. He gave two examples. One was that in 1496 the British Royal Family began to rule North America discovered by its ships, and the other was that the benefits Spain and Portugal acquired through the discovery of South America and Central America.[40]

Japan began to send its students to study international law in 1862, so it got to know the meaning of the principle of discovery and occupation at the time. Probably it was precisely because of this, having realized that China had long had good knowledge of the Diaoyu Islands and had given names to these islands following its survey in 1885, Japan didn't announce its "occupation" of these islands. It wasn't until on January 14, 1895, nine years later, when Japan was set to win the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, that Japan drafted in secret a bill bringing the Diaoyu Islands under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture. Afterward, under the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Japan started a 50-year-long colonial rule of Taiwan including the Diaoyu Islands. Japan didn't authorize its private sector to carry out development on the Diaoyu Islands until after it began its colonial rule of Taiwan in 1896, which is purely a form of colonial expansion.

It wasn't until 1933 that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs took the acquisition of the Diaoyu Islands as a territorial acquisition case under the principle of occupation. However, even according to Japan's authoritative explanation of the principle of occupation, the Diaoyu Islands belong to China, not Japan. To clarify

[40]Liang Zhijian, "The Contribution of Geographers and Historians as well as Hans Kelsen and Other Jurists in German-Speaking Countries to the Study of the Diaoyu Islands," *German Studies,* no. 3, 2012.

this, it is necessary to cite, in greater details, the following authoritative views of Japanese international law scholars.

The 1975 Japanese edition *International Law Dictionary* defines occupation as follows: "Occupation is a legal basis recognized under international law for acquiring territory. When a country's rule reaches a region that doesn't belong to any country, it can take that region as its territory. This system was created by analogizing the Roman law rule of occupation." Since the great geographical discoveries in the early modern times, had played an important role in enabling European powers to acquire and carved up the undeveloped regions outside of Europe and make them their colonies. After colonies had been carved up, people began to feel that the rule had accomplished its historical mission. However, it is still applicable today.

"In order to make occupation effective, the country must make a territorial claim and brings the *terra nullius* under its valid occupation. The conditions for occupation are: First, the occupation must be carried out by a country. Private action will not be regarded as state action unless it is carried out under state authorization or subsequently ratified by the state. Second, what is occupied must be *terra nullius* recognized under international law. It must not belong to any country and even if it is inhabited, it can be occupied if it is not the territory of any country. Third, the subjective condition is that the country must make a territorial claim by, for example, making an announcement on incorporating the territory into the country, adopting a law or measures, and issuing notices to other countries. Fourth, the necessary objective condition is that there must be valid occupation. Discovering an uninhabited island, flying the national flag on it and other symbolic territorial acquisitions do not mean valid occupation. The general idea is that recognizing the discovery is a preliminary legal basis, but if there is no subsequent valid occupation, the territorial acquisition will not be valid. However, there are two explanations of valid occupation. One is that the occupation must be material, i.e. the land must be actually exploited and inhabited, and the other is that the occupation must be social, i.e., rule must be exercised of the territory. Among the cases that were judged in the twentieth century all supported the second idea which was deemed to be right. Therefore, even if a country's people live in the territory, but its rule has not reached there, occupation will not be valid. On the contrary, even if it is an uninhabited island, a country can realize occupation of it by having warships or official ships carry out regular patrols of it."[41]

If these explanations made by Japanese jurists of the principle of occupation are the major premise, if relevant historical facts are the minor premise and compared, it is obviously evident that the Diaoyu Islands weren't *terra nullius* occupied by Japan.

However, Toshio Okuhara, probably the most representative scholar on this issue in Japan, wrote an article in 1978, stating that according to the decision

[41]The Japanese Society of International Law, *International Law Dictionary,* Chin. ed., Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1985, pp. 278–279.

rendered in 1931 in the arbitration over Clipperton Island claimed by France and Mexico, with regard to totally uninhabited territory, a country would have sovereignty over it if it made a territory claim, however, the first country to make this claim must immediately launch a protest to the country that occupies it. Nevertheless, this was not applicable to the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) which Japan had exercised de facto rule for 80 years since it incorporated them into Japanese territory and China had silent for so long.[42]

Okuhara forged the minor premise of the abovementioned logic, which led him to wrongly conclude that "this was not applicable." In fact, it is not true that by 1978, Japan had exercised de facto rule of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) for 80 years without any protest by China. In the first 50 years, as China had ceded to Japan Taiwan and the islands affiliated with it under the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki, China naturally couldn't separately protest Japan's rule of several uninhabited islands of Taiwan. However, this doesn't make it legally valid for Japan to use war to steal the Diaoyu Islands. The Chinese people's War of Resistance was the strongest and most effective protest. From the time when the War of Resistance ended to 1978, Japan didn't exercise de facto rule of these islands. From 1945 to 1972, these islands were under the control of the United States with the tacit endorsement of the Taiwan authorities, which was opposed by the mainland of China, i.e., the government of the People's Republic of China. Since 1972, both sides of the Taiwan Strait have protested the US' transfer of control of the Diaoyu Islands to Japan and have never recognized so-called Japan's de facto rule of them.

Okuhara's logic cannot stand. Even under the principle of occupation, the abovementioned international arbitration of an uninhabited island is totally applicable to the Diaoyu Islands which was first discovered, named and exploited by China. If Japan's logic stands, it should ask itself why it never protested to China for its owning the Diaoyu Islands for more than 500 years. On the contrary, it cited the maps of Qing China. Doesn't this mean that Japan long recognized China's occupation of the Diaoyu Islands? How can the same islands be subject to occupation twice?

(2) The Principle of Acquisitive Prescription

The acquisitive prescription is a way of a country acquiring the sovereignty over part of the territory of another country through long-term, uninterrupted, open and stable occupation and governance. This concept originates in Roman law, is a common concept of civil law, and is analogized to be applicable to international law, though this is challenged by international law scholars. The acquisitive prescription international law does not take subjective goodwill as the condition; it regards the country as the legal owner of the territory if that country meets the abovementioned requirements of the acquisitive prescription so that it is generally

[42]Yoshio Okuhara, "The Basis of Japanese Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands), Jpn. ed., *Central Public Opinion*, no. 7, 1978.

recognized as the owner. Open and stable occupation means the country exercises sovereignty over the territory it occupies without obstruction, or the country whose territory is occupied does not argue in protest or opposition, or it argued in protest or opposition but will not continue to do that.[43]

According to Japan's *International Law Dictionary*, the so-called acquisitive prescription international law is used for the territory of a country other than one's own. The acquisitive prescription means after a country, with the right of the sovereign, has maintained long-term, uninterrupted, stable and open occupation and governance of areas or waters of another country, it can use this as the international law basis for securing jurisdiction over the territory in question. The necessary conditions are:

(1) The territory occupied and governed is not *terra nullius*, but the territory of another country. This is different from occupation.
(2) Occupation and governance have lasted for a quite long period of time. However, there is disagreement over how long the occupation and governance should be to meet the condition of the acquisitive prescription. The disagreement is still there.
(3) Occupation and governance must not be interrupted. Effective ways to interrupt the prescription include valid diplomatic protests, lawsuits filed at an international court, and disputes referred to an international organization for settlement. Diplomatic protests should not be valid until after effective retaliatory measures are taken, including severing diplomatic relations and restricting trade. Simply repeating protests in the form will not be considered to be enough.
(4) Occupation and governance must be stable and open.
(5) Sovereignty is exercised based on the rights of the sovereign.[44]

In September 2012, the Yoshihiko Noda cabinet stated that Japan's purpose of purchasing the islands was to achieve "stable and effective management." This apparently sounds better than the Japanese right-wing Shintaro Ishihara's attempt to purchase and land on the islands, but it actually does not. "Stable and effective management" is an international law term, that is, it is an important condition to meet the conditions of the acquisitive prescription under international law. From the perspective of international law, the attempt of neither Ishihara nor Tokyo Metropolitan to purchase the islands does not show that they have the actual sovereignty over the territory. The real reason for the Yoshihiko Noda cabinet's attempt to buy the islands is that the Japanese government knows that it is at a disadvantage in terms of the historical sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, so it has to strengthen its valid controls over these islands and taking advantage of the radical

[43]Cheng Xiaoxia and Yu Caimin (eds.), *International Law (*21st century law series courseware), Chin. ed., Beijing: Renmin University of China Press, fourth edition, 2011, p. 98.

[44]The Japanese Society of International Law, *International Law Dictionary,* Chin. ed., Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1985, pp. 373–374.

rhetoric of Ishihara to seduce China to tacitly agree the Japanese government's "stable and effective management" of these islands and eventually to enable Japan to gain the upper hand under international law by means of the principle of acquisitive prescription and secure permanent occupation of the islands by nationalizing them.

It has really been hinted in Japan that the country should use the principle of acquisitive prescription to secure the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. For example, Kentaro Serita, Professor of law at Aichi University stated, "Japan had the valid controls over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) from 1895 until 1945, but it is not certain whether Japan had the occupation of them as *terra nullius* or the control of the territory ceded by China. However, the Chinese government did not lodge any protest against the Japanese government's valid controls over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) from 1945 through December 1971, this enabled Japan secure the sovereignty over these islands."[45]

However, what the Yoshihiko Noda cabinet did and what Serita said concerning the Diaoyu Islands backfired. Under the abovementioned conditions for prescription, it is difficult for Japan to secure sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands by means of the principle of acquisitive prescription.

First, Japan has so far attempted to prove its legal occupation of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) by citing them as *terra nullius*, so it cannot use the principle of prescription at the same time as well.

Second, if Japan wants to use the principle of acquisitive prescription to its advantage, it has to consider the long-term valid controls over the Northern Territories (called the Kuril Islands by Russia) and Takeshima (known as Dokdo in the Republic of Korea) by Russia and the Republic of Korea, respectively, but both are claimed by Japan. Otherwise, Japan would go for wool and come back shorn.

Third, the so-called principle of acquisitive prescription is only a way of securing territory internationally and has so far not been recognized by most international law scholars.

Fourth, prescription requires uninterrupted and undisturbed occupation and controls, but so far Japan has not achieved that over the Diaoyu Islands. Japan's occupation of the Diaoyu Islands during its colonial rule of Taiwan from 1895 through 1945 has been negated by the Potsdam Declaration which demanded Japan return the islands to China. From 1945 until 1972 the Diaoyu Islands weren't under the control of Japan, and they were illegally occupied and governed by the USA despite the opposition of the People's Republic of China. Since 1972, as the USA incorporated the administrative jurisdiction over the Diaoyu Islands into Okinawa Prefecture, China and Japan have been disputing over the jurisdiction over these islands.

Unfortunately, Serita, an international law professor of Japan, went so far as to forge the Japanese government's valid, effective controls over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) from 1945 through December 1971. From March 1945 when the

[45]Kentaro Serita, *Japanese Territory*, Jpn. ed., Tokyo: *Tyuo Series,* 2002, p. 137.

Ryukyu Islands were occupied by the US Armed Forces to May 1972 when the Agreement between Japan and the USA concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands (Okinawa Reversion Agreement) took effect, even Okinawa Prefecture was under the control of the USA–Ryukyu government, let alone the Diaoyu Islands. Could this Japanese professor of international law, who was familiar with the Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, find from the article any evidence that by 1972 Japan had had valid controls over the Diaoyu Islands? He absolutely could not. Even when the USA signed that treaty, John Foster Dulles recognized that Japan had so-called potential sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands, but that wasn't interpreted as including the Diaoyu Islands. In addition, Japan had not resumed or exercised sovereignty over Ryukyu, so how could it have valid controls over it?

With regard to the invented valid controls Japan had over the Diaoyu Islands from 1945 to 1971, the Chinese government of course will not rush to make a quixotic error by lodging a protest. Now that the premise for Japan's postwar sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, as described by Mr. Serita, was false, it is not right to claim that Japan had postwar sovereignty over these islands. There can hardly be any other interpretation.

In international law practice, the prescription is not a territory acquisition principle that stands alone, but is related to a number of concepts such as tacit agreement, equitable estoppel, and protest against or effective suspension of the so-called stable and effective management. On September 10, 2010, the Yoshihiko Noda cabinet announced that Japan would purchase the Diaoyu Islands in an attempt to achieve uninterrupted and stable management of the islands by nationalizing them, but that was strongly protested and effectively curbed by the Chinese government. On the same day, the Chinese government announced territorial coordinates—base points and baselines—for waters of the islands and Chinese safeguard ships began to sail regularly for law enforcement in the territorial waters off these islands. This foiled Japan's attempt to maintain its "effective control." If the Chinese government didn't take any legal countermeasure against the Japanese government's attempt to purchase the Diaoyu Islands that could mean the Chinese government's tacit agreement to the conditions for Japan's future acquisitive prescription for these islands. In this sense, all the countermeasures taken by the Chinese government against the Yoshihiko Noda cabinet's attempt to purchase and nationalize the Diaoyu Islands were all measures that must be taken under international law. These measures effectively interrupted the process of acquisitive prescription Japan had been expecting.

(3) The Critical Date

The critical date refers to the date of reference used in law for determining the existence of the legal relationship claimed by the party concerned. In making a legal judgment on a territorial dispute between countries, if the territory in question is confirmed to belong to a country for a certain period of time, but another country exercised effective rule of the territory for another period of time, then a question

arises with regard to which period of time should be taken as the standard date for determining its ownership, that is, the question of the critical date. The critical date refers to the date after which the actions of the parties can no longer affect the issue of the legal relationship in dispute. Chinese and Japanese jurists basically share the same opinion about the explanation of this date international law.

Yoshiro Matuyi, Honorary Professor of Nagoya University, believed that "The critical date is of great importance for territorial disputes." The critical date means "the date when the territorial dispute is crystallized" or "a past date which is understood in terms of law to be the date when the dispute between the two countries is 'frozen.'" After the critical date is determined, the court may decide how to judge the case in accordance with relevant laws. The court may automatically exclude the actions taken by any of the country concerned to change the *status quo* that existed when the dispute arose.[46]

Shinya Murse, Professor of Sophia University also believed that if a territorial dispute is filed to international law for arbitration, at first the first will determine when the "dispute" arose and then only collect the evidence before this "critical date." Any action and facts that come after that date will be taken as effective evidence. Therefore, from a jurist perspective it is irrelevant to build lighthouses and station civil servants on the islands after the critical date as a party to the dispute.[47]

Japanese jurists don't think that internationally there is a standard for determining the critical date, but most of them agree Gerald Fitzmaurice's standards:

(1) the date when the dispute first arose;
(2) the date clearly claimed by the plaintiff;
(3) the date when the dispute was crystallized;
(4) the date when a country to the dispute proposed the dispute be settled through negotiation, mediation, intervention, or other nonjudicial procedures;
(5) the date when one of the procedures listed under Item 4 above that was implemented;
(6) the date when the dispute was raised for arbitration or trial.

Once the critical date is determined, any change that took place to the actual condition can no longer affect the legal relationship between the parties to the dispute.[48]

With regard to the critical date, Chinese jurists believe that "if the sovereignty over the disputed territory in a certain period of time is affected by any events before and after that period and the sovereignty over that territory can be directly

[46]Yoshiro Matuyi, *Interpretations of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) Issue by International Law Scholars*, Jpn. ed., Tokyo: Nippon Hyoron Sha Co., Ltd., December 2014, p. 10.

[47]Shinya Murse, "Southeast Asian Seas and Territory from an International Law Perspective," *SGRA Report*, Jpn. ed., Tokyo: Sekiguchi Global Research Association, No. 00069, October 20, 2014.

[48]The Japanese Society of International Law, *International Law Dictionary,* Chin. ed., Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1985, p. 331.

and finally determined, then that period of time is called the 'critical date' under international law." According to Gerald Fitzmaurice, when it comes to a territorial dispute, the critical date is more decisive than any other historical date. This is because "the territory under dispute will always has the same status as it did at the critical date… If one of the parties had sovereignty over the territory, it will now keep that sovereignty or be considered to have it… At the critical date time is believed to have ceased to move, and anything that happens afterward will not change the situation that existed then."[49]

This shows that from the perspective of international law, to determine sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, in addition to the historical documents that prove historical sovereignty, it is especially important to determine the critical date and sovereignty over these islands during that date. According to Professor Zhou Zhonghai at China University of Political Science and Law, by referring to the occupation principle, the Japanese government negated the fact that China had the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands before 1895. "This therefore forced us to prove that China had the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands during the specific date shortly before and after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and made it irrelevant for us to prove that China had the sovereignty over the islands long before this date, say, for example, during the China's Ming Dynasty. As a result, the large quantities of historical materials China had become irrelevant."[50] China must therefore conduct more thorough research on the historical materials with the focus on the critical date and collect key evidence from them showing China's sovereignty over the islands.

2. *The Sovereignty Over the Diaoyu Islands from the Perspective of International Law*

(1) The Critical Date When the Dispute Over the Diaoyu Islands Arose Between China and Japan Can Be Determined as of January 1895 When the Japanese Meiji Government Occupied Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet and Other Uninhabited Islands of China During the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895

China and Japan are divided over the critical date when the dispute them over the Diaoyu Islands arose. Yoshiro Matuyi and other Japanese scholars tried to set this date as 1971 when both sides of the Taiwan Strait openly claimed sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands or as of June 17, 1971, when the Agreement between Japan and the USA concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands (Okinawa Reversion Agreement) was signed. The so-called reasons for this are:

First, when Japan occupied these islands in January 1895, China didn't protest the "occupation" and after that, China had long remained silent on that issue.

Second, suppose Japan these islands were Chinese territory when it claimed its occupation of them, it can still acquire the territory under the principle acquisitive

[49]Zhou Zhonghai, *A Collection of Papers on International Law of the Sea, Chin. ed., Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press,* 2012, p. 534.

[50]Ibid. pp. 542–543.

prescription according to which a country has the will to own the territory of another country and maintains long-term and stable occupation of that territory, or it can also achieve legitimacy under the concept of "frozen historic rights."[51]

Nevertheless, these dispositions and reasons are untenable and impractical. If China accepts them, it means China admits that Japan's occupation of the Diaoyu Islands from 1895 through 1945 is justified and indisputable and China accepts the United States' occupation and trusteeship of them after 1945. This is undoubtedly a legal trap designed to subvert China's principled stand on the Diaoyu Islands issue.

First, the Diaoyu Islands had been Chinese territory since the 14th century until the Japanese Hirobumi Ito cabinet secretly decided to occupy Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet in January 1895 during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. That was the critical date when the Sino-Japanese dispute over the territory of the Diaoyu Islands first arose. The documents of China, Japan, the UK, and other countries can prove that before that date, the Diaoyu Islands are Chinese territory and are islands affiliated with northeast Taiwan. Facts and evidence will be provided later in this book.

Second, as China was fighting a war against Japan, the latter stole the former's uninhabited island Diaoyu Island without holding any talks. It was impossible for China to protest anything that it didn't know, so this cannot make Japan's theft of country's territory legitimate. No matter whether the owner of something that has been stolen protests to the thief or not, it has the right to claim what has been stolen. Japan says that Diaoyu Islands were *terra nullius*, but that was not true: By 1895, China had been the owner of these islands for more than 500 years.

Third, about three months after Japan stole Diaoyu Island, the Hirobumi Ito cabinet forced the Qing government to sign the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki under which China ceded to Japan the whole of Taiwan Island and the islands affiliated with it. In 1945 when Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration and surrendered, it had exercised the colonial rule of Taiwan for 50 years. During this period, the Chinese government didn't protest Japan's occupation of the whole of Taiwan, let alone the Diaoyu Islands, and Japan maintained a stable rule of Taiwan. If the Japanese scholars' opinion is correct, Japan was justified to occupy Taiwan by means of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. Of course, this is wrong because this is not allowed under postwar international law.

According to the Japanese government, the Diaoyu Islands were *terra nullius*, so its occupation of them means they are the so-called inherent territory of Japan. There is not any historical and legal basis for this. Inherent territory means the territory exists in Japan as a permanent and inseparable part; it is not from outside Japan. However, the Diaoyu Islands were actually stolen by the Empire of Japan, so they are not all its inherent territory. Even Okinawa isn't Japan's inherent territory because before 1872 Okinawa was the Kingdom of Ryukyu that had been there for

[51]Yoshiro Matuyi, *Interpretations of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) Issue by International Law Scholars*, Jpn. ed., Tokyo: Nippon Hyoron Sha Co., Ltd., December 2014, p. 10.

at least 500 years and the Diaoyu Islands had never been part of the Kingdom of Ryukyu.

It is worth noting that Japanese international law scholars have long stressed that in the 75 years until 1871 China didn't express its disagreement with Japan's occupation of these islands. This doesn't mean these scholars don't understand history, but on the contrary, they are setting a "legal trap." If they had their way, then Japan may have gained the three advantages as follows:

First, it can totally deny that China had historical sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands before 1895;

Second, it can postpone the critical date when the Diaoyu Islands dispute arose until 1971 so that the United States' de facto jurisdiction and the treaties and agreements between Japan and the US can be used to negate the stipulations about Japan's postwar territory made in the Cairo Declaration in 1943 and in the Potsdam Declaration in 1945;

Third, it can stress that Japan has exercised "long-term, stable and effective" jurisdiction of the Diaoyu Islands on the ground that since 1972 when Japan took over from the USA the jurisdiction of these islands, Japan has ignored China's unilateral attempt to shelf the dispute.

The ultimate aim of these Japanese scholars is to cut off or alter history and fool with legal concepts in order to decide the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands and even to prepare the legal opinion for future actions on these islands.

A lot of historical documents prove that the Diaoyu Islands has been Chinese inherent territory which was first discovered, named, and exploited by China and had been brought under Chinese defense programs since the Ming Dynasty. In the subsequent 500 years or so, these islands had been under Chinese jurisdiction without being challenged by any country. The Diaoyu Islands are uninhabited, but they were absolutely not *terra nullius* before they were stolen by Japan. The Diaoyu Islands dispute between China and Japan is a continuation of Japan's expansion into Taiwan following its annexation of Ryukyu in 1879. The dispute was caused by Japan in 1894 by waging the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. To be more accurate, the dispute was the direct consequence of the secret decision made by the Hirobumi Ito cabinet to steal Chinese territory in January 1895 when Japan had the upper hand in the war. This shows that viewed both objectively and subjectively, the Japanese government's allegation that it owns the Diaoyu Islands by means of occupation is not supported by any condition that is required by international law for valid occupation.

Chinese Doctor of Law Wang Junmin has made an in-depth analysis of the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands from the perspective of international law. According to him, there are two interconnected dates for the Diaoyu Islands dispute. One is 1945 which the main critical date for the dispute, and the other is 1895 which is the critical date for the dispute on whether the Diaoyu Islands should be reverted to China at the end of World War II. The legal basis for Zhang's work is that international law scholars admit that in any dispute, one or several dates are

especially important for the evaluation of facts. When several dates exist, it is necessary to determine which comes first.[52] However, judging from the facts and legal logic he has and the order of the key dates he gives, it would be more reasonable and accurate if he had made the second date primary and the first date secondary.

I believe that the critical dates concerning the Diaoyu Islands dispute are closely related to the abovementioned key stages of development of the Diaoyu Islands issue. All things should be taken into consideration in order to accurately determine the critical dates of all stages and the relationships between them. From these dates, the one that will be decisive for the final judgment should be chosen and properly explained under the context of international law with solid evidence. Therefore my basic views are:

(1) In the sense of international law, the critical date of the dispute between China and Japan over the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands is January 21, 1895, when the Japanese Ito cabinet approved the January 14 secret decision according to which Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet would be incorporated into Okinawa Prefecture and markers would be erected on them. From the perspective of international law, if the Diaoyu Islands are proven to be *terra nullius* before the critical date of January 14, 1895, that is, before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, it would be beneficial to Japan's position; if it is proved not to be *terra nullius* but to be Chinese territory as affiliated with Taiwan, it would be beneficial to China's position and Japan's actions on and after that date would not affect the determination of the territorial sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands.
(2) The critical date for the postwar dispute over whether Japan should return Taiwan, the Diaoyu Islands included, to China in pursuit of the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration is September 8, 1951, when the USA and other countries signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan. If it is certain that the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration the Japanese government had promised to accept and observe before this critical date do not include the Diaoyu Islands, then it would be beneficial to Japan's position. However, if it is proved that no matter whether the Diaoyu Islands are included in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, they are part of "the territory seized from China" as stated in the Cairo Declaration, then the actions taken on and after the critical date of 1951 when the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed will not affect the postwar decision on the territorial sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands.
(3) The critical date of the dispute between China and Japan over the jurisdiction of the Diaoyu Islands since the 1970s is June 17, 1971, when the USA and Japan reached the Agreement between Japan and the USA concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands (Okinawa Reversion Agreement). The US' position was to return the legislative, judicial and administrative power of

[52]Wang Junmin: *A Focus on the Diaoyu Islands: Sovereignty and Dispute Settlement*, Chin. ed., Beijing: Central Party School Press, November 2014, pp. 50, 51.

Okinawa to Japan. However, the USA made it clear that it reverted to Japan the power of administration, not the territorial sovereignty, over the Diaoyu Islands. Both the Chinese and Japanese governments have claimed ownership of these islands and believe that the sovereignty over them belongs to their respective countries, and the USA doesn't take a stand in this regard. However, this gives rise to the dispute over the jurisdiction of the Diaoyu Islands between China on the one hand the USA and Japan on the other. Jurisdiction power must be attached to sovereignty, but the reality is that the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands is separated from the judicial power due to the Okinawa Reversion Agreement signed by the USA and Japan in 1971. This leads me to believe that if, before the critical date of this dispute, it is proved that the Diaoyu Islands were part of the Kingdom of Ryukyu before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and that the jurisdiction the USA had over the Diaoyu Islands from 1945 to 1971 was recognized by China, the Soviet Union, the UK, and most other members of the Allies during World War II or the official trusteeship mandated by the United Nations, then it will mean it was legitimate for the USA to revert to Japan the jurisdiction power of the Diaoyu Islands and will be beneficial to Japan's position. If both or one of the abovementioned two conditions is proved not to exist, then the relevant content of the Okinawa Reversion Agreement between the USA and Japan that gave rise to the dispute as well as the actions taken by the Japan or the USA on and after the critical date will not affect the determination of the sovereignty over and the jurisdiction power of the Diaoyu Islands.

I don't believe that even if the case is referred to the international court for arbitration, China will be in the wrong anyway. The core of the matter is the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, that is, were they China's inherent territory or the so-called *terra nullius*? This book will provide some newly discovered facts and evidence concerning these questions.

(2) The Diaoyu Islands Japan Stolen from China Weren't *Terra Nullius* at All

According to Japan, Tatsushiro Koga, a native of Fukuoka, "discovered" large numbers of albatrosses on Huangwei Islet in 1884 and found that their feathers could be sold to Europe. So he asked the governor of Okinawa Prefecture in 1885 for permission to develop the island erected the marker with "Koga development on Kuba Island (Huangwei Islet)" written on it. The Japanese cites this as evidence that Diaoyu Islands were *terra nullius* and first occupied by the Japanese, but not stolen from China during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. This is actually not true. The so-called Koga's discovery of the Diaoyu Islands in 1885 was invented. In addition, following its secret survey in 1885, Japan found that there was no sign of China exercising governance in the Diaoyu Islands and that they were not *terra nullius* and probably belonged to China. So Japan would be in trouble if it occupied them openly, and it had to stop short of occupation following the secret survey.

It wasn't until January 1895 that, taking advantage of Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, the Ito cabinet decided in secret to steal the

Diaoyu Islands it had long coveted before negotiations for the Treaty of Shimonoseki. One of Japan's military purposes for seizing these islands was to use them as a base for warship attack on Taiwan. On April 17, 1895, Li Hongzhang was forced to sign the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki, ceding to Japan the whole of Taiwan and the islands affiliated with it. It was not specified what the affiliated islands were, but they naturally included the Diaoyu Islands affiliated with Taiwan. Japan understood this, it deliberately used the fact it secretly stole the Diaoyu Islands before the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed to separate its de facto occupation of the Diaoyu Islands from its subsequent colonial rule of the whole Taiwan and the islands affiliated with so that it would be able to continue to occupy the Diaoyu Islands after the Treaty of Shimonoseki expired.

The problem is that Japan's secret occupation of the Diaoyu Islands before the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed was illegitimate. According to the Japanese government, "The on-the-spot surveys conducted by the Okinawa authorities since the 18th year of the Meiji Era (1885) not only showed that they were uninhabited islands but also confirmed that there were no signs of the Qing Dynasty exercising governance there. So Japan decided on January 14 of the 28th year of the Meiji Era (1895) to erect national markers on the islands and officially incorporate them into Japanese territory." However, many historical facts show that this statement is groundless.

First, in the Ming Dynasty at the latest, the Diaoyu Islands were no longer *terra nullius*; they were under the rule of China's Ming Dynasty government as part of the marine defense area. These islands had dangerous environments and had long been uninhabited, but they were not without an owner. In addition, they were first named by China and incorporated into China's historical territory. China was the first to discover, record, exploit, administer, and defend these islands.

Second, in the ten years or so before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, Japan had become deeply aware of these facts, so it did not have the occupation of the Diaoyu Islands; it stole them in secret later. This becomes back then it is in strict secret that Japan decided to incorporate these islands into Okinawa Prefecture and erect markers there, and Japan didn't announce that to the world later. Even in the Order for Establishing Okinawa Prefecture, which was approved in the Japanese Emperor's Decree 13 on March 5 of the 29th year of the Meiji Era (1896), the Diaoyu Islands or the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) weren't mentioned.

Third, according to the Japanese government, "These islands have always been a component part of our country's Southwest Islands and were not included in Taiwan and the Penghu Islands that were ceded to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki that took effect in the 28th year of the Meiji Era."[53] However, Japan does not have evidence for the first half the statement, nor can it prove it to be true. It is stipulated in Article 2 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki that China should cede to

[53]"The Basic View of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Territorial Sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)" (March 8, 1972), *Basic Data of the Japan–China Relations (1970–1992)*, Jpn. ed., compiled under the supervision of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs China Division, Tokyo: Kazankai Foundation, November 20, 1993, p. 73.

Japan "the whole of Taiwan Island and the islands affiliated with it." These included Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islands, but like Huaping Islet and other islands affiliated with Taiwan, they were not listed in the treaty, but this doesn't mean they are not affiliated with Taiwan.

(3) With Regard to the Diaoyu Islands Issue, Japan Should Observe the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration

The Cairo Declaration was jointly issued by Chiang Kai-shek of China, Roosevelt of the USA, and Churchill of the UK on December 1, 1943. It was clearly stipulated in the declaration that, "The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The Three Great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already rising. The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa [Taiwan], and the Pescadores [Penghu Islands], shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent."[54]

On July 26, 1945, China, the USA, and the UK issued the Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender at Potsdam in Germany (the Potsdam Declaration for short). According to Article 8 of the proclamation, "The terms of the Cairo declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine."[55]

On August 10, 1945, the Japanese government issued the Japan Surrender Note, stating that it would accept the Potsdam Declaration. On August 14 of the same year, Japanese Emperor Hirohito issued the Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War, stating that, "We have ordered our Government to communicate to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union that our Empire accepts the provisions of their joint declaration."[56] On September 2 of the same year, Japanese government representatives signed the Instrument of Surrender, promising that, "We hereby undertake for the Emperor, the Japanese Government and their successors to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith…."[57]

[54] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cairo_Declaration.

[55] http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc./c06.htm.

[56] http://www.emersonkent.com/speeches/surrender_hirohito.htm.

[57] http://www.robinsonlibrary.com/history/history/worldwar2/japan-surr.htm.



朕ハ昭和二十年七月二十六日米英支各國政府ノ首班カポツダムニ於テ發シ後ニ蘇聯邦カ參加シタル宣言ノ掲クル諸條項ヲ受諾シ帝國政府及大本營ニ對シ聯合國最高司令官カ提示シタル降伏文書ニ朕ニ代リ署名シ且聯合國最高司令官ノ指示ニ基キ陸海軍ニ對スル一般命令ヲ發スヘキコトヲ命シタリ朕ハ朕カ臣民ニ對シ敵對行爲ヲ直ニ止メ武器ヲ措キ且降伏文書ノ一切ノ條項竝ニ帝國政府及大本營ノ發スル一般命令ヲ誠實ニ履行セムコトヲ命ス

御璽

内閣

昭和二十年九月二日

内閣總理大臣 兼 文麿

國務大臣公爵 近衛文麿

海軍大臣 米内光政

外務大臣 重光葵

運輸大臣 小日山直登

大藏大臣 津島壽一

司法大臣 岩田宙造

農林大臣 千石興太郎

國務大臣 安倍源基

内閣

内務大臣 山崎巖

商工大臣 中島知久平

厚生大臣 松村謙三

文部大臣 太田耕造

國務大臣 小澤敬四郎

陸軍大臣 下村定

Fig. 1.10 Surrender document signed by Emperor Hirohito and all members of the Japanese cabinet on September 2, 1945

On the same day, the surrender order signed by Emperor Hirohito, the Japanese Prime Minister and other members of the Japanese cabinet stated that, "Accepting the terms set forth in the Declaration issued by the Heads of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and China on July 26th, 1945 at Potsdam and subsequently adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, We have commanded the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General

Headquarters to sign on Our behalf the Instrument of Surrender presented by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and to issue General Orders to the Military and Naval Forces in accordance with the direction of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers."[58] (see Fig. 1.10).

Compared with the Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War, the Japanese Emperor issued on August 15, the surrender order he issued on September 2 made it clearer that Japan was defeated and would surrender. Now that Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration, it means it had given up the territory it had seized from China, which included, of course, the Diaoyu Islands affiliated with Taiwan. According to Article 3 of the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué issued on September 29, 1972, "The Government of the People's Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration."[59] This means that Japan promised to revert to China Taiwan and the islands affiliated with it. In 1971 the United States arbitrarily brought the Diaoyu Islands under the administrative jurisdiction of Okinawa, which was illegal and invalid and has met the opposition of the Chinese government and people.

In 1972, China and Japan held talks on the normalization of bilateral relations, and their governments didn't held negotiations on the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands and shelved the issue. However, this does not mean China gave up its right to continue making claims on the sovereignty over these islands in accordance with the law the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration. In the 1972 Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué, Japan promised to observe Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration, and Japan should not go back on its words. According to the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship concluded on August 12, 1978, "… the principles enunciated in the Joint Communiqué should be strictly observed."[60] This treaty is legally and politically binding to both China and Japan and is integrated with the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué. According to Article 98 the current Constitution of Japan, "This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the nation and no law, ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or part thereof, contrary to the provisions hereof, shall have legal force or validity. The treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be faithfully observed."[61]

This makes it possible to ascertain that either from the perspective of international law or from the perspective of Japanese laws, when it comes to territory, Japan must observe the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration. On the Diaoyu Islands issue, any attempt to will be baseless and will not be successful.

[58] http://taiwandocuments.org/receipt.htm.

[59] http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/China-Japan-Relations/2013-09/25/content_16993227.htm.

[60] http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/treaty78.html.

[61] http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html.

Chapter 2
Evidence of China's Sovereignty Over the Diaoyu Islands: Ancient Chinese Literature and Maps

The Diaoyu Islands have been Chinese territory since ancient times; they were not affiliated with the ancient Ryukyu Kingdom. Since the fifth year of the reign of Emperor Hongwu of China's Ming Dynasty (1372) when China established the investiture and tributary relations with Ryukyu, it had been clear who owned which island. The Diaoyu Islands including Chiwei Islet belonged to China while Kume Island (used to be known as Gumi Island (古米岛) or Gumi Island (姑米山)) across the Black Water Trench in the east belonged to the Ryukyu Kingdom. Imperial envoys sent by China's Ming and Qing dynasties the Ryukyu Kingdom wrote that "Chiwei Islet marks the boundary between China and Ryukyu,"[1] "Gumi Island is in Ryukyu,"[2] Gumi Island was "the main island on the southwestern border of Ryukyu."[3] For another example, back then the Ryukyu trough between Chiwei Islet and Gumi Island was known as the Black Water Trench or the Black Water Sea and was recorded by Chinese envoys as "the border between China and Ryukyu."[4] When Chinese envoys were at the Black Water Sea on their way back to China from Ryukyu, they said, "After we leave the Black Water Trench, we are surely in Chinese territory."[5]

The maritime boundary between China and Ryukyu came between Chiwei Islet and Gumi Island (Kume Island). The Ryukyu Kingdom was invaded by forces of Japanese Satsuma han in 1609; in 1872 it was forced by Japan to change to the name of Ryukyu han; in 1879 it was annexed by Japan and renamed Okinawa

[1]Guo Rulin and Li Jichun, *On a Diplomatic Mission to Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., 1561, collected at National Library of China, Beijing.
[2]Chen Kan, *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu*, Chin. ed., 1534, collected at National Library of China, Beijing.
[3]Xu Baoguang, *Record of Messages from Chûzan*, 1719, in Huang Ruihua and Xue Ying (eds.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, October 2000, vol. 1, p. 36.
[4]Wang Ji, *Serving as an Envoy to Ryukyu,* 1684, collected at National Library of China, Beijing.
[5]Xia Ziyang and Wang Shizhen, *Serving as an Envoy to Ryukyu*, 1606, collected at National Library of China, Beijing.

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J. Liu, *The Diaoyu Islands*, China Academic Library,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8699-2_2

Prefecture. After that, the Japanese Meiji government had military surveys conducted on the Diaoyu Islands in 1885 and secretly drafted a decision on January 14, 1895, to steal these islands. On January 21 of the same year, the main members of the Japanese cabinet had completed their signature of the decision and it was decided that the Diaoyu Islands would be brought under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture. Before this either Japan or the Ryukyu Kingdom had written records of the Diaoyu Islands. In Japanese history, relevant maps used Chinese names—Diaoyutai, Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet—to refer to these islands.

2.1 China's Sovereignty Over the Diaoyu Islands Traces Back at Least to 1372

China's sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands can trace back at least to the 15th of the first lunar month of the fifth year of the reign of Emperor Hongwu of the Ming Dynasty (1372) when Zhu Yuanzhang, the founding emperor of the Ming Dynasty, sent Yang Zai on an imperial mission to the Ryukyu Kingdom. During his visit, China and Ryukyu established the investiture and tributary relations with China. The History of Ming has an account of this: in the Ming Dynasty "in the first lunar month of the fifth year of the reign of Emperor Hongwu, sent Yang Zai on a diplomatic mission to Ryukyu. Chûzan King Satto sent his brother Taiki and others to China to offer tributes to our dynasty. The emperor was pleased and awarded the visitors the Ming calendar and silk fabrics" (see Fig. 2.1).

In addition to the account of the event from China's ancient documents, there is a similar account in the *History of Chûzan*, the official history of the Ryukyu Kingdom, compiled under the supervision of the Ryukyuan national master and Grand Master with the Purple-Golden Ribbon Sai Taku and his son Sai Un. A passage of the book reads, "As summoned by Ming Emperor Taizu, King Satto sent his brother Taiki to declare themselves vassals and offer tributes…. This marked the beginning of relations between Ryukyu and China"[6] (see Fig. 2.2).

There is hardly any specific historical material to serve as evidence of who was the first to name the Diaoyu Islands and when. However, which country was the first to discover and name these islands can be proved with several methods.

One of the methods I used was the method of exclusion with which Japan and the ancient Ryukyu Kingdom were excluded from among the countries that could be the first to discover and name the Diaoyu Islands, and only China remained. Another method I used was the retrospective method with which every effort was made to discover and sort out China's first historical documents to discover and name the Diaoyu Islands. Even it was impossible for these documents to the

[6]Cai Wen (Ryukyu) et al., *Chûzan History* in Yin Mengxia, Jia Guirong and Wang Guan (eds.), *The National Library of China Continued Data of Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, 2002, vol. 2, pp. 82–83.

Fig. 2.1 *The History of Ming* Published in 1739



Fig. 2.2 *History of Chûzan*, Official Ryukyuan History, 1725

modern international law concept of sovereignty, they are enough to prove that China was the first to discover and name the Diaoyu Islands and has the historical sovereignty over them.

1. *With regard to the disagreement over the statement made in the History of the Sui Dynasty concerning Gaohua Islet (Diaoyu Island), even if this is quite probable, the book can hardly serve as the evidence of China's ownership of Diaoyu Island at that time.*

China doesn't have proven records about Ryukyu before its Sui Dynasty (581–618). According to the record of the *History of the Sui Dynasty* and other ancient Chinese books, in the first year of the reign of Emperor Daye of the Sui Dynasty, the sailor He Man, who had been looking eastward for years every spring and fall when it was fine and less windy, found a smoggy place, though he was sure how thousands of kilometers away that was. Two years later, Sui Emperor Yang ordered Commandant Zhu Kuan to discover other countries by the sea, and He Man joined him and arrived at the Ryukyu Kingdom. They couldn't do anything there because of language barriers; they returned with a local man. Looking across the vast expanse of the sea, Zhu Kuan and his party found Ryukyu resembled a flowing dragon (liuqiu), so they named the place Liuqiu. In the following year, acting on the order of the emperor, Zhu Kuan made another voyage to Ryukyu to demand it come under the rule of the Sui Dynasty, but Ryukyu refused. So Zhu Kuan returned with Ryukyu cloth armors. Accidentally a Japanese envoy was having an audience with the Sui emperor, they were told that the cloth armors were used by people in southern Ryukyu. China referred to Ryukyu as 琉求 (liuqiu) from the Tang Dynasty (618–907) to the Song Dynasty (960–1279). When the Yuan Dynasty (1206 what the dynasty was founded–1279 when the Southern Song Dynasty was eliminated–1368) said that it was across the sea from Zhangzhou, Quanzhou and Fuzhou, it was obviously referring to Taiwan, not the Ryukyu Kingdom. Since the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), China had been referring to Ryukyu as the Ryukyu Kingdom and Taiwan as Small Ryukyu.

(1) There is a reason to believe that he Gaohua Islet referred to in the *History of the Sui Dynasty* is Diaoyu Island.

According to the *History of the Sui Dynasty (81): Eastern Countries—The Ryukyu Kingdom*, "The Ryukyu Kingdom is an island country east of the Jian'an Prefecture and it takes five days to get there by the sea." Following Zhu Kuan's two voyages to Ryukyu, Sui Emperor Yang sent Garrison Commander Chen Leng and General Master for Court Audiences Zhang Zhenzhou to lead armed forces from Yi'an in attacking Ryukyu. They first reached Diaoyu Island. Two days later, they got to Goubi Islet (Kume Island, Ryukyu), and it took them one more day to arrive at Ryukyu. At first, General Chen Leng sent his Kunlun men from southern China who understood the Ryukyu language to persuade Ryukyu to surrender, but they were turned down. So he attacked Ryukyu and reached its capital, winning all battles. He had the Ryukyu palace burnt and brought several thousand local people



Fig. 2.3 *History of the Sui Dynasty (81): Eastern Countries—The Ryukyu Kingdom*

as well as goods and materials back to China. That put an end to China's relations with Ryukyu for a while"[7] (see Fig. 2.3).

Ju Deyuan, a former research fellow of the First Historical Archives of China says that Gaohua Islet the Chinese passed on their way to Ryukyu, an event recorded in the *History of the Sui Dynasty*, was Diaoyu Island of which the summit is Gaohua Summit.[8] Shi Cunlong, maritime transport historian and former academician of the Waterborne Transportation Institute of China's Ministry of Transport also says that "Gaohua Islet was today's Diaoyu Island." On the basis of a comparative study of Gaohua Islet mentioned in the *History of the Sui Dynasty* and Diaoyu Island, they believe that "a comparison of their shapes and names, they are the same island." Therefore, "it is justifiable to say that 1400 years ago, Chinese navigators and members of the Chinese official fleet they led were the first to discover Diaoyu Island."[9] This means that the date when China first discovered the Diaoyu Islands was pushed back to the Sui Dynasty in the early seventh century.

[7] *History of the Sui Dynasty (81): Eastern Countries—The Ryukyu Kingdom*, in *The Twenty-Five Histories*, Chin. ed., Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Books Publishing House, 1986, p. 218.

[8] Ju Deyuan, *The Truth about the Diaoyu Islands,* Chin. ed., Beijing: Kunlun Press, 2006, pp. 7–8.

[9] Shi Cunlong, "China's Official Discovery of the Diaoyu Islands," June 17 2013, http://www.qstheory.cn/lg/xszh/201306/t20130617_240468.htm.

However, was Gaohua Islet really Diaoyu Island Goubi Islet really Kume Island? If so, how did the names evolve? These questions have yet to be investigated.

Thereafter, following the example of the *History of the Sui Dynasty*, the Tang Dynasty's *The New Tang Book: Geography*, the Song Dynasty's *Fang Yu Sheng Lan*, and *The United Annals of the Ming Dynasty* have records about Gaohua Islet and Goubi Islet. According to the Ming Dynasty's *Huanyu Tongzhi* and *The United Annals of the Ming Dynasty*, "It takes one day to sail west to Goubi Islet. It takes three days to sail west to Gaohua Islet. General Chen Leng of the Sui Dynasty and his troops passed these islets."[10] That was the time it took in ancient times to sail westward from the Ryukyu Kingdom to China via Goubi Islet and Gaohua Islet. In addition, according to Ming documents, it took seven days to sail from the Port of Quanzhou to the Port of Naha of the Chûzan State of Ryukyu while it was three days voyage from Gaohua Islet to Chûzan, Ryukyu. These numbers show that it took three day and three nights, either on a one-way or two-way voyage, to sail from Gaohua Islet to Ryukyu. That voyage would have to be made through a vast expanse of sea accurate the Ryukyu trough, and ancient ships weren't very fast. If a ship kept moving nonstop for three days and three nights at the speed of approximately six kilometers per hour, it would finish 420 km at sea and that was the distance between Diaoyu Island Naha, Ryukyu.

The late Guangdong scholar Liang Chia-pin wrote an article in 1948 in Taiwan, stating that, "In both pronunciation and shape, Kume Island is the Goubi Island mentioned in the *History of the Sui Dynasty*."[11] Ju Deyuan also pointed out that "Goubi (黿鼊) was a terrestrial tortoise found in Ryukyu, 黿鼊 resembled the shape of the island was "well-connected with the name Gumi Island (Kume Island)."[12] This leads to the conclusion that the Gaohua Islet Chen Leng of the Sui Dynasty passed on his way to attack Ryukyu was China's Diaoyu Island Goubi Islet was Ryukyu's Gumi Island (Kume Island) east of the Black Water Trench.

In the Ming Map of Beijing, Nanjing and 13 Provinces, Gaohua Islet, or Diaoyu Island is painted brick red just as Fujian Province and is located northeast of Taiwan and the Pengjia Mountain. In the 48th year of the reign of Emperor Qianlong of Qing China (1783), Sekisui Nagakubo drew up the Map of the Qing Dynasty based on *The Geography of China* and other books by Cai Fangbing. The map clearly includes Gaohua Islet where Diaoyu Island should be and a note is added, which says, "It takes four days to sail northeastward from here to reach Ryukyu." That means that back then it took four days to sail from Diaoyu Island to Naha. This leads to the conclusion that the Gaohua Islet in the map was exactly China's Diaoyu

[10]Qiu Jun et al., "The Ryukyu Kingdom," *Huanyu Tongzhi*, vol. 116, and Li Xian, et al., "Foreign Countries: Ryukyu," *The United Annals of the Ming Dynasty*, vol. 89.

[11]Liang Chia-pin, "On the *History of the Sui Dynasty* Account of Voyages from Taiwan to Ryukyu on the Sea of Japan," *Ryukyu, Southeastern Islands and China*, Tunghai University, Taipei, 1965, p. 309.

[12]Ju Deyuan, *On the Sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands Seized by Japan*, Chin. ed., Beijing: Capital Normal University Press, vol. 2, 2001, p. 630.



Fig. 2.4 Sekisui Nagakubo, the Authoritative Geographer of the Japanese Edo Era, Includes Gaohua Islet (Diaoyu Island) in His Map of the Qing Dynasty in 1783

Island. Unlike other maps, the map doesn't include Ryukyu's Yaeyama Islands and Miyako Islands, probably indicating that the map is indeed a map of Chinese territory (see Fig. 2.4).

(2) The statement that the Liuqiu (琉求) mentioned in the *History of the Sui Dynasty* is Taiwan is open to question.

Both the Sui Map of Prefectures of Huainan and Jiangbiao in Volume V of *A Collection of Historical Chinese Maps* and the Map of Sui Patrols of Liuqiu (琉求) in the *Map of Taiwan Province* include Goubi Islet in the Penghu Islands west of Taiwan Island. In 2005, *Four Hundred Years of Taiwan* said that in the Sui Dynasty Chen Leng "set sail in Jieyang, Chaozhou in Guangdong, and moved along the ancient coastal route first probably to Dongshan Island, Fujian Province, and then to Hua Islet (Gaohua Islet) and Kuibi Islet (Goubi Islet) in the Penghu Islands."[13]

However, Shi Cunlong believed that this is a misunderstanding caused by the Japanese scholar Fujita Toyohati. In his *Commentary on the Record of Overseas Countries and Peoples* published in 1915, Toyohati not only tried to

[13]Shi Cunlong, "China's Official Discovery of the Diaoyu Islands," June 17 2013, http://www.qstheory.cn/lg/xszh/201306/t20130617_240468.htm.

prove that "in the Sui Dynasty Liuqiu was Taiwan" but also regarded Gaohua Islet as the Hua Islet in the Penghu Islands.[14]

The crux of the matter discussed above is whether the "Liuqiu" Zhu Kuan and Chen Leng and their troops were said to have reached in the *History of the Sui History* was Taiwan or Ryukyu. The *United Annals of the Ming Dynasty,* documents related to Ming and Qing envoys, and ancient documents of the Ryukyu Kingdom mostly said Liuqiu was the Ryukyu Kingdom, not Taiwan. However, due to the influence of the historical materials of the Yuan Dynasty, records about Taiwan in the *United Annals of the Qing Dynasty* and other documents regarded Liuqiu as Taiwan, not the Ryukyu Kingdom. Shi Cunlong maintained that Zhu Kuan reached Taiwan while Chen Leng arrived at Ryukyu. I agree with the relevant records by Ming and Qing envoys. In addition, the *United Annals of the Ming Dynasty* categorically says that it took three days to sail from Ryukyu to Gaohua Islet while it took five days to get to the Penghu Islands. Obviously, Gaohua Islet and the Penghu Islands were not the same places, so Gaohua Islet should not be regarded as an island in the Penghu Islands.

Instructions given by Ming Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang to provincial officials can be found in the *Record of Ming Emperor Taizu*. The instructions are enough to prove that the Liuqiu mentioned in the *History of the Sui Dynasty* wasn't Taiwan and that it was Ryukyu. The content of the instructions is as follows: "In September of the fourth year of the reign of Emperor Hongwu (1371), the Emperor addressed provincial officials, stating:… as our forefathers say, a vast territory is hard to enjoy lasting peace; public discontent is a source of chaos. For example, Emperor Yang of the Sui Dynasty launched military attacks on Ryukyu, killed its people, burnt its palace, and captured dozens of its citizens. He failed to put the land he seized and the people he captured to best use, thus doing harm to China. His actions were recorded in the annals and began a laughing stock for them. Small foreign countries are remote, separated from China by mountains and seas. We must understand that they are not troublemakers for China. I hope you will keep these remarks of mine in mind."[15] These instructions were not groundless; they represented the official position of China's Ming Dynasty. Those who know this section of the history may no longer bother to investigate this issue.

In the year after Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang gave these instructions, he sent Yang Zai on a mission to the Ryukyu Kingdom. On the one hand, this shows that he had admitted the mistakes made by other Chinese emperors, learned a lesson from them, decided not to repeat historical mistakes and wanted to develop a friendship with Ryukyu. On the other hand, this also shows that the Chinese had been visiting the Ryukyu Kingdom since the Sui Dynasty. They went there via Gaohua Islet, which was probably also known as Gaohua Peak. However, this issue is still open to question.

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[14]Ibid.

[15]*Record of Ming Emperor Taizu*, vol. 68, collected at the National Library of China.

(3) China's Qing assistant envoys Xu Baoguang and Zhou Huang and the Qing Imperial College professor Pan Xiang corrected the mistakes made in the map by Ming military geographer Zheng Ruozeng.

In the 40th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Jiajing (1561), Zheng Ruozeng produced the Map of the Ryukyu Kingdom, marking the Ryukyu Kingdom as Big Ryukyu and Taiwan as Small Ryukyu and categorically stating that "Small Ryukyu is close to Quanzhou. It is visible from the Drum Mountain when it is clear. It has part of the Ming Dynasty and doesn't offer tribute to it."[16] This shows that Taiwan was already part of the territory of China's Ming Dynasty.

However, in the map, Zheng Ruozeng mistakenly marked the Penghu Island Gaohua Islet as part of Ryukyu. This shows that he didn't have a clear understanding of the territory of Ryukyu. His map was actually an illustration in his writing on the Ryukyu palace. In the map, on the left of the palace is Diaoyu Island Gumi Island (now Kume Island), but at the same time, on the upper left of the map are Penghu Island, Gaohua Islet and Yuanbi Islet, which are far north from Taiwan (see Fig. 2.5). However, the map with such mistakes was cited by the Japanese as "evidence" of the Diaoyu Islands being part of Ryukyu.

This is because Zheng Ruozeng had never been to Ryukyu and had produced the map based on historical documents. These documents had two names for the same island, but Zheng mistook them for two different islands. For example, he recorded Chiwei Islet as two different islets—Chi Islet and Chikan Islet, though they are actually the names of the same islet. Probably, he mistook Diaoyu Island Gaohua Islet as two different islands.

Chen's writing and mapping was actually based on "Relevant Books" in Chen Kan's *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu*. One passage of the records reads, in Ryukyu, "with regard to mountains and rivers, in the south, there is Taiping Island, in the west, there are Gumi Island and Machi Island, and in the north there are Liuhuang Island, Rebi Island, Huijia Island, Yishan, Qidao Island many more. Yuanbi and other islets and Penghu and other islands are nowhere to be found; they are all far from Ryukyu."[17] These are the Ryukyu islands drawn by Zheng Ruozeng, though he added to them Small Ryukyu and its affiliated islets such as Huaping and Diaoyu and he also exaggeratedly included, in the upper left of the map, the Penghu Island, Gaohua Islet and Yuanbi Islet, which were "nowhere to be found." There are similar mistakes in the China coastal defense map done by Zheng Ruozeng in the same period. He mistakenly took Yuanbi (黿鼊) Islet as Yuanbi (元辟) Islet.

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[16]Zheng Ruozeng, "Map of Ryukyu," Chin. ed., in Huang Runhua and Xueying (eds.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, 2000, vol. 1, p. 1111.

[17]Chen Kan, *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., 13th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Jiajing (1534) in Huang Runhua and Xueying (eds.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, October 2000, vol. 1, p. 62.



Fig. 2.5 "The Map of the Ryukyu Kingdom," *Miscellaneous Writings of Zheng Kaiyang*

The Map of the Ryukyu Kingdom in Volume XIII of *Illustrated Heaven, Earth, and People*, compiled by Wang Qi in the 35th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Wanli (1607), was an imitation of Zheng's map and made even more mistakes. For example, it mistook Gaohua Islet as Gaoying Islet and Penghu (澎湖) Island as Penghu (澎胡) Island; and they were made too far from Taiwan. In addition, Diaoyu Islet was made closer to than Ryukyu Palace than Kumi Island was misplaced.

These mistakes were corrected by Qing envoy Xu Baoguang in his *Record of Messages from Chûzan* in 1719. He reported to Emperor Kangxi, "Many mistakes have been made about islands and islets, and many corrections have been made in the records by my predecessors. According to the *Unified Annals of the Ming Dynasty,* Yuanbi Islet is a one-day voyage westward from Ryukyu, and Gaohua (also called Gaoying) Islet is a three-day voyage westward from Ryukyu, but I have found neither of them there. According to the same annals, Penghu Island is a five-day voyage westward of Ryukyu. However, Penghu is close to Taiwan and Quanzhou and is not part of the Ryukyu Islands. The Map of Ryukyu produced by Zheng Ruoceng of Kunshan repeated this mistake. In addition, in this map, Pengjia Island, Diaoyu Islet, Huaping Islet, as well as Jilong and Small Ryukyu and other islands are somewhere between 1000 and 1500 km from Ryukyu are misplaced to be close to Kumi Island Naha, which is a big mistake. Taiping Island [today's Miyako Island] is 1000 km south of Ryukyu, but Zheng's map has it as a small



Fig. 2.6 Xu Baoguang: *Record of Messages from Chûzan*, 1719

mountain in front of the Kankaimon Gate at the peak of Chûzan, which is especially wrong"[18] (see Fig. 2.6).

The abovementioned corrections made by Xu Baoguang are very important. He stated that neither Yuanbi Islet nor Gaohua Islet was found there. This is because ancient books such as *Voyage with a Tail Wind* that were published in the early years of the Ming Dynasty in the early fifteenth century had already replaced Gaohua Islet with Diaoyu Island Goubi (Yuanbi) Islet with Kumei Island. In the early sixteenth century, Chen Kan could explain where Gaohua Islet mentioned in the *United Annals of the Ming Dynasty* was, so it was natural that Xu Baoguang didn't find there in the eighteenth century. All these islands appeared simultaneously in the maps of the Ryukyu Kingdom by Zheng Ruozeng and Wang Qi, which is really wrong. As Gaohua Islet and Goubi Islet disappeared from the subsequent ancient documents, Diaoyutai or Diaoyu Islet and Gumi (姑米) Island or Gumi (古米) Island became standard expressions. With regard to the names of islands China and Ryukyu, this was a phenomenon, not an accident.

[18]Xu Baoguang, *Record of Messages from Chûzan,* Chin. ed., in Huang Runhua and Xueying (eds.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, October 2000, vol. 1, pp. 325–326.

Assistant envoy Zhou Huang, who went on a mission to Ryukyu in the 21st year of Qing Emperor Qianlong (1756), also pointed out in the *Record of the Ryukyu Kingdom*, "According to the *History of the Sui Dynasty,* in the fourth year of the reign of Sui Emperor Yang, the emperor send Garrison Commander Chen Leng to attack Ryukyu. He reached Gaohua Islet from which it took him two days to sail to Goubi Islet and one more day to Ryukyu. The *United Annals of the Ming Dynasty* also states that Yuanbi Islet is west of Ryukyu. It takes one day to sail from Yuanbi Islet to Gaohua (also known as Gaoying) Islet and takes three days to sail westward from Ryukyu to reach Yuanbi Islet. These names are simply not there anymore. According to the history of the Yuan Dynasty, Liuqiu (瑠求) is across the sea from Penghu Island. The *United Annals of the Ming Dynasty* also states that it takes five days to sail westward from Ryukyu to reach Penghu Island; however, I have found that Penghu Island is close to Taiwan and is not the territory of the Ryukyu Kingdom. The Map of the Ryukyu Kingdom produced by Zheng Ruozeng based on maritime routes mistakenly places close to Shurijo in Ryukyu's capital city of Naha Pengjia Island, Diaoyutai, Huaping Islet as well as Jilong and Small Ryukyu and other mountains that are 1000–1500 km far. And the map misplaces in front of Kankaimon Gate of Chûzan."[19]

In addition, Pan Xiang, teacher of Ryukyu students at the Imperial College, also corrected Zheng Ruozeng's mistakes. In 1764, Pan Xiang stated in his *Record of Ryukyuan Students at the Imperial College* that, "Previous documents have records about Gaohua Islet and Yuanbi Islet, but these names no longer exist today. Penghu Island is close to Taiwan and is not the territory of Ryukyu. Pengjia Island, Diaoyutai, Huaping Islet, Jilong Island, Small Ryukyu, and Taiping Island are all 1000–1500 km away from Chûzan Province. However, the Map of Ryukyu produced by Zheng Ruozeng of Kunshan misplaces them close to the Port of Naha and Kankaimon Gate. There are many other mistakes in the map."[20]

Why did Zheng Ruozeng make those mistakes? I think this is probably because he had never been to Ryukyu and had been affected by Zheng Shungong's *Record of Japan*. In the book, Zheng discussed the shipping route to Ryukyu via Diaoyu Islands and Huangwei Islet, and he also said, "There is also a shipping route from Penghu all the way to Big Ryukyu via Gaohua and Yuanbi." In fact, these could be the same shipping route referred to differently in different dynasties, but Zheng Shungong mistook them as two different routes and recorded them. Ancient sailing vessels moved on the strength of the wind. A voyage eastward to Ryukyu probably made Penghu the first station, and then, on the strength of southwesterly winds, reached Gaohua (Diaoyu Island), then arrived at Yuanbi (Kume Island) and eventually got to Big Ryukyu (the Ryukyu Kingdom). Considering the dates of the

[19]Zhou Huang, *Record of the Ryukyu Kingdom (*vol. 1), Chin. ed., in Huang Runhua and Xueying (eds.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, 2000, vol. 2, p. 845.

[20]Pan Xiang, *Record of Ryukyuan Students at the Imperial College,* Chin. ed., 1764, in Huang Runhua and Xueying (eds.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, 2000, vol. 3, p. 345.

publication of the two writings, Zheng Shungong's *Record of Japan* was completed in 1556 while Zheng Ruozeng's Map of the Ryukyu Kingdom was produced in 1561. It is therefore justifiable to say the latter could be misled by the former. However, this is open to question. However, the *Record of Japan* and the *Illustrations on Defense against Japanese Pirates* were not affected by Zheng Ruozeng's map when they indicate that the Diaoyu Islands are affiliated with Taiwan and were brought within the scope of China's coastal defense.

(4) The corrections made by Xu Baoguang, Zhou Huang, and Pan Xiang were so important that they stopped those mistakes from being misused.

Under the pen name of Li Woteng, the book *Whose Is Diaoyutai? History and Legality* was published in September 2014. When it comes to "the Japanese understanding of Diaoyutai," the book says, "In Japanese classics, the first book to mention Diaoyutai was *Japanese-Chinese Illustrated Heaven, Earth, and People* published in 1712". This book was based on *Illustrated Heaven, Earth, and People* that appeared in China's Ming Dynasty. The Chinese book includes the Map of the Ryukyu Kingdom. By form, the map is well connected with *Illustrations on Defense against Japanese Pirates* and *The Enlarged Map of China*. The map includes Diaoyu Islet as the territory of Ryukyu Kingdom. Because the map also includes Small Ryukyu (Taiwan) that does not belong to Ryukyu, it is not enough to serve as evidence that Diaoyutai belongs to Ryukyu. However, the map once again proves that the historical position of Diaoyutai was ambiguous. The title 'The Enlarged Map of China' can better show that China has the sovereignty than the 'Map of Coastal Islands' included in *Illustrations on Defense against Japanese Pirates.*[21]

Japanese-Chinese Illustrated Heaven, Earth, and People is the Japanese translation of the *Illustrated Heaven, Earth, and People* written in Chinese by Wang Qi in the 15th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Wanli (1607). The Map of the Ryukyu Kingdom included in *Japanese-Chinese Illustrated Heaven, Earth, and People* (see Fig. 2.7) is exactly an imitation of the Map of the Ryukyu Kingdom in "Geography" (vol. 13) in *Illustrated Heaven, Earth, and People*. And the map in the Chinese book was based on Zheng Ruozeng's Map of the Ryukyu Kingdom in *Illustrations on Defense against Japanese Pirates*.

This leads to the conclusions as follows:

First, *Japanese-Chinese Illustrated Heaven, Earth, and People,* the first Japanese book to discuss the Diaoyu Islands, is merely a translation or copy of the Chinese ancient book *Illustrated Heaven, Earth, and People* published in China 105 before, can absolutely not prove that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to Japan or Ryukyu, but on the contrary, shows that Japan's knowledge of the Diaoyu Islands entirely came from China.

[21]Li Woteng, *Whose Is Diaoyutai? History and Legality*, Chin. ed., Taipei: Wu-Nan Book Company Ltd., 2014, pp. 117–118.



Fig. 2.7 "The Map of the Ryukyu Kingdom," *Japanese-Chinese Illustrated Heaven, Earth, and People,* 1712

Second, the official reports submitted to Chinese emperors, such as the *Record of Messages from Chûzan* written by Chinese Qing Assistant envoy Xu Baoguang in 1719, the *Record of the Ryukyu Kingdom* written by assistant envoy Zhou Huang in 1756, and the *Record of Ryukyuan Students at the Imperial College* completed by Pan Xiang in 1764, all clearly point out and correct the mistakes in Zheng Ruozeng's "Map of the Ryukyu Kingdom" in his *Miscellaneous Writings of Zheng Kaiyang*.

Third, ignoring these historical materials, deliberately exaggerating the mistakes made by *Japanese-Chinese Illustrated Heaven, Earth, and People* and corrected by authoritative documents, fabricating the "ambiguous position" of the Diaoyu Islands in history would mislead readers and must therefore be clarified based on facts.

(5) Diaoyu Island and other islands might have been named by the Chinese since the Sui Dynasty.

The Ryukyuan people had their own language, used Chinese characters, and understood Chinese, but their pronunciations were based on Japanese. China and Ryukyu could choose Chinese characters to name places based on their pronunciations. In Chinese, 龜鼈 is pronounced goubi, meaning turtle. It should be noted

that both *Voyage with a Tail Wind* and *Compass Rules*[22] discussed Kumei (枯美) Island, i.e., Gumi Island (Kume Island). Both Ryukyu and Japan pronounced枯美 as Kobi, which was similar with枯美's pronunciation in the southern Fujian dialect.

After the *History of the Sui Dynasty* stated that Chen Leng attacked Ryukyu via Gaohua Islet and Goubi Islet, Ryukyu "still didn't pay tribute to China during the Tang and Song dynasties and in the Yuan Dynasty Ryukyu turned down the Chinese envoy's demand it come under the command of China."[23] This shows that it was not until the fifth years of the reign of Ming Emperor Hongwu (1372) that official relations were established between China and Ryukyu. During the Tang and Song dynasties, the exchange between China and Ryukyu was mainly carried out through private vessels. The Yuan Dynasty made military attacks on Liuqiu (瑠求), which was Taiwan, not the Ryukyu Kingdom. In these approximately 760 years, it was probably because Goubi (鼇), an islet the Chinese named for Ryukyu, was hard to write and recognize, it was changed by the Ryukyuan to Kumei (枯美) based on its pronunciation. In and after the Ming Dynasty, Kumei Island was changed by the Chinese to similar Chinese characters 姑米山 and 古米山 (both pronounced Gumi Island), and later on, it was renamed Kume Island.

In Japanese, 古米 is pronounced Kome and久米, Kume, both being similar to their Chinese pronunciations. Gaohua Islet was most probably renamed Diaoyutai by southern Fujian fishermen before the Ming Dynasty while it was referred to as Diaoyu Islet in the *Record of Missions to Ryukyu* and other Ming China's official documents. This is probably because Diaoyutai was confusing since there were four or five places in China that were so named while there was only one Diaoyu Islet (Diaoyu Islands) and no confusion would be caused. By custom Fujian and Taiwan often referred to islands as islets while Ryukyu often called *mountains*.

Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet, islands affiliated with the Diaoyu Islands, are related to the name of the Diaoyu Islands and were most probably so named after the color of the fish in the sea and the natural scenes there. In 1808, Chinese envoy Qi Kun (1770–1815) composed a poem titled "Chiwei Islet," which reads, "Chi and Huang comes together, set in an untrimmed manner. Big fish emerge from water,

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[22]There was a relevant book titled *Maritime rules* which was completed in the Ming Dynasty and is now missing. *Compass Rules* was mentioned in *The General Meaning of the Compass (*originally titled *A Grand Maritime Guide*), written by Ryukyuan scholar Tei Junsoku in 1708. *Compass Rules* is probably another title of *Maritime rules.* Xiang Da brought to China a copy of *Compass Rules* from the University of Oxford in the UK and in 1961, this book and *Voyage with a Tail Wind* were combined to appear as *Two Kinds of Maritime Rules*. Xiang Da reckoned that *Compass Rules* was completed in the last years of the reign of Qing Emperor Kangxi in the eighteenth century. However, Chinese contemporary scholar Zhang Chonggen doesn't agree, arguing that the book mentioned praised the Ming Dynasty, so it wasn't a Qing book but a probably a book completed in the mid-seventeenth century.

[23]*The United Annals of the Ming Dynasty* and Chen Kan, *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu*, the 13th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Jiajing (1534), in Huang Ruihua and Xue Ying (eds.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, October 2000, vol. 1, p. 62.

the sun shines in red…."[24] The big fish were probably whales in the Black Water Trench (Okinawa Trough) close to Chiwei Islet.

In Qing China, Tei Gakukai, a Ryukyuan student in China, also wrote a poem, which reads, "When the God of Sea plays on the sea/hundreds of sea monsters emerge as company. Whales hit the water with their tails and turtles have red backs/ They emerge from waves when the sea and sky look alike. As the sun over the waves is setting/a ray of light shines in all directions"[25] Fengyi is believed to be the Sea Spirit in the Black Water Trench (Okinawa Trough) who originates in Hebo, the legendary River Spirit in China's Yellow River region. Later on, the legend was introduced to Japan and the monster evolved into a kappa is a Japanese water monster that has a beak, a shell on its back and a human body. This poem vividly records that when passing the Black Water Trench at sunset, one can also see the setting sun redden the whales emerging from the sea. According to Qing envoy to Ryukyu Li Dingyuan, "Chiwei Islet is a red square island, with western and eastern parts higher than the middle section in which a summit stands." What Li described is very much like a whale emerging from the sea and reddened by the rays of evening sunlight. This leads to the conclusion that this probably gave Chiwei Islet its name.

(6) The *History of the Sui Dynasty* isn't enough to determine when China began to own the Diaoyu Islands.

From the perspective of international law, there seems not to be enough evidence of Sui China's ownership of the Diaoyu Islands, and the issue requires further research.

First, as the *History of the Sui Dynasty* shows, beginning in the Sui Dynasty, China took Ryukyu as an East China Sea country, but it didn't immediately determine its maritime boundary with Ryukyu.

Second, was Gaohua Islet really Diaoyu Island? Was Yuanbi Islet really Kume Island? What was the relationship between these two islands? So far no ancient documents have been found to be enough to answer these questions.

Third, even if it certain that Gaohua was Diaoyu Island Yuanbi Islet was Kume Island, that only means Sui China discovered and named these islands and cannot rule out the possibility of the Ryukyuan discovering and living in Yuanbi Islet (Gumi Island or Kume Island).

Fourth, even if it is certain that China discovered both of these islands, there were no Chinese documents before the Ming Dynasty indicating which of these

[24]Qi Kun, *Eight Poems on My Voyage to Ryukyu,* poem 5 *Chiwei Islet*, in Wang Han (ed.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu, Part Three,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, first edition, 2006, vol. 2, p. 323.

[25]*Ryukyu Poetry*, the 24th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Daoguang (1844), block-printed edition, in Huang Ruihua and Xue Ying (eds.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, October 2000, vol. 2, p. 796.

islands belonged to China, which belonged to Ryukyu, and China continued its valid occupation of Gaohua Islet through patrols after it discovered that islet.

Fifth, ancient Chinese documents before the Ming Dynasty didn't have records about Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet. From the perspective of international law, it is not certain that China has had the ownership of Diaoyu Island islands affiliated with it since the Sui Dynasty. Nevertheless, relevant investigations will help the Chinese better understand the history of their islands and are of positive significance and academically valuable.

2. *Since the Ming Dynasty, China has had clear records about Diaoyutai and Diaoyu Islet (Diaoyu Island).*

From the perspective of international law, historical evidence of territorial sovereignty isn't the earlier, the better; on the contrary, the more accurate and specific it is, the more valuable it is. Since the Ming Dynasty, Diaoyu Island not only had been made a sea marker helping Chinese envoys sail to Ryukyu, but also had been included in the coast defense area against Japanese pirates and brought under effective jurisdiction. This had been recognized by the Ryukyu Kingdom and the maritime boundary had thus been determined.

(1) China began to own Diaoyu Island no later than 1372 when it established relations with Ryukyu.

Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang founded the Ming Dynasty in 1368 and made the year the first year of the Hongwu Era. Since that, the Ming government sent envoys to Vietnam, Korea, Java, and other countries and established the investiture and tributary relations with them. This was a feudal tributary system formed with China as Asia's economic and cultural center. The system was not based on the equality of sovereign states, but it was not a colonial system imposed by a suzerain on its colony with force. China rewarded heavily those countries who offered it tributes and were quite friendly to them.

Back then, before the king of Ryukyu ascended the throne, he asked China for an investiture and expressed his gratitude to China. When he expressed his gratitude to China in the 13th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Jiajing (1808), he said, "Your Majesty's kindness is a great honor for my country, the imperial morality makes a China a respectable country."[26]

Ming envoy Yang Zai made two visits to Ryukyu and Japan in 1369 and another in 1372, and his visit to Ryukyu must be made via Diaoyu Island. In March 1369, Ming Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang sent Yang Zai to Japan to demand that Japan ban pirates and pay tribute to China. Back then northern and southern parts of Japan

[26]Yin Mengxia, Jia Guirong, and Wang Guan (eds.), *Continued Edition of the Materials about Ryukyu at the National Library of China*, vol. 1, Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Publishing House, first edition 2002, p. 357.

were separated and the country suffered from incessant wars. Prince Kaneyoshi of the Nanboku-chō period in Japan, who ruled the Kyushu area, turned down China's demand even beheaded five Ming envoys and kept Yang Zai under arrest for three months.[27] After that, Yang Zai returned from Kyushu to Fujian via Ryukyu. This event was an important reason why the early years of the Ming Dynasty China banned on maritime trade with Japan.

Later on, on December 29 of the fifth year of Ming Emperor Hongwu (1372), he sent Yang Zai to the Ryukyu Kingdom and Yang was received by the king of Chûzan. Back then, the Ryukyu Kingdom has yet to be unified and Okinawa Island was divided into Chûzan, Sannan, and Sanhoku kingdoms. King Satto of the Ryukyu kingdom of Chûzan sent his brother Taiki to travel to China together with Yang Zai to offer tributes and accept investitures. Because Diaoyu Islet, Huangwei Islet, Chiwei Islet, and other islands were important places for Yang Zai's travels to and from Ryukyu, they were used as marine markers.

The imperial edict Yang Zai brought to Ryukyu reads, "All the territory under the jurisdiction of the emperor, wherever the sun and moon shine, will be treated the same no matter how far it is. As China was in chaos, neighboring countries all went their own way without coming under China's command. Since the governance of the Yuan Dynasty failed, it had been 17 years of incessant wars. I was born into a poor family and started my political career in Jiangzuo. I led my men in conquering all those who refused to come under my command, eliminating Dahan King Chen Youliang in the west, taking captive Wu King Zhang Shicheng, conquering Minyue in the south, capturing Bashu, seizing Youyan in the north and thus bringing peace to Chinese and other ethnic groups, and restoring China to its original territory. With the support of the people, I became the emperor of the Ming Dynasty in the era of Hongwu. I have sent envoys abroad to make my will be widely known. Wherever my envoys reach, local chiefs all vow allegiance and offer tribute. However, as Ryukyu is overseas southeast of China, it hasn't been notified of this. I hereby send my envoy to bring you my will" (see Fig. 2.8).[28]

On the 24th day of the 12th moon of the 7th year of the Hongwu Reign (1374), the Ming Dynasty ordered Attendant Gentleman of the Ministry of Justice Li Hao on a mission to Ryukyu, awarding Ryukyuan King Satto 20 bolts of silk fabrics and 1,000 pieces of earthenware. In addition, the envoy's ship brought 100 bolts of silk fabrics, 50 bolts of satins, 69,500 pieces of earthenware, and 990 iron stills. On the 1st day of the 4th month of the 9th year of the Hongwu Reign (1376), Li Hao exchanged his commodities for 40 Ryukyuan horses and 2500 km of sulfur.29 It was precisely Ming Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang's.[29] It was precisely Ming Emperor

[27]Mamoru Akamine, *The Ryukyu Kingdom*, Jpn. ed., Tokyo: Kodansha Ltd., 2004, p. 35.

[28]Yan Congjian (ed.), *An Introduction to Different Countries: Ryukyu,* vol. 1, block-printed edition, the second year of Ming Emperor Wanli (1574), in Huang Ruihua and Xue Ying (eds.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, October 2000, vol. 1, pp. 104, 105.

[29]*Record of Ming Emperor Taizu,* vol. 95 and 150.



Fig. 2.8 Yan Congjian, *An Introduction to Different Countries: Ryukyu,* vol. 1, 1574

Zhu Yuanzhang's policy of friendship with neighboring countries that started the history of friendly exchange between China and Ryukyu.

In the 15th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Hongwu (1382), Chûzan, Sannan, and Sanhoku kings in Ryukyu went to war with each other. The Ming government ordered Chief of Service Liang Min to bring them edicts demanding they stop the war for the benefit of the people. Ming Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang said in his edict to Sanhoku King Hanachi, "God cherishes the people, and they are countless people across the world. Heaven is afraid that the people do harm to each other, so the wise are created to rule them for their good. Your envoy has come from the sea and complained that the three kings of Ryukyu are fighting each other, thus devastating agriculture and causing the loss of lives. I am disheartened to hear that. I hereby have my envoy travel to Ryukyu to tell you that God loves the people and that you should stop the war for the benefit of the people. Will that be OK? Otherwise, if God gets angry, you will be brought to account. So that is what I have to say in this edict."[30] In the following year, the war died down. In his edict to Ryukyuan King Satto, Zhu Yuanzhang said, "As the king of Ryukyu, you live between Heaven and Sea, love your land work for your country. From shore to shore your country has been consolidated…. I have a gilded seal for you through the good office of my

[30]Zhu Yuanzhang, *A Collection of Works*, Chin. ed., Anhui ancient books, Hefei: Huangshan Press, November 1991, p. 166.

envoy."[31] This can also be found in the *History of Chûzan*, the official history of Ryukyu[32] (see Fig. 2.9).

After that, Ryukyuan Sannan and Sanhoku kings began to send tributes to China in return for investitures. In the 18th year of the reign of Ming Emperor (1385), the Ming government awarded Sannan and Sanhoku kings gilded silver seals. In the fourth year of the reign of Ming Emperor Xuande (1429), Chûzan King Shō Hashi (his original name was Hashi and the Ming emperor gave him the surname Shō) reunified Chûzan, Sanhoku, and Sannan to establish a unified Shō Dynasty of the Ryukyu Kingdom that accepted China's investiture, paid tribute to China, and used China's calendar. That is to say, Ryukyu abided by Chinese law, use the Chinese era, and became a vassal of China.

After China and Ryukyu established the investiture and tributary relations, both Chinese and Ryukyuan ancient official documents affirmed that the maritime boundary between China and Ryukyu was roughly the Black Water Trench (also known as the Okinawa Trough) between Chiwei Islet, which is affiliated with Diaoyu Islands, and Kume Island, Ryukyu. From 1372 when Yang Zai visited Ryukyu to 1879 when Japan totally annexed Ryukyu, China and Ryukyu maintained more than 500 years of friendship. Their maritime boundary came between China's Chiwei Islet and Ryukyu's Gumi Island (today's Kume Island), which had never been disputable to either side. Seeking the investiture of China, Ryukyu had been sticking to rules and absolutely shied away from the idea of obtaining Chinese territory.

(2) Since the Ming Dynasty, China had brought the Diaoyu Islands and relevant waters under its coast defense.

Since the Ming Dynasty, the Ryukyu Kingdom had accepted China's protection. As it was recorded, "We rely on the friendship of China on stopping other countries from seizing our territory … so as to keep it intact."[33] A coast defense general of Ming China stated, "Japanese come from the East China Sea, and the best way to defeat them is to intercept them at sea."[34] In the early years of the Ming Dynasty, the area covered in China's defense against Japanese pirates extended from the territorial waters around the Diaoyu Islands to Kume Island in open waters west of Ryukyu. According to China's *History of the Ming Dynasty*, in the sixth year of the reign of Ming Emperor Hongwu (1373), Fuzhou coast defense general Zhang He led his fleet in regular patrols of Chinese waters and expelled Japanese pirates at the

[31]Ibid., p. 165.

[32]Cai Wen (Ryukyu) et al. *Chûzan History* in Yin Mengxia, Jia Guirong and Wang Guan (eds.), *The National Library of China Continued Data of Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, 2002, vol. 2, pp. 84–87.

[33]"Memorial of Ryukyuan King Shō Shin" (1479), in Fuyu Iha (ed.), *Ryukyuan Historical Materials Series*, Tokyo: Natori Shyoten, 1941, p. 85 in Mi Qingyu, "The Appointment Relations between China and Ryukyu in Modern Times," Chin. ed., *Japanese Studies*, no. 4, 1997, p. 129.

[34]Zhen Ruozeng, "The Strengths of Sha-Type Ships," *Miscellaneous Writings of Zheng Kaiyang*, 14th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Jiaqing (1561).



Fig. 2.9 *History of Chûzan*, Official History of the Ryukyu Kingdom, 1725

Niushan sea, Fujian (today's open waters off Pingtan Island) and followed them up to the waters off Ryukyu."[35] These waters included the Black Water Trench east of Chiwei and the open waters off Ryukyu. The Black Water Trench in ancient times served as the natural boundary between China's Fujian waters and the waters of Ryukyu. Eastward straight from the Niushan Sea, Fujian (open waters off Pingtan Island) was Diaoyu Island. To follow up Japanese pirates to Ryukyu waters, the Chinese had to pass Diaoyu Island and Chiwei Islet and use these islands as beacons. This shows that since the early years of the Ming Dynasty, China's coast defense areas had covered Diaoyu Island relevant waters.

It is by no means accidental that back then the Ming Dynasty both sent Yang Zao on a mission to Ryukyu and had Zhang He patrol the waters of Fujian. According to *Rules and Regulations of the Ming Dynasty*, the dynasty had strict regulations on tributary timing, routes, and mission scales Diaoyu Island other islands were exactly on the tributary route and a maritime marker for approximately 500 years in the Ming and Qing dynasties. In 1373, Zhang He sailed for several hundred nautical miles to expel Japanese pirates and patrol waters, probably because he wanted to ensure the tributary route was safe between Ryukyu and China. Back then, Japan was divided into the Northern and Southern Dynasties, some armed forces were reduced to pirates who kept attacking the coastal regions of Chinese and the Korean Peninsula. Zhang He's patrols of the sea and Yang Zai's mission to Ryukyu coincided mainly for the purpose of stop Japanese pirates from threatening the sea route between China and Ryukyu. Otherwise, the Ming Dynasty did not have to fight a war in the seas of Ryukyu.

According to the *History of the Ming Dynasty*, in the seventh year of the reign of Ming Emperor Hongwu (1374), Marquis of the Sea Wu Zhen led the navy in patrolling Fujian waters and attack Japanese pirates. They reached as far as Ryukyuan waters, captured Japanese ships, and brought prisoners of war to China's capital.[36] Just the *History of the Ming Dynasty* said, it was exactly in that year that Ryukyuan King's brother Taiki made another trip to China to offer tribute; Attendant Gentleman of the Ministry of Justice Li Haoji was sent to Ryukyu to award its king silk fabrics, earthenware, and ironware. When he returned to China in 1376, he brought back horses and sulfur. Back then, maritime safety was essential for an exchange between China and Ryukyu. These historical facts show that Diaoyu Islands had been brought under China's patrols in the early years of the Ming Dynasty.

Just as I mentioned above, according to Japan's *International Law Dictionary* stated, "Even if it is an uninhabited island, a country can realize occupation of it by having warships or official ships carry out regular patrols of it."[37] By this definition,

[35]"Zhang He," *History of the Ming Dynasty*, vol. 12, pp. 3832–3833.

[36]"Wu Zhen," *History of the Ming Dynasty*, pp. 3840–3841.

[37]The Japanese Society of International Law, *International Law Dictionary,* Chin. ed., Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1985, p. 270.

China had expelled Japanese pirates and patrolled on the waters from Fujian's coastal areas to Ryukyu via the Diaoyu Islands since the Ming Dynasty at the latest, so it had achieved the occupation of the Diaoyu Islands and other islands and they were not *terra nullius*.

3. *According to Voyage with a Tail Wind, the earliest available Chinese ancient document that recorded the Diaoyu Islands, the Diaoyu Islands had become a maritime marker for China's diplomatic ships to Ryukyu in the late fourteenth century at the latest.*

Voyage with a Tail Wind was a Ming China's guide to shipping. The book was anonymous and has been missing. In the Age of Exploration, "Shunfeng Xiangsong," the Chinese title of the book, means that wishing you a voyage with a tail wind. This is because in ancient times, wood ships had to sail on the strength of a tail wind. This led to the custom "wishing a voyage with a tail wind" in Fujian. According to the custom, when local people sailed across the sea to other countries, they would pay a visit to relatives to bid them goodbye, and receive from their relatives gifts such as eggs, rice noodles and other local products.[38] These gifts might also include shipping guides or maps that were used among the people.

The book was probably named after the custom. A transcript of the book can be found in the Bodleian Library at the University of Oxford in the UK. The back cover of the book includes a note by the donor Archbishop of Canterbury to Archbishop William Laud, Chancellor of the University of Oxford. Chinese historian Xiang Da visited the University of Oxford as an exchange librarian of the Beiping Library, the predecessor of the National Library of China, from 1935 to 1936. At the university, he found this copy in the Bodleian Library and made a copy of it. In 1961, Xiang's copy was published as *Two Sea Directories* with notes.

Voyage with a Tail Wind records the shipping routes between Fujian and Ryukyu and between Ryukyu and Japan. It has records about Diaoyu Island and Chikan Islet. It is one of the earliest writings on how the Chinese named and exploited these islands. *Voyage with a Tail Wind* has the following statement about the shipping route from Fujian to Ryukyu:

> Set sail from Taiwu Island (Jinmen Island) and move northeast for seven *geng* (one day and one night are roughly divided into ten *geng*) to reach Wuqiu Islet. Move on northeast and then east and turn south from Dongqiang Island. Move southeast to Small Ryukyu and then sail southeast to Mu Island. In a northerly wind, set sail from Dongyong and move northeast to Pengjia Island. Move northeast and east to Diaoyu Islet. In a southerly wind, set sail from Dongyong and move south by east to Small Ryukyu Island as well as Pengjia Island and Huaping Islet. When there is a southerly wind, set sail from Meihua and move southeast to Small Ryukyu. Move southeast to the south of Diaoyu Islet. Move east to Chikan Islet, and move northeast to Kumei Island. When there is a southerly wind, move

[38]Ma Shuhua and Qu Jinliang (eds.), *Marine Culture History of China: Ming and Qing Dynasties*, Chin. ed., Qingdao: Ocean University of China Press, 2012, p. 545.



Fig. 2.10 *Voyage with a Tail Wind,* the Earliest Available Ancient Chinese Writing about the Shipping Route to Diaoyu Islet

east by south for four *geng*. Watch the wind closely, move north by east for 11 *geng* to reach Kuma Island, that is, Machi Island (the Kairyuma Islands and Aka Island), and then move northeast to the Ryukyu Kingdom"[39] (see Fig. 2.10.)

Voyage with a Tail Wind mentions Diaoyu Islet twice. Also appears in the book are Chikan Islet (Chiwei Islet), Ryukyu's Kume Island, Kuba Island, one of the Kerama Islands southwest of and closest to Kume Island the name of which has remained unchanged until today), and Aka Island in the Ryukyuan Kerama Islands.

This shows that Japan wrongly named Huangwei Islet Kuba Island, leading to two islands being called the same name. Both 赤 (chi) and 阿嘉 (ajia) are pronounced "aka" in Japanese. As a result, 赤島 (Chi Island) in the Kerama Islands was changed to 阿嘉島 (Aka Island). After Japan annexed Ryukyu, it changed 赤尾屿 (Chiwei Islet) to Kume Aka Island and renamed it Taisho Island after 1920. However, even today firing/bombing ranges of the US military bases in Okinawa are still registered as Kobi Syo and Sekibi Syo. This proves that the Diaoyu Islands are Chinese islands that were first named by China.

[39]Xiang Da (corrections and annotations), "Maritime Rules (Part One): Voyage with a Tail Wind," *Record of Zheng He's Voyage to the Western Oceans, Zheng He's Nautical Chart, and Two Kinds of Maritime Rules,* Chin. ed., Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, first edition, April 2000, pp. 95–96.



Fig. 2.11 Pan Xiang, illustration, *Record of Ryukyuan Students at the Imperial College*, 1764

The passages cited above from Voyage with a Tail Wind involve ancient Chinese shipping terms. One of them is "geng." Geng is a measure of time by using the hourglass or burning burn incenses to estimate the distance of travel. A night is divided into ten *geng*. Normally, a ship could go 30 km a *geng*, though this might vary depending on the wind and the ocean current. The hourglass was used for timekeeping. Two glass bottles, one of which was full of sand, were placed mouth to mouth and connected with a thread in their middle to allow the passage of sand. Two and a half bottles of sand used were counted as a *geng*, and 24 battles of sand would last a whole night (see Fig. 2.11).

In the Warring States Period in ancient China, the primitive *Sinan* compass was invented, and people began to use the compass to assist shipping in the Northern Song Dynasty. The Ming Dynasty 24 Chinese characters to form the Earthly Branches, the Eight Diagrams, and the Heavenly Stems to indicate compass points. With the upper part of the compass indicating south, the lower indicating north, the left indicating east, and the right indicating west, the 360° compass was divided into 24 parts with 24 characters, with each character occupying 15°.[40] Of the 24 characters, *mao*, *you*, *wu*, and *zi*, which came from the Earthly Branches, were used

[40]Ma Shuhua and Qu Jinliang (eds.), *Marine Culture History of China: Ming and Qing Dynasties*, Chin. ed., Qingdao: Ocean University of China Press, 2012, p. 560.

to indicate the four directions of east, west, south, and north, respectively. In the Eight Diagrams, these are known as *zhen*, *dui*, *li*, and *kan*, respectively. Together with *gen* (northeast), *kun* (southwest), *qian* (northwest), and *xun* (southeast), these added up to eight directions. When *jia*, *yi*, *bing*, *ding*, *ren*, *kui*, *xin*, and *gen* were respectively placed on each side of *mao*, *you*, *wu*, and *zi* (representing east, west, south, and north respectively), this made the compass more accurate. For example, in the passage cited above, *danmao* means due east, *yichen* means 22°30′ southeast, *genzhen* means 45° northeast….[41]

2.2 Voyage with a Tail Wind Is not the Earliest Record of the Diaoyu Islands

1. *It is divided over when* Voyage with a Tail Wind *was completed. It is generally held that the book appeared somewhere between 1403 and 1639 when Laud donated a copy of it to the University of Oxford.*[42]

According to Wu Tianying, assuming it was produced in the fourteenth century "is the most conservative estimation" and "it is generally believed that it was completed in 1403 based on the statement made at the beginning of the book that 'In the first year of the reign of Ming Emperor Yongle, I was sent on a mission to countries of the western oceans during which I corrected maritime rules.'"[43] According to Zhang Rong and Liu Yijie, *Voyage with a Tail Wind* came as result of repeated addition, revision, and correction; it wasn't completed by any one person overnight. The book that appeared in the first year of the reign of Emperor Yongle could originate in maritime rules in the Yuan Dynasty or earlier. Professors Ma Shuhua and Qu Jinliang of the Ocean University of believe that this book is of the books on maritime rules Zheng He used during his seven voyages to the western oceans. However, it is still open to question whether it was the original copy or was transcribed, revised, or reedited.[44]

On the basis of Xiang Da's assumption, some maintain that *Voyage with a Tail Wind* was most probably produced in the sixteenth century.[45] Zhang Chonggen a

[41]Wu Tianying, *The Sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895*, revised and enlarged Chin. ed., Beijing: China Democracy and Legality Press. 2013, p. 28.

[42]Zheng Hailin, *The Diaoyu Islands: History and Legality*, Revised and enlarged Chin. ed., Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 2007, p. 27.

[43]Wu Tianying, *The Sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895*, Chin. ed., Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 1994, p. 27.

[44]Ma Shuhua and Qu Jinliang (eds.), *Marine Culture History of China: Ming and Qing Dynasties*, Chin. ed., Qingdao: Ocean University of China Press, first edition, November 2012, p. 562.

[45]Xiang Da (corrections and annotations), "Preface to the Two Kinds of Maritime Rules," *Record of Zheng He's Voyage to the Western Oceans, Zheng He's Nautical Chart, and Two Kinds of Maritime Rules,* Chin. ed., Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, first edition, April 2000, p. 4.

Chinese mainland-based historian on Taiwan is one of them. He assumes that the book first appeared not earlier than 1571.[46] This is because it wasn't until that year Spain occupied Manila and the Portuguese began to live in Nagasaki. Zhang's main support comes from Xiang Da's note to the term "佛郎番" (Fulangfan): 佛郎 (Fulang) probably means the Portuguese who came to the Spice Islands in the early sixteenth century and began to live there." The Ming Dynasty referred to the Dutch, the Portuguese and the Spanish as "佛郎机" (Fulangji), a transliteration of the Persian term Frangi (Firingi).[47]

However, the Portuguese began to engage in trade on Tunmen Island (the New Territories, Hong Kong) at the mouth of the Pearl River in the eighth year of the reign of Ming Emperor Zhengde (1513). Four years later, they built gun batteries and stationed troops there. When Chen Kan sailed to Ryukyu in 1534, his vessel was equipped with two Frangi guns. This means there is a lack of evidence of *Voyage with a Tail Wind* being completed in 1571 when the Spanish occupied Manila.

According to *Voyage with a Tail Wind,* "Fulangfan can be found in Nagasaki." As a result, some Japanese people believe that Fulangfan were the French or the Portuguese who began to live in Nagasaki in 1570 and assume that the book was completed in the late sixteenth century.

However, this may be a repetition of what Xiang Da said above and is open to question. Some also argue that 佛郎 (Fulang) in 佛郎番 (Fulangfan) was probably a tribe of ancient Taiwan's aboriginals—the Favorlang.[48] Fulang was the southern Fujian dialect pronunciation of Favorlang; in addition, 番 (fan) was unique to Taiwan. This leads to the conclusion that the Fulangfan mentioned in *Voyage with a Tail Wind* was probably the Favorlang tribe, not necessary the French or the Portuguese, though this is open to discussion.

It is worth noting that Xiang Da was an authoritative Chinese historian for exchange between China and other countries. However, his main interest was Dunhuang and Sino-foreign cultural and transport history related to the Western Regions, but not the Diaoyu Islands and the history of China's relations with Japan and Ryukyu. When he discovered the hand-copied *Voyage with a Tail Wind* in the 1930s, Taiwan was under Japan's colonial rule. Back then, Diaoyu Island had been renamed Uotsuiri Island become part of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands).

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[46]Zhang Chonggen, "On When the Two Kinds of Maritime Rules Were Completed and Creating an Index to Them," Chin. ed., *National Maritime Research,* no. 4, Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Book Publishing House, 2013, p. 70.

[47]Fulangji is mentioned in Yan Congjian's *An Introduction to Different Countries,* though it is not specified who Fulangji are. See *A Continued Edition of the Complete Library in the Four Branches of Literature: History and Geography*, Chin. ed., vol. 735, pp. 711–715.

[48]Lin Changhua, "In Search of the Favorlang: Reestablishing the Ethnic Annals of the Favorlang Based on Dutch Documents," Taipei: *Taiwan Education History Society Journal*, no. 63. November 2009.

In his *Two Kinds of Maritime Rules* in 1961, Xiang Da wrote, "Diaoyu Island is one of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) between Taiwan and Ryukyu. It is now called both Uotsuiri Island Diaoyu Island."[49]

I reckon that Xiang Da said this on the basis of the map produced during the Japanese rule of Taiwan in the 1930s or the 1958 edition *The Atlas of the World* China published on the basis of the application filed before the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression. Xiang Da didn't say whether these belonged to Japan or China; however, the term "Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)" and "Uotsuiri Island" he used were misleading. Therefore, after he died, the book was reprinted in 1982 with corrections being made to indicate that Diaoyu Island is an island affiliated with Taiwan Province, China.

It is worth noting that Dutch scholar Jan Willem Duyvendak assumed that *Voyage with a Tail Wind* was completed in 1430 when Zheng He finished his seventh voyage to the Western Oceans. This was basically in agreement with the conclusion made by Dr. Joseph Needham in his *Science and Civilization in China.* They had a point to say that *Voyage with a Tail Wind* was related to Zheng He's voyages to the Western Oceans.

Ming navigator and diplomat Zheng He (1731–1433), also known as Ma Sanbao, became Grand Eunuch and was awarded the surname Zheng by Ming Emperor Chengzu. Following the order of the emperor, Zheng He made seven voyages to the Western Voyages from 1405 through 1433. The Ming Dynasty's navigation peaked during the reign of Emperor Chengzu. Ming navigators both had maritime maps and guides. Taking everything into account, it is concluded that work on *Voyage with a Tail Wind* started in the first year of the reign of Ming Emperor Yongle (1403) and basically completed in 1433 when Zheng He finished his seventh voyage to the Western Oceans and thereafter, it was the most probably revised and improved. One explanation is as follows:

After Ming Emperor Zhu Di ascended to the throne in 1403, he adjusted the ban on maritime trade and sent Zheng He on his voyage on the Eastern and Western oceans to visit Asian and African countries. This made it possible to write maritime guides such as *Voyage with a Tail Wind.* According to the book, "The original copy of this book is old and damaged and it is difficult to make up for the damage. Any copy of the book produced by hand may not be correct." Therefore, "Following the order of Emperor Yongle in the first year of his reign, missions were made to countries of the Western Oceans, the maritime routes were revised in each mission, a sailor's book was produced consisting of the locations of stars and islands in the sea, and sea currents. It is essential to have people aboard who are well-versed in ships and the compass, can tell the time, locate stars, and judge the depth of the

[49]Xiang Da (corrections and annotations), *Two Kinds of Maritime Rules,* Chin. ed., Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, first edition, 1961, p. 253.

seawater. As long as careful observations are made, nothing will go wrong in your voyage if you repeatedly compare the sailor's book with the circumstances."[50]

Those who were with Zheng He's voyages to the Western Oceans mostly published signed books. For example, translator Fei Xin published the *Record of My Voyages* based on his four voyages to the Western Oceans since 1409, and Arabic translator Ma Huan produced *It's All about My Voyages* on the basis of his three voyages to the Western Oceans since 1413. *Voyage with a Tail Wind,* however, was not a sign book because it was not written by a single person on his or her experiences. It is an official maritime guide that was most probably produced through repeated corrections and additions during Zheng He's voyages to the Eastern and Western oceans.

During the reign of Ming Emperor Yongle, the Chinese government strictly banned maritime trade by private vessels, though it worked to develop an official exchange with other countries. The work on the book probably started in the third year of the reign of Emperor Yongle (1403) and was basically completed in the eighth year of the reign of Ming Emperor Xuande (1433), and the revisions and additions were constantly made to the book thereafter. As it was stated in the book that "Following the order of Emperor Yongle, a mission was made to countries of the Western Oceans," it was not clear who made the mission. This has omitted the names of the authors and editors and shows that the authors and the book are authoritative and reliable. This is because that it was Zheng He and others who followed the order of Emperor Yongle in the first year of his reign (1403) and made a mission to the Eastern and Western oceans. These are almost the same as the records made by Ryukyuan scholar Tei Junsoku in his *A Grand Maritime Guide*.

2. Voyage with a Tail Wind *didn't say that Zheng He had sailed to Japan through the Eastern Oceans, but evidence shows that this is related to the timing of the book.*

According to records, in the first year of the reign of Ming Emperor Yongle (1403), the emperor had Zhao Juren accompany the Japanese envoy on his way back to Japan. History books also said that Zheng He's fleet visited Japan in that year. According to the Ming Dynasty's *A Maritime Guide,* "In the first year of the reign of Ming Emperor Yongle, following the order of the emperor, official envoys Zheng He, Li Xing, and Yang Min were going on a mission to foreign nations of the Eastern and Western oceans. To prepare for this, they compiled a book on the relevant stars, islands, islets, and current in order to make sure that nothing would go wrong along the voyage."[51] This leads to the conclusion that the anonymous

[50]Xiang Da (corrections and annotations), "Preface to Voyage with a Tail Wind," *Record of Zheng He's Voyage to the Western Oceans, Zheng He's Nautical Chart, and Two Kinds of Maritime Rules,* Chin. ed., Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 2000, pp. 21–22.

[51]Zhuang Weiji, *New Annals of Jinjiang*, vol. 1, part 5, "Ming and Qing Annals" in Zhang Rong and Liu Yijie, "Collating *Voyage with a Tail Wind* and Determining When the Book Was Completed," Chin. ed., *National Maritime Research,* no. 3, Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Book Publishing House, p. 91.

book *Voyage with a Tail Wind* was probably the official maritime guide produced by some of those who made the voyages, but not by a single person.

In addition, according to the memorial to the emperor on oceanic conditions in Wenzhou, Ningbo, "In the first year of the reign of Ming Emperor Yongle, following the order of the emperor, official envoys Zheng He, Li Kai (Li Xing), and Yang Min were going on a mission to foreign nations of the Eastern and Western oceans. To prepare for this, they compiled a book on the relevant stars, islands, islets, and current in order to make sure that nothing would go wrong along the voyage." All these records mentioned both Eastern and Western oceans.[52] According to Professor Ma Shuhua and others, when Zheng He made voyages to the Western Oceans, the boundary between Eastern and Western oceans was Palau Weh northwest of Sumatra, Indonesia, and later Brunei became the boundary.[53] There can be no doubt that the nations of the Eastern Oceans were Japan and Ryukyu.

According to the *Illustrations on Defense against Japanese Pirates* written by Hu Zongxian and Zheng Ruozeng in 1562, "In April of the 2nd year of the reign of Ming Emperor Yongle, Japanese pirates Tsushima Island Iki Island attacked Suzhou Songjiang prefectures, and then moved on to Zhejiang and other coastal areas. The Chinese emperor ordered Grand Eunuch Zheng He to protest it to the Japanese Emperor Go-Komatsu (Yoshimitsu Ashikaga), who had the chief of the pirates captured and gave him up to China."[54] This book is probably the only official book that recorded Zheng He's meeting with the Japanese Emperor. This should have been recorded in the original archives of the Ming Dynasty during the reign of Emperor Yongle. However, the possibility cannot be ruled out that the relevant important historic documents about Zheng He were kept with the archives about Ming envoys before Chen Kan became an envoy in 1534, but unfortunately these archives could have been lost in a fire.

Nevertheless, this was not the only record of the event. Feng Yingjing also wrote in his *Collected Ming Works*, "In the 2nd year of the reign of Ming Emperor Yongle, Japanese pirates attacked Zhejiang and Nanzhili. The emperor ordered Grand Eunuch Zheng He to protest it to Japanese Emperor Go-Komatsu, who sent his forces to capture the chief of the pirates and give him up to China. In return, China awarded him silk fabrics and raised him to the Emperor of Japan. It also named a Japanese mountain National Longevity and Peace Mountain."[55]

It is of particular note that in 1556 Zheng Shungong also recorded in his *Survey of Japan: Rivers and Seas* (vol. 6), "In the 2nd year of the reign of Ming Emperor Yongle (1404), Japanese pirates attacked Nanzhili and Zhejiang Province.

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[52]Zheng Hesheng and Zheng Yijun, *A Collection of Data about Zheng He's Voyages*, revised and enlarged Chin. ed., Beijing: China Ocean Press, 2005, vol. 2, p. 1146.

[53]Ma Shuhua and Qu Jinliang (eds.), *Marine Culture History of China: Ming and Qing Dynasties*, Chin. ed., Qingdao: Ocean University of China Press, 2012, p. 241.

[54]Hu Zongxian and Zheng Ruozeng, *Illustrations on Defense against Japanese Pirates: Japanese Pirates in Zhili*," Chin. ed., vol. 6.

[55]Feng Yingjing, *Collected Ming Works*.



Fig. 2.12 Zheng Shungong, *Record of Japan*

The emperor sent Grang Eunuch Zheng He to protest it to the Japanese Emperor. The following year Japanese Emperor Go-Komatsu sent an envoy to give the captured pirates up to China"[56] (see Fig. 2.12).

Zheng Shungong issued the Chinese emperor's order to Japan and was its state guest sent by the Ming Dynasty to Japan for research purposes. In his *Record of Japan*, he mentioned that Zheng He visited Japan in 1404. If this was true, that would be the second time the Ming Dynasty sent an envoy to issue the emperor's order after Yang Zai failed to do so at the suggestion of Ming Emperor Taizu in 1369. Unlike Prince Kaneyoshi of the Nanboku-chō period who was rude to the Chinese envoy, Ashikaga Yoshimitsu was friendly to the Ming Dynasty and accepted the seal China awarded him and established the tributary and trading relations with China. An important reason why Zheng Shungong was in Japan was that Japanese pirates frequently attacked coastal Zhejiang and Fujian so that security could not be ensured for the Chinese ports where the Chinese set off for voyages to the Western Oceans. Therefore, it was essential to first send people to eradicate the danger posed by pirates. These pirates were actually from the Japanese Satsuma han in Kyushu who collaborated with outlawed Chinese. At that time, the Japanese Southern and Northern Dynasties were opposed to each other, and the southern ruler Ashikaga Yoshimitsu had secured the power to rule the whole of

[56]Zheng Shungong, *Record of Japan: Rivers and Coasts*, vol. 6.

Japan and was therefore in a position to reached consensus with China's Ming government.

3. *The original copy of* Voyage with a Tail Wind *can be traced back to the first year of the reign of Ming Emperor Yongle (1403) when Zheng He started his voyage to the Western Oceans.*

According to records, in the first year of the reign of Ming Emperor Yongle only censor Yin Shou helped work out a maritime route for the mission to the Western Oceans and participated in the voyage. The emperor was pleased by his report on the voyage and by the maps he drew during the process. These would greatly help Zheng He during his future voyages to the Western Oceans. This can lead to the conclusion that Yin Shou was an important contributor to *Voyage with a Tail Wind.*[57]

According to *Voyage with a Tail Wind,* "Navigation astronomy was relied on to ensure the safety of the Bao Vessel."[58] I have found that the Bao Vessel referred to the vessel Zheng He used on his voyage to the Western Oceans. The book mentioned "the Mingzhu Goddess worshipped in the Ming Dynasty as the patron of the country and people." The title "Mingzhu Goddess," the Goddess of the Sea, didn't appear until after in the 18th year of the reign of Yuan Emperor Zhiyuan (1281). In the 14th year of the reign of Yuan Emperor Zhizheng (1353), the title was changed to the "the Mingzhu Goddess worshipped as the generous patron of the country and the people and the assistant to the emperor." It wasn't renamed "the Puji Goddess" until in the seventh year of the reign of Ming Emperor Yongle (1409) and her full title was "the Puji Goddess worshipped as the benevolent and wise patron of the country and the people." This shows that *Voyage with a Tail Wind* used both Yuan and Ming titles to refer to the Goddess of the Sea, indicating the changes in the transition of the title of the Goddess of the Sea in the years around 1409.

Voyage with a Tail Wind had the following same records as made during Zheng He's voyages to the Western Oceans from 1405 through 1433:

(1) The book mentioned "the area from Nanjing all the way to Taichang and directly under the jurisdiction of Nanjing in the Ming Dynasty." This means that from the early years of the reign of Ming Emperor Hongwu when Nanjing was made the country's capital city to the early years of the reign of Ming Emperor Yongle when the capital was moved to Beijing, the area from Nanjing all the way to Taichang was directly under the jurisdiction of Nanjing;

[57]Yan Congjian (ed.), *An Introduction to Different Countries: Kmir,* vol. 8, block-printed edition, 1574, in Zhang Rong and Liu Yijie, "Collating *Voyage with a Tail Wind* and Determining When the Book Was Completed," Chin. ed., *National Maritime Research,* no. 3, Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Book Publishing House, p. 92.

[58]Xiang Da (corrections and annotations), "Preface to *Voyage with a Tail Wind*," *Record of Zheng He's Voyage to the Western Oceans, Zheng He's Nautical Chart, and Two Kinds of Maritime Rules,* Chin. ed., Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 2000, p. 22.

(2) The book mentioned Malacca Town, which was the action capital of Malaysia first built in 1403 and was visited by Zheng He;
(3) The book mentioned Calicut which was the Kingdom of Calicut Zheng He visited during his voyages to the Western Oceans.
(4) The book discussed Hormuz. Zhengzhou visited the Port of Bandar Abbason the Strait of Hormuz in Iran.
(5) The book had records about Port of Palembang, a city in Sumatra, Indonesia, which Zheng He also visited. During the reign of Ming Emperor, China established the Pacification Office, the highest administrative body in the Southern Oceans.
(6) When it came to the subheading "The Maritime Route from Fujian to Jiaozhi," the book mentioned the Annan Kingdom, which was referred to as Vietnam since the Song Dynasty. From 1407 to 1427, northern Annan was occupied by China and renamed "Jiaozhi." Later on, Annan was reunified to become a vassal of China. This shows the changes in the names of Vietnam before the 1430 s. If *Voyage with a Tail Wind* had completed in the sixteenth century, it would not have included Jiaozhi in its subheading. However, as Zheng He arrived at Jiaozhi in 1405 during his first voyage to the Western Oceans, it was entirely possible for Jiaozhi to be included in the subheading.

In most cases in ancient China, "maritime guides usually appeared in the form of books. When people hand-copied these books, fishermen made constant additions and revisions based on their navigation experience."[59] *Voyage with a Tail Wind* mentioned Cambodia, attracting the attention of some scholars. They believed that as Cambodia wasn't called Cambodia until during of the reign of Ming Emperor Wanli, they concluded that the book first appeared in the late sixteenth century. It is true that before Tang China, Cambodia was known as Funan, and it was renamed Chenla in the mid-period of the Tang Dynasty. In the Song Dynasty when Chenla occupied Champa, it was renamed Zhanla, though the Yuan Dynasty continued to call it Chenla. According to the *History of the Ming Dynasty*, Zheng He visited Chenla during his second voyage to the Western Oceans from 1407 to 1409. According to historical data, in the fifth year of the reign of Ming Emperor Xuande (1430), the Angkor Empire was invaded by Thailand was forced to move its capital city to Phnom Penh. In 1432, Chenla was renamed Cambodia. If this was true, as Zheng He made his seventh voyage to the Western Oceans in 1433, even if *Voyage with a Tail Wind* was completed in that year, it is reasonable that it mentioned Cambodia.

Judging from the content and structure of *Voyage with a Tail Wind*, the book was mainly about the maritime routes taken by Zheng He during his voyages to the Western Oceans. In addition to recording these routes, the book also included the maritime routes that had been had discovered between Fujian and Ryukyu and between Ryukyu and Japan. As a result, the book became a detailed navigation

[59]Ma Shuhua and Qu Jinliang (eds.), *Marine Culture History of China: Ming and Qing Dynasties*, Chin. ed., Qingdao: Ocean University of China Press, first edition, November 2012, p. 558.

guide to voyages to the Eastern and Western oceans. This means that the book wasn't a book written by a single author once and for all, but was a book on the maritime routes to the Eastern and Western oceans that had been repeatedly verified by many. The order that the routes to these oceans were listed in the book didn't indicate the order by which the routes were discovered. The maritime route recorded in the book to Ryukyu via Diaoyu Island represents China's understanding of the maritime route to Ryukyu and the maritime boundary between China and Ryukyu following Yang Zai's visit to Ryukyu in 1372 at the latest.

Moreover, before Zheng He started his first voyage to the Western Oceans, in the 29th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Hongwu, Ryukyuan Sanhoku King Hanachi died of illness, and his ascending to the throne requiring China's investiture. It wasn't long before Chûzan King Satto died of illness and his son Bunei needed the investiture of the Ming emperor. On August 8 of in the first year of the reign of Ming Emperor Yongle (1403), the Ming Dynasty sent Bian Xin on a mission to Ryukyu. On February 21 of the following year, the Ming emperor ordered his envoy Shi Zhong to travel to Ryukyu to appoint its king. Shi Zhong was the second Ming envoy to Ryukyu after Yang Zai and China's first envoy to Ryukyu. Investitures were the important foreign affairs, and the investiture envoy's vessel could not do without a maritime route. This leads to the conclusion that even if Zheng He's fleet didn't arrive at Ryukyu via the Diaoyu Islands and then move on to Japan in 1404, the original records *Voyage with a Tail Wind* had about the Diaoyu Islands must come before the book was completed.

Voyage with a Tail Wind discussed the maritime routes from Fujian to Ryukyu in its second half, which is just the opposite of the order by which Zheng He made his voyages to the Eastern and Western oceans. In addition, the book only mentioned the Western Ocean ("Following the order of Emperor Yongle in the first year of his reign, a mission was made to countries of the Western Oceans); it didn't say anything about the Eastern Oceans. Why was that? This is my explanation:

I reckon that the following possibilities cannot be ruled out. Judging from the backdrop and content of *Voyage with a Tail Wind*, the book was originally written probably to help Zheng He make his voyages to the Western Oceans and it was about the maritime routes verified during these voyages. This is why the book began by recording the voyages to the Western Oceans and the routes for the voyages. Just as I discussed above, the maritime routes to Ryukyu and other parts of the Eastern Oceans had been made clear before 1372. In addition, the first Ming envoy Shi Zhong sailed to Ryukyu in the 2nd year of the reign of Emperor Yongle (1404). I am therefore sure that no matter when *Voyage with a Tail Wind* was completed, from 1372 through 1404, Chinese official vessels had travelled to Ryukyu twice and the Diaoyu Islands on their maritime routes had been confirmed as Chinese islands. This is why *Voyage with a Tail Wind* only added the revised maritime guide to Ryukyu to its second half so that there would be complete the records of the maritime routes China would take to the Eastern and Western oceans. This leaves it open to interpretation.

4. *In 1708, Ryukyuan scholar Tei Junsoku wrote* A Grand Maritime Guide, *affirming that the Chinese were the first to discover, name, exploit the Diaoyu Islands and they taught the Ryukyuan about the Maritime Routes.*

In his book, Tei Junsoku said that when the helmsman of the Chinese investiture vessel taught maritime knowledge to his Ryukyuan counterpart, he gave him a copy of the *Maritime Routes* and said, "This book recorded the voyages made by Zheng He and others in the first year of the reign of Ming Emperor Yongle (1403) to the Eastern and Western oceans on a mission to other countries and accept their tribute, in case that they got lost on their way back. The book also served as a maritime rule and the general information about the maritime route through which Ryukyu sent tribute to China."

The Ryukyuan had always esteemed Chinese culture and benefited a lot from their tributary trade with China. After Ryukyu established the tributary relations with China in 1372, it broke the rule that it should pay tribute to China once every two or more years, it often had people visit China on different occasions such as those to celebrate the emperor's birthday, the emperor's ascending to the throne, and the New Year's Day; to ask for an investiture; to obtain the letter of investiture; to thank the emperor for his favor; to offer incense to Buddha; to arrange Ryukyu's tribute to China; to give obituary notices; to accompany official students to China; help Chinese refugees return home; to assist Ryukyuan official students in returning home; to report the attacks by Japanese pirates; to accompany China's envoys on their way back to China; to deliver reports to the emperor; and to ask for military support. According to statistics, from the fifth year of the reign of Ming Emperor Hongwu (1372) to the fifth year of the reign of Qing Emperor Guangxu (1879), the Ryukyuan delegations made 884 trips to China or 1.7 trips a year. Of these trips, 537 were made in the Ming Dynasty and 347 occurred in the Qing Dynasty, far exceeding the number of trips the Chinese made to Ryukyu.[60] However, no one from Ryukyu challenged China's ownership of the Diaoyu Islands. They unanimously held that the islands from the east of Chiwei Islet to Gumi Island (Kume Island) across the Black Water Trench were the Ryukyu Islands.

Nevertheless, having many vessels traveling to China is not evidence that the Ryukyuan were the first to discover, name, and exploit the Diaoyu Islands. On the contrary, it is exactly because the Ryukyuan learned from China the maritime route between Ryukyu and Fujian via the Diaoyu Islands and had the assistance of China that after 1372, they were able to move across the sea to visit China in large numbers. One of the most convincing pieces of evidence is *A Grand Maritime Guide* written by Ryukyu's Tei Junsoku (1663–1735) in 1708.

Tei Junsoku was a Ryukyuan politician, scholar, and Grand Master with the Purple-Golden Ribbon. He was born into the Tei family in Kume Village (China Town, Naha, the Ryukyu Kingdom). He was also known as Si Wutai, Pangwen and Nian'an. He was referred to as the Ueekata (Master) of Nago and the Sage of Nago.

[60]Official Web site of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Fujian Provincial Government of China: http://218.85.73.164:8088/pub/fjfao/ztzl/wsz/dwjw/201011/t20101125_534693.htm.

He was the adopted son of the translator Cheng Taizuo whose forefathers were surnamed Gu and migrated to Ryukyu.

According to the Tei family tree, the forefather of the Tei family in Nago was Tei Fuku, the Prime Minister of the Chûzan king during the Chûzan-Sanhoku-Sannan period. He was one of the first Fujian emigrants Ming China sent to the Ryukyu Kingdom in 1392, and his ancestral home was in Henan. Later on, the Tei family didn't have a son, and hating to see that there would be no one carrying on the Tei family line, the Ryukyuan king Shō Ken ordered Yu Bingxian, a third great-grandson of Gu Cheechiku, to be renamed Cheng Bingxian. Tei Junsoku's father Cheng Taizuo was the second son of Cheng Bingxian. Cheng Taizuo was well versed in Confucianism, served as a translator in the Ryukyu Kingdom, and sent tribute twice to China on behalf of Ryukyu. In collaboration with Akamine Pe-chin, he founded the first Confucius temple in Ryukyu at Izumizaki Village.

Tei Junsoku was smart and loved to learn during his childhood. Probably due to the influence of his father, he had a keen interest in China's Confucianism and poetry. He became a local *xiucai* at the age of 13. Throughout his life, he made five trips to Fuzhou, and four trips to Beijing. Back then China was in the High Qing period (1681–1796). Tei Junsoku held China in great respect. He studied in Fujian for four years beginning in the 22nd year of the reign of Qing Emperor Kangxi (1683).

Thereafter, after he became a translator in Fuzhou for Ryukyu vessels carrying a tribute to China in 1689, he studied Zhuism and Chinese poetry. As a translator of the Ryukyuan tributary mission to China, he visited Beijing again in 1696, and then he left Beijing for Fuzhou where he stayed for three years. In 1706, Tei Junsoku visited Beijing again as a member of the Ryukyuan tributary mission. In 17
08 when a Ryukyuan tributary mission stayed in Fuzhou, he funded an engraved edition of his *A Grand Maritime Guide* and brought it back to Ryukyu. The book was originally titled *A Maritime Manual*. Later on, he changed it to its present title. In addition, he stressed that "Any revisions to this book must be based on other books; no groundless changes are allowed." The book not only had detailed accounts of the maritime route between Fuzhou and Ryukyu via the Diaoyu Islands and solved some of the mysteries surrounding these islands. To this end, I quote:

"A survey of the *Maritime Rules* given by China:

"In 1683 during the reign of Qing Emperor Kangxi, the Chinese investiture vessel arrived at Chûzan. Its helmsman was a patient person from Fujian. He taught the Ryukyuan helmsman about the *Maritime Rules,* with illustrations of navigation astronomy, currents and islands. He explained that the book was produced for the following reason: In the first year of the reign of Ming Emperor Yongle, official envoys Zheng He, Li Kai (Li Xing) and Yang Min went on a mission to foreign nations of the Eastern and Western oceans. As they would receive large quantities of tribute, they would need certain maritime routes to take so that nothing would go wrong. So they sought opinion from a wide range of sources, accepted all feasible advices, and recorded all maritime rules to be followed during their voyages. Today Ryukyu is working out tributary maritime rules, you may use this book as a

指南廣義

中山程順則龍文彙輯

傳授航海針法本末考

康熙癸亥年封舟至中山其主掌羅經舵工閩之婆心人也將航海針法一本內畫牽星及水勢山形各圖傳授本國舵工併告之曰此本係前朝永樂元年差官鄭和李愷楊敏等前往東西二洋等處開諭各國續因納貢纍纍恐往返海上針路不定致有差錯乃廣詢博採凡關係過洋要訣一一開載以作舟師準繩今琉球修貢海道須知宜將此卷留心細勘自能用之不窮惟是舊本相沿日久或有傳訛應俟有心者參互考訂彙集成書以涉大川不無少補云

按洪武二十五年遣閩人三十六姓至中山內有善操舟者其所傳針本緣年代久遠多殘闕失次今陸採其一二以示不忘本之意

Fig. 2.13 Ryukyuan Scholar Tei Junsoku, *A Grand Maritime Guide,* 1708, Proving that the Ming Chinese Taught the Ryukyuan the Maritime Routes to and from the Diaoyu Islands

reference. This is an old book; it has been used long and may have errors. You may find it necessary to correct them based on research and produce your own book based on experiences for voyages across big oceans. Note: In the 25th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Hongwu (1392), China sent Fujian emigrants to Chûzan. Some of were good helmsmen. They used an old book of maritime rules and pages were missing. I hereby quote some passages from it to show we won't forget the favor the Chinese did to us"[61] (see Fig. 2.13).

This passage from *A Grand Maritime Guide* is about a historical fact: In 1683, Qing envoy Wang Ji and assistant envoy Li Linchang arrived at Ryukyu on their investiture vessel for the investiture of the Ryukyuan king Shō Tei. The Fujian helmsman of the investiture vessel taught the Ryukyuan about maritime routes and gave them a copy of *Maritime Routes*. This book was probably the original copy of *Voyage with a Tail Wind* with illustrations of astronomy technology, islands, and currents. Unfortunately, the current copies of *Voyage with a Tail Wind* do not have these illustrations, and *Maritime Routes* is missing and cannot be verified.

In 1683, following the order of Prime Minister Shō Shōken, Tei Junsoku joined the thanksgiving mission led by the Grand Master with the Purple-Golden Ribbon

[61]Tei Junsoku, *A Grand Maritime Guide,* 1708.

of Ryukyu Kokuba Wue-kata and traveled to China. They made their way from Fuzhou to Beijing. This thanksgiving trip by Tei Junsoku was exactly a return visit for Wang Ji's visit to Ryukyu in the same year. This leads to the conclusion that the maritime guide used on this thanksgiving vessel was exactly the *Maritime Routes* obtained from Wang Ji's investiture vessel. The abovementioned records Tei Junsoku made in his *A Grand Maritime Guide* were about his own experiences and that his book was written on the basis of Chinese works.

This shows that these historical records made by Tei Junsoku have a great value. The quotations he made from Chinese works prove that before his voyage to the Western Oceans in 1405, Zheng He had moved across the Eastern Oceans to Japan with the help of *Maritime Routes*. It is logical to assume that the part of *Voyage with a Tail Wind* about voyages to Ryukyu and Japan was completed in the fifteenth century and later on the part about voyages to the Western Oceans was added. Tei Junsoku also made it clear in his *A Grand Maritime Guide*: In the 25th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Hongwu (1392), China sent Fujian emigrants to Chûzan. Some of them were good helmsmen. They used an old book of maritime rules and pages were missing. I hereby quote some passages from it to show we won't forget the favor the Chinese did to us. By favor, Tei Junsoku meant the Chinese unselfishly taught maritime routes to the Ryukyuan.

5. *The maritime routes to and from the Diaoyu Islands mentioned Ming China's* Voyage with a Tail Wind *can also be found in Tei Junsoku's* A Grand Maritime Guide.

The places of departure, the final destinations, routes, and wind directions listed in the two books, and the way they describe things are quite similar. In Table 2.1, in Column 1 is what can be found in the quotations made by *A Grand Maritime Guide* from *Maritime Routes for Investiture Vessels*, and in Columns 2, 3 and 4 is what can be found from the quotations *A Grand Maritime Guide* made from the Fujian emigrants' maritime route manual. Except for Diaoyu Island, which is referred to as Diaoyu Islet in *Voyage with a Tail Wind* and referred to Diaoyutai in *A Grand Maritime Guide*, these two books can be said to be entirely identical. For details of *A Grand Maritime Guide*, refer to Sect. 4.1 of Chap. 4 below.

Both books included "Fujian to Ryukyu" and to the so-called Small Ryukyu (Taiwan). They both mentioned Machi Island (today's Kerama Islands) in Ryukyu as well as its affiliated island Kuba (Koba) Island (now Kuba Island). For example, *A Grand Maritime Guide* said, "Kume Island and Kuba Island are visible at two and half a *geng*."

The difference between the two books is the way they referred to Diaoyu Island and Chiwei Islet. *A Grand Maritime Guide* mentioned Diaoyutai, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet while *Voyage with a Tail Wind* only had Diaoyu Islet and Chikan Islet without discussing Huangwei Islet. This is probably because in addition to recording the maritime routes from China to Ryukyu, *Voyage with a Tail Wind* recorded the routes to the Western Oceans and the islands along these routes. On a route to Jiaozi (Vietnam), there was also an island called "Diaoyutai," and there

Table 2.1 Similarities between *Voyage with a Tail Wind* and *A Grand Maritime Guide* regarding the Maritime Routes to and from the Diaoyu Islands

	1	2	3	4
Voyage with a Tail Wind	Set sail from Taiwu Island	Dongqiang-Mushan	Dongyong-Diaoyu Islet	Attendant Gentleman of the Ministry of Justice-Diaoyu Islet
A Grand Maritime Guide	Set sail from Taiwu Island	Dongqiang-Mushan	Dongyong-Diaoyutai	Attendant Gentleman of the Ministry of Justice-Diaoyutai
Similarity	100%	100%	More than 99%	More than 99%

Source Comparative studies I made on the four maritime routes based on the two books

were other places that also called Diaoyutai. In order to keep these places from becoming confusing, the authors of the *Voyage with a Tail Wind* might probably use Diaoyu Islet as its official name. It was also called Diaoyu Islet in the *Record of Missions to Ryukyu* written by Ming envoys, so it was possible that *Voyage with a Tail Wind* was used as a guide to navigation. *A Grand Maritime Guide* proves that even during the reign of Qing Emperor Kangxi, helmsmen of Chinese investiture vessels still had *Maritime Routes* with them and taught the Ryukyuans about it.

In his *A Grand Maritime Guide*, Tei Junsoku quoted from the missing Chinese maritime guides—*Maritime Routes* and the Fujian emigrants' maritime route manual—that recorded Diaoyu Island, but he didn't mention *Voyage with a Tail Wind*. This is probably because when he wrote *A Grand Maritime Guide*, *Voyage with a Tail Wind* was already lost in China or because *Voyage with a Tail Wind* was one of these three books, though this is open to question. Chinese envoys' visit to Ryukyu can be traced back to as early as 1372 when Yang Zai visited Ryukyu, so *Maritime Routes for Investiture Vessels* that was used to guide the voyages of investiture vessels can also be traced back to as early as 1372. Fujian people began to migrate to Ryukyu in 1392. These emigrants must have maritime guides to the Diaoyu Island route with them during their voyage to Ryukyu, so it can be assumed that the Fujian emigrants' maritime route manual can be traced back to 1392.

However, it is worth noting that the Fujian emigrants' maritime route manual recorded by Tei Junsoku in his *A Grand Maritime Guide* was not the one the first Fujian emigrants used during their voyage to Ryukyu in 1392. Generally speaking, with regard to geography and maps, the earlier the data, the more blurred it is; the later the data, the clearer it is. The records of *A Grand Maritime Guide* are clearer and more thorough than those of *Voyage with a Tail Wind.* The voyage time from Ryukyu to Fujian recorded in *A Grand Maritime Guide* was "at somewhere between 11 a.m. and 1 p.m. on September 24 of the 21st year of the reign of Ming Emperor Huacheng, starting from Kume Island to move southwest by west." That was in 1485, which was later than 1403 as mentioned in *Voyage with a Tail Wind*. This in turn leads me to assume that the records made in *Voyage with a Tail Wind* about the Diaoyu Islet route were made earlier than 1485.

In short, in efforts to determine when China discovered Diaoyu Island, the time when *Voyage with a Tail Wind* was completed was an important reference, not a deciding factor. This is because the book was not the first Chinese ancient writing to record Diaoyu Island; it is only one of the oldest relevant ancient writings. The discovery of Diaoyu Island by the Chinese can even be traced back to the Sui Dynasty, and it was before 1403 that China named Diaoyu Island and began to exploit it as maritime marker for the sea route to Ryukyu. Relevant Chinese ancient writings were lost, but the quotations from the Fujian emigrants' maritime route manual made by Tei Junsoku in his *A Grand Maritime Guide* are convincing evidence. This will be Chap. 4 below.

2.3 Official Records of the Diaoyu Islands in the Ming Dynasty

The *Record of Missions to Ryukyu* written by Ming China's envoys to Ryukyu, its maritime defense maps, and other official documents all clearly recorded Diaoyu Island and other Chinese islands and the maritime boundary between China and Ryukyu. In the early years of the Ming Dynasty, China imposed the ban on maritime trade in order to guard against Japanese pirates, but it maintained its exchange with Ryukyu. From 1372 to 1866, Ming and Qing China sent envoys on 23 missions to Ryukyu to mark its kings' ascending to the throne and recorded Diaoyu Island in the *Record of Missions to Ryukyu.*

1. *The earliest Chinese official document on Diaoyu Island available in China is the Record of My Mission to Ryukyu written by Chen Kan, the envoy who went on the 11th mission to Ryukyu for investiture purposes in the 13th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Jiajing (1534).*

In lunar December of the fifth year of the reign of Ming Emperor Hongwu (1372), the Ryukyuan Chûzan king Satto sent his brother Taiki to offer tribute to China, and Taiki traveled to China together with China's envoy Chen Kan and established tributary relations with China. The Ming government put the Fujian Foreign Trade Administration in charge of receiving Ryukyuan delegations. In the early years of the Ming Dynasty, the Fujian Foreign Trade Administration established a guest station at Cheqiao Village in southern Quanzhou for the purpose of receiving Ryukyuan delegations and accompanying them on their journey from Fuzhou to Beijing.

Since the Ming Dynasty, whenever a Ryukyuan king "was to ascend to the throne, he would ask for an investiture by the Chinese government."[62] In most

[62]Gao Qi, *Annals and Investigations of Fujian Maritime Trade Inspection Administration*, Chin. ed., stereotype edition, 1939, p. 36, at the official website of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Fujian Provincial Government of China.

cases, Ming and Qing rulers accepted the request of Ryukyu and sent large delegations to sail across the oceans to Ryukyu for investiture purposes. This had become an established system and special political relations had been established between China and Ryukyu. Counting from the mission made by Shi Zhong to Ryukyu in the 2nd year of the reign of Ming Emperor Yongle (1404) to the last mission made by Imperial College editors Zhao Xin and Yu Guangjia in the fifth year of the reign of Qing Emperor Tongzhi (1866), not including Yang Zai's mission to Ryukyu in 1372, Ming and Qing China sent 23 delegations to Ryukyu for investiture purposes. These delegations included 43 envoys and assistant envoys. Fifteen of these delegations, totaling 27 members, were sent by the Ming Dynasty; and eight other delegations, totaling 16 members, were sent by the Qing Dynasty (see Table 2.2).[63]

The place of departure of the investiture missions was in Fujian. In the early years of the Ming Dynasty, the port leading to Ryukyu was in Quanzhou. During the reign of Ming Emperor Chenghua, the Maritime Trade Administration was moved to Fuzhou and the port leading to Ryukyu was also moved to the mouth of the Min River. The Ming government required the Fujian government to make it convenient for Chinese envoys traveling to Ryukyu for investiture purposes. The number of delegation members came between 300 and 400 at one point.

Before the Chinese delegations chose a lucky day to go to sea, the Ryukyu Kingdom would send a reception vessel and provide experienced sailors to help with the voyages. On the day of departure, local officials of Fujian would give a farewell dinner. The vessels would start sailing when the tide fell at the Min River to reach the mouth of the river, Wuhumen, Jilong Island, Huaping Islet, Pengjia Island, Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, Chiwei Islet, Ryukyu's external island of Gumi and Machi, and finally the Port of Naha, Ryukyu. During the voyages, local goddesses and gods of Fujian would be worshipped such as the Goddess of Sea and the Dragon King of the Sea for a good voyage. Not only the Chinese envoys attended the investiture ceremonies and made inspection tours across Ryukyu, other members of the delegations also engaged in economic, cultural, artistic, and technological exchange with local people. Most of these people were from Fujian, Fujian's emigrants to Ryukyu, and their descendants.

According to the *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu* written by Ming envoy Chen Kan in 1534, "The Ministry of Rites lost the documents on Ryukyuan investitures," so "we have nowhere to look up previous information about the investiture of Ryukyu kings."[64] This shows that records of the investiture of Ryukyuan kings made by 1534 were lost. Chen Kan's *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu* was an important Chinese official document on the maritime boundary between China and Ryukyu he had surveyed and affirmed. According to the book, in the Ryukyu

[63]Official Web site of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Fujian Provincial Government of China: http://www.fjfao.gov.cn/ztzl/wsz/dwjw/201011/t20101125_1180163.htm.

[64]Chen Kan, *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., 13th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Jiajing (1534) in Huang Runhua and Xueying (eds.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, October 2000, vol. 1, p. 19.

Table 2.2 Ming and Qing Missions to Ryukyu for investiture purposes

Year	Name of Envoy		Ryukyuan king	Envoy's works and others
	Envoy	Deputy Envoy		
2nd year, Ming Emperor Yongle (1404)	Messenger Shi Zhong		Bunei	
13th year, Ming Emperor Yongle (1415)	Messenger Chen Xiufang		Sannan king Taromai	
1st year, Ming Emperor Hongxi (1425)	Eunuch Chai Shan		Shō Hashi	Chai Shan: "Steles of Daianzenji Temple" and "The 1000-Buddha Stele"
8th year, Ming Emperor Zhengtong (1443)	Supervising Secretary Yu Bian	Messenger Liu Xun	Shō Chū	
13th year, Ming Emperor Zhengtong (1448)	Executive Assistant of the Office of Scrutiny for Justice Chen Fu	Messenger Wan Xiang	Shō Shitatsu	
3rd year, Ming Emperor Jingtai (1452)	Supervising Secretary Chen Mo	Messenger Dong Shouhong	Shō Kinpuku	*Record of Ming Emperor Yingzhong*, vol. 206
7th year, Ming Emperor Jingtai (1456)	Supervising Secretary Li Bingyi	Messenger Liu Jian	Shō Taikyū	*Record of Ming Emperor Yingzhong*, vol. 252
7th year, Ming Emperor Tianshun (1463)	Supervising Secretary of the Office of Scrutiny for Personnel Pan Rong	Messenger Cai Zhe	Shō Toku	Pan Rong: *Eight Sites in Chûzan*
8th year, Ming Emperor Chenghua (1472)	Supervising Secretary of the Office of Scrutiny for War Guan Rong	Messenger Han Wen	Shō En	

(continued)

Table 2.2 (continued)

Year	Name of Envoy		Ryukyuan king	Envoy's works and others
	Envoy	Deputy Envoy		
15th year, Ming Emperor Chenghua (1479)	Supervising Secretary of the Office of Scrutiny for War Dong Min	Deputy Director of the Messenger Office Zhang Xiang	Shō Shin	
13th year, Ming Emperor Jiajing (1534)	Supervising Secretary of the Office of Scrutiny for Personnel Chen Kan	Messenger Gao Cheng	Shō Sei	Chen Kan: *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu* Gao Cheng: *An Voyage*
40th year, Ming Emperor Jiajing (1561)	Supervising Secretary of the Office of Scrutiny for Justice Guo Rulin	Messenger Li Jichun	Shō Gen	Guo Ruolin: *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu*
7th year, Ming Emperor Wanli (1579)	Supervising Secretary of the Office of Scrutiny for Revenue Xiao Chongye	Messenger Xie Jie	Shō Ei	Xiao Chongye: *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu* Xie Jie: "Additions to Record of Ryukyu"
43rd year, Ming Emperor Wanli (1606)	Supervising Secretary of the Office of Scrutiny for War Xia Ziyang	Messenger Wang Shizhen	Shō Nei	Xia Ziyang: *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu* Wang Shizhen: *Ryukyu and China's Imperial College*
6th year, Ming Emperor Chongzhen (1633)	Supervising Secretary of the Office of Scrutiny for Revenue Du Sance	Messenger Yang Lun	Shō Hō	Hu Jing: *Envoy Du Sance's Mission to Ryukyu for Investiture Purposes*
2nd year, Qing Emperor Kangxi (1663)	Deputy Regulatory Official of the Office of Scrutiny for War Zhang Xueli	Messenger Wang Gai	Shō Shitsu	Zhang Xueli: *My Mission to Ryukyu* and *Record of Chûzan*
22nd year, Qing Emperor Kangxi (1683)	Assistant of the Hanlin Academy Wang Ji	Drafter of the Grand Secretariat Lin Linchang	Shō Tei	Wang Ji: *Miscellaneous Record of My Mission to Ryukyu*, *History of Chûzan*, and *An Explanation of Documents on Ryukyuan Investitures*

(continued)

Table 2.2 (continued)

Year	Name of Envoy		Ryukyuan king	Envoy's works and others
	Envoy	Deputy Envoy		
58th year, Qing Emperor Kangxi (1719)	Assistant of the Hanlin Academy Hai Bao	Junior Compiler of the Hanlin Academy Xu Baoguang	Shō Kei	Xu Baoguang: *Record of Messages from Chûzan* and *Travels in Sannan*
21st year, Qing Emperor Qianlong (1756)	Expositor-in-Waiting of the Hanlin Academy Quan Kui	Junior Compiler of the Hanlin Academy Zhou Huang	Shō Boku	Zhou Huang: *Record of the Ryukyu Kingdom*
5th year, Qing Emperor Jiaqing (1800)	Senior Compiler of the Hanlin Academy Zhao Wenkai	Drafter of the Grand Secretariat Li Dingyuan	Shō On	Zhao Wenkai: *Works on My Mission to Ryukyu* Li Dingyuan, *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu*
13th year, Qing Emperor Jiaqing (1808)	Editorial Assistant of the Hanlin Academy Qi Kun	Supervising Secretary of the Office of Scrutiny for Works Fei Xizhang	Shō Kō	Qi Kun: *Continued Record of the Ryukyu Kingdom* and *Poetry on the Mission to Ryukyu*
8th year, Qing Emperor Daoguang (1828)	Senior Compiler of the Hanlin Academy Lin Hongnian	Junior Compiler of the Hanlin Academy Gao Renjian	Shō Iku	
5th year, Qing Emperor Tongzhi (1866)	Junior Compiler off the Hanlin Academy Zhao Xin	Junior Compiler of the Hanlin Academy Yu Guangjia	Shō Tai	Zhao Xin: *Continued Records of the Ryukyu Kingdom*

Source Official Web site of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Fujian Provincial Government of China: http://www.fjfao.gov.cn/ztzl/wsz/dwjw/201011/t20101125_1180163.htm

Kingdom, "with regard to islands and rivers, in the south there is Taiping Island, in the west there are Gumi Island and Machi Island, and in the north there are Liuhuang Island…."[65] On its voyage to Ryukyu from Fujian, China, the Chinese investiture vessel "moved through Pengjia Island, Diaoyu Islet, Huangmao Islet, Chi Islet, and a stream of other islands. In a night and a day it covered the distance that should have taken three days to achieve. The Ryukyuan boat was small, failed to keep up with our vessel and was left behind. On the evening of the 11th, we saw

[65]Ibid., p. 62.



Fig. 2.14 Chen Kan's *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu*, 1534, Records Diaoyu Island States That Kume Island Is Part of Ryukyu

Gumi Island (Kume Island), which is part of Ryukyu. The Ryukyuans on board began to sing and dance on their boat because they were happy to be home"[66] (see Fig. 2.14). Ancient block-printed books also stated, "The Ryukyuan beat drums and danced aboard their boat because they were happy to be home." This shows that both China and Ryukyu believed that after departing Fujian and passing China's Chiwei Islet, it entered the territory of the Ryukyu Kingdom when it arrived at Gumi Island.

The Ryukyuan mentioned above were those who had come to Fujian, China, to welcome China's envoy on his mission to Ryukyu for investiture purposes. Back then, new Ryukyuan kings attached great importance to these Chinese envoys. They often sent people to welcome the envoys in Fujian and travel back to Ryukyu on the Chinese vessel. Some of the Ryukyuan were descendants of the Fujian people who had migrated to Ryukyu in Ming China. When an investiture vessel moved beyond China's Chiwei Islet and arrived at Ryukyu's Kume Island, Ryukyuan boats would welcome it and guide it into the Port of Naha.

Taking advantage of the following passage in Chen Kan's *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu*, some Japanese tried to stress that the Ryukyuan knew the maritime

[66]Ibid., p. 27.

routes better than the Chinese and that proved Diaoyu Island was first discovered by the Ryukyuan. According to the passage, "My colleagues and I were pleased to hear that the Ryukyu tributary ship had arrived. The Fujian people weren't familiar with the maritime routes. I was worrying about that when the Ryukyuan ship came. That made me happy and I asked the Ryukyuan for information. The following day, I was told that another Ryukyuan ship had arrived; it was his Royal Highness sending senior subaltern Cai Tingmei 1992 Entrepreneurs to welcome my colleagues and me. I was glad that saved me the trouble of asking the tributary ship, and the ship sent by his Royal Highness could lead us in the voyage. Cai Tingmei met me to explain what his Royal Highness sent him there for. He also told me that as his Royal Highness was afraid that the Fujian people might not be good at sailing in Ryukyuan waters, he had sent a maritime translator along with 30 experienced sailors to move the Chinese vessel. I was glad that I even didn't have to follow the lead of the Ryukyuan boat and they were working aboard my vessel."[67]

This passage shows that Chen Kan was worried about his voyage to Ryukyu and felt grateful for the consideration of the Ryukyu king. There were special reasons why he was afraid that "the Fujian people weren't familiar with the maritime routes." One was that 55 years before his mission to Ryukyu, the Ming envoy Dong Min had gone on a mission to Ryukyu for investiture purposes in the 15th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Chenghua (1479). It was only normal that 55 years later, Chen Kan was worried that the new generation of Fujian people wasn't familiar with the maritime routes to Ryukyu. The second was that before starting his mission to Ryukyu, Chen Kan tried to look up for relevant documents at the Ministry of Rites, but the reports prepared by his predecessors and relevant maritime information had all been lost in a fire.

In addition, what happened later proved that his worries weren't groundless. Cai Tingmei (Sai teibi), who welcomed the investiture vessel in Fujian on behalf of the Ryukyu Kingdom, was also a descendant of the Fujian emigrants to Ryukyu and had been sent by the Ryukyuan government to study in China for six years in the fifth year of the reign of Ming Emperor Jiajing.[68] Back then, most of the translators from Ryukyu who were in charge of leading the voyage were descendants of the Fujian emigrants. There were veteran boatmen from Zhangzhou, Fujian, aboard Chen Kan's vessel, and they played a crucial role at critical moments, so it was advisable to have them aboard. According to Chen Kan's *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu*, several older people who skillfully dealt with the windstorms during the voyage "are from Zhangzhou. The people of Zhangzhou make a living at sea. Even children there learn how to cope with the sea, and it is never too old to learn, so they

[67]Ibid., pp. 20–21.

[68]Wang Shizhen (Qing Dynasty), *Ryukyu and China's Imperial College*, in Yin Mengxia, Jia Guirong, and Wang Guan (eds.), *Continued Edition of the Materials about Ryukyu at the National Library of China*, vol. 1, Chin. ed., Beijing: Beijing Library Press, 2002, p. 626.

Fig. 2.15 Chen Kan, *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu*, 1534

are accustomed to windstorms"[69] (see Fig. 2.15). It was convenient for the people of Zhangzhou to sail to Penghu and then to Taiwan, so many of them went to sea and were familiar with navigation.

[69]Chen Kan, *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., 13th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Jiajing (1534) in Huang Runhua and Xueying (eds.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., Beijing: Beijing Library Press, 2000, vol. 1, p. 52.



Fig. 2.16 Chen Kan, *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu,* 1534

In his *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu,* Chen Kan corrected an important concept; that is, the difference between Ryukyu and Taiwan was that the former was known as Big Ryukyu, while the latter as Small Ryukyu. Back then he stated, "Scholars of Fujian often say that when it is clear, Ryukyu is visible from the Drum Mountain. Here Ryukyu means Small Ryukyu, because from Fujian, even good eyes cannot see Big Ryukyu which is 10,000 *li* away"[70] (see Fig. 2.16). This makes it clear Taiwan is different from the Ryukyu Kingdom, which is a contribution made by Chen Kan.

Thereafter, the Ming and Qing envoys who went on a mission to Ryukyu for investiture purposes and the history of the Ryukyu Kingdom confirmed that the Liuqiu (流虯) Sui Emperor Yang sent Zhu Kuan to visit and the Ryukyu he sent Chen Leng and his troops to attack later were the Ryukyu Kingdom, not Taiwan. Back then, Taiwan was referred to as Small Ryukyu and Keelung, as Small Ryukyu Head.

If the Diaoyu Islands were first discovered by the Ryukyuan and belonged to Ryukyu, why weren't Ryukyuan documents recording this in the more than 500 years since the Ming Dynasty and why did China and Ryukyu both confirmed that Ryukyu as 36 islands? Why didn't Ryukyu raise objections to China's ownership of the Diaoyu Islands during this period when Ryukyuan official ships made more than 200 voyages to China? Why didn't those Japanese pirates in the areas surrounding the Diaoyu Islands leave any records suggesting otherwise? Why

[70]Ibid., p. 68.



Fig. 2.17 Guo Rulin, *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu,* 1561

didn't those Japanese trade vessels leave any records of Ryukyu's ownership of these islands? There is only one answer: these islands belong to China.

2. *In the 40th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Jiangjing (1561), Guo Rulin, who went on China's 12th mission to Ryukyu for investiture purposes, wrote his Record of My Mission to Ryukyu, further confirming that Chiwei Islet was China's island on the China-Ryukyu border.*

According to Guo Rulin's *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu,* "On leap lunar May 1, we went beyond Diaoyu Islet. On May 3, we arrived at Chi Islet. Chi Islet is a local island marking the boundary between China and Ryukyu. With good winds for another day, we will be able to see Gumi Island (Kume Island)…. At noon on May 6, we had good winds and continued our voyage and saw Tonaki Island, a Ryukyuan border island"[71] (see Fig. 2.17).

Guo Rulin categorically stated, "Chi Islet is a local island marking the boundary between China and Ryukyu." This means that it is a Chinese island on the maritime boundary between China and Ryukyu. Tonaki Island was located east of the Ryukyu Kingdom. This shows that Chinese envoys on a mission to Ryukyu for

[71]Guo Rulin, *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu*, Chin. ed., in the 40th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Jiajing (1561).

investiture purposes took Chiwei Islet as a Chinese island marking the maritime boundary between China and Ryukyu and regarded Tonaki Island as one of the border islands of Ryukyu. Just as the Japanese historian Kiyoshi Inoue stated if a far-fetched conclusion was jumped to that Diaoyu Islands were the boundary between Ryukyu and *terra nullius* that would be in total disregard of the meaning of the Chinese text.[72]

In his *Selected Works of Shiquan Shanfang*, Guo Rulin wrote in 1562, "On my voyage to Ryukyu, I set off from Chi Islet, which marks the boundary between China and Ryukyu."[73] Chi Islet is now Chiwei Islet. In the Chinese original, Guo Rulin used the character "涉." Chinese dictionaries say 涉 has several meanings, but the first meaning is "wade" and "cross the water." According to *A Chinese Dictionary*, "涉" also means river crossing and ferry crossing. On this basis, Guo Rulin's statement means when crossing the sea to Ryukyu, Chi Islet marked the border. This means the same thing as what he said above, "Chi Islet is a local island marking the boundary between China and Ryukyu."

However, taking advantage of the character 涉 which also means arrive and enter, Nozomu Ishii, an associate professor of Nagasaki Junshin Catholic University and Li Woteng mistook Guo Rulin to mean "I entered the border of Ryukyu where it was known as Chi Islet."[74] This is an utter distortion of Chinese ancient documents. Historically, both China and Ryukyu maintained that their maritime boundary was roughly at the Black Water Trench between Chiwei Islet and Gumi Island (today's Kume Island), this is, the Okinawa Trough. Not a single Ryukyuan document said that Chiwei Islet belonged to Ryukyu.

3. *In China's 13th and 14th missions to Ryukyu, headed, respectively, by Xiao Chongye in the seventh year of the reign of Ming Emperor Wanli (1579) and Xia Ziyang in the 34th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Wanli (1605), recorded their voyages through the Black Water Trench.*

To the east of Chiwei Islet is the Okinawa Trough. The trough is deep and black, so it was referred to by ancient people as the "Black Water Trench" or the "Dark Trough." Across the trough was Kume Island, which was known as "Gumi Island (古米山)" and "Gumi Island (姑米山)" in ancient times. Therefore, the trough was taken as the natural maritime boundary between China and the Ryukyu Kingdom in ancient times. China's envoys to Ryukyu would offer sacrifices to the sea whenever they reached here.

In his *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu*, Xiao Chongye recorded the maritime marker from Fujian to Ryukyu as follows: "Move northeast for 11 *geng* to Diaoyu Island; move on east-southeast for four *geng* to Huangwei Islet; sail east from there

[72]Kiyoshi Inoue, *An Analysis of the Historical Facts concerning the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)*, Jpn. ed., Disan Shyokan, October 2012, p. 30. The writing first appeared in Japan's *History Studies,* February 1972 and was published by Nihon Gendai Hyoronsha in October 1972.

[73]Guo Rulin, *Selected Works of Shiquan Shanfang*, Chin. ed., vol. 6, 1562.

[74]Nozomu Ishii, "Early History of Senkaku Island as Occupied *Terra Nullius*: http://www.yaeyama-nippo.com/2012/08/04.

for five *geng* to Chiwei Islet; move east-northeast for five *geng* to Gumi Island (Kume Island); and move on east-southeast for six more *geng* to Machi Island to directly arrive at Ryukyu."

Xie Jie, who was the assistant envoy on Xiao Chongye's voyage, wrote an article "Additions to the *Record of Ryukyu*," in which he recorded the Black Water Trench they sailed across: "Our vessel moved from west to east to Ryukyu, and sailed from east to west back to China, crossing more than 10,000 *li* of high waves. On our voyage to Ryukyu, we moved from a vast expanse of sea into the Black Water Trench while on our way back, we moved from the Black Water Trench into a vast expanse of sea."

In the 34th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Wanli (1606), at the request of the Chûzan king Shō Nei, following the order of the Chinese emperor, Xia Ziyang went on a mission to Ryukyu for investiture purposes. According to his *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu*, "In the afternoon, we moved past Diaoyu Island. On the following day, we went beyond Huangwei Islet. On that night, we were hit by high winds and waves and helms were broken. For days we moved on black water in something like a dirty indigo trench. According to Xie Jie's *Additions to the Record of Ryukyu*: On our voyage to Ryukyu, we moved from a vast expanse of sea into the Black Water Trench, and yes, the sea was really black. On the 29th, Gumi Island was visible. This made the Ryukyu aboard happy because their home was around the corner" (see Fig. 2.18).[75]

Xia Ziyang wrote on his voyage back to China, "A boat was vaguely visible. Those aboard were gladdened, saying that meant China wasn't far away and that as we returned to a vast expanse of sea from the Black Water Trench, we had entered Chinese territory." This shows that on the voyage back to Fujian from Ryukyu, one would enter Chinese territory after one moved across the Black Water Trench and Diaoyu Island was on the Chinese side of the border.

In addition, in the 2nd year of the reign of Ming Emperor Chongzhen (1629), Mao Ruizheng (Mao Yuanyi's cousin) of the Ministry of War wrote in his *Record of the Ming Dynasty*, "The Ryukyu Kingdom is an island nation east of Quanzhou, Fujian. If the wind permits, it takes seven days and seven nights to sail to Ryukyu from Attendant Gentleman of the Ministry of Justice, Changle. It is close to Fuzhou, Ningbo, Wenzhou and Taiwan. The tributary route from Ryukyu ends in Min County…. If you see Gumi Island, it is its territory."[76]At the same time, Chen Renxi, a successful candidate in the highest imperial examinations in the Ming Design, wrote the *Record of the Ming Dynasty* probably before 1636, the ninth year of the reign of Emperor Chongzhen. The book also stated, "If you see Gumi Island, it is its territory" (see Fig. 2.19).

The tributary route here means the route through which Ryukyu offered tribute to Ming China. In 1708, the Ryukyuan scholar Tei Junsoku also stated in his *A*

[75]Xia Ziyang, *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu*, Chin. ed., an ancient book collected at the National Library of China.

[76]Mao Ruizheng, *Record of the Ming Dynasty*, Chin. ed., vol. 1, 1629, pp. 17–24.



Fig. 2.18 Xia Ziyang, *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu*, 1606

Grand Maritime Guide that the maritime routes China taught Ryukyu served as a guide to Ryukyu's efforts to build the tributary route. Gumi Island located east of Chiwei Islet was on the Ryukyuan side of the border, and the Diaoyu Islands including Chiwei Islet on the tributary route undoubtedly belonged to China.

Neither side had objection to this. For example, in his "Admiring Tides by the Sea," Ryukyuan student in China Tei Gakukai wrote, "The ship with high sails leaves Kumi (a Ryukyuan Island beyond which there will be no more islands of my humble country)/Into a boundless expanse of sea."[77] The author had a note about Kumi. Back then, the Ryukyuan called China "your distinguished country" and referred to their country as "my humble country," indicating the investiture and tributary relations between China and Ryukyu in the feudal times.

4. *Since the Ming Dynasty, China had brought the Diaoyu Islands under its maritime defense and carried out maritime patrols.*

The Diaoyu Islands were not only the maritime marker assisting Ming and Qing investiture vessels sailing to the Ryukyu Kingdom but also the frontier where resistance was put up against Japanese pirates.

[77] *Selected Ryukyuan Poetry* (Ryukyu), Chin. ed., the 24th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Daoguang (1844), vol. in Huang Runhua and Xueying (eds.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, 2000, vol. 2, p. 795.


皮弁玉圭麟袍犀帶脉二品秩及妃皆有冠服綵幣初用中使宣德間改用給事中行人給事賜衣麒麟行人賜衣白澤並假玉帶從福建往治五橈巨艦長可十七丈橈用杉舵用錢梨木其國屆期遣看針通事一人并水手來與偕寄室看針即自晝燃燈亦名十更船往以西南風期孟夏歸以東北風期季秋望見古米山即其境東去三百里爲葉壁山又東即日本恒與貿易假貸近國哪覇首里並有馬市貶鬻率女僧市用日本錢十當一如

Fig. 2.19 Mao Ruizheng, *Record of the Ming Dynasty,* 1629

An important backdrop was that in the last years of the Kamakura shogunate, economic and social problems were aggravated in Japan and the decadent feudal landlords, bankrupt warriors, and smugglers in southwestern Japan collaborated to become pirates. They began to attack China's coastal areas in the last years of the Yuan Dynasty in the thirteenth century. Thereafter, Chinese outlaws and pirates in Japan became the guides of Japanese pirates who expanded their attacks on China's coastal areas in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Fujian.

In the third year of the reign of Ming Emperor Hongwu (1370), the Ming government sent Zhao Zhi to present a statement to the Japanese King Sinno Kaneyoshi in Kyushu. The Chinese ship was in distress and finally managed to arrive in Japan. However, King Sinno Kaneyoshi wasn't friendly to the Chinese envoy, for he hated the Mongolian rulers of the Yuan Dynasty for launching military attacks on Japan. Zhao Zhi was not to be deterred; he was patient in explaining that China had established the Ming government and that the Mongolians of the Yuan Dynasty were no longer the rulers of China. In the following year, accompanied by nine monks, Sinno Kaneyoshi's envoy sent tribute to China and brought more than 70 Chinese men and women who had been captured from China.

In addition, according to the *Record of the Ming Dynasty,* because the Japanese Southern and Northern Dynasties (1336–1392) let Japanese pirates threaten China's southeast coast, in the 14th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Hongwu (1381), the Chinese Ministry of Rites refused to take the tribute offered by the Japanese King Sinno Kaneyoshi and filed a protest. The Ming Court condemned the Japanese Southern Dynasty King Sinno Kaneyoshi, stating that, "You have failed to remain in your proper sphere. Believing that you are well defended by seas and mountains, you have become overbearing, insulted your neighbor and let your people become thieves." At the same time, the Ming government warned the Japanese side that, "While those who are benevolent enjoy the support of Heaven, those who are not benevolent will be punished by it."[78] However, all was turned down by the Japanese. Back then, Japan was separated into northern and southern parts with each part shirking the responsibility for controlling pirates. As a result, pirates increased their attacks on China. Therefore, Zhu Yuanzhang ordered exchange between China and Japan be stopped.

The Ming Dynasty didn't lift the ban on maritime trade with Japan until the first year of the reign of Emperor Yongle (1403). At that time, Japan began to cooperate with China in containing Japanese pirates and Japanese Emperor Go-Komatsu sent troops to eliminate the pirates on Tsushima Island other island. Having noticed that, on January 25 of the 4th year of the reign of Emperor Yongle (1406), the Ming government sent an envoy to Japan to issue a written citation to the Japanese government. In the first year of the reign of Ming Emperor Zhengtong (1436), Japan began to engage in so-called tributary trade with China. The idea was that Japanese merchant ships certified by the Chinese government were allowed to enter Chinese ports and carry out trade. This was designed partly to get the Japanese government to eliminate Japanese pirates.

However, during the reign of Ming Emperor Jiajing, smugglers and pirates between China and Japan ran wild so that tributary trade was suspended in the 26th year of the reign of Emperor Jiajing (1547) and China reimposed the ban on maritime trade with Japan and stepped up coastal defense development. Against this backdrop, in the 41st year of the reign of Emperor Jiajing (1562), Zheng Ruozeng and Hu Zongxian, noted Ming generals who fought Japanese pirates, included in the "Map of Coastal Islands" in their *Illustrations on Defense against Japanese Pirates* Diaoyu Islet, Huangwei Island (Huangwei Islet), and Chi Islet (Chiwei Islet) (see Fig. 2.20).

In his Map of Coastal Islands, a map of China's coastal defense and islands, Zheng Ruozeng only included Chinese islands without any island of the Ryukyu Kingdom. This shows that Diaoyu Island was a Chinese island within the scope of Ming China's coastal defense. In the China Coastal Defense Map in *Miscellaneous Writings of Zheng Kaiyang,* he also completed in the same period; however, Zheng

[78]*Record of the Ming Dynasty*, Chin. ed., vol. 7, collected at the National Library of China.



Fig. 2.20 Hu Zongxian and Zheng Ruozeng, "Map of Coastal Islands," *Illustrations on Defense against Japanese Pirates*, 1562, Includes the Diaoyu Islands in the Scope of China's Coastal Defense

Ruozeng included the Ryukyu Kingdom across the ocean. This shows China also ensured the security of the kingdom and worked with it in fighting Japanese pirates (see Fig. 2.21).

Ancient Chinese coastal defense maps all followed the example of the 1561 *Illustrations on Defense against Japanese Pirates*. These maps include the Complete Map of China's Coastal Defense produced by Xu Bida and others of the Evaluation Department of the Ministry of Official Personnel Affairs in the 33rd year of the reign of Ming Emperor Wanli, the Fujian Coastal Islands Map for Coastal Defense (2) in the military treatise *National Defense* written by Mao Yuanyi in the first year of the reign of Ming Emperor Tianqi (1621), and the Fujian Coastal Islands Map in *On National Defense* (vol. 2) written by Shi Yongtu in the late Ming Dynasty (see Fig. 2.22). An important backdrop of the maps of China's coastal defense produced by Xu Bida and others was that in 1592 and 1597 Hideyoshi Toyotomi's invaded Korea for large-scale expansion ultimately to China.

In the map Maritime Routes from Fujian to Japan in *Miscellaneous Writings of Zheng Kaiyang*, Diaoyu Islet, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet appear on the same page, while Gumi Island, Machi Island, and Big Ryukyu Island appear on the next page to indicate that their respective Chinese and Ryukyu ownership (see Fig. 2.23).

According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "It is not clear in Hong Zongxian's *Illustrations on Defense against Japanese Pirates* whether these islands were included in the scope of the coastal defense of the Ming Dynasty. These



Fig. 2.21 Zheng Ruozeng, China Coastal Defense Map, *Miscellaneous Writings of Zheng Kaiyang*, vol. 8



Fig. 2.22 Mao Yuanyi, Fujian Coastal Islands Map, Coastal Defense (2), *National Defense*, 1621



Fig. 2.23 Maritime Routes from Fujian to Japan, *Miscellaneous Writings of Zheng Kaiyang*, vol. 4

islands being recorded in this map doesn't necessarily prove that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) were regarded as Chinese territory."[79] I would like to explain that not all the islands included by Zheng Ruozeng in the China Coastal Defense Map in his *Miscellaneous Writings of Zheng Kaiyang* were Chinese territory. However, the islands included in the Map of Coastal Islands in *Illustrations on Defense against Japanese Pirates* compiled by Hong Zongxian and Zheng Ruozeng and in the Fujian Coastal Islands Map for Coastal Defense (2) in *National Defense* written by Mao Yuanyi in 1621 are, without doubt, Chinese territory. Therefore, the basic fact (no matter whether the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs can face squarely or not) is: Since the Ming Dynasty, China has included the Diaoyu Islands in its scope of coastal defense, clearly incorporated them in coastal defense maps and carried out maritime patrols in the waters around the Diaoyu Islands, whereas the Japanese and Ryukyuan documents in the same period didn't say the Diaoyu Islands were *terra nullius* or their own territory.

5. *In its sections on "the number of geng it takes to travel to Ryukyu from Fujian Province by boat," "the maritime routes from China to Ryukyu" and "the number of geng it takes to travel to Japan from Fujian Province by boat," the*

[79]Official website of the Japanese Embassy in China: http://www.cn.emb-japan.go.jp/fpolicy/senkaku_3.htm#6.

Maritime Transpiration of the Ming Dynasty records the maritime boundary between China and Ryukyu

The Maritime Transpiration of the Ming Dynasty was compiled by Shen Maoshang, a native of Wuxing (today's Huzhou), Zhejiang Province, somewhere between the reign of Ming Emperor Jiajing (1522–1566) and the reign of Ming Emperor Wanli (1573–1620). In the book, the sections on "the number of *geng* it takes to travel to Ryukyu from Fujian Province by boat," "the maritime routes from China to Ryukyu" and "the number of *geng* it takes to travel to Japan from Fujian Province by boat" all have detailed accounts of voyages via Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, and Chi Islet. The book doesn't specify the ownership of these islands, but it says that Ryukyu territory didn't include the Diaoyu Islands and makes it clear that "Tunaji Island and the islands on the Ryukyu border have many reefs. Guibie Islet is the west of Ryukyu and it takes one day to travel there by boat. Gaohua Islet is also in the west of Ryukyu…."

The Tunaji Island referred to in the book was the Tonaki Island in the sea west of Naha, Okinawa. Goubi Islet, or Kume Island, was exactly west of Tunaji Island (Tonaki Island) and it took a boat about one day to reach there from Ryukyu at that time. Probably because most of the residents of the island were people of Chinese origin, the book doesn't include the island into Ryukyu territory and believes the China–Ryukyu maritime boundary came between Tunaji Island (Tonaki Island) and Goubi Islet (Kume Island). This is different from China's official account such as the Chinese envoys' records of their missions to Ryukyu, but Gaohua Islet was probably the ancient Chinese name for Diaoyu Island as the main summit of Diaoyu Island is still called Gaohua Summit. According to *The Maritime Transpiration of the Ming Dynasty*, Gaohua Islet west of the Ryukyu Kingdom, so it obviously didn't belong to Ryukyu; it was a Chinese island (see Fig. 2.24).

Here is what *The Maritime Transpiration of the Ming Dynasty* has to say:

The number of *geng* it takes to travel to Ryukyu from Fujian Province by boat

Set sail from Meihua, Guangshi, Changle County, Fuzhou Prefecture, Fujian Province in a southerly wind. Move east by south from the Dongshan Mountain for six *geng*. Move southeast for two *geng* toward Small Ryukyu (Taiwan). Move southeast-east for four *geng* to Pengjia Mountain. Move east for ten *geng* to Diaoyu Islet. Move southeast-east for four *geng* to Huangwei Islet. Move east for five *geng* to Chi Islet. Move east for five *geng* to Gumi Island. Move southeast-east for six *geng* to Machi Island and move on to the port of Nana, Ryukyu. Local officials guard the port. From the port, move east for two *geng* and then northeast to the inner port of Naha. Move five *li* to arrive at the Tenshikan Center, travel 25 more *li* to reach Chûzan Center, and five more *li* to get to the Kankaimon Gate. If we travel to countries southwest of China, we often have a port to stay in after two or days of voyage. Nevertheless, Ryukyu is 10,000 *li* from Fujian Province, but we have nowhere to stay in between and there are always high winds.

Maritime routes from China to Ryukyu

Move east in a southerly wind, east in a southwesterly wind, or southeast-east in a southeasterly wind for ten *geng* to Diaoyu Islet. Move past the north of the island, and



Fig. 2.24 Photocopy of Shen Maoshang's *The Maritime Transpiration of the Ming Dynasty*

travel east in a southerly wind or east and then southeast-east in a southeasterly wind for four *geng* to Huangwei Islet. Move southeast-south in a southerly wind, or east and southeast-east in southeast winds for ten *geng* to Chi Islet. Move past the islet in the north and travel east and southeast-east in south winds, northeast in southwest winds, and east in southeast winds for 15 *geng* to Gumi Island. Move past the mountain in the north carefully. Move east in the southerly wind for four *geng* to Machi Island. Move east and northeast for two *geng* to Ryukyu in a southerly wind. Move north for four *geng* to Iejima Island from the port. Move north for four *geng* to Sulfur Mountain. Move north for five *geng* to Tianjiadi Island. Move 3.5 *geng* to Dujiala Island. Move north and northwest for three *geng* to Daluo Island. Move northwest for three *geng* to Qidao Island and get past the island by either side. Move five *geng* to Yeguda Island and get pass the mountain from the inside. Move northeast for 2.5 *geng* to Dan'er Island.[80]

The number of *geng* it takes to travel to Japan from Fujian Province by boat

Set sail from Dongwaishan, Meihua in Chengle County and move southeast for ten *geng* to Small Ryukyu (Taiwan). Move north of Small Ryukyu to see Jilong Islet, Huaping Islet, and Pengjia Island. Move east for ten *geng* past the north of Pengjia Island to Diaoyu Islet. Move for ten *geng* past the north of Diaoyu Islet. Move east for four *geng* to Huangma Islet. Move east for five *geng* past the north of Huangma Islet. Move for ten *geng* to Chikan Islet. Move east for 15 *geng* past the north of Chikan Islet to Kume Island. Move past the north of Kume Island, making sure to avoid reefs. Move east for five *geng* to Maqi Island. Move for five more *geng* to the greater Ryukyu. Dock the boat at the Port of Naha (guarded by officials). Move east for two *geng* into the inner port of Naha, Ryukyu.[81]

[80]Shen Maoshang, *The Maritime Transportation of the Ming Dynasty* in Zheng Zhenduo (eds.), *A Sequel to the Xuanlantang Book Series*, Chin. ed., vol. 92.

[81]Ibid., vol. 94.

2.4 Document Records of the Diaoyu Islands in the Qing Dynasty

More Chinese official documents such as the *Record of Missions to Ryukyu*, *Record of Messages from Chûzan*, and *Record of Ryukyuan Students at the Imperial College* prove that the Black Water Trench was the maritime boundary between China and Ryukyu and that the Diaoyu Islands are the inherent territory of China.

However, in spite of substantial evidence in favor of China, Japan continued to quibble that the Chinese "records of missions to Ryukyu for investiture purposes are private voyage records" and "do not explicitly state that Chiwei Islet is Chinese territory."[82] Therefore, "it might not belong to either country."[83] This implies that a far-fetched conclusion should be jumped to that the Diaoyu Islands, including Chiwei Islet, were *terra nullius*. However, the documents I will discuss below provide enough evidence that Chiwei Islet, which was directly recorded by Chinese envoys to Ryukyu and repeatedly confirmed, was Chinese maritime territory.

1. *Zhang Xueli and Wang Ji who went on a mission to Ryukyu for investiture purposes, respectively, in the 2nd year of the reign of Qing Emperor Kangxi (1663) and in the 22nd year of his reign (1683) recorded the maritime boundary between China and Ryukyu.*

From the reign of Ming Emperor Hongwu to that of Qing Emperor Guangxu, whenever a Ryukyuan king died and before a new king ascended to the throne, the Ryukyuan would report it to the Chinese government, vow allegiance, offer tributes, use the Chinese era, and stay as a vassal of China. This was the basic form of state of the 500-year-old Ryukyu Kingdom and also the basic form of Sino-Ryukyuan relations.

During the Qing Dynasty, China maintained more intimate relations with Ryukyu than ever before. Whenever Ryukyuan envoys came to China to offer tribute, Qing emperors would invite them to dinner. In addition, each time the Qing government gave Ryukyuan envoys gifts ten or one hundred times the worth of their tribute and granted special permits for them to sell their local products in China tax free.[84]

Zhang Xueli was the first envoy of the Qing Dynasty sent to Ryukyu for investiture purposes; he was there in the 2nd year of the reign of Emperor Kangxi (1663) to appoint Shō Shitsu the king of Ryukyu. In his *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu*, "The color of the sea was unusual; it grew dark blue. A boatman told me that we were in the ocean. All of a sudden a white stream of water stretched far

[82]*Sakae Midori*, *The Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)*, Jpn. ed., Naha: Okinawa Bunko, 1984, p. 90.

[83]Yoshio Okuhara, "The Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands): Critical of Taiwan's Position," *Okinawa* (quarterly), no. 56 (The Senkaku Islands [Diaoyu Islands]), 1971.

[84]The Palace Museum and Zhu Chengru (eds.), *History of the Qing Dynasty: Emperor Daoguang*, Chin. ed., Beijing: Forbidden City Press, 2002, vol. 9, p. 22.

north and south, and a boatman explained that we had crossed the border into a foreign land. That was where Heaven separated China and Ryukyu."[85] So when Zhang Xueli sailed across the Okinawa Trough, he believed that the maritime boundary between China and Ryukyu came so natural.

In his *Record of Chûzan*, Zhang Xueli also stated that one of the reasons the Ming Dynasty awarded Ryukyu Fujian emigrants with 36 surnames was to spread Chinese culture on its 36 islands. The book stated that in the Ryukyu Kingdom, "In order to inherit the throne, the eldest son of the Ryukyu king studied at the Imperial College. When his father died, he returned to Ryukyu to become king. When the Hongxi era began in 1425, the Chinese emperor permitted him not to come back to China because the voyage was dangerous. He awarded the Ryukyu king emigrants with 36 surnames to teach his 36 islands Chinese language in a hereditary system. Until today all those who came to China from Ryukyu to ask for an investiture, thank the emperor for his favor, or offer tribute have been the descendants of the emigrants."[86]

This passage shows why the Ming government awarded Ryukyu Fujian emigrants. Some of them were good sailors, and others were teachers. In order to facilitate the exchange between China and Ryukyu and the spread of Chinese culture, and save Ryukyuan inheritors to the throne the risk of making voyages, the Ming Dynasty sent Fujian emigrants with 36 surnames to Ryukyu. These people knew about the sea well and had received a high level of education. The descendants of these emigrants became Ryukyuan officials who were in charge of sending tribute to China or welcoming Chinese investiture vessels.

Wang Ji was the second envoy of the Qing Dynasty sent to Ryukyu for investiture purposes; he was there to appoint Ryukyu King Shō Tei in June 1683. Following the mission, he wrote *Miscellaneous Record of My Mission to Ryukyu*. In this book, he discussed how he crossed the Black Water Trench after sailing beyond Diaoyu Island and Chiwei Islet. He wrote, "At daybreak on the 24th, we saw Pengjia Island. I didn't know when we went past those islands. Somewhere between 7 a.m. and 9 a.m., we passed Pengjia Island, and somewhere between 5 p.m. and 7 p.m. Our vessel was just like flying. On the 25th, we should have reached Huangwei Islet before Chi Islet, but I didn't know why we arrived at Chi Islet without seeing Huangwei Islet. It was misty when we crossed the trench (过沟 or 过郊) …. 'What does the trench (郊) mean?" I asked. 'It's the China-Ryukyu border (中外之界)," came the answer. 'How can you tell?' 'It's just a guest," came the answer. The place we just offered pigs and sheep as sacrifices is exactly the border; it is not a guess"[87] (see Fig. 2.25).

[85]Zhang Xueli, *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu*, Chin. ed., collected at the Museum of Rare Books of the National Library of China Branch, Beijing.

[86]Ibid.

[87]Wang Ji, *Miscellaneous Record of My Mission to Ryukyu*, Chin. ed., 23rd year of the reign of Qing Emperor Kangxi (1684), collected at the Museum of Rare Books of the National Library of China Branch, Beijing.



Fig. 2.25 Wang Ji, *Miscellaneous Record of My Mission to Ryukyu*, 1683

Japanese scholar Yoshio Okuhara didn't agree that by中外之界, Wang Ji meant "It's the China–Ryukyu border." According to Okuhara, the author meant the border between ocean currents. Chinese scholar Wu Tianying corrected and strongly refuted Okuhara's misunderstanding in *The Sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895* he published in 1994.[88]

This reason why Wang Ji didn't see Huangwei Islet could be partly explained from his poems as follows. First, he was at Diaoyu Island around 5 p.m. to 7 p.m. The farther his vessel moved east the darker it became. The visibility at the sea was low, so it was already daybreak the following day when he saw Chiwei Islet. Second, Wang Ji said, "Our vessel was just like flying." This shows the westerly winds were strong. As Huangwei Islet was north of Diaoyu Island, Wang Ji's vessel probably moved directly on the strength of the winds to Chiwei Islet without going through Huangwei Islet in the north.

As an envoy to Ryukyu, Wang Ji was thinking of the Chinese islands on his way there. He paid more attention to the maritime boundary between China and Ryukyu his vessel crossed. It is of particular note that when his vessel moved through the Black Water Trench, the winds were strong and the waves were high, so pigs and sheep were offered as sacrifices for security. After that, Wang Ji asked how to tell the China–Ryukyu border. The answer he was given was that it was just a guess.

[88]Wu Tianying, *The Sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895,* Chin. ed., Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1994, pp. 58–60.

Wang Ji corrected it, stating that the place we had just offered pigs and sheep as sacrifices was exactly the border; it was not a guess.

However, there are still some Japanese people today who believe that just as Wang Ji's boatmen said, "It's the China–Ryukyu border (中外之界)" was just a guess. They even disagree that by 过郊, Wang Ji meant "cross the China–Ryukyu border (中外之界)." Nevertheless, they fabricated that 郊 means suburbs and outskirts and maintained that by 中外之界, Wang Ji meant the border between the downtown area of a city and its suburbs in a Daoist sense. As the Ryukyu Kingdom was highly Daoist, so 中外 meant the inside and the outside in the sense of *fengshui*. As 中外之界 didn't include 国 in it, it didn't mean the boundary between China and Ryukyu.[89] This is more a far-fetched quibble than a misunderstanding.

过郊 and 过沟 mean the same thing: cross the trench. Wang Ji added 或作沟 to 过郊 as a note because in the southern Fujian dialect, and both 郊 and 沟 are pronounced "kan."[90] Here 郊 has nothing to do with suburb and Daoism; it clearly means the Black Water Trench, the maritime boundary between China and Ryukyu.

In addition, according to *Ryukyuan Family Trees: The Gen Family*, "In his memorial to the Chinese emperor, Ryukyuan Chûzan King Shō Nei states that when the family tree is about to discontinue, efforts should be made to keep it from happening; when the country is lacking personnel, training must ensue. Soon after we vowed allegiance to China, Chinese emperors Hongwu and Yongle awarded us Chinese emigrants with 36 surnames. The learned emigrants were appointed grand masters or senior subalterns to take charge of Ryukyuan tribute and express gratitude to China; the emigrants who were experienced sailors were appointed translators or chiefs to serve as guide to Ryukyuan voyages…. As time goes by, there are only six surnames left, we don't have the correct maritime routes to external islands, documents are filled with flaws, ships often get lost, and even tribute cannot make the deadline. I am requesting the Fujian government to send Ruan Guo and Mao Guoding of Zhangzhou to my country. My appreciation of your favor is beyond word."[91] Wang Ji, who went on a mission to Ryukyu to appoint its king in 1683, produced *History of Chûzan* reviewed by the emperor. In the book, Wang Ji also recorded this event (see Fig. 2.26).[92]

According to the *History of Chûzan,* envoy Xia Ziyang, who went on a mission to Ryukyu in the 34th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Wanli (1606), helped send people surnamed Ruan or Mao to Ryukyu as emigrants to assist the Ryukyuan in

[89]Mozomu Yishiyi, "An Investigation into the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)," Jpn. ed., http://www.yaeyama-nippo.com.

[90]Information from Zhang Zhenxing, Chinese dialect expert of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in Wu Tianyign, *The Sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895,* revised and enlarged Chin. ed, Beijing: China Democracy and Legality Press, 2013, pp. 77–78.

[91]Ju Deyuan, *The Sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands Seized by Japan,* Chin. ed., Beijing: Beijing Normal University Press, 2001, p. 530.

[92]Wang Ji, *History of Chûzan* (II), Chin. ed., *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, 2006, vol. 1, p. 1042.


中山紀略

（清）張學禮撰　清光緒間上海著易堂鉛印本

中山紀略　清翰林院編修張學禮著

琉球海中小國也所出土產惟蕉布磺黃馬刀紙張摺扇漆器之類貨來自日本國有參蔴可供應王府長史食者茹魚肉樽酒可享數人飲獻治酒已一盃不過一二盃即夫妻兒女從不同席宴食之所餘皆棄之客來相訪不分上下東西任隨客意自坐席設於地坐下方叩一首煙酒茶湯接連而至如客返亦叩一首竟出主人不送迎若無聞也官宦之家俱有書室客軒插花竹木四時羅列架列四書唐詩通鑑等集報關高關旁靜土言本國之書亦廣但不知所載何典所言何事耳設官之法自唐宋至元王之長子應襲爵者至中國入國子監讀書其父薨始歸國受封至洪熙時偶其父往夙波臨國不測特免之賜三十六姓人教化三十六姓子孫世襲通使之職習中國之語言文字至今讀封謚恩卹貢皆諸姓之後俱有姓名若士官有名無姓也取士之法不徇文不考試舉賢良方正由秀才應法司設官長無衙門從役惟百姓輪值其執法甚嚴不徇情面即官長父子兄弟犯法輕則徒流重則處死不曲庇縱容也百姓見官長經過男女皆去簪脫履俯伏道旁候過而後敢行小心畏法若是道不拾遺夜不閉戶甚有太古之風有犯罪者大夫問之法司法司察其因由曲直令曲者死亦不敢逃留也有犯法重者竟自刎頸投繯不敢妄辦案生男女不薙胎髮男至二十歲立妻妻之後將頂髮削去惟留四旁餘挽一髻於前額右旁譬小如意如官亦分貴賤品級國王用金而起花者王之伯叔兄弟用金三法司紫金大夫用銀起花者大夫通使等職用光素百姓用紅青間用竹簪而已婦女亦繞衣服皆長袍腰繫全幅錦緞長丈餘兩旁插扇子趨發小刀之類足穿無根皮鞋亦以紙為胎細布裹之分貴賤長七寸闊二分週週三轉共為一圈王用五色花緞王之叔伯兄弟子姪用黃花緞宗族用黃光緞法司紫金用紫花緞大夫通使等官用紅綢初進王府者為秀才用紅光綢王府役人及雜職用紅布百

Fig. 2.26 1683 Envoy to Ryukyu Wang Ji, *History of Chûzan*

moving across the sea to offer tribute to China. Xia Ziyang also brought a humble letter written by King Shō Nei to the Ming emperor. This not only shows that King Shō Nei needed Chinese emigrants to serve as maritime guides but also implies that shortly before and after Ryukyu was invaded by Japanese Satsuma han in 1609 for the first time, it urgently needed to rely on China for political security.

King Shō Nei's request for more experienced sailors fully proves that from the early Ming Dynasty to the reign of Ming Emperor Wanli (fourteenth to seventeenth centuries), the Diaoyu Islands maritime routes between China and Ryukyu had always been led and maintained by Ryukyuan people of Chinese descent.

2. *Xu Baoguang, an assistant envoy who went on a mission to Ryukyu for investiture purposes during the reign of Qing Emperor Kangxi, wrote the Record of Messages from Chûzan in 1719. He worked together with Ryukyu in*



Fig. 2.27 1719 Qing Envoy Xu Baoguang, *Record of Messages from Chûzan*, with the Note: Gumi Island "the Main Island on the Southwestern Border of Ryukyu"

confirming the Ryukyuan ownership of islands and Ryukyu's maritime border, proving that the Diaoyu Islands didn't belong to Ryukyu, but to China.

The reason why Xu Baoguang wrote the *Record of Messages from Chûzan* was to report reliable conditions of the Ryukyu Kingdom to the Qing emperor. The book was based on Xu Baoguang's field study in the Ryukyu Kingdom. It was an authoritative work jointly produced and recognized by China and Ryukyu. In the book, Xu Baoguang quoted Tei Junsoku as saying in his *A Grand Maritime Guide* in 1708, "A maritime route from Fuzhou to Ryukyu starts from Min'an Town and moves all the way to Naha via Wuhumen, Dongshawai, Huaping Islet, Pengjia Island, Diaoyutai, Huangwei Islet, Chiwei Islet, Gumi Island (the main island on the southwestern border of Ryukyu), and Machi" (see Fig. 2.27).[93]

In the passage above, the message "the main island on the southwestern border of Ryukyu" in brackets was a note added by Xu Baoguang, stressing that Gumi Island was the main island on the southwestern border of the Ryukyu Kingdom. This shows that the maritime boundary between China and Ryukyu came between Chiwei Islet of the Diaoyu Islands and Gumi Island (Kume Island). Both China and Ryukyu agreed to that.

[93]Xu Baoguang, *Record of Messages from Chûzan*, 58th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Kangxi (1719), in Huang Ruihua and Xue Ying (eds.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, October 2000, vol. 1, p. 36

Today the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs says, according to the *Record of Messages from Chûzan,* Gumi Island was "the main island on the southwestern border of Ryukyu…. These documents prove that Kume Island, but they didn't say that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) west of Kume Island belonged to the Ming or Qing Dynasty."[94] So the Japanese Ministry concludes that the documents cannot serve as evidence. This question is easy to answer because back then there were no Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) to speak of. The *Record of Messages from Chûzan* is about the Ryukyu Kingdom, not China. This was why when it came to the maritime route from China to Ryukyu, a note was added that Gumi Island (Kume Island) was "the main island on the southwestern border of Ryukyu." With regard to the ownership of the islands west of Kume Island, Guo Rulin, who went on a mission to Ryukyu for investiture purposes, made clear records, saying "Chi Islet is the mountain separating China and Ryukyu." This clearly means that Chiwei Islet was the Chinese island on the China–Ryukyu border; it absolutely doesn't mean that Chiwei Islet was *terra nullius* that separated China and Ryukyu. In addition, besides Chinese ancient documents and maps, the map produced by the Japanese scholar Ren Yamada in 1810 and *The China Sea Directory* published by the British Admiralty in 1894 when the Sino-Japanese War broke out both categorically confirmed that the Diaoyu Islands were the islands affiliated with Taiwan Province, China, in the northeast of the province.

The note—Gumi Island (Kume Island), "the main island on the southwestern border of Ryukyu"—made by Xu Baoguang shows that that island marked the border of the Ryukyu Kingdom, and west of the border was China. This statement was identical with what Guo Rulin's statement "Chi Islet is the mountain separating China and Ryukyu."[95] In addition, in his *Record of Messages from Chûzan* Xu Baoguang also wrote, "These eight islands constitute the Yaeyama Islands which are in the most southwestern end of Ryukyu" (see Fig. 2.28).

Before Qing vessels on their way to Ryukyu for investiture purposes entered the Black Water Trench via Chiwei Islet, China's easternmost island, Chinese envoys and assistant envoys would offer sacrifices to the sea and give Chiwei Islet a salute with their eyes. I will elaborate on this later. The *Record of Messages from Chûzan* included the Sino-Ryukyuan maritime route map (see Fig. 2.29). The map includes the main islands from the starting point to the final destination without specifying to which country they belonged. Therefore, to acquire a better understanding of the China–Ryukyu border, one must consult the Map of Ryukyu and the relevant discussions in the *Record of Messages from Chûzan*.

Before 1719, the Ryukyu Kingdom lacked detailed maps of their country. In order to help Xu Baoguang with his work on the *Record of Messages from Chûzan*, Ryukyuan King Shō Kei had Tei Junsoku, an authoritative Ryukyuan scholar and a Grand Master with the Purple-Golden Ribbon, worked out a large-scale map of

[94]The Japanese Embassy in China: http://www.cn.emb-japan.go.jp/fpolicy/senkaku_3.htm#1.

[95]Kiyoshi Inoue, *An Analysis of the Historical Facts concerning the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)* (new edition), Jpn. ed., Disan Shyokan, 2012, p. 41.


彭家山用乙辰針至八重山明洪武中中山王察度
始通中朝時二大島來貢于中山即八重山太平山
也山較太平尤饒給多樫木黑木黃木赤木草蓆產
牛馬螺石出麻布棉布海參紅酒名密林酒五穀珲
粟琦琱珊瑚羊肚松紋海芝海松海梧等石每年五
六月與太平山來貢于中山
烏巴麻二島譯曰宇波間在八重山西南
巴度麻譯曰波渡間在八重山西南
由那姑呢在八重山西南以上四島皆近臺灣
姑彌在八重山西較他島為大
達奇度奴譯為富武在八重山西姑彌東
姑吕世麻譯為久里島在八重山西少北
阿喇姑斯古譯曰新城在八重山西
巴梯吕麻譯曰波照間在八重山極西北
以上八島俱屬八重山國人稱之皆曰八重山此
琉球極西南屬界也
三十六島前錄未見惟張學禮記云賜三十六姓
教化三十六島其島名物產則未之及也今從國

Fig. 2.28 Xu Baoguang, *Record of Messages from Chûzan*, 1719



Fig. 2.29 1719 Qing Envoy to Ryukyu Xu Baoguang, *Record of Messages from Chûzan*, Including Diaoyu Island in China's Maritime Route



Fig. 2.30 1719 Qing Envoy Xu Baoguang, Map of Ryukyu, *Record of Messages from Chûzan*, Not Including Diaoyu Island

Ryukyu for Xu's information. The map marked in a general sense the 36 islands of Ryukyu, but it didn't specify how far one island was from another and what their local products were. Having realized this, based on the map, Xu Baoguang solicited opinions from a wide range of sources, led surveyors Ping An and Feng Sheng'e traveled to every corner of Ryukyu, verified all they have to verify, reproduce the map of Ryukyu and corrected some of the mistakes Zheng Ruozeng and other predecessors had made in their maps of Ryukyu. Xu's map was the most accurate and thorough map the Ryukyuan had of their country at that time. The *Record of Messages from Chûzan* written by Xu Baoguang and the Map of Ryukyu he produced were published in 1722 (see Fig. 2.30).

Xu Baoguang realized that the Ryukyu Kingdom actually had more than 36 islands. However, he continued to count Ryukyuan islands as 36 just as it was done in the *Annals of Chûzan,* the first history book about Ryukyu written by Ryukyuan Prime Minister Shyo Jyoken in 1650 and counted as one island East Machi Island (consisting of five islands east of Kerama Islands) as well as West Machi Island (consisting of four islands west of Kerama Islands). East Machi Island and West Machi Island were two of the three islands in west Ryukyu.[96] In this way, Ryukyu continued to have 36 islands as before. Whatever the case, it is an indisputable fact that Ryukyuan islands didn't include Diaoyu Island.

[96]Xu Baoguang, *Record of Messages from Chûzan*, the 58th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Kangxi (1719), in Huang Ruihua and Xue Ying (eds.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, October 2000, vol. 1, p. 315.

Following the completion of thing Map of Ryukyu, Xu Baoguang wrote the poem "Ode to the Map of Ryukyu" to express his gratitude to the Ryukyuan king. More importantly, the poem more accurately recorded Ryukyuan. The poem reads:

Ryukyu has thirty-six islands,
Which are separated from China by the sea.
….
The northern island is called Yama,
Which marks the border with Japan.
Located in the south of country,
Taiping Island faces Taiwan in the north.
King Satto established tributary relations with China,
Island officials contribute to the prosperity of Chûzan.
The country lacked maps of its territory,
Though its border are well defended.
….
Gumi and Machi may be small,
We cannot see them as far as we look to the south.[97]

This poem gives a clear count of Ryukyuan territory. It says that west of the country's 36 islands across the sea was China. According to the poem, Ryukyu bordered Japan in the north. The main island in the southern Ryukyu was Taiping Island, including the Miyako Islands and the Yaeyama Islands, and these islands faced Taiwan in the south. The problem here is that in reality, Taiwan is west of the Miyako Islands and the Yaeyama Islands while Diaoyu Island is north of them. Xu Baoguang was keenly aware of that and marked the location of Taiwan Island and Diaoyu Island in the Fujian–Ryukyu maritime route map, so he would not have made that mistake. Then why did he write in his poem "Located in the south of country/Taiping Island faces Taiwan in the north"? This means that Miyako Islands in the south face Taiwan in the north. The only reasonable explanation is that Xu Baoguang regarded Diaoyu Island as affiliated with Taiwan and indirectly expressed this opinion in his poem.

According to the poem, Ryukyu suffered a lack of maps of its territory, but the country was well defended. The poem said that the Map of Ryukyu was produced with the direct assistance of the Chûzan king and the names of the Ryukyuan islands in different dialects were translated by the king. All this shows the map was a result of the official cooperation between China and Ryukyu. The demarcation of the maritime boundary between China and Ryukyu had been jointly confirmed by the two governments and Chiwei Islet and the islands west of it simply belong to China.

[97]Xu Baoguang, "Map of Ryukyu," in Wang Han (ed.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu, Part Three,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, 2000, vol. 1, pp. 223–225.



Fig. 2.31 Xu Baoguang, "Song of Voyage," 1719

According to a Japanese person, Xu Baoguang didn't visit Diaoyu Island in person and merely quoted from *A Grand Maritime Guide*, so what he wrote is insignificant. However, just as I have discussed above, Tei Junsoku made it clear that the Diaoyu Island and other maritime route maps were based on the maritime route manuals of the Fujian emigrants to Ryukyu and *Maritime Routes for Investiture Vessels* produced by Chinese envoys to Ryukyu. During his visit to Ryukyu, Xu Baoguang wrote a poem titled "Song of Voyage," which reads:

Sacrificing pigs and sheep in the trough,

Beating drums and gongs in honor of God.

Yellow sand spread long on the waves,

Being reported the Mikang Ocean has passed.

(Pigs and sheep were sacrificed in the maritime boundary and yellow sand floated long on the Mikang Ocean.)[98] The statement in brackets was a note (see Fig. 2.31).

[98]Xu Baoguang, *Poetry on Voyage*, Wang Han (ed.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu, Part Three,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, 2006, vol. 1, p. 187.

This fully shows that Xu Baoguang was sure that the Okinawa Trough between Chiwei Islet and Kume Island was the maritime boundary between China and Ryukyu and that the islands west of Chiwei Islet, including the Diaoyu Islands, belonged to China. This means the same as the "boundary between China and Ryukyu" described by Wang Ji. Moreover, Xu Baoguang didn't entirely copy Tei Junsoku's records. As China's envoy on a mission to Ryukyu for investiture purposes, Xu Baoguang had a better understanding of the Diaoyu Island maritime route and the influence of the way the wind blew than Tei Junsoku.

Another important contribution made by Xu Baoguang in his *Record of Messages from Chûzan* was that in order not be lost on a voyage to Ryukyu, in addition to making Diaoyu Island and other islands as markers, it was important to watch the way the wind blew. The book suggested that the Ryukyuan on their voyage to welcome Chinese investiture vessels study carefully what was discussed in the records of Xia Ziyang and Wang Ji about their missions to Ryukyu so as not to get lost at sea.

According to the book, the wind blew southwest on May 21, 1719, when Xu Baoguang started his voyage to Ryukyu. At first, at the suggestion of the Ryukyuan official accompanying Xu Baoguang the vessel sailed east. However, on the morning of May 27, "Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, Chiwei Islet, and other islands should have appeared, but none of them had." On May 28, Xu Baoguang told Captain Lin to change direction move southeast. On May 29, "At sunrise, six small mountains appeared in the northeast. The Ryukyu official aboard said, 'This is not Gumi; it's Yebi Island northwest of Ryukyu.' So they realized that they moved north too much. The vessel was moving northeast. Should it not have been for the northwesterly wind, the vessel would not have reached the Port of Naha."[99] Xu Baoguang stated, "The Ryukyuan maritime route the Ryukyu official used was mostly based on *A Grand Maritime Guide*. The mistake was to move north too much, leading the vessel too much to the north. My predecessor Wang Ji said that the investiture vessel went too much to the north and had to turn back."[100] In addition, "*A Grand Maritime Guide* focuses on the direction of voyages while ignoring the direction of winds. Vessels often moved too much to the north to pass Yebi, not Gumi."[101] As the Kuroshio Current between Chiwei Islet and Gumi Island moved from south to north, due to the influence of southerly or southwesterly winds, ships could easily deviate from its route too much to the north.

Gumi Island was a landmark island on the border of the Ryukyu Kingdom. In his *Record of Messages from Chûzan* Xu Baoguang highlighted the importance of this island: "Those who are on their voyage from Fujian to Ryukyu must take this mountain as a reference" (see Fig. 2.32). In ancient times, to sail from Fujian to

[99]Xu Baoguang, *Record of Messages from Chûzan*, the 58th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Kangxi (1719), in Huang Ruihua and Xue Ying (eds.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, 2000, vol. 2, pp. 41–42.

[100]Ibid., p. 43.

[101]Ibid., p. 44.


齒產者色久不退爲良產魚螺山多鹿近姑米山有
姑巴汎麻山亦多鹿無人居
〔姑米山〕在馬齒山西去中山四百八十里有安河具
志川仲里二間切由閩中至國必針取此山爲準封
舟行海中第七日有小黑魚點點浮水面接封使臣
云此出姑米山下名墨魚山形勢雄拔產五穀及土
綿繭紬白紙蠟燭螺魚等物山多雞豚牛馬
西北五島
〔度那奇山〕譯曰渡名喜島近姑米山山多牛

Fig. 2.32 Xu Baoguang, *Record of Messages from Chûzan*, 1719

Ryukyu, people had to pass Diaoyu Island, which was not an island of Ryukyu, and they weren't in Ryukyu until they reached Gumi Island.

3. The *Record of the Ryukyu Kingdom written by Zhou Huang in the 21st year of the reign of Qing Emperor Qianlong (1756) as an envoy who went on a mission to Ryukyu to appoint its king, his poems and the poems of the scholar Wang Wenzhi have all proven that the Fujian Seas of China the Black Water Trench marked the maritime boundary between China and Ryukyu.*

In 1756, Chinese assistant envoy Zhou Huang accompanied envoy Quan Kui on the voyage to Ryukyu to appoint Shō Boku Ryukyu king, wrote the *Record of the Ryukyu Kingdom* and presented it to Emperor Qianlong. Later on, in the 27th year of the reign of Emperor Qianlong (1762), Zhou wrote *Eastern Seas.* According to the book, "Following ten *geng* of voyage from Huaping Islet, Diaoyutai appeared, which is like a piece of jade. Following four *geng* of voyage from Diaoyu Islet, Huangwei Islet emerged, and after ten more *geng* of travel, we arrived at Chiwei Islet. Gumi is dotted in the vast sea. Six *geng* of voyage took us to Gumi Island.… Machi is divided into east and west islands and serve as the gateway to Ryukyu"[102] (see Fig. 2.33.)

[102]Zhou Huang, *Eastern Seas* (I), in Wang Han (ed.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu, Part Three,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, first edition, 2006, vol. 1, pp. 334–335.



Fig. 2.33 Zhou Huang, *Eastern Seas* (I), 1762

In the *Record of the Ryukyu Kingdom* (V) Zhou Huang presented to Emperor Qianlong, he stated that the Ryukyu Kingdom "is surrounded by seas and the Black Water Trench in the west marks the boundary with Fujian waters. Along the voyage from Fujian to Ryukyu is the Black Water Trench, which is part of Ryukyu…. The 36 islands of Ryukyu are interdependent"[103] (see Fig. 2.34).

This once again confirms that the Black Water Trench was the maritime boundary between China and Ryukyu and that the Ryukyu Kingdom had 36 islands, not including the Diaoyu Islands. On the strength of winds, Zhou Huang's vessel moved toward Ryukyu and "on June 10, moved out of Humen, arrived at Gumi Island on June 13, and stopped to wait for favorable winds close to the mountain on June 14…"[104] (see Fig. 2.35).

Zhou Huang not only recorded his experience with Diaoyutai on his voyage to Ryukyu but also stated that "Machi is divided into east and west islands and serves as the gateway to Ryukyu." This is of particular importance. Machi Island is the

[103]Zhou Huang, *Record of the Ryukyu Kingdom* (V), in Huang Runhua and Xue Ying (eds.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, October 2000, vol. 2, pp. 899–900.

[104]Zhou Huang, *Record of the Ryukyu Kingdom* (VI), in Huang Runhua and Xue Ying (eds.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, October 2000, vol. 2, pp. 980–981.



Fig. 2.34 Zhou Huang, *Record of the Ryukyu Kingdom* (V), 1756



Fig. 2.35 Zhou Huang, *Record of the Ryukyu Kingdom* (VI), 1756



Fig. 2.36 Zhou Huang, "Two Poems on Gumi Island," 1756

Kerama Islands between Kume Island and Naha. It was probably because Zhou Huang didn't see any island during his voyage past Gumi Island at night when torches were used to guide his vessel as a sign of welcome, he failed to see the island and mistook the two islands of Machi Island he later sailed through as the gateway to Ryukyu. In his "Two Poems on Gumi Island," Zhou Huang wrote:

At night torches appear in the mountain,

Apparently in five horizontal lines.

These are a report of safe arrival;

We come ashore at daybreak without difficulty.

The mirage fades away on the island,

Our hosts' warmness reassures us.

Ryukyu's top three officials are warmhearted,

They row a boat to welcome us (the chief of Gumi Island has dozens of small boats escort us to cast anchor at shore side[105] (see Fig. 2.36).

[105]Zhou Huang, *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu* in Guo Rulin (Ming Dynasty), Xu Baoguang (Qing Dynasty) et al., Wang Han (ed.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu, Part Three,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, 2006, vol. 1,

In fact, Machi Island (Kerama Islands) consisted of more than two islands; it was composed of two west–east archipelagoes of more than ten islands. The archipelago in the west included Kuba Island and Aka Island (赤岛), now known as Aka Island (阿嘉岛). It is worth noting that while Japan infiltrated and expanded to Ryukyu in the nineteenth century, the names of these two islands were mistakenly used to refer to China's Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet, respectively. This caused confusion over island names but the Japanese Meiji government also took advantage of them to mislead the public, which paved the way for it to steal these islands.

The Black Water Trench between Chiwei Islet and Gumi Island (Kume Island) served as the maritime boundary between China and the Ryukyu Kingdom. This was also recorded by the scholar Wang Wenzhi who joined Quan Kui and Zhou Huang on their voyage to Ryukyu for investiture purposes. In his *Ode to the Voyage*, Wang Wenzhi wrote:

….

The Black Water Trench is as dark as ink,

It is all blurred like what the universe was believed to be at birth.

….

The cold wind penetrates one's bones,

This is where the boundary between China and Ryukyu is.[106]

This poem is about what the author saw and thought of when he moved across the Black Water Trench aboard the investiture vessel. It is about how he felt about the maritime boundary between China and Ryukyu.

It is worth noting that according to Zhou Huang, the Fujian Sea was west of the Black Water Trench. This sea has been within the scope of China's coastal defense since ancient times and the islands there all belong to China. This wasn't challenged by the Ryukyu Kingdom and can be said to represent the common understanding between China and Ryukyu.

4. *According to the "Ode to the God of the Sea" Qing envoys Zhao Wenkai and Qi Kun delivered while offering sacrifices to God at the Black Water Trench during their voyage to Ryukyu for investiture purposes in 1800 and 1808, respectively, those aboard must give a salute with their eyes to Chiwei Islet to say good-bye to their country.*

The "Ode to the God of the Sea" was usually prepared jointly by the envoy and assistant envoy before they left for Ryukyu. It was originally designed to pray for the Goddess of the Sea for safety during the voyage. I have found out that the "Ode

[106]Wang Wenzhi, "*Ode to the Voyage*" in Yin Mengxia, Jia Guirong, and Wang Guan (eds.), *Continued Edition of the Materials about Ryukyu at the National Library of China*, vol. 1, Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Publishing House, 2002, pp. 596–597.



Fig. 2.37 Envoy Zhao Wenkai and assistant envoy Li Dingyuan, "Ode to the God of the Sea," 1800

to the God of the Sea" prepared by Qing envoys to Ryukyu in 1800 was the first to include things like giving a salute with eyes to Chiwei Islet, the easternmost island of China. For example, in their "Ode to the God of the Sea," envoy Zhao Wenkai and assistant envoy Li Dingyuan who went on a mission to Ryukyu for investiture purposes in November of the fifth year of the reign of Qing Emperor Jiaqing (1800), said, "We give Chiwei Islet a salute with our eyes"[107] (see Fig. 2.37).

In delivering at Chiwei Islet, the prepared "Ode to the God of the Sea" in the 13th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Jiaqing (1808) when they were about to cross the Black Water Trench, envoy Qi Kun and assistant envoy Fei Xizhang said, "Giving the Chinese islet (华屿) a salute with our eyes, we break waves with sincerity."[108] Here the Chinese Islet (华屿) refers to the Chiwei Islet west of the Black Water Trench.

First, one of the several explanations of the ancient Chinese "华" is gorgeous, splendid, or bustling. As Chiwei Islet was barren without vegetation like a huge stone emerging from the sea, it was far from gorgeous or splendid. Second, the main summit of Diaoyu Island is called Gaohua Summit (高华峰), and it was

[107]Zhao Wenkai and Li Dingyuan, "Ode to the God of the Sea" in Yin Mengxia, Jia Guirong, and Wang Guan (eds.), *Continued Edition of the Materials about Ryukyu at the National Library of China*, vol. 1, Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Publishing House, 2002, p. 306.
[108]Ibid., p. 295.

known as Gaohua Islet (高华屿) in ancient China. However, as Diaoyu Island is more than 100 km west of Chiwei Islet and is far from the Black Water Trench, the author obviously didn't mean Diaoyu Island. Third, just as I wrote above, in their "Ode to the God of the Sea," envoy Zhao Wenkai and assistant envoy Li Dingyuan who went on a mission to Ryukyu for investiture purposes in 1800 said, "We give Chiwei Islet a salute with our eyes." Fourth, Qi Kun is generally believed to be more aware of the China–Ryukyu maritime boundary than other Ming and Qing envoys to Ryukyu. These four reasons are enough to conclude that by the Chinese islet (华屿), Qi Kun undoubtedly referred to China's Chiwei Islet. As I am a Chinese citizen, when I carefully study the encouraging statement "Giving the Chinese islet (华屿) a salute with our eyes, we break waves with sincerity" Qi Kun and Fei Xizhang wrote in their "Ode to the God of the Sea," I can feel that they ardently loved the islands of their country and were firmly resolved to accomplish the mission to Ryukyu in spite of hardships and difficulties during the dangerous voyage.

Given the speed of a wood sailing ship back then, it usually took three days and three nights to move from Fujian to Chiwei Islet provided there was a tailwind. Sometimes Chinese vessels arrived at Chiwei Islet at night with strong winds and high waves. To reach Gumi Island (Kume Island), the first island in western Ryukyu, they had to move from west to east to cross the deep and swift 110-kilometer-wide Black Water Trench (the Okinawa Trough) which moved about seven kilometers per hour from south to north. In the meantime, there weren't any islands in the vast sea to serve as maritime markers. So how hard the voyage was!

This shows that when their vessels moved across the Black Water Trench, Qing envoys saluted China's Chiwei Islet with their eyes while riding on the waves on the China–Ryukyu border toward Gumi Island in Ryukyu, in a display for their loyalty to China and their trust of Ryukyu. While Ming investiture vessels offered pigs and sheep as sacrifices at sea and prayed to the Goddess of the Sea for protection, Qing envoys were keenly aware of the international border.

The China–Ryukyu relations in the feudal period have gone forever, but if I am not mistaken, the Chinese officials who appointed Ryukyuan kings on behalf of Chinese emperors had proclaimed to the world by paying a salute to Chiwei Islet with their eyes: the Diaoyu Islands have been Chinese territory since ancient times. This undeniable ironclad evidence will be there forever.

5. *Envoy Qi Kun and assistant envoy Fei Xizhang who went on a mission to Ryukyu for investiture purposes in the 13th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Jiaqing (1808) stated that Gumi Island was Ryukyuan territory in an article titled "The Maritime Routes" and reported it to the emperor. In addition, Qi Kun wrote a poem about how he arrived at Chiwei Islet before moving on to Gumi Island to enter Ryukyu.*

Qi Kun and Fei Xizhang followed closely the maritime route to Ryukyu and had a strong sense of responsibility in this regard. In order to prevent future investiture vessels from being brought too much to the north by winds to deviate from the



Fig. 2.38 "The Maritime Route" Qi Kun and Fei Xizhang Submitted to the Emperor States That Gumi Island Is a Ryukyu Island

Diaoyu Island maritime route, they added the 170-word article "The Maritime Route" to the five-volume *Continued Record of the Ryukyu Kingdom*. According to the article, "Ryukyu is in the east of the sea. There are mountains at which to dock your ship all the way from Wuhumen, Fujian, to Gumi Island, Ryukyu. Along the route is an immeasurable expanse of water with trenches"[109] (see Fig. 2.38).

Here Kumi Island, Ryukyu, was as Xu Baoguang put it, "the main island on the southwestern border of Ryukyu" and is known as Kume Island today. This shows that these two Chinese envoys who went on a mission to Ryukyu for investiture purposes were keenly aware of the border, and this indirectly shows that all the islands between Wuhumen, Fujian, and Kume Island, Ryukyu, were Chinese islands.

Why did Qi Kun and Fei Xizhang specify the notion "the islands between Wuhumen, Fujian, and Kume Island, Ryukyu" in "The Maritime Route" they presented to the emperor? I found out that in fact, they wanted to report to the emperor that all the islands between Wuhumen, Fujian, and Kume Island, Ryukyu were Chinese islands. My reason is as follows:

[109]Qi Kun and Fei Xizhang, *Continued Record of the Ryukyu Kingdom (*III) in Yin Mengxia, Jia Guirong, and Wang Guan (eds.), *Continued Edition of the Materials about Ryukyu at the National Library of China*, vol. 1, Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Publishing House, 2002, p. 481.

Following "The Maritime Route," the book said, "We benefit enormously from Your Majesty's great favor. We attach herewith the maritime route from Fujian to Ryukyu."[110] This shows that envoys Qi Kun and Fei Xizhang wanted to inform the emperor about the maritime route and what islands were along the route so as to provide future envoys with reference for their voyage to Ryukyu. Taking this part of the book as a whole, "The Maritime Route," which is less than two pages long, merely serves as a short preface. The 17-page "Record of the Voyage" that comes after it is the main body of the report.

The "Record of the Voyage" is about five Ming and Qing envoys' voyages to Ryukyu for investiture purposes. They were Ming envoy Xia Ziyang (1606) and Qing envoys Wang Ji (1683), Xu Baoguang (1719), Zhou Huang (1756), and Li Dingyuan (1800). In addition, Qi Kun's records of his personal experiences were attached. In the "Record of the Voyage," five arrivals at Diaoyu Island are reported, there are three arrivals at Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet, and five arrives at Gumi Island are mentioned. Qi Kun was probably worried that if he didn't explain "Gumi Island, Ryukyu" in his report to the emperor, the latter might wonder where the investiture vessel should be to be considered to have entered Ryukyu. Therefore, he made that explanation in "The Maritime Route." Of course, Taiwan had long been become part of the Qing Dynasty and in addition, envoy Zhao Wenkai and assistant envoys who sailed to Ryukyu in 1800 had presented a report to the emperor. Therefore, it might be true that Emperor Jiaqing didn't know that Diaoyu Island belonged to China. In short, a careful study of these historical data may lead to this conclusion: Qing Emperor Jiaqing was keenly aware of the Diaoyu Islands route from China to Ryukyu and understood that the China–Ryukyu maritime boundary came between Chiwei Islet and Gumi Island.

Just as I mentioned above, Qi Kun and Fei Xizhang's awareness of the maritime boundary were also reflected in their valuable poetry. For example, Qi Kun wrote poems about the location of Diaoyutai, Chiwei Islet and the China–Ryukyu maritime boundary. In his five-character "regulated" verse "Diaoyutai," one of his "Eight Poems on My Voyage to Ryukyu," Qi Kun wrote:

The fisherman has already left,
The island is still there.
The island's full of cliffs,
Bashed by waves upon waves.
Who is that man there
Climbing toward the island summit?
In a straw rain cape,
He appears tiny on top.[111]

[110]Ibid. p. 482.

[111]Qi Kun, "Diaoyutai," "Eight Poems on My Voyage to Ryukyu" in Wang Han (ed.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu, Part Three,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, 2006, vol. 1, pp. 322–324.



Fig. 2.39 Envoy Qi Kun, "Gumi Island," "Eight Poems on My Voyage to Ryukyu," 1808

This poem gives a picturesque description of the static and dynamic Diaoyu Island the people landing on it and gives expression to the author's love and praise of the island.

Qi Kun also wrote his poem "Gumi Island (on the Ryukyuan side of the border":

Something in the shape of a dragon emerged suddenly,

It was the first mountain in the west.

An array of summits rose high,

Paths wound through the mountain.

The ship moved amidst the sea mist,

And swiftly passed islands with the help of the sail

The Ryukyuan were happy to point at this and that,

That was a place they called home (Ryukyuan officials aboard who were to welcome the investiture vessel brightened up when they saw the mountain)[112] (see Fig. 2.39).

The last two lines of the poem are the finishing touch as they say that the Ryukyuan were happy to be home, pointing at Gumi Island. Qi Kun also had a note to the poem "Gumi Island," which said that "this mountain is on the Ryukyuan side of the border." In addition, he added a note stating that "Ryukyuan officials aboard

[112]Qi Kun, "Kumi Island," *ibid.*

who were to welcome the investiture vessel brightened up when they saw the mountain." This highlights the theme of the poem. What is described in this poem is exactly the same as what Chen Kan said in his *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu* before.

Some people tried in vain to prove that Diaoyu Island doesn't belong to China, citing as evidence the statement "Jilong Island marks the border of China" Qi Kun made in his *Poetry on My Mission to Ryukyu,* while deliberately ignoring his statement that "Gumi Island (Kume Island) is on the Ryukyuan side of the border."[113] This is because Jilong Island is located close to the northern end of Taiwan Island serves as a landmark. However, the mountain wasn't on the border of Taiwan, China, because the famous island Guishan lies east of Keelung, Huaping Islet, Mianhua Islet, and Pengjia Islet are located northeast of Keelung, and the Diaoyu Islands and other islands affiliated with Taiwan are across the sea. The China–Ryukyu boundary came in the middle of the Black Water Trench or the Okinawa Trough. As a native of Fuzhou, Qi Kun learned a lot about Ryukyu from his grandfather during his childhood and could tell stories from the Ryukyuan history book *Ryukyu*, so he knew Ryukyu well.

In his poem "The Black Water Trench" in *Eight Poems on My Voyage to Ryukyu*, Qi Kun wrote:

> The maritime boundary is invisible,
>
> Except the Black Water Trench.
>
> The seawater from all directions
>
> Fades away in every direction.
>
> Beating drums in the evening,
>
> We offer animals as sacrifices.
>
> Sea monsters are well-behaved,
>
> No need to deter them.[114]

It was at night that Qi Kun's investiture vessel reached the Black Water Trench, so it was natural he could not tell the color of the trench as the boundary and regarded it as one color.

Qi Kun's poetry was not merely about the feelings he had during the voyage, but, on the contrary, was about what it was like to cross the maritime boundary between China and Ryukyu.

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[113]Mozomu Yishiyi, *Chinese Language Historical Data of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)*, Jpn. ed., Nagasaki Junshin Catholic University Comparative Culture Institute. Also see Li Woteng, *Whose Is Diaoyutai? History and Legality*, Chin. ed., Taipei: Wu-Nan Book Company Ltd., 2014, pp. 53–54.

[114]Qi Kun, "The Black Water Trench," *Eight Poems on My Voyage to Ryukyu* in Wang Han (ed.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu, Part Three,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, 2006, vol. 2, pp. 323–324.



Fig. 2.40 Assistant Envoy Fei Xizhang, "The Black Water Trench (the Boundary between China and Ryukyu), 1808

Just as I mentioned above, accompanying Qi Kun on his voyage to Ryukyu was his assistant envoy Fei Xizhang. Fei wrote in his poem "The Black Water Trench (the Boundary between China and Ryukyu)":

Sacrificing pigs and sheep offshore,

Praying at our knees aboard.

I'm awaken from my dreams,

By drums at the trench.[115]

The author explained the title of the poem meant the boundary between China and Ryukyu (see Fig. 2.40).

This fully shows that Fei Xizhang continued the understanding Xu Baoguang had had of the China–Ryukyu boundary 89 years before. According to the records back then, as long as Diaoyu Island appeared, those aboard the investiture vessel would immediately realize that Chiwei Islet was around the corner and that they must prepare for offering sacrifices at the Black Water Trench. Even when they reached the trench at night, they would still beat drums and offer sacrifices in the hope that they could cross the trench safely to arrive in Ryukyu. In his *Record of the*

[115]Fei Xizhang, "The Black Water Trench," *A Selection of Poetry*, ibid., p. 440.

Investiture for the Ryukyuan King, the scholar Shen Fu, who joined the mission to Ryukyu for investiture purposes in the 13th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Jiaqing (1808), wrote that after they arrived at Diaoyu Island, they offered sacrifices to the Black Water Trench remotely. This shows that for hundreds of years, China and Ryukyu had been aware that the Black Water Trench was their maritime boundary and had held it with reverence.

Back then China and Ryukyu shared the same position regarding their maritime boundary. As early as the 10th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Chongzhen (1640), Ryukyuan King Shō Hō wrote in his report to China, "Located in the east and bordering with Fujian, Ryukyu shares the same interest as China. The Black Water Trench comes as a natural boundary."[116] This once again proves that both China and Ryukyu had long recognized the Black Water Trench east of Chiwei Islet as their maritime boundary. China was west of the boundary while Ryukyu was in the east. This is indisputable.

6. *There is a reason why assistant envoy Li Dingyuan said he didn't see the Black Water Trench during his voyage to Ryukyu for investiture purposes in the fifth year of the reign of Qing Emperor Jiaqing (1800), and this doesn't mean the Black Water Trench was simply not there.*

According to Li Dingyuan's *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu*, "We moved on southeastward for ten more *geng*, before Diaoyutai emerged before us. Three summits stood there straight like stone bones. The sky and sea shared the same color, and the voyage was smooth. White birds hovered around the vessel, probably wondering where we were. At night the light of the stars and moon was variably reflected on the sea. It was like flames coming and going just as Mu Hua put it in his 'Ode to the Sea,' 'Yin flames burn implicitly.' Boatmen reported that we should offer sacrifices at the Black Water Trench. According to records of previous voyages, pigs and sheep were offered as sacrifices at the Black Water Trench and armed soldiers helped in the process. Having moved on the sea for three days, we haven't seen the trench yet. The Ryukyuan captain said, 'We haven't seen the Black Water Trench yet; we may offer sacrifices to the sea when Diaoyutai emerges.'"[117]

Li Dingyuan continued, "Someone on board said, 'I've been told that the Fujian Sea is west of the Black Water Trench, which was known as Cangming or Dongming in the past. The Ryukyuan don't know about this. Why didn't we see it on our voyage?' I said, 'Many sail on the sea, but few of them write about their voyage. Few of those aboard do not vomit, and even fewer can write anything on aboard. When someone says he wants to write something, others will encourage

[116]Ryukyu, *Dynastic Documents* (Richi dee fū an), Chin. ed.; Wu Tianhao, *The Sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895*, Chin. ed., Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 1994, p. 60.

[117]Li Dingyuan, *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu* in Yin Mengxia, Jia Guirong, and Wang Guan (eds.), *Continued Edition of the Materials about Ryukyu at the National Library of China*, vol. 1, Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Publishing House, 2002, p. 751.

him to do so. It is believable that the Ryukyuan cross the sea every year, but they don't know the Black Water Trench, and we don't argue with them about this.'"[118] This shows that Li Dingyuan didn't see the Black Water Trench after he passed Diaoyu Island. He asked the Ryukyuan chief about it, and the Ryukyuan didn't know either. So they just offered sacrifices in honor of God when Diaoyu Island appeared. Li Dingyuan therefore believed that the past record of the Black Water Trench was hearsay and the Black Water Trench wasn't necessarily there.

Taking advantage of this, a Japanese scholar negated the objective existence of the Black Water Trench recorded by other Chinese envoys to Ryukyu as the China–Ryukyu boundary.[119] However, a careful analysis shows that it is normal that Li Dingyuan and the Ryukyuan aboard the same vessel didn't see the Black Water Trench in the waters of Diaoyu Island. There are three main reasons as follows:

First, as Li Dingyuan sailed to Ryukyu via Diaoyu Island, he couldn't see the Black Water Trench because the trench is a 200-kilometer-wide stretch of sea from east of Chiwei Islet, approximately 100 km east of Diaoyu Island, to Gumi Island (Kume Island).

Second, night fell soon after Li Dingyuan sailed past Diaoyu Island. When he arrived at Chiwei Islet, it was cloudy so that the sky and sea shared the same color, making it impossible for him to realize it was the Black Water Trench.

Third, when the Ryukyuan sailed from Ryukyu to Fujian, it wasn't long before they moved from Gumi Island (Kume Island) to the wide Black Water Trench. They couldn't tell it was the trench because, to quote Song poet Su Shi, "The reason why I can't tell the true shape of Lushan Mountain is that I myself am standing on the mountain; I can't see it as a whole." It was already dark when they arrived at Chiwei Islet, so it was difficult for them to realize the color of the sea had changed. On their return voyage, they could hardly feel the existence of the Black Water Trench at night.

As a matter of fact, the so-called Black Water Trench is where the Kuroshio Current, which is well known to the Japanese, flows through. The Kuroshio Current begins off the east coast of Luzon, the Philippines, Taiwan and flows northeastward past Ryukyu and Japan. No matter whether Li Dingyuan saw it or not, its existence is an eternal objective fact. The objective existence of the Black Water Trench cannot be denied based on Li Dingyuan's misjudgment of geographical locations and on the opinions of some Ryukyuan people.

In addition, even Li Dingyuan recorded it was like after the investiture vessel sailed past Chiwei Islet and Ryukyu's Gumi Island appeared. According to him, "At noon Gumi Island appeared. It has eight ranges. Each range has one or two summits, which are connected or stand alone. Those aboard hailed them…. Due to

[118]Ibid., p. 795.

[119]Nobuo Harada, *The Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands): A Study of the Chinese Appointment Envoys' Record of Ryukyu*, Jpn. ed., Okinawa: Yoju Shorin, 2006, pp. 101–103. Note: Nobuo Harada, (1927–), Doctor of Medicine, translated and annotated the 11-volume *A Collection of Chinese Envoys' Record of Ryukyu* in a period of 16 years starting 1995, exerting considerable influence.

submerged reefs at Gumi, the Ryukyuans often stop for the night before moving on to Gumi after daybreak…. Between 7 p.m. and 9 p.m., torches are used on board as a signal of arrival, and then torches are used on Gumi Island in response. I was told that these are the secret signals of the Ryukyuans. Guns are fired in daytime while torches are used at night to send signals."[120] In his *Continued Record of Ryukyu*, China's last envoy Zhao Xin who went on a mission to Ryukyu for investiture purposes in the fifth year of the reign of Qing Emperor Tongzhi (1866) still stated, "Our vessel arrived at the waters off Gumi, but it couldn't be docked for days due to strong winds and deep water."

7. *In his book* Record of Ryukyuan Students*, Qing Imperial College professor Pan Xiang for Ryukyuan students wrote in the 29th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Qianlong (1764) that Taiwan and islands affiliated with it didn't belong to Ryukyu.*

In addition to Ming and Qing envoys' records of the Diaoyu Islands, there are other official Chinese ancient documents about these islands. The *Record of Ryukyuan Students,* written by Qing Imperial College professor Pan Xiang for Ryukyuan students in 1764, is one of these documents. The book was produced based on relevant historical Chinese and Ryukyuan documents and with the help from Zheng Xiaode and Cai Shichang.

The *Record of Ryukyuan Students* begins with "Here is my report to Your Majesty," indicating that the book wasn't merely a textbook for Ryukyuan students but also an official document presented to the emperor. When it came to the China–Ryukyu maritime boundary, the book says that Ryukyu "is comprised of islands surrounded by the sea. The Black Water Trench in the west is the border with the Fujian Sea. To sail from Fujian to Ryukyu, one has to go past the Black Water Trench, which was known Cangming in the past…. In addition, the Black Water Trench marks the maritime boundary between China and Ryukyu and sacrifices must be offered before crossing the trench" (see Fig. 2.41).

The maritime boundary between China and Ryukyu referred to here is the boundary between China's Fujian Sea and Ryukyu which came between China's Chiwei Islet and Ryukyu's Gumi Island. From the perspective of Ryukyu, Ryukyu bordered the Fujian Sea west of the Black Water Trench. Diaoyu Island was exactly located in the Fujian Sea. In order to further illustrate this, Pan Xiang also stated in his *Record of Ryukyuan Students* that, "Penghu Island is close to Taiwan and is not part of Ryukyu. Pengjia Island, Diaoyutai, Huaping Islet, Jilong Island, Small Ryukyu, and Taiping Island are all 100–200 km from Chûzan. However, in the map of Ryukyu produced by Zheng Ziruo from Kunshan, they were all placed close to

[120]Li Dingyuan, *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu* in Yin Mengxia, Jia Guirong, and Wang Guan (eds.), *Continued Edition of the Materials about Ryukyu at the National Library of China*, vol. 1, Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Publishing House, 2002, p. 752.



二十二年正月三十日開洋至馬齒山安護浦下
椗初四日出澳過姑米山初五日夜過溝祭海初
七八九日大霧不見山寄椗初十日早白虹見霧
開見台州石盤山午復大霧白虹再見東北風起
椗見溫州南杞山十一日至羅湖下椗十二日收
入定海所下椗十三日進五虎門
環島皆海也海面西距黑水溝與閩海吟由福建
閩洋至琉球必經滄水過黑水古稱滄溟溟與冥
通幽元之義又曰東溟琉地固巽方實符其號而

黑水溝爲中外吟水過溝必先祭之東臨日本薩
摩洲指南廣義作夢是麻常與交市一葦可航北望野古可
直逼高麗南逼臺澎淡水後之溜山與葉壁後之
滌水同屬尾閭沃焦之壤而三十六島水中復有
沙舟隱現斷續若草蛇灰線馬跡蛛絲海潮之進
退有度朝而至者爲潮夕而至者爲汐山海經以
爲海鰌出入浮屠氏謂爲神龍變化抱朴子以爲
兩水相合相盪而成然必疾風暴雨始足以張其
勢盧肇以爲日出於海衝激而成高麗圖經謂天

Fig. 2.41 Professor Pan Xiang, *Record of Ryukyuan Students*, 1764

the Port of Naha and the Kankaimon Gate at the summit of Chûzan, which is totally wrong"[121] (see Fig. 2.42).

These records are very important. First, they distinguish Taiwan and Penghu from Ryukyu, and then list Diaoyu Island along with Huaping Islet and other islands affiliated with Taiwan, make it clear that these islands of Taiwan are far from Chûzan, Ryukyu, and include Diaoyu Island in the scope of Taiwan, but not Ryukyu. Just a I mentioned earlier, Pan Xiang also corrected the big mistake made in Zheng Ruozeng's map of Ryukyu which placed Diaoyu Island close to Naha and the Kankaimon Gate where Chinese envoys were welcomed.

The mistakes made in Zheng Ruozeng's map of Ryukyu in 1561 had been corrected by Qing envoy Xu Baoguang in 1719 and by Pan Xiang, a professor for Ryukyuan students at the then China's most privileged school the Imperial College in 1764. This being the case, it is inappropriate for some Japanese people today to try to prove that Diaoyu Island belonged to Ryukyu based on the mistakes made by Zheng Ruozeng in his map of Ryukyu.

[121]Pan Xiang, *Record of Ryukyuan Students at the Imperial College,* Chin. ed., 1764, in Huang Runhua and Xueying (eds.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, 2000, vol. 3, p. 345.



九島曰八重山　烏巴麻譯曰宇巴度麻譯曰波渡
聞　由姑那呢譯曰與那國　姑彌達奇度奴譯曰富武
姑吕世麻譯爲久里島　阿喇姑斯古譯爲新城巴梯吕麻
譯曰波照間
臣按汪楫錄云琉球國三省幅員可五六千里東
西長南北狹徐葆光謂其國里數以中國十里爲
一里今以中國里數定之乃南北長四百四十里
東西皆見海周煌琉球志從之兩官生弗是也至
屬島則徐錄謂水程南北三千里東西六百里前
史所載高華竈罷諸嶼今皆無其名澎湖島與臺
灣相近并非球之屬島彭家山釣魚臺花瓶嶼雞
籠山小琉球太平山等皆去中山省二三千里而
昆山鄭子若著琉球圖乃圖於那瀚港及歡會門
之左近舛謬甚矣

Fig. 2.42 Pan Xiang, *Record of Ryukyuan Students*, 1764

8. *Continuing the tradition of Ming China's maps of coastal defense, Qing maps also included the Diaoyu Islands and other coastal islands of China in the scope of China's coastal defense.*

The Complete Coastal Defense Map of China, produced during the reign of Qing Emperor Yongzheng (1723–1736), is 36 cm wide and 433 cm long. Collected at the National Library of China, it was put on display at the library in 2014. The map is based on Ming coastal maps and clearly includes the Diaoyu Islands and other islands in the scope of China's coastal defense. The map not only specifies the islands of China and Ryukyu, respectively, but also is keenly aware of the threat posed by Japanese pirates to the Ryukyu Kingdom and coastal Fujian. The map has

Fig. 2.43 The Complete Coastal Defense Map of China, Produced during the Reign of Qing Emperor Yongzheng (1723–1736)

a note here stating "Places most vulnerable to Japanese pirates" (see Fig. 2.43). This shows that from the Ming to the Qing dynasty, China had always included Taiwan and islands affiliated with it such as the Diaoyu Islands as priorities for coastal defense in the southeast.

9. *Diaoyu Island was awarded by Empress Dowager Cixi's imperial decree to Sheng Xuanhuai in the 19th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Guangxu (1893). This has become a controversy among scholars and can hardly serve as the basis for determining the sovereignty over Diaoyu Island.*

Mr. Wu Tianying conducted research into this issue in 1972. He said that he doubted Empress Dowager Cixi's imperial decree and that the event cannot shake in the slightest the fact that the Diaoyu Islands belong to China. This so-called imperial decree dated October of the 19th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Guangxu (1893) and bearing the Seal of Empress Dowager Cixi first appeared in *Kaleidoscope*, no. 1, vol. 11, published in Taiwan in January 1972. After Wu Tianying read Sha Jianlin's article "Empress Dowager Cixi's Imperial Decree and the Sovereignty over Diaoyutai," he immediately conducted research into the issue. The imperial decree reads, "Empress Dowager Cixi hereby issues this decree: Court of Imperial Sacrifices Grand Minister Sheng Xuanhuai's medicine is very effective. According to a report, the medicinal herb that was used to produce the medicine

came from the small island of Diaoyutai of Taiwan. The effective medicine from the sea is different from medicines from China's mainland. I have found out that your family has pharmacies and help the poor with their illness, which is highly commendable. I hereby award Diaoyutai, Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet to Sheng Xuanhuai to serve as a source of medicinal herbs as a token of kindness from the Emperor and me."[122]

After reading the imperial decree, Wu Tianying asked Professor Zheng Yisheng at Nankai University, Tianjin, in early summer 1972, to verify the decree. Mr. Zheng gave a three-point comment:

First, the material the decree was made of wasn't right. The decree was made of red brown fabric, but all Qing imperial decrees were made of white paper.

Second, there were mistakes in the text. Empress Dowager Cixi's decrees usually began with "Following the order of the Empress Dowager Cixi" while the orders issued by Emperor Guangxu usually started with "Following the order of my mother empress."

Third, there is something wrong with the seal affixed on the decree. The seals of Empress Dowager Cixi were different from the Qing seal for imperial decrees. For imperial decrees, she used the seal "Award" while for artistic appreciation she used the seal "Appreciation." In addition, according to Wu Tianying's research results, the name of Sheng Xuanhuai didn't appear in the memorials of the Ministry of Rites and Ceremonies after the 22nd year of the reign of Qing Emperor Guangxu (1896). Sheng Xuanhuai wasn't a chief minister of the Ministry of Rites and Ceremonies" in the 19th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Guangxu (1893).[123]

In my opinion, there are countless official documents that prove the Diaoyu Islands are the inherent territory of China, so we don't need a disputable imperial decree to serve as evidence in China's favor. In pursuit of the principle of seeking truth from facts, the decree, which is suspected to be forged, should not be cited as evidence even if it is in China's favor. If we do that, it will be a laughing stock and do discredit to our research results. With this on mind, I cited the above research results of Wu Tianying for the reader's information.

2.5 Relations Between the Diaoyu Islands and Taiwan in Chinese History

Both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one and the same China. The historical and legal basis of Diaoyu Island as an island affiliated with Taiwan comes from the fact that it became Chinese territory in the Ming Dynasty at the latest. In the Qing Dynasty, it was shifted from the administration of Fujian Province to that of Taiwan

[122]Wu Tianhao, *The Sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895*, Chin. ed., Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 1994, p. 111.

[123]Ibid., pp. 112–113.

Prefecture. In 1567, Zheng Ruozeng included the Diaoyu Islands in the scope of Fujian's coastal defense in the Fujian 7–8 sections of the Map of Coastal Islands in his *Illustrations on Defense against Japanese Pirates*.

Since the beginning of China's Han Dynasty, the Chinese had been to Taiwan for reclamation purposes. During the reign of Ming Emperor Wanli (1573–1619), Taiwan already appeared in China's national government documents. In 1624, the Netherlands invaded Taiwan and started colonial rule there. In April 1661, Zheng Chenggong, the son of Zheng Zhilong, an early pioneer of Taiwan, led troops from Kinmen, Fujian, to attack Taiwan and recovered it from the Dutch colonialists in the following February. However, Zheng Chenggong used Taiwan as the base for opposing the Qing Dynasty and restoring the Ming Dynasty. In 1683, the Qing government sent Shi Lang, the commander-in-chief of the Qing fleets in Fujian, to attack Taiwan. The Qing government defeated Zheng Chenggong's troops and established Taiwan Prefecture under the administration of Fujian Province.

1. *Geographically, the Diaoyu Islands are close to Taiwan and are affiliated with it. And they were brought under the administration of Fujian Province before Taiwan Island was.*

In the 35th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Jiajing (1556), Zheng Shungong wrote the *Record of Japan* based on his visit to that country. The book includes the poem "My Long Journey" based on the places he had been to in Japan. The author added notes to these places. The poem reads:

We set sail from Huitou[124] to Xiaodong,

There Tokora Islands[125] appeared in white clouds.

We may also set sail from Dongshan, Meihua,[126]

Diaoyu serves the meshes of Jilong (meaning chicken coop),[127]

To reach Machi Island and Liyi, Ryukyu,[128]

We must move past Huangwei Islet, Chiwei Islet and Gumi Island.

From Rebi we move to Mengjiala,[129]

[124]Huitou, today's Weitou, Fujian Province, was one of the ports from which voyages could be made to Xiaodong Island (Taiwan Island).

[125]These were Ryukyuan islands that served as the maritime boundary between Ryukyu and Japan's Satsuma han and were seized by Satsuma han in 1609.

[126]Attendant Gentleman of the Ministry of Justice was Attendant Gentleman of the Ministry of Justice, a port on the southbank at the mouth of the Min River that led to Taiwan, Ryukyu, and Japan.

[127]Diaoyu was Diaoyu Islet, and Jilong was Jilong Island at the Port of Keelung, Taiwan.

[128]Machi Island was Ryukyu's Kerama Islands. Liyi (𤉋迤) Islet, also known as Liyi (离倚) Islet, was Ryukyu's Okinoerabu Island.

[129]Rebi was Rebi Island or Yebi Island was Iheya Island in Ryukyu. Mengjiala was the Takara Island of the Tokara Islands.

From Daluo we sail to the Qidao Strait.[130]

We sail past Yaku and Kago,[131]

Aboard the vessel come flying fish.[132]

According to the notes the author had for the poem, "We reached Jilong Island of Xiaodong Island…. After about ten *geng*'s voyage, we sailed toward Diaoyu Islet…. We sailed from Meihua to Penghu, and moved on to Xiaodong, Ryukyu and eventually to Japan…. Diaoyu Islet is a small island of Xiaodong."[133] Xiaodong refers to Taiwan.

The finishing touch of the poem is "Diaoyu serves the meshes of Jilong (meaning chicken coop)" and "Diaoyu Islet is a small island of Xiaodong." The line "Diaoyu serves the meshes of Jilong" is quite imaginative, likening Taiwan's Jilong Island to a chicken and compares Diaoyu Island to the meshes of the chicken coop. This means that Diaoyu Island is inseparable from Taiwan's Jilong Island. In addition, Zheng Shungong included the Map of the Sea in his book. The map has Diaoyu Islet in it (see Fig. 2.44) and has a note specifying that Xiaodong Island is Small Ryukyu which refers to Taiwan.

In the map, Huaping Islet, Pengjia Island and Diaoyu Islet are marked close to Xiaodong Island. Ming China referred to the waters around Diaoyu Island as the Fujian Sea, and Qing China called it the Great Qing Sea and referred to the waters east of Chiwei Islet and west of Ryukyu as the Ryukyuan Ocean. The Black Water Trench, or the Okinawa Trough, marked the boundary between the Fujian Sea and the Ryukyuan Ocean. It is therefore indisputable that Diaoyu Island and other islands in the Fujian Sea west of the Black Water Trench were Chinese territories. This shows that geographically China had made Diaoyu Island affiliated with Taiwan.

2. *The* Record of Taiwan*, written by investigating censor Huang Shujing in 1722, and the* Geographical Conditions of Taiwan*, written by Qing Surveillance Commissioner Fang Junyi in 1875, marked the incorporation of Diaoyu Island into the scope of administration and defense of Taiwan.*

Following the Qing Dynasty's establishment of the local government of Taiwan, it gradually turned Diaoyu Island over to the administration of Taiwan. In the 60th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Kangxi (1721), two years after Xu Baoguang's mission to appoint the Ryukyu king, the Qing government established the official position of Taiwan patrol supervisor who was in charge of patrols over Taiwan's islands including Diaoyu Island. In the following year, Taiwan Patrol Supervisor Huang Shujing wrote in "Maritime Defense" in his *Record of Taiwan* (vol. 2),

[130]Daluo was today's Tanega Island in Kagoshima Prefecture, Japan. The Qidao Strait was the Tokara Strait in Kagoshima Prefecture.

[131]Yaku was Yaku Island in Satsuma han (today's Kagoshima Prefecture) and Kago was an island in Kagoshima Prefecture.

[132]These refer to the flying fish close to the waters off Yaku Island.

[133]Zheng Shungong, *Record of Japan*, Chin. ed., 1556.



Fig. 2.44 Zhong Shungong, "The Map of the Sea," *Record of Japan*, 1566

"North of the sea off Shanhou there is a hill called Diaoyutai with the capacity for docking more than ten big ships. Sampans can be docked at the Port of Xuebolan in Chongyao Island" (see Fig. 2.45).[134] Here Shanhou means the eastern Taiwan region.

In the *Revised Annals of Taiwan Prefecture* (vol. 2) produced in the 12th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Qianlong (1747), it is reported that picket ships could be handled in its offshore port. Following this, the book has a passage from the *Record of Taiwan* written by Huang Shujing in 1722 in its entirety: "North of the sea off Shanhou there is a hill called Diaoyutai with the capacity for docking more than ten big ships. Sampans can be docked at the Port of Xuebolan in Chongyao Island" (see Fig. 2.46). All later annals of Fujian and Taiwan Prefecture cited this passage.

In his *Record of Taiwan* in 1722, Qing investigating censor Huang Shujing reported in great details about the Qing navy patrolling the waters off Diaoyu Island docking their ships there. This should serve as convincing evidence of China's effective governance of Diaoyu Island and the waters around it. According to Huang's book, too many hidden reefs made it hard to approach Diaoyu Island, ships couldn't enter the port until after the tide rose to a safe level; otherwise, they might get stranded or find it impossible to get docked during windstorms. Flatboats, however, were easier to use for patrolling purposes because they could drift along

[134]Huang Shujing, "Maritime Defense," *Record of Taiwan* (vol. 2), Beijing: collected at the Rare Books Department of Tsinghua University Library.



Fig. 2.45 Qing's Taiwan Patrol Supervisor Huang Shujing, "Maritime Defense," *Record of Taiwan,* 1722, Stating That Diaoyutai is Located in the Sea Northeast of Taiwan

with the wind and be docked wherever fit. In May 1722, during the reign of Emperor Kangxi, the Qing government navy was hit by windstorms during its patrol mission. With the masts being broken, the vessel floated to Huangyan. This story shows that the Chinese navy patrolled Diaoyu Island and docked its ships there in 1722. The port of Diaoyu Island motioned in the story is probably the fair wind port built by the Chinese facing China's mainland.

This shows that the place in Diaoyu Island that had the capacity for docking more than ten big ships was probably the fair wind port. This proves that as early as 1722, taking advantage of the terrain of Diaoyu Island, the Chinese had developed a port which provided a shelter for ships during windstorms and helped them set sail again when the wind was favorable. The port was therefore called a fair wind port.

The fair wind port was 4.5 m wide and about 36 m long. Chinese warships were not big in the late Ming Dynasty and the early Qing Dynasty, with a handling capacity of 10–15 persons each. Some of these warships had a three-story deck[135] (see Fig. 2.47). According to visual estimation, about ten of these ships could be docked at the fair wind port of Diaoyu Island at once and the ships were around 16 square meters on average.

[135]National Library of China (ed.), *Selected Military and Government Data of the Qing Dynasty*, Chin. ed., Beijing: China National Microfilming Center for Library Resources, 2002, pp. 428–429.


入水裡港牛罵大甲猫干吞霄房裡後壠中港竹塹南
嵌八里坌蛤仔難可通杉板船臺灣州仔尾西港子灣
裡鳳山喜樹港萬丹港諸羅海豹堀蓬山港只容舶仔
小船再鳳山岐後枋寮加六堂謝必益龜壁港大綉房
魚房港諸羅鰱仔究象領今盡淤塞惟小魚船往來耳
山後大洋北有山名釣魚臺可泊大船十餘崇爻之薛
坡蘭可進杉板同上
郵傳
臺灣縣鋪四 府前鋪南路鋪北路鋪
新港鋪鋪兵各四名
鳳山縣鋪七 縣前鋪下淡水鋪楠子坑鋪中衝崎鋪
鯽魚潭鋪岡山鋪府前鋪鋪兵各四名
諸羅縣鋪一十五 新港鋪鋪兵四名目加溜灣鋪麻豆鋪
佳里興鋪茅港尾鋪大路邊鋪赤山鋪
臺灣府志 卷二 規制 三

Fig. 2.46 *Revised Annals of Taiwan Prefecture*, 12th Year of the Reign of Qing Emperor Qianlong (1747)

In addition, in the first year of the reign of Qing Emperor Guangxu (1875), a senior Qing official and the then Fujian Surveillance Commissioner Fang Junyi stated in his *Geographical Conditions of Taiwan*, "Diaoyu Islet, north of Jilong Island, can take large ships and is good for maritime defense" (see Fig. 2.48).

This Qing official highlighted the importance of Diaoyu Island for maritime defense after Japanese troops invaded Taiwan for the first time. This fully proves that Diaoyu Island had been within the scope of maritime defense of China from the Ming Dynasty to the late Qing Dynasty, and that following the transfer of Diaoyu Island from the administration of Fujian Province to the administration of Taiwan Province, Qing officials clearly proposed building up defense at Diaoyu Island in documents involving Taiwan. This shows Diaoyu Island was absolutely not *terra nullius* before 1895, but rather it undoubtedly belonged to Taiwan. This book was published in public, announcing that Diaoyu Island belonged to Taiwan, China and China could build defense there. So far no objections have been raised in Japan, which is tantamount to giving tacit consent to Diaoyu Island belonging to Taiwan Province, China.

This was not negligence on the part of Japan; it reflected the Japanese government's basic understanding that Diaoyu Island belonged to China. The Map of



Fig. 2.47 Photocopies of Ming and Qing Warships

Coastal Qing Provinces, produced by the Japanese Ministry of the Navy and confirmed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1875 clearly affirmed that Diaoyu Islet, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet were the northeastern islands of Taiwan. This is ironclad evidence of China's ownership of these islands.

3. *The official incorporation of Diaoyu Island into the administration of Yilan County (the Kavalan Office) of Taiwan Prefecture can be traced back to local Chinese annals: the 1852 edition of* Annals of the Kavalan Office *and the 1871 edition of the* Revised Annals of Fujian.

Just as I mentioned earlier, in his *Revised Annals of Taiwan Prefecture* completed in the 12th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Qianlong (1747), Fan Xian, Taiwan Inspecting Censor and Education Intendant, included the following quotes from Huang Shujing's *Record of Taiwan*: "North of the sea off Shanhou there is a hill called Diaoyutai with the capacity for docking more than ten big ships. Sampans can be docked at the Port of Xuebolan in Chongyao Island."[136] This was the official confirmation by the annals of Taiwan Prefecture revised by Qing China's government officials that Diaoyu Island belonged to Taiwan. This leads to the conclusion that back then Diaoyu Island was put under the administration of Taiwan Prefecture.

[136]Fan Xian, *Revised Annals of Taiwan Prefecture*, Chin. ed., 12th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Qianlong (1747), collected as ancient books at the National Library of China Branch, Beijing.



Fig. 2.48 Fang Junyi, *Geographical Conditions of Taiwan*, 1875

The *Revised County Annals of Taiwan* edited by Wang Bichang in the 17th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Qianlong (1752), the *Continued Annals of Taiwan Prefecture* edited by Yu Wenyi in the 29th year of the reign of Emperor Qianlong (1764), and the *Continued County Annals of Taiwan* edited by Xie Jinluan in the same year all basically used the statement by the *Record of Taiwan*. Nevertheless, the wording in revised and continued county annals of Taiwan is as follows: "North of the sea off Shanhou there is an islet called Diaoyutai. Sampans can be docked at the Port of Xuebolan in Chongyao Island."[137]

In the 17th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Jiaqing (1812), Taiwan Prefecture founded the Kavalan Office (which was renamed Yilan County in 1875). In the *Annals of the Kavalan Office* completed in 1852, the following passage about

[137]Wang Bichang (ed.), *Revised County Annals of Taiwan*, Chin. ed., Taipei: Taiwan Institute of Economic Research (ed.), *Taiwan Document Series,* vol. 113, November 1961, pp. 50–51; Xie Jinluan, *Continued County Annals of Taiwan*, Chin. ed., Taipei: Taiwan Institute of Economic Research (ed.), *Taiwan Document Series,* vol. 140, June 1962, p. 27.



二年社衙改照民丁例凡四社又與芝舞蘭芝密水莽納納名爲崇爻八社另輸鹿皮打徵丁銀亦可見番性之還改無常故社之分合不一也今芝密訛作奇密與納納另屬四波灣四波灣有十八社番與奇萊連界府志作薛波灣志據採訪冊歌筆譯屬鳳山縣界亦在崇爻山後文可知奇萊卽嘉義之背四波灣卽鳳山之脊由此而卑南覓而沙馬磯頭迴環南北一帶則山後諸地自洲鼻至瑯嶠大畧與山前千餘里等耳臺灣縣志謂舟從沙馬磯頭盤轉而入卑南覓諸社山後大洋之北有嶼名釣魚臺可泊巨舟十餘艘崇爻山下薛波灣可進三板船則竟有至其地可知也

Fig. 2.49 *Annals of the Kavalan Office*

Diaoyu Island was quoted from the abovementioned annals of Taiwan Prefecture and counties: “North of the sea off Shanhou there is an islet called Diaoyutai with the capacity for docking more than ten big ships. Sampans can be docked at the Port of Xuebolan in Chongyao Island. On-the-spot surveys have even been conducted there” (see Fig. 2.49).

The focus of the quotations is on Chongyao Island, a continuation of Taiwan’s Fengshan range, and the related islands. The quotations discussed the Port of Xuebolan at the foot of Chongyao Island as well as clearly stated that Diaoyu Island was a maritime island affiliated with Taiwan north of Houshan located east of Taiwan Island. As the ancient Chinese text didn’t use punctuation marks, readers tend to mistake these two places as the one and same place. Taking the Port of Xuebolan at the foot of Chongyao Island as an island close to Diaoyu Island is questionable. Similarly, taking Diaoyu Island as island close to the Port of


島嶼最險要而紆回狹口不得方舟而內港可容千艘今設副將
駐防
噶瑪蘭廳
噶瑪蘭卽廳治北界三貂東沿大海生番聚處時有匪船潛踪又
治西有烏石港與海中龜嶼相對夏秋間港流迴暢內地商船集
此設礮臺防守嘉慶十七年設噶瑪蘭營道光四年設都司駐五
圍城內
蘇澳港在廳治南港門寬闊可容大舟屬噶瑪蘭營分防又後山
大洋北有釣魚臺港深可泊大船千艘崇爻之薛坡蘭可進杉板
船
歷代守禦

Fig. 2.50 Chen Shouqi and Others (eds.), *Re-edited Annals of Fujian*, 1871

Xuebolan at the foot of Chongyao Island is what the original Chinese text means and runs against reality.

In the 18th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Tongzhi (1871), Chen Shouqi and others edited *Re-edited Annals of Fujian*, listing the Diaoyu Islands under the section "Places of Strategic Importance in Counties" in "Annals of Maritime Defense." The text reads, "The Su'ao Port is located south of the Kavalan Office with a harbor big enough for large ships. It is defended by the Kavalan Office. North of the sea off Shanhou lies Diaoyutai with the capacity for docking 1000 (sic) big ships. Sampans can be docked at the Port of Xuebolan in Chongyao Island"[138] (see Fig. 2.50).

The 1871 edition *Revised Annals of Fujian* made it clearer than the 1722 edition of the *Record of Taiwan* that Diaoyu Island was defended by Taiwan's Kavalan Office. In addition, before it came to Diaoyu Island, the *Record of Taiwan* discussed the Su'ao Port on the northeastern coast of Taiwan. This shows that the Diaoyu Island discussed in the book was exactly the island affiliated with Taiwan off the town of Suao in today's Yilan County. On January 10, 1972, Taiwan made it clear

[138]Chen Shouqi, et al. (ed.), *Revised Annals of Fujian*, Chin. ed., collected as ancient books at the National Library of China Branch, Beijing.

in its "Ministry of Education Decree" [T. (61) Z.Z. No. 0810] that "the Diaoyutai Islands are part of Taiwan Province, China…. We categorically state that it is under the administration of Yilan County."[139]

The abovementioned term "the Port of Xuebolan in Chongyao Island" comes from the two Chinese original terms "崇爻之薛波瀾" and "崇爻山下薛波瀾." This is open to discussion. Some hold that "崇爻" means towering and jagged and that "薛波瀾" was used in ancient China to refer to Diaoyu Island and islands affiliated with it such as Huangwei Islet, Nanxiao Islet, and Beixiao Islet."[140] However, according to the *Annals of Zhuluo County* produced in the 56th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Kangxi (1717), "崇爻" (Chongyao), meaning ape, was another name for the Atayal Tribe that lived in mountainous areas in Taiwan and later on became the name of a place, that is, eastern Taiwan. According to the *Annals of the Kavalan Office*, Chongyao Island is south of Yilan County. The *United Annals of the Qing Dynasty: Taiwan Prefecture* said, "Southeast of it is Kavalan Mountain and further south is Heishahuang Mountain. These mountains are quite towering and jagged."

It is still open to question whether the Port of Xuebolan in Chongyao Island studied by Huang Shujing in 1722 is the same place recorded in the *Annals of the Kavalan Office.* However, this should never become a reason to negate the right location the abovementioned documents had for Diaoyu Island and the fact that the island was under the administration of Taiwan.

In his Chinese works, a person whose pen name is Li Woteng tried his best to deny these historical data as evidence of China's sovereignty over Diaoyu Island. His so-called basis is that the Map of Ports and Harbors in Taiwan included in the *Re-edited Annals of Fujian* does not have Diaoyutai in it, which indicates that Diaoyutai was not under the administration of the Kavalan Office.[141] This argument is not to the point. Diaoyu Island was naturally not included in the map of Taiwan's coastal ports because as an uninhabited island which could take in ships, Diaoyu Island was not a coastal port of Taiwan. In fact, the map excludes not only Diaoyu Island but also Guide Island, Pengjia Islet, Mianhua Islet, Huaping Islet and all other islands affiliated with Taiwan. If Li Woteng's logic is correct, these islands didn't belong to Taiwan. This shows that it is indisputable that *Re-edited Annals of Fujian* is evidence that Diaoyu Island was under the administration of the Kavalan Office of Taiwan.

In the 2nd year of the reign of Qing Emperor Tongzhi (1863), Hubei Governor Hu Linyi and Governor-General of Hu-Guang Guan Wen edited the *World Atlas of the Chinese Dynasty.* The Map of the Qing Dynasty included in the book clearly marked Diaoyu Islet, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet as Chinese territory. This

[139]Taiwan, *Education and Culture Journal*, vol. 2, no. 2, January 16, 1972.

[140]Ju Deyuan, *On the Sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands Seized by Japan*, Chin. ed., Beijing: Capital Normal University Press, vol. 2, 2001, pp. 719–720.

[141]Li Woteng, *Whose Is Diaoyutai? History and Legality*, Chin. ed., Taipei: Wu-Nan Book Company Ltd., 2014, p. 94.



Fig. 2.51 Map of the Qing Dynasty, 1863

map of the border areas of Qing China was China's official map printed by the office of the Hubei Governor in the Qing Dynasty and once again clearly marks the Diaoyu Islands as Chinese territory. On the contrary, the map includes Ryukyu's Kume Island east of Chiwei Islet in a peanut-shaped circle and explains that "the Ryukyuan name for Gumi Island is Kume Island…" (see Fig. 2.51).

Back then not only did the Japanese government not raise any objection to the Map of the Qing Dynasty marking Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet as Chinese territory, but on the contrary, the map was cited in its entirety in the Map of the Coastal Provinces of the Qing Dynasty produced by the Japanese Navy in 1875. The Japanese map was recognized by Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This proves that Japan gave tacit consent to China's ownership of the Diaoyu Islands northeast of Taiwan before 1874 at the latest when it launched an armed invasion of Taiwan.

When the Qing government of China included the Diaoyu Islands in the annals of Taiwan and published these annals, neither Japan nor the Ryukyu Kingdom raised any objection. Even in 1872 when Japan renamed the Ryukyu Kingdom the Ryukyuan han, it didn't have any objection to the administration of Diaoyu Island by Taiwan, China. The *Annals of Okinawa Prefecture* prepared in the 17th year of the Meiji Era (1884) stated that Okinawa "faces Quanzhou in the Qing Dynasty across the sea remotely in the west and is close to Taiwan Island in the southwest" and didn't include Diaoyu Island in Okinawa islands.

Today, Japan ignores these facts and falsely claims that before 1895 China didn't incorporate the Diaoyu Islands in its territory and that the islands were *terra nullius*.

There is also a Japanese person who says that the statements made by China's envoys who went on a mission to Ryukyu for investiture purposes "were all individuals' travel notes, but not China's official records and statements."[142] However, this allegation is made baseless by the records made by China's official envoys to Ryukyu, annals of China's local governments, China's maritime defense maps, and ancient maps.

Someone claims that because both the *United Annals of the Qing Dynasty: Taiwan Prefecture* and the *Illustrated Annals of Taiwan Prefecture* state that the northernmost end of Taiwan Prefecture is the coast of the city of Jilong, the Diaoyu Islands aren't part of Taiwan. *An Illustrated Book of Taiwan* also says that the northernmost end of Taiwan is Jilong Island, so the Diaoyu Islands aren't part of Taiwan. The reason for this is that Taiwan here means the island of Taiwan and doesn't include the maritime islands northeast of Taiwan Island. Otherwise, it would mean that Huaping Islet, Pengjia Islet, and other islands aren't part of Taiwan, which is obviously wrong. The *World Atlas of the Chinese Dynasty* produced in the 2nd year of the reign of Qing Emperor Tongzhi (1863) is rough, but it clearly includes China's Pengjia Islet, Diaoyu Islet, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet as maritime markers for voyages from Fujian, China, to Gumi Island, Ryukyu. The reason why Gumi Island is written in large characters is that it was the first island on the Ryukyuan side of the border that was reached on a voyage from China to Ryukyu (see Fig. 2.52).

4. *The British Admiralty's sea documents translated by China in the last years of the Qing Dynasty also prove that the Diaoyu Islands were part of the chain of islands northeast of Taiwan and that Chiwei Islet was China's easternmost island.*[143] *Japan didn't raise objection to this.*

Proof 1 In 1870, the Jiangnan Arsenal translated into Chinese the *China Sea Directory* published by the Great Britain Hydrographic Department in 1861. The translation was done by the Englishman Fryer John and the American Kreyer Carl with the help of Wang Dejun and the Chinese version was titled *Illustrated Sea Directory.*[144] The book includes the Diaoyu Islands, which are affiliated with Taiwan. Wang Dejun transliterated the English names of Nanxiao and Beixiao islands as Tulie Island, Diaoyu Island as Hai-Pin-San, Huangwei Islet as Diyawusu Island and Chiwei Islet as Erleli Rock[145] (see Fig. 2.53).

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[142]Sakae Midori, *The Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)*, Jpn. ed., Naha: Okinawa Bunko, 1984, p. 52.

[143]Great Britain. Hydrographic Department (ed.), *The China Sea Directory*, 1884 and 1894. The book's Chinese version, produced by Chen Shoupeng, was titled *A New Translation of the Sea Map of China* and was published by Shanghai Jingshi Press in Shanghai in 1901.

[144]Ju Deyuan, *The Truth about the Diaoyu Islands,* Chin. ed., Beijing: Kunlun Press, January 2006, pp. 280–281.

[145]Ju Deyuan, *On the Sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands Seized by Japan*, Chin. ed., Beijing: Capital Normal University Press, vol. 2, Map 16, 2001, p. 744.

Fig. 2.52 *World Atlas of the Chinese Dynasty*. Produced by China in 1863

台灣北角東北緯度距赤道北二十五度二十七分經度偏東五度三十分（原圖偏東一百二十一度五十一分）有凸嶼緯度距赤道北二十五度二十九分緯度偏東五度四十一分（原圖偏東一百二十二度九分）有克來克嶼緯度距赤道北二十五度三十八分經度偏東一度四十分（原圖偏東一百二十二度八分）有挨金可爾特島

凸列嶼和平山低牙吾蘇嶼

此三島處成句股形和平山距低牙吾蘇嶼十五里和平山距凸列嶼最向南者二里凸列嶼間有數石行和平山與凸列嶼間雖爲穩便水道而潮力流行甚疾帆船頗不易行

和平山高一千一百八十一尺山麓南岸自西西北至東東南形如陡削惟東面有斜陂並多淡水和平北岸緯度距赤道北二十五度四十七分七秒經度偏東七度二分半（原圖偏東一百二十三度三十分半）上無居民凸列嶼與和平山間有石

行並沙灘和平山與船路石間水道深十二拓距和平山東北稍偏北十五里有低牙吾蘇嶼爲亂石所成高六百尺

爾勒里石

緯度距赤道北二十五度五十七分經度偏東七度三十四分或四十五分（原圖偏一百二十四分或九分）有石高九十尺者曰爾勒里石四周甚陡徑約六十尺自遠視之形如順風帆船

Fig. 2.53 *Illustrated Sea Directory*, Vol. 9, Taiwan's Northeastern Islands, 1870

Proof 2 The Shanghai Jingshi Press published in 1901 *The China Sea Directory: A New Translation*, the Chinese version of *The China Sea Directory* written by Great Britain Hydrographic Department in 1873. The book was based on the *Narrative of the Voyage of H.M.S. Samarang, during the Years 1843–46* and the information collected thereafter. The revised version of the book was published in 1884. In 1894, the third edition of the book appeared. In 1899, the book was translated into Chinese by Chen Shoupeng, and the translation was published and distributed in Shanghai in 1901. A revised edition of the Chinese translation appeared in 1907. The book marks the Diaoyu Islands as "islands northeast of Formosa [Taiwan]" and Chiwei Islet as the "easternmost of the chain" (of islands northeast of Taiwan).

A relevant passage from the book is as follows: For 170 miles from northern end of Taiwan, there is a rising and falling chain of islands stretching east-north; all of them are very small. When viewed close, they are towering and distant from each other. The waters between these islands and the coast of China vary a lot in depth.[146]

Following the discussion of Pinnacle Island, Craig Island, Agincourt Islands, Huaping Islet, Mianhua Islet and Pengjia Islet, the book states: Other islands are 80 miles east, including Hoa-pin-su (Diaoyu Island). Islands such as The Pinnacle Group and Tia-a-su are 50 miles away, and Raleigh Rock the easternmost of the chain. All of them are at the center of the strong ocean currents in Japanese waters. The currents are not as strong close to the last three islands as Miyako Island[147] (see Fig. 2.54).

In addition, in its Map 42 about coastal Fujian Province and Taiwan, the book-marks Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, and Nanxiao and Beixiao islands as islands northeast of Taiwan. The defect of the Chinese version of the map is that it mistakenly marks Yonaguni Island of the Yaeyama Islands as Gumi Island. The original English map doesn't include this island, so this is the fault of the translators. This mistake can be partly blamed on the similar mistake made by the French scholar Michel Benoist in 1767 in his map of the Chinese empire and neighboring territories.

Chen Shoupeng was a native of Fujian who studied English and ship piloting skills. He stayed in Europe for a while after which he taught English and did translation work in China. It is understandable that he made mistakes in his translation of geographical names and the mistakes weren't so grave.

The book is important evidence of China's sovereignty over Diaoyu Island in the sense of international law. As a British official document, the book, through words and maps, clearly indicates that British official documents still maintained that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to Taiwan Province, China before 1895, the critical date for the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands between China and Japan. The book has a very clear definition of islands northeast of Formosa [Taiwan] by stating that Raleigh Rock [Chiwei Islet] is easternmost of the chain (of islands northeast of Taiwan).

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[146] *The China Sea Directory*, edited by Great Britain. Hydrographic Department in 1884 and reprinted by the same department in 1894. The book's Chinese version, produced by Chen Shoupeng, was titled *A New Translation of the Sea Map of China* and was published by the Shanghai Jingshi Press in Shanghai in 1901.

[147] Ibid.



Fig. 2.54 *The China Sea Directory: A New Translation*

The value of this book as evidence of China's sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands is often ignored. An important reason for this is that in its maps the English book has special names for China's Diaoyu Islands which were mostly transliterated into Chinese. For example, in Chen Shoupeng's *The China Sea Directory: A New Translation*—the Chinese version of the British book *The China Sea Directory,* 花瓶屿 (Hoa-pin-su) refers to Diaoyu Island, 众尖岛 (The Pinnacle Group) means Nanxiao and Beixiao islands, 台夷岛 (Tia-a usu) refers to Huangwei Islet, and 母勒利符石 (Raleigh Rock) means Chiwei Islet.[148] Everything will be clear as long as these names are right.

[148]Ju Deyuan, *On the Sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands Seized by Japan*, Chin. ed., Beijing: Capital Normal University Press, vol. 2, Map 17, 2001, p. 744.

Mr. Ju Deyuan was one of the first to point out this issue. He said more about this in Volume 2 of his *On the Sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands Stolen by Japan* (p. 744) in 2001 and in his *The Truth about the Diaoyu Islands* (pp. 284–292) in 2006.

Chapter 3
Evidence of China's Sovereignty Over the Diaoyu Islands: European Maps and Literature Before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895

Before Japan stole the Diaoyu Islands in 1895, the maps produced by all other countries used their Chinese names and most of these maps used Roman words to serve as a distinctive line between the Diaoyu Islands and the Yaeyama and Miyako islands, indicating the Diaoyu Islands were Chinese territory. In this area, Chinese scholars have collected as many maps as possible and carried out in-depth investigations. For example, Ju Deyuan published *On the Sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands Stolen by Japan* in two volumes in May 2001, which contains more than 100 photocopies of Chinese and foreign ancient maps and documents. I will now explain some of the representative European and American ancient maps about the Diaoyu Islands issue.

3.1 *Record of Messages from Chong-Shan*: The First Book in Which France Learned About the Diaoyu Islands

1. An early French map indicating China's ownership of the Diaoyu Islands

The Carte des Isles de Lieou-Kieou was produced by the French missionary Antoine Gaubil in 1752 and published in 1758 based on the *Record of Messages from Chûzan* written by Xu Baoguang in 1719. The map marks the Diaoyu Islands in China's southern Fujian dialect on the route from Kilungchan (Jilong Island), Taiwan, to Naha, Ryukyu (see Fig. 3.1).

These islands are included in this map as islands northeast of Taiwan, not as islands of the Ryukyu Kingdom because the map was produced by Antoine Gaubil based on the Map of Ryukyu and the Map of maritime routes to Ryukyu in the *Record of Messages from Chûzan* written by Qing assistant envoy Xu Baoguang in 1719. In his *Mémoire sur les îles que les Chinois appellent îles de Lieou-Kieou*, Antoine Gaubil included the French version of the following passage about the maritime route from Xu Baoguang's *Record of Messages from Chûzan*, "In sailing

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J. Liu, *The Diaoyu Islands*, China Academic Library,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8699-2_3



Fig. 3.1 French missionary Antoine Gaubil, Carte des Isles de Lieou-Kieou, 1758

toward Ryukyu, Chinese ships must pass these islands…. Only the Chinese can ensure that the voyage is safe. After passing the north of Taiwan, the ships move on eastward, though a little bit toward the south. For details, see the islands I have marked on the map. And then the ships move northward along these islands to the north of Gumi Island… before eventually arriving at the Port of Naha."[1]

2. The Carter du royaume et des isles de Lieou-Kieou produced by the Frenchman Philippe Buache in 1754, with the Diaoyu Islands on the Chinese route.

The map is now collected at the National Library of France and marks the Chinese islands in the southern Fujian dialect with Pengjia Island as Pongkiachan, Huaping Islet as Hoapinsu, Diaoyu Islet as Tyaoyusu and Huangwei Islet as Hoangoueysu. The subtitle of the map says that the map was produced based on the map Antoine Gaubil made in China in November 1752. According to some Japanese scholars, these islands are included in the Map of Ryukyuan islands, so they are Ryukyuan Islands. This understanding is not right because the map not only marks the Diaoyu Islands with their Chinese names but also makes it clear that this is a "route des Chinois" (see Fig. 3.2).

[1]Ju Deyuan, *On the Sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands Seized by Japan*, Chin. ed., Beijing: Capital Normal University Press, vol. 2, 2001, pp. 646–647.



Fig. 3.2 Carter du royaume et des isles de Lieou-Kieou, 1754, with the Diaoyu Islands on the Chinese route

Due to geographical vicinity, European and American maps of China often include the Ryukyu Archipelago, the Yaeyama Islands, or the Miyako Islands. However, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that these islands belonged to China. To make a correct and comprehensive judgment, one should not only look at what maps say but also see what ancient documents say.

Carter du royaume et des isles de Lieou-Kieou includes Chinese islands and is designed to illustrate the ancient maritime route formed by the islands from Fujian to Ryukyu. The map was clearly affected by the Diaoyu Islands maritime route discussed in Xu Baoguang's *Record of Messages from Chûzan* and connected these islands with a dotted line and marked the maritime route from Fujian to Ryukyu, thus proving that the Chinese were the first to discover and exploit the Diaoyu Islands.

3. The Great Universal Geographic Map produced by Michel Benoist, a French member of the Society of Jesus who arrived in China in 1744, on behalf of the Qing government in the twenty-first year of the reign of Emperor Qianlong (1756), including the Diaoyu Islands.

Benoist made additions to the Atlas of the Qing Dynasty produced during the reign of Emperor Kangxi. He produced the Great Universal Geographic Map in the twenty-fifth year of the reign of Emperor Qianlong (1760) and presented it to the

Fig. 3.3 Michel Benoist, Great Universal Geographic Map, 1767, with Diaoyu Island written in its southern Fujian dialect pronounciation "Hao-yu-su"

emperor as a gift for his 50th birthday. Emperor Qianlong had Prince Zhuang of Yunlu review the map and made the following comments on Yunlu's memorial: "Good. Please have him produce another with the help of the imperial secretariat." Thanks to seven more years of hard work, Benoist produced the Great Universal Geographic Map (see Fig. 3.3).

The Chinese names of the places included in the map were in the handwriting of the secretary of the Qing government responsible for translation and transcription. This shows that this was an official map completed based on the Sino-French cooperation.

Record of Messages from Chûzan, written by China's assistant envoy to Ryukyu Xu Baoguang in 1719, and *Outline of the Three Countries,* written by Shihei Hayashi in 1785, were translated into French and the French versions were published. The two books have basically the same account of the Diaoyu Islands route, with the latter being based on the former. This means that ancient French maps of the Diaoyu Islands were based on the relevant records by the *Record of Messages from Chûzan*. In his Great Universal Geographic Map, Michel Benoist marked the Diaoyu Islands in Chinese characters pronounced in the southern Fujian dialect, but not in the Ryukyuan language. For example, Hoa-pin-su represents Huaping Islet; Hao-yu-su, Diaoyu Islet; Hoan-oey-su, Huangwei Islet, and Tche-oey-su as Chiwei Islet.

3.2 Evidence of China's Sovereignty Over the Diaoyu Islands: Ancient British Maps and Literature

1. *At first the United Kingdom's ancient maps of the Diaoyu Islands were also affected by French maps.*

(1) China, Divided into Its Great Provinces, and the Isles of Japan, produced by Samuel Dunn, Mathematician, in 1774, were influenced by French maps. The map marks the Diaoyu Islands, affiliated with Taiwan, in the southern Fujian dialect pronunciations, including marking Diaoyu Island as Hao-yu-su, Huangwei Islet as Hoan-oey-su, and Chiwei Islet as Tche-oey-su.[2] This was the UK's first map to include the Diaoyu Islands, and it indicates that they were Chinese islands, not Ryukyuan Islands (see Fig. 3.4).

In the 220 years until the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, the maps and historical documents published in the UK unanimously held that the Diaoyu Islands belonged



Fig. 3.4 Samuel Dunn, China, divided into its Great Provinces, and the Isles of Japan, 1774, including the Diaoyu Islands

[2]Ju Deyuan, *On the Sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands Seized by Japan*, Chin. ed., Beijing: Capital Normal University Press, vol. 2, 2001, p. 652.

to northeast islands of Taiwan, China. It wasn't until 1845 when the British warship H. M. S. *Samarang* conducted a survey of the Diaoyu Islands that British maps often mistakenly used the southern Fujian dialect pronunciation for Huaping Islet to name Diaoyu Island, used the pronunciation for Diaoyu Island to name Huangwei Islet, and called Chiwei Islet Raleigh Rock. This affected the maps produced in Japan and other countries.

(2) The British scholar John Cary produced A New Map of China in 1801, which was published after being verified by the UK government. The map also uses the pronunciation of the Diaoyu Islands specified in Samuel Dunn's China, Divided into its Great Provinces, and the Isles of Japan in 1774, that is, using the pronunciation the French missionaries Antoine Gaubil and Michel Benoist had for the Diaoyu Islands, the map indicates the Diaoyu Islands are part of China. On the map, Fujian, Taiwan, Diaoyu Island and the Yaeyama Islands are yellow, which is quite different from the colors of other provinces of China, indicating that these areas are in the same of scope of administration, whereas the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) and the islands west of Ryukyu (including Kume Island) are green, indicating that these were the territory of the Ryukyu Kingdom.

In 1800, the Japanese held negotiations with China over its intention to seize Ryukyu, stating that China could have the Yaeyama Islands and the Miyako Islands. The coloring of this map just reflects that historical background. It also shows that John Cary believed that not only Taiwan and the Diaoyu Islands affiliated with it but also the Yaeyama Islands and Miyako Islands belonged to China. This historical process didn't materialize, but this British map colors China's Chiwei Islet yellow while making Ryukyu's Mume Island green, which serves as evidence of China's ownership of the Diaoyu Islands. Another edition of the map was published and distributed in 1811 (see Fig. 3.5).

2. *Based on the records of the captain of the British delegation to China in 1793, the Sailing Pilot of East India, China and the Oceanic Continent with Notes, Explanatory and Descriptive, published in 1816, included Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet in Taiwan*

In the table "Eastern Sea and Coasts of China, with the Islands of Leookeo (Ryukyu)" in the *Sailing Directions for the East Indies, China, Australia, etc. with Notes, Explanatory and Descriptive*, it was clear Taiwan included Hoapin-su (lat. 25°42′N, long. 123°23′, Diaoyu Island), Taiyu-su (lat. 25°50′N, long. 123°35′E,



Fig. 3.5 A New Map of China, United Kingdom, 1801, with the Diaoyu Islands written in their southern Fujian dialect pronunciations and having the same color as Fujian and Taiwan

Huangwei Islet), and Broughton's Rock (above water, lat. 25°58′N, long. 124°30′E, Chiwei Islet)[3] (see Fig. 3.6).

It is worth noting that there were many islands affiliated with Taiwan, including, for example, inhabited islands such as the Guishan Island, 12 km east of Yilan County, and the Huaping Islet, Mianhua Islet, and Pengjia Islet northeast of Keelung. However, these islands were not included in the table, but uninhabited islands outside Taiwan such as Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet were recorded. This is because the Diaoyu Islands were the easternmost islands that marked the maritime boundary with the Ryukyu Kingdom, not *terra nullius* as Japan called.

According to the table, the records of China's coastal islands came from the British diplomatic officials who visited Beijing in 1793. This was Britain's first diplomatic mission to China apparently to celebrate Emperor Qianlong's birthday

[3]The Web site sponsored by the National Marine Data and Information Service and organized by the China Internet Information Center under the title "The Diaoyu Islands: China's Inherent Territory": http://www.diaoyudao.org.cn/2014-12/11/content_34350275.htm.

John Purdy, Tables of the Positions, or of the Latitudes and Longitudes, of Places, Composed to Accompany the *Oriental Navigator*; or *Sailing Pilot of East India, China and the Oceanic Continent with Notes, Explanatory and Descriptive*, London: Ridkr and Weed, Litthe Britsin, 1816, p. 156.



32. EASTERN SEA AND COASTS OF CHINA, WITH THE ISLANDS OF LEOOKEOO, &c.

	LATITUDE.				LONGITUDE.				AUTHORITIES.
	°	′	″		°	′	″		
TAI-WAN, or FORMOSA;									
N.E. or Haycock Point	25	10	30	N.	121	53	0	E.	See Section 29, page 138.
Hoapin-au [1.]	25	42	0	—	123	23	0	—	
Tinoyu-su.....	25	50	0	—	123	35	0	—	
Broughton's Rock (above water) [1.]	25	58	0	—	124	30	0	—	For the Madjicosemah and Leookeoo Islands, Capt. Wm. R. Broughton and Mr. Wm. Chapman, R.N.—For St. Augustin and Sulphur Island, Captain Krusenstern.—For the Coasts of China, Officers of the Lion and Hindostan, on the Embassy to Peking, in 1793, &c.
MADJICOSEMAH ISLES;									
Kumi [2.] *Western Point*	24	27	0	—	123	15	0	—	
Hummock Isle	24	15	0	—	123	51	0	—	
Sandy Isle.....	24	11	0	—	124	3	0	—	
Rocho-o-ko-ko [3.] *West End*	24	21	0	—	123	56	0	—	
Patchusan [3.] *S.E. End*	24	22	0	—	124	24	0	—	
Typinsan [3.] *S.E. End*.....	24	42	0	—	125	34	0	—	
Providence Reef [3.] *N.W. End*	25	5	0	—	125	10	0	—	

Fig. 3.6 A table of islands included in *Sailing Pilot of East India, China and the Oceanic Continent* with notes, explanatory and descriptive, London, 1816

but actually to open a trade route to China. The mission had more than 700 members and arrived in China on five ships. The ships were docked off Fujian and Taiwan. Back then the mission discovered Chiwei Islet without the knowledge of its Chinese ownership, so they named it Broughton's Rock after British Captain Broughton as an island affiliated with Taiwan. This shows that as early as back to 1793 British authorities realized that the islands affiliated with Taiwan included the Diaoyu Islands.

According to the *Records of Qing Emperor Qianlong*, back then the British envoys hoped that the Qing government gave Britain an island where the British could dock their ships and store their goods. In response, Emperor Qianlong wrote to the British king, "All my dynasty's land is strictly demarcated and registered, including even islands and sandbars. They are under the jurisdiction of authorities. It is particularly impossible to give any of them away."[4] This fully shows that in the late eighteenth century the Chinese Qing emperor was keenly aware of the country's offshore islands and sandbars and did his best to protect them. "All my dynasty's land is strictly demarcated and registered, including even islands and sandbars." The Diaoyu Islands were of course included.

3. *The survey conducted by the British warship H. M. S. Samarang in 1845 said that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to Taiwan, which greatly affected Japan.*

The Chart Shewing the Tracks of H. M. S. *Samarang* during the Years 1843–1846 includes the ship's survey route from islands east and northeast of Taiwan to the Ryukyu Kingdom. It also includes the route the ship took when it returned to Okinawa Main Island, Ryukyu, from Ishigaki Island via Diaoyu Island, Huangwei

[4]*Records of Qing Emperor Qianlong*, vol. 1435, China Book Company, http://www.uus8.org/c/156/008/1443.htm.

Fig. 3.7 Chart shewing the tracks of H. M. S. *Samarang* during the years 1843–1846

Islet, and Chiwei Islet. The map marks these islands with their pronunciation in the southern Fujian dialect. However, the map mistakenly marks Diaoyu Island as Hoa-pin-su (Huaping Islet), Huangwei Islet as Ti-a-usu, and calls Chiwei Islet Raleigh Rock (see Fig. 3.7), which has affected both Japan and European and American countries.

It should be noted that the chart also has the Roman words "Meia-co-shima islands" in a curve to clearly differentiate these Ryukyuan Islands from the Diaoyu Islands, islands affiliated with Taiwan. This shows that the Diaoyu Islands didn't belong to the Ryukyu Kingdom at all. According to records, the H. M. S. *Samarang* made two voyages to the Diaoyu Islands from Ishigaki Island of Ryukyu's Yaeyama Islands when the boatmen of the Yaeyama Islands didn't know what the Diaoyu Islands were called.[5]

There were probably people from Zhangzhou, Fujian Province, aboard the ship, and it was highly likely that they told the British captain Edward Belcher what the Diaoyu Islands were called in the southern Fujian dialect. As a result, Belcher recorded Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet in their southern Fujian dialect pronunciations in his *Voyage of H. M. S. Samarang, during the Years 1843–46*. This book calls Nanxiao Island, Beixiao Island, and other islands and reefs the Pinnacle group which was transliterated into Japanese as the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands).[6] This is the origin of the so-called Japanese Senkaku Islands.

The *Narrative of the Voyage of H. M. S. Samarang, during the Years 1843–46 has the following records of the northeast islands of Taiwan:*

> … Hoa-pin-san to secure a landing for the meridian distance, but here as in other positions nearly the Northern Tropic, the sun at this period being nearly vertical at noon compelled us to have resource to start observations for Latitude. Toward sunset, the ship found anchorage on a bank to the eastward of Pinnacle Island, and thus prevented here being drifted beyond out sight before the morning. Had such an event occurred, it would have placed us in rather an awkward dilemma, as the strong eastern currents, attended with very ling airs, would have prevented her recovering her ground, and our eatables were already reduced to a low ebb, although most delicious water abounded. Every luxury they say has its evil, and not long after sunset we had reason to repent of the proximity of this same luxury. Scarcely had we commenced with the stars than the mosquitoes attracted by our lamps, attacked us in the most merciless manner. A determined action, with these pests, were vigorously maintained for nearly half an hour, at the expiration of which period, the exclamation of my assistant and boat's crew, added some very *piquante* hints, that enough to satisfy any opponent as to the actual Latitude of the position (differing merely two seconds north and south), induced me to withdraw my forces to the salt water, leaving the instruments until the more powerful sun dispersed our enemies. Hauling off to an anchorage about 100 yards from our position, we obtained a release from further punishment and enjoyed tolerable repose. Having embarked our instruments in the morning, and obtained another station on the Pinnacle Island, we rejoined the ship.

On the 16th, we endeavored to obtain observations on Tia-usu (Huangwei Islet), a landing was affected, but the absence of sun prevented our obtaining satisfactory

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[5]Edward Belcher, *Narrative of the Voyage of H.M.S. Samarang, during the Years 1843–46,* Eng. edition, London: Reeve, Benham, and Reeve, 1848, vol. l, pp. 315–320. Also see Unryu Suganuma, *Sino-Japanese Relations and Territorial Sovereignty*, Jpn. ed., Tokyo: The Duan Press, February 28, 2007, pp. 118–127, and Tadayoshi Murata, *The Origin of the Japanese-Chinese Territory Issue: The Awkward Truth from Official Documents*, Jpn. ed., Tokyo: Kaden Sha, 2013, pp. 90–91.

[6]The Ministry of the Navy Maritime Affairs Agency, *Japanese Maritime Annals*, Jpn. ed., Tokyo: The Ministry of the Navy Maritime Affairs Agency Press, vol. 2, March 1884.

observations, and bad weather coming on hastened our departure. This group, comprehending Hoa-pin-san, Pinnacle Rocks, and Tia-usu, form a triangle, of which the hypotenuse, or distance between Hao-pin-san and Tia-usu, extends about 14 miles, and that between Hoa-pin-san and the Southern Pinnacle, about two miles. Within this space lie several reefs, and although the safe channel exists between Hoa-pin-san and Pinnacle Islands, it ought not, (by reason of the strength of the tides destroying steerage) to be attempted if it can be avoided. This is very deceitful, as the slight deviation of course which would change the current from the weather to the lee bow, would also most materially change the rate of sailing particularly under the variables which prevail here, and from the reliance on what would be deemed a commanding breeze, the vessel would be suddenly found unmanageable. To those employed on these critical examinations, and who are daily if not hourly, subject to these nervous predicaments, these facts are keenly felt, as the lives of all are constantly in their keeping, and it is on the quitting the ship at such moments that the Commander feels the responsibility he incurs, and which for the due execution of his peculiar duties it is requisite for him to transfer into the hands of his Lieutenant. Fortunately, I felt that to no one could I entrust this charge with more satisfaction than to my zealous supporter Lieut. Anderson. But with the command I could not give him the breeze which had accompanied us, and I had the mortification to see him baffled all day, without being able to examine any of the space alluded to, and barely to save his distance on a casual bank discovered, as before-mentioned, at sunset; once driven easterly in this region, it would be impolitic in us to lose time by the attempt to recover it. The extreme height of Hoa-pin-san was found to be 1181 feet, the island apparently cut away vertically at this elevation, on the southern side, in a W.N.W. direction, the remaining portion sloping to the eastward, where the inclination furnished copious rills of excellent water. There were no traces of inhabitants or visitors; indeed, the soil was insufficient for the maintenance of half of the dozen individuals.

The composition of this island in trap, including masses of Basaltic Hornblende, Amygdaloid, &c., but the inclination of the upper strata, as viewed from the ship, exhibited lines of stratification deeply inclined to the N.E., facilitating the flow of water to the beach on that side. That this supply is not casual, is proved by the existence of freshwater fish, found in most of the natural cisterns, which are connected almost to the sea, and abounding in woods, which shelter them. Trances of the wreck of Chinese or Japanese junks were noticed. The position of the southeast angle of this island was found to be in Latitude 25°47′7″N., and Longitude 123° 26′E.

Pinnacle Group is connected by a reef and bank of soundings with Hoa-pin-san, allowing a channel of about 12 fathoms between it and Channel Rock; it prevents the appearance of an upheaved, and subsequently ruptured, mass of compact gray columnar Basalt, rising suddenly into needle-shaped pinnacles, which are apparently ready for disintegration by the first disturbing cause, either gales of wind or earthquake. On the summits of some of the flat rocks, long grass, similar to that usually noticed on rocks frequented by seabirds, was found, no shrubs or trees. The rocks were everywhere whitened by the dung of marine birds, comprising the Booby, (*Pelicannus Sula*), Frigate Bird, (*Pelicannus Aquilus,*) and various Tern,

(*Sterna*), the noise from which, intended to frighten us from their eggs, was almost deafening. Tia-usu appears to be composed of huge boulders of a greenish porphyritic stone, probably a Basalt, cemented by coralline and amygdaloidal matter, the upper surface being loose plates of grayish Basalt, occasionally cemented by the same amygdaloidal mortar. Some distressed beings had evidently visited this island, not Europeans, as their temporary beds were constructed of materials which belonged to canoes, palmetto thatch, &c. They had probably solicited this cave as furnishing water by percolation from above and were probably sustained by the bodies and eggs of the seabirds which about in the brush wood. In addition to the seabirds notices on Pinnacle Island, we found here the gigantic Petrel in all stages. At the first discovery of the young in its unfledged state, I had some idea that I had been fortunate enough to hit upon a specimen of the long-extinct *Dodo*, but on proceeding further, I found the parent to differ materially from both that and the *Solitaire*. The capping of this island, from about 60 feet to its summit, which is about 600 feet above the level, is covered with a loose brushwood, but no trees of any size.

We now sought Raleigh Rock, situated to the eastward, but were equally unfortunate in the want of sun, and the weather continuing still to threaten, did not warrant further detention, particularly at it was my intention to revisit them on my southern route. I found landing practicable, and remained on the reef, upon which it rises, as long as any hope remained, either of seeking the sun or obtaining the bearing of Tia-usu from it, but a heavy squall put an end to any further exercise of patience. Raleigh Rock rises abruptly from the reef to a height computed at 90 feet perpendicular on all sides, and covering an area of probably 60 feet, in diameter, appearing in the distance, as a junk under sail. As we found it upon the computed bearing as given in the charts, from Tia-usu, its position cannot be much, if at all, in error.

Giving up for the present any further delay in this uninhabited and not very interesting region, we pushed on for Loo-Choo, with no small degree of anxiety on my part, from having reckoned upon gaining some insight into northern politics, and upon making them acquainted with the probability of our coming into contact with those whom I knew they now considered their lords and masters.

On the 19th, we anchored in the roads of Napa Kiang and were immediately visited of the Offices of State, &c., requesting, in their set form, to be made acquainted with the object of our visit, and what supplies we stood in need of. The reply, "water and the sun", seemed in no way to disconcert them; they were evidently aware of the object of our visit and did not appear to be quite so well satisfied when apprized of our intention of sailing either the next, period at latest, the following day.

Presents of one bullock, two hogs, three goats, and vegetables followed this visit, and the next morning I landed nearly opposite to the town, in order to obtain our Observations. Here, we were visited by some of the minor Mandarins or Secretaries, evidently deputed emissaries, and much interesting matter was communicated through my Chinese interpreter, who informed me that our visit had been some time expected, that they had received full reports of our proceedings at the

Meiaco-shimas, and that they know us to be people who did not offend their prejudices, or want only enter their towns. Upon mentioning the chances of my communicating with the Japanese, they were silent, but some scraps were written, and hastily destroyed the instant my interpreter read them, which implied that we might succeed but beware of being entrapped. To use the expression of my Chinese interpreter, it would stand nearly thus—"He say Japan man very cunning; suppose he see you strong, he very civil; suppose he catch you too civil, he take you head. He give plenty to eat, but no let you walkee on shore." To my enquiry, if they had any idea of our visit, "they thought—*yes.*"

Our communications were interrupted by the visit of a French priest, who came to pay his respects and ascertain if we either brought him letters or could afford him any intelligence of the movements of the French squadrons in this direction. He acquainted me that he had been left Buddhism by one of the French frigates, about 16 months since, under the pretence of learning their language, and teaching them French; and that they were not then aware that he was a priest from Macao"[7] (see Fig. 3.8).

These records include these historical facts as follows.

First, before the H. M. S. *Samarang* arrived at the Diaoyu Islands in 1845, there were traces of people inhabiting on the islands. This shows that fishermen from Fujian or Taiwan, China, had lived on the islands.

Second, it can be inferred that the captain's interpreter in Ryukyu was Chinese.

Third, back then Ryukyu did not belong to Japan, but the Japanese had infiltrated Ryukyu, and the Ryukyuans were not on good terms with the Japanese. The Ryukyuans did not think highly of the Japanese and were alert against them.

Suppose the Diaoyu Islands were really *terra nullius* before 1895, that would have been recorded in the *Narrative of the Voyage of H. M. S. Samarang, during the Years 1843–46* published in 1845 following an on-the-spot survey of the Diaoyu Islands, and the UK would have announced its occupation of these islands without leaving them to be occupied by Japan during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895.

In fact, at the time not only did the UK not take the Diaoyu Islands as *terra nullius*, it also recorded these islands as islands northeast of Taiwan, China, in *The China Sea Directory* the British Admiralty compiled in the following 50 years up to 1894. I will elaborate on this in the coming Section Four of this chapter.

4. *From the Meiji Restoration in Japan to its annexation of the Ryukyu Kingdom, Britain viewed the Diaoyu Islands as part of China, not Ryukyu.*

(1) The map Coast of China between Formosa (Taiwan) Island and Pi-Chi-Li Gulf: [Eastern passages to China and Japan], published in Britain in 1867, is very important.[8] The map clearly marks the Diaoyu Islands in Chinese territory,

[7]Edward Belcher, *Narrative of the Voyage of H.M.S. Samarang,during the Years 1843–46*, vol. l, London: Reeve, Benham, and Reeve, 1848), pp. 316–321.

[8]Library of Congress, https://lccn.loc.gov/2007629451.



316 ATTACK OF MOSQUITOES. [1845.

Hon-pin-san to secure a landing for the meridian distance, but here as in other positions near the Northern Tropic, the sun at this period being nearly vertical at noon compelled us to have recourse to star observations for Latitude. Towards sunset the ship found anchorage on a bank to the eastward of Pinnacle Island, and thus prevented her being drifted beyond our sight before the morning. Had such an event occurred, it would have placed us in rather an awkward dilemma, as the strong eastern currents, attended with very light airs, would have prevented her recovering her ground, and our eatables were already reduced to a low ebb, although most delicious water abounded. Every luxury they say has its evil, and not long after sunset we had reason to repent of the proximity of this same luxury. Scarcely had we commenced with the stars than the mosquitoes attracted by our lamps, attacked us in the most merciless manner. A determined action, with these pests, was vigorously maintained for nearly half an hour, at the expiration of which period, the exclusation of my assistant and boat's crew, added to some very *piquante* hints, that we had enough to satisfy any opponent as to the actual Latitude of the position (differing merely two seconds north and south), induced me to withdraw my forces to the salt water, leaving the instruments until the more powerful sun dispersed our enemies. Hauling off to an anchorage about 100 yards from our position, we obtained a release from further punishment, and enjoyed tolerable repose. Having embarked our instruments in the morning, and obtained another station on the Pinnacle Island, we rejoiced the ship.

1845.] TIA-USU AND PINNACLE ISLANDS. 317

On the 16th, we endeavoured to obtain observations on Tia-usu; a landing was effected, but the absence of sun prevented our obtaining satisfactory observations, and bad weather coming on hastened our departure. This group, comprehending Hon-pin-san, Pinnacle Rocks, and Tia-usu, form a triangle, of which the hypothenuse, or distance between Hon-pin-san and Tia-usu, extends about fourteen miles, and that between Hon-pin-san and the Southern Pinnacle, about two miles. Within this space lie several reefs; and although a safe channel exists between Hon-pin-san and Pinnacle Islands, it ought not, (by reason of the strength of the tides destroying steerage) to be attempted if it can be avoided. This is also very deceitful, as the slight deviation of course which would change the current from the weather to the lee bow, would also most materially change the rate of sailing particularly under the variables which prevail here, and from the reliance on what would be deemed a commanding breeze, the vessel would be suddenly found unmanageable. To those employed on these critical examinations, and who are daily if not hourly, subject to these nervous predicaments, these facts are keenly felt, as the lives of all are constantly in their keeping, and it is on quitting the ship at such moments that the Commander feels the responsibility he incurs, and which for the due execution of his peculiar duties it is requisite for him to transfer into the hands of his Lieutenant. Fortunately I felt that to no one could I entrust this charge with more satisfaction than to my zealous supporter Lieut. Anderson. But with the command I could not give him the breeze which had accompanied us, and I had the mortification to see him baffled all day, without

318 HOA-PIN-SAN. [1845.

being able to examine any of the space alluded to, and barely to save his distance on a casual bank discovered, as before-mentioned, at sunset; once driven easterly in this region, it would be impolitic in us to lose time by the attempt to recover it. The extreme height of Hon-pin-san was found to be 1181 feet, the island apparently cut away vertically at this elevation, on the southern side, in a W.N.W. direction, the remaining portion sloping to the eastward, where the inclination furnished copious rills of excellent water. There were no traces of inhabitants or visitors; indeed, the soil was insufficient for the maintenance of half a dozen individuals.

The composition of this island is trap, including masses of Basaltic Hornblende, Amygdaloid, &c., but the inclination of the upper strata, as viewed from the ship, exhibited lines of stratification deeply inclined to the N.E., facilitating the flow of water to the beach on that side. That this supply is not casual, is proved by the existence of fresh-water fish, found in most of the natural cisterns, which are connected almost to the sea, and abounding in weeds, which shelter them. Traces of the wreck of Chinese or Japanese junks were noticed. The position of the south-east angle of this island was found to be in Latitude 25° 47′ 7″ N., and Longitude 123 26′ E.

Pinnacle Group is connected by a reef and bank of soundings with Hon-pin-san, allowing a channel of about twelve fathoms between it and Channel Rock; it presents the appearance of an upheaved, and subsequently ruptured, mass of compact grey columnar Basalt, rising suddenly into needle-shaped pinnacles, which are apparently ready for disintegration by the first disturbing cause, either

1845.] GEOLOGY OF TIA-USU. 319

gales of wind or earthquake. On the summits of some of the flat rocks, long grass, similar to that usually noticed on rocks frequented by sea birds, was found, but no shrubs or trees. The rocks were everywhere whitened by the dung of marine birds, comprising the Booby, (*Pelicanus Sula*,) Frigate Bird, (*Pelicanus Aquilus*,) and various Tern, (*Sterna*), the noise from which, intended to frighten us from their eggs, was almost deafening. Tia-usu appears to be composed of huge boulders of a greenish porphyritic stone, probably a Basalt, cemented by coralline and amygdaloidal matter, the upper surface being loose plates of greyish Basalt, occasionally cemented by the same amygdaloidal mortar. Some distressed beings had evidently visited this island, not Europeans, as their temporary beds were constructed of materials which belonged to cances, palmetto thatch, &c. They had probably selected this cave as furnishing water by percolation from above, and were probably sustained by the bodies and eggs of the sea-birds which abound in the brush wood. In addition to the sea-birds noticed on Pinnacle Island, we found here the gigantic Petrel in all its stages. At the first discovery of the young in its unfledged state, I had some idea that I had been fortunate enough to hit upon a specimen of the long-extinct *Dodo*, but on proceeding further, I found the parent to differ materially from both that and the *Solitaire*. The cap-ping of this island, from about sixty feet to its summit, which is about six hundred feet above the level, is covered with a loose brushwood, but no trees of any size.

We now sought Raleigh Rock, situated to the eastward, but were equally unfortunate in the want of

Fig. 3.8 British Admiralty's *Narrative of the Voyage of H. M. S. Samarang, during the years 1843–46*



Fig. 3.9 Coast of China between Formosa (Taiwan) Island and Pi-Chi-Li Gulf: [eastern passages to China and Japan], published in Britain in 1867, including the Diaoyu Islands

excludes all the islands of the Ryukyu Kingdom and separates with a black line China's Chiwei Islet from Ryukyu's Kume Island. This symbolizes the maritime border between the two countries (see Figs. 3.9 and 3.10). This further shows that in the 1860 s, it was international consensus that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to China, and no countries, including Japan and the Ryukyu Kingdom, raised objections about this.



Fig. 3.10 Amplified section of the Coast of China between Formosa (Taiwan) Island and Pi-Chi-Li Gulf: [eastern passages to China and Japan] on the Diaoyu Islands



Fig. 3.11 Coast of China includes between Hongkong and the River Yang-Tse, published in Britain in 1888 (details)

The map Coast of China between Formosa (Taiwan) Island & Pi-Chi-Li Gulf: [Eastern passages to China and Japan] was renamed the Coast of China includes between Hongkong and the River Yang-Tse in 1888 following Japan's annexation of Ryukyu. No change was made to the map which includes the Diaoyu Islands in China's eastern coastal islands (see Fig. 3.11).

The above-mentioned maps published in Britain in 1867 and 1888 suffice to prove that back then Britain viewed the Diaoyu Islands as part of China's eastern coastal islands, but not as *terra nullius*. In addition, it also affirmed that the Diaoyu Islands had nothing to do with the Ryukyu Islands or the Yaeyama and Miyako Islands of Okinawa Prefecture, formerly the Ryukyu Kingdom Japan had forcibly annexed.

(2) In China East Coast Hong Kong to Gulf of Liau-Tung published in 1877 in London, Diaoyu Island is marked in its southern Fujian dialect pronunciation. North of the Yaeyama and Miyako Islands and facing China's Diaoyu Islands, there are the bold and capitalized Roman words "SAKISHIMA GUNTŌ" which indicate the maritime boundary between China and Japan and mean that the Diaoyu Islands belong to the chain of islands northeast of Taiwan.

Nevertheless, the map was also affected by earlier French maps and the Chart Shewing the Tracks of H. M. S. *Samarang* so that one island was mistaken for another. For example, Diaoyu Island was mistaken for Hoa-pin-su (the southern Fujian dialect pronunciation of Huaping Islet), Huangwei Islet was mistaken for Ti-a-usual, Chiwei Islet was marked as Raleigh Rock (which was translated as 尔勒里石 [Erleli Rock] or 尔勒里岩礁 [Erleli Reef], and Nanxiao, Beixiao and other islands were marked as Pinnacle Group) (see Fig. 3.12).



Fig. 3.12 China East Coast Hong Kong to Gulf of Liau-Tung, London, 1877

5. Around the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, the British government had always regarded the Diaoyu Islands as islands affiliated with Taiwan, China.

(1) In 1884, the Great Britain Hydrographic Department revised and published *The China Sea Directory* which includes the Diaoyu Islands in islands northeast of Taiwan (see Fig. 3.13) and is basically the same as the 1873 first edition of the book. The new edition cited relevant records of the *Narrative of the Voyage of H. M. S. Samarang, during the Years 1843–46*. This further proves that the Diaoyu Islands are Chinese territory.

The British Admiralty*'s The China Sea Directory* has detailed records of the northeastern islands of Taiwan as follows: Nanxiao Island, Beixiao Island and other islands (the Pinnacle Islands), Mianhua Islet (the Craig Islands), and the Pengjia Islet (Agincourt Islands), lying north-eastward of the north end of Formosa (Taiwan Island), have often been sighted by passing vessels, but as yet no description has been given of them; their positions are as follows: Nanxiao Island, Beixiao Island and other islands, 170 feet in height, lat. 25°27′N., long. 121°58′E.; Craig, 240 feet high, lat. 25°29′N., long. 122°9′E.; Pengjia Islet, 517 feet high, is in lat. 25°38′N., long. 122°8′E.

The book mistakes Huaping Islet (Hoa-pin-su) for Diaoyu Island. The extreme height of Huaping Islet is 1181 feet, the island apparently being cut away vertically at this elevation, on the southern side, in a W.N.W. direction; the remaining portion sloping to the eastward, where the inclination furnished several rills of excellent water. Diaoyu Island has natural cisterns which are basically connected with the sea. Freshwater fish and weeds are found in most of the natural cisterns. This shows that creeks do not exist there by chance. The north face of Hoa-pin-su (Diaoyu Island) is in lat. 25°47′7″N., 1ong. 123°30′30″E. There are no traces of inhabitants, indeed the soil is insufficient for the maintenance of half a dozen persons.

Nanxiao, Beixiao, and other islands (the Pinnacle Group), which are connected by a reef and bank of soundings with Hoa-pin-su, allowing a channel of about l2 fathoms water between it and the Channel rock, presents the appearance of an up-heaved and subsequently ruptured mass of compact gray columnar basalt, rising suddenly into needle-shaped pinnacles, which are apparently ready for disintegration by the first disturbing cause, either gales of wind or earthquake. On the summit of some of the flat rocks long grass was found, but no shrubs or trees. The rocks were everywhere whitened by the deposit of seabirds, comprising the Booby, Frigate bird, and various Tern, the noise of which is almost deafening. The reef (as shown on the chart) on which these rocks are situated, extends six miles eastward and four miles northward of Hoa-pin-su (Diaoyu Island).

Huangwei Islet (Ti-a-usu), about 15 miles to the north-eastward of Hoa-pin-su (Diaoyu Island), appears to be composed of huge boulders of a greenish porphyritic stone. The top of this island from about 60 feet to its summit, which is 600 feet high, is covered with a loose brushwood, but no trees of any size. In addition to the seabirds mentioned on Nanxiao Island and Beixiao Island, the Gigantic Petrel is found here. The center of the island is in lat. 25°58′30″N., long. 123°4′E.



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CHAPTER I.

GENERAL REMARKS—CLIMATE, PREVAILING WINDS AND WEATHER, FOGS, STORMS AND GALES, TYPHOONS — CURRENTS — MAKING PASSAGES.*

THE KOREA, KOREA STRAIT, COAST OF TARTARY, SEA OF JAPAN, GULF OF TARTARY, SEA OF OKHOTSK AND KAMCHATKA.

GENERAL REMARKS.—The KOREAN peninsula (see page 49) is divided into eight Do or provinces. One of the remarkable features of the inland physical geography of this peninsula is the irregular chain of well-wooded mountains, extending along its east side from north to south through seven parallels of latitude. Although great differences of climate are found on opposite sides of this range, the climate of the Korea in general is excellent, bracing in the north, and in the south tempered by the sea breezes of summer.

As compared with European countries of the same latitude, Korea is much colder in winter and hotter in summer. Spring and autumn are the most pleasant seasons. During summer, in addition to the great heat, rain often falls in torrents, rendering the roads almost impassable. Toward the end of September storms and variable winds commence.

On the west coast and in the Yellow sea, the following seem to be the usual changes of weather, and the prevailing winds at the different seasons:

Winds.—From January to March, inclusive, N.W. winds prevail, and in January strong lasting gales from North and N.W. are frequent. On the western shores of the Yellow sea, the wind follows the trend of the coast, and is more to the north and north-eastward.

* See Admiralty Atlas.—Wind and current charts for Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian Oceans, 1878.

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it to Tai-pin-san. On the morning following, not seeing Yhima (which is supposed not to exist), and the weather being very boisterous, she stood on to the westward to get under the lee of Pa-chung-san, and endeavoured to reach some place of shelter. On nearing the latter island, she ran down the eastern and southern side, to the south-western extremity of its reef.

Here was a barrier of breakers as far as the eye could reach from the most-head, and apparently connecting Hasyokan island with the group of larger islands. An opening, however, was found into the reef, and after due examination the vessel was shot up into 13 fathoms, into Port Broughton, and warped into a snug position, where she was moored with just sufficient room to swing, the depths up to the coral ledges varying from 13 to 7 fathoms.

PORT HADDINGTON to TAI-PIN-SAN.—After quitting port Haddington the *Sesostris* worked to the northward, and endeavoured to weather the two low coral islets, Mitsuna and Tatara. She had passed the breakers, leaving them about 3 miles under her lee, when finding the depths decrease to 7 fathoms, the vessel was immediately tacked, and stood to the S.W. Captain Belcher strongly suspects that extensive banks or ledges of coral connect these islets (northerly) with Tai-pin-san; and a good reason for this offers in the fact of their being included by the natives in the Tai-pin-san group, when they are much closer by half the distance to Pa-chung-san.

Upon nearing the south-west part of Tai-pin-san, and having tacked twice, rather close to two off-lying patches, and obtaining soundings with 15 fathoms, a boat was sent ahead. Upon a given signal, for "danger discovered," the anchor was let go, and the vessel found to be in a secure berth in 12 fathoms, the boat being on the reefs. It is merely an indentation formed by the reefs connecting the western island with Tai-pin-san, and is very unsafe, a heavy sea tumbling in with a southerly wind. The observatory at the south-west angle of Tai-pin-san (at the most convenient landing-place within the reefs and the last rocky point towards the long sandy bay) is in lat. 24° 43′ 35″ N., long. 123° 47′ 09″ E. Tai-pin-san should not be approached at all on its northern side, and reefs are said to extend 7 miles southward of the south point of the island.

Yhimah island, with an islet to the north-east of it, and placed on the charts in lat. 24° 25½′ N., long. 123° 28′ E., 17 miles southward of Tai-pin-san is not otherwise known. It was not seen by Sir E. Belcher who searched for it in 1844, or by the U.S. expedition to Japan under Commodore Perry, 1856.*

* Captain Von Reiche H.M. (German) S. *Cyclop* reports that the natives say this island, which they name Oumi Aka sima, does exist, and that it is a group of islands, the largest of which is about 300 feet high.

PINNACLE, CRAIG, and AGINCOURT ISLANDS, lying north-eastward of the north end of Formosa, have often been sighted by passing vessels, but as yet no description has been given of them; their positions are as follows:—Pinnacle (about 170 feet in height), lat. 25° 27′ N., long. 123° 58′ E.; Craig, 240 feet, lat. 25° 29′ N., long. 122° 9′ E.; Agincourt, 547 feet high, is in lat. 25° 36′ N., long. 122° 8′ E.

Hoa-pin-su.—The extreme height of Hoa-pin-su is 1,181 feet, the island apparently being cut away vertically at this elevation, on the southern side, in a W.N.W. direction; the remaining portion sloping to the eastward, where the inclination furnished several rills of excellent water. That this supply is not casual is proved by the existence of fresh-water fish found in most of the natural cisterns, which are connected almost with the sea, and abound in weeds which shelter them. The north face of the island is in lat. 25° 47′ 7″ N., long. 123° 30½′ E. There are no traces of inhabitants, indeed the soil is insufficient for the maintenance of half a dozen persons.

The Pinnacle group, which is connected by a reef and bank of soundings with Hoa-pin-su, allowing a channel of about 12 fathoms water between it and the Channel rock, presents the appearance of an up-heaved and subsequently ruptured mass of compact grey columnar basalt, rising suddenly into needle-shaped pinnacles, which are apparently ready for disintegration by the first disturbing cause, either gales of wind or earthquake. On the summits of some of the flat rocks long grass was found, but no shrubs or trees. The rocks were everywhere whitened by the deposit of sea birds, comprising the Booby, Frigate bird, and various Tern, the noise of which is almost deafening. The reef (as shown on the chart) on which these rocks are situated, extends 6 miles eastward, and 4 miles northward of Hoa-pin-su.

Ti-a-suu, about 15 miles to the north-eastward of Hoa-pin-su, appears to be composed of large boulders of a greenish porphyritic stone. The top of this island from about 60 feet to its summit, which is 600 feet high, is covered with a loose brushwood, but no trees of any size. In addition to the sea birds mentioned on Pinnacle island, the Gigantic Petrel is found here. The centre of the island is in lat. 25° 28½′ N., long. 123° 40′ E.

RALEIGH ROCK, in lat. 25° 55′ N., long. 124° 34′ E., rises abruptly from a reef to a height of 270 feet above the sea, is perpendicular on all sides, and appears in the distance as a junk under sail. The existence of this rock was considered doubtful before July 1857, when it was seen by H.M.S. *Raleigh*. It was afterwards visited by Captain Belcher in

Fig. 3.13 British Admiralty, record of the Diaoyu Islands, *The China Sea Directory*, 1884

Chiwei Islet, named Releigh Rock by the British, is in lat. 25°55′N., long. 124° 34′E., and rises abruptly from a reef to a height of 270 feet above the sea, is perpendicular on all sides and appears in the distance as a junk under sail. The

existence of this rock was considered doubtful before July 1837, when it was seen by H.M.S. *Raleigh*. It was afterward visited by the Captain Belcher in 1845 and Commander Bulloek in 1866. Owing to its lying in the Kuro Siwo or Japan stream, several very widely differing positions have been assigned to it (see Fig. 3.13).

(2) In 1886, the Great Britain Hydrographic Department produced the China Sea Compiled from the Latest Government Surveys 1886. The map has basically the same records of islands as the China East Coast Hong Kong to Gulf of Liau-Tung compiled in 1877, marking the Diaoyu Islands in Chinese pronunciations and referring to the Yaeyama Islands and the Miyako Islands in Japanese pronunciations, and using the Roman words Meiaco Sima Group (Miyako Islands) as a separation from the Diaoyu Islands on the upper left (see Fig. 3.14).
(3) In 1897, the UK published the China Eastern Part after Japan began its colonial rule of Taiwan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The map still includes the Diaoyu Islands in Chinese territory (see Fig. 3.15).

Following the example of the *Narrative of the Voyage of H. M. S. Samarang, during the Years 1843–1846*, the map also marks the Diaoyu Islands in the southern Fujian dialect. It should be noted that in the Diaoyu Island section, there appears in the map "Pinnacle Is" (translated by Japan as the Senkaku Islands [Diaoyu Islands]) while Diaoyu Island is still referred to as Hoa-pin su (the southern Fujian dialect



Fig. 3.14 British Ordnance Survey, China Sea compiled from the latest government surveys (details), 1886, including the Diaoyu Islands



Fig. 3.15 The UK, China Eastern Part (details), 1897, including the Diaoyu Islands

pronunciation of Huaping Islet), and Huaping Islet in the waters off Keelung, Taiwan, is marked as Pinnacle I (known as Senkaku Island in Japan).

The UK published the Map of the Empire of Japan in 1922, which has the same color for the Diaoyu Islands and Taiwan as Japanese territory. This reflects the change of status of Taiwan during the Japanese colonial rule of Taiwan following the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki and absolutely cannot prove that the Diaoyu Islands are Japan's inherent territory.

(4) Diaoyu Island is mistaken for Hoa-pin Su (Huaping Islet or Huaping Island). In his *Illustrated Descriptions of Islands* in 1870, the Chinese scholar Wang Dejun translated Hoa-pin Su as Hai-Pin-San (和平山). This is why Diaoyu Island is written as 和平山 in some Japanese maps.

However, Huaping Islet is written as Pinnacle I, which was translated by Wang Dejun as Tu Island and translated by the Japanese as Sento Island or Senkaku Island. Nanxiao, Beixiao, and other islands were generally referred to as Pinnacle Is (see Fig. 3.16), which was translated by Wang Dejun as Tulie Island, translated by Chen Shoupeng as Zhongjian Island and translated by the Japanese as Sento Islands or Senkaku Islands. It wasn't until 1900 that these islands, together with Diaoyu Island, were given the joint name 尖閣列島 or 尖閣諸島 (Senkaku Islands).

It should be admitted that the mistakes made about the islands in these original English texts and the transliterations of the islands made it very difficult for researchers so that they could not decide how valuable and important these historical documents were. I will now elaborate on this issue.



Fig. 3.16 *Map (details), The China Sea Directory* (translated into *The China Sea Directory: A New Translation* in Chinese), including the Diaoyu Islands

3.3 Maps from German-Speaking Areas Showing Sovereignty Over the Diaoyu Islands Before the Sino-Japanese War 1894–1895

Modern documents and maps about the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands mainly include the publications of Austria and Germany. They share the same source with French documents. Based on my research, I must clarify that German's Map of China, Korea, and Japan is suspected of being forged.

1. *China's envoy to Ryukyu Xu Baoguang was the German-speaking scholars' source of knowledge of the Diaoyu Islands.*[9]

(1) In 1800, Schalbacher Verlag in Wien published the *Schrämbl Atlas,* an authoritative atlas in the German-speaking region. The atlas includes the Map of the Diaoyu Islands published by Franz Anton Schrämblin 1786. In this map, there appears the German sentence "Diese Inseln gehoeren dem Koenig von Likeyo" (These islands belong to the Ryukyu Kingdom) in a curve between the

[9]Liang Zhijian, "The Contribution of Geographers and Historians as well as Hans Kelsen and Other Jurists in German-Speaking Countries to the Study of the Diaoyu Islands," *German Studies,* no. 3, 2012, pp. 62–79.

north of the Yaeyama Islands, Ryukyu, and the Diaoyu Islands, China. This shows that the Yaeyama Islands south of the curve belong to the Ryukyu Kingdom while Hao-yu-su, Hoan-oey-su, Tsche-oey-su, and islands of the Diaoyu Islands are marked as Chinese territory. This means that cartographers in the German-speaking region believed in the eighteenth century that China had the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands.

(2) In 1843, Justus Perthes Verlag (Justus Perthes Publishers) in Gotha, Germany, published a color map titled Karte von China und Japan: den Manen d'Anville's und Klapproth's gewidmet (A Map of China and Japan: dedicated to the d'Anville und Klapproth team). The map includes I. Tiaogu su (Diaoyu Island; I is the abbreviation for Island), I. Haopin su (Huangwei Islet), Fels (Chiwei Islet) (it is called Fels [rock] because it is small) is marked on the Chinese side northwest of the curved China–Ryukyu boundary formed with the Roman words Lieu Khieu oder Riu Kiu (Lieu Khieu is the German transliteration of the Chinese for Liuqiu while Riu Kiu is the German transliteration of the Japanese transliteration of the Chinese for Liuqiu) in a color different from that of Ryukyu.

(3) Philipp Franz von Siebold, the German scholar and the European founder of Japanology in the nineteenth century compiled a Map of Japan, which does not include the Diaoyu Islands. Siebold was an advisor to the Tokugawa Shogunate and stayed in Japan for a period of nine years. He conducted thorough surveys of Japan's geographical information. In 1851, based on original Japanese maps, he published a collection of Chinese and Japanese maps and sea maps. The collection indicates that the southern islands of the Ryukyu Kingdom between China and Japan didn't include the Diaoyu Islands.[10] In the notes of the collection Tiaoyusu (Diaoyu Island), Hoangoùcysu (Huangwei Islet) and Tchehoeysu (Chiwei Islet) are marked with the transliteration of their southern Fujian dialect pronunciations following the example the French missionary Antoine Gaubil.

Siebold confirmed that the original Japanese maps he had did not include the Diaoyu Islands. He believed that after Japanese Satsuma han invaded Ryukyu, more Japanese people acquired a better understanding of the islands in northern and central Ryukyu. Back then Japan's trade with Ryukyu was mainly carried out by Satsuma han because other parts of Japan did not have easy access to Ryukyu. This can partly explain why in the late eighteenth century the Europeans lacked the geographical information about Ryukyu from Japan. In addition, he believed that the maps of Ryukyu found in *An Illustrated Account of the Three Countries,* written

[10]Philipp Franz von Siebold, Atlas von Land und Seekarten vom Japanischen Reich und dessen Neben- und Schutzländern, Jezo mit den südlichen Kurilen, Krafto, Korai und Lie-Kiu-Inseln, nach Originalkarten und astronomischen Beobachtungen der Japaner mit Hinweisung auf die Entdeckungen in älterer und neuerer Zeit, nebst einer Seekarte von der Küste von China und der Insel Formosa. Leyden: [Selbstverlag] 1851. S.5. Liang Zhijian, "The Contribution of Geographers and Historians as well as Hans Kelsen and Other Jurists in German-Speaking Countries to the Study of the Diaoyu Islands," *German Studies,* no. 3, 2012, pp. 62–79.

by Shihei Hayashi in 1785, were much worse than the Map of Ryukyu compiled by the Chinese official Xu Baoguang in 1719.[11] Siebold stated that thorough geographic information about Ryukyu was not known in the outside world until the early eighteenth century. The credit should go to Xu Baoguang from China who brought the most valuable information about Ryukyu. He was the envoy sent to Ryukyu by Emperor Kangxi in 1719. Antoine Gaubil and Julius Klaproth introduced the most scientific part to the Europeans from the documents written by Xu Baoguang.[12]

(4) In 1900, Justus Perthes Verlag (Justus Perthes Publishers) published the East Asian Chart about the Contemporary War in China, Korea, and Japan: East Asia from the Political and Military Perspective (Politisch-militärische Karte von Ost-Asien zur Veranschaulichung der Kämpfe in China, Korea, und Japan bis zur Gegenwart: mit statistischen Begleitworten: Ost-Asien vom politisch-militärischen Standpunkte).[13] The title of the chart was intended to show the change in the territory of China, Korea, and Japan following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. The chart not only shows the territorial change in China and Japan caused by the Treaty of Shimonoseki that was concluded following that war (China ceded to Japan Taiwan and islands affiliated with it which included the Diaoyu Islands) but also marks the boundary between China and Ryukyu after the Diaoyu Islands were ceded to Japan. To be more specific, China's Taiwan and islands affiliated with it became Japanese territory, but the Diaoyu Islands were still marked as part of Taiwan northwest of the boundary formed by the German words Riu-Kiu (Ryukyu) in a curve, indicating that the compiler of the chart was consistent in his understanding of the ownership of these islands.

2. *The Map of China, Korea and Japan produced in Germany in the 19th century and quoted by Japanese scholars may not be correct.*

Exceptions are bound to occur during research. These exceptions may well support the opposite opinion and warn the research from the opposite side to consider if the conclusions he drew earlier is correct. In my opinion, these exceptions should not be avoided; they should be further studied in order to eliminate the false and retain the true and draw a correct conclusion.

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[11]Philipp Franz von Siebold, Nippon. Archiv zur Beschreibung von Japan und dessen Neben- und Schutzländern Jezo mit den südlichen Kurilen, Sachalin, Korea und den Liukiu-Inseln von Ph.Fr. von Siebold, herausgegeben von seinen Söhnen, Erster Band, Zweite Auflage. Würzburg/Leipzig: Verlag der K.U.K. Hofbuchhandlung von Leo Woerl, 1897, S.266. *Ibid.*

[12]Philipp Franz von Siebold, Nippon. Archiv zur Beschreibung von Japan und dessen Neben- und Schutzländern Jezo mit den südlichen Kurilen, Sachalin, Korea und den Liukiu-Inseln von Ph.Fr. von Siebold, herausgegeben von seinen Söhnen, Erster Band, Zweite Auflage. Würzburg/Leipzig: Verlag der K.U.K. Hofbuchhandlung von Leo Woerl, 1897, S.266. *Ibid.*

[13]N.N., Politisch-militärische Karte von Ost-Asien zur Veranschaulichung der Kämpfe in China, Korea und Japan bis zur Gegenwart: mit statistischen Begleitworten: Ost-Asien vom politisch-militärischen Standpunkte, Gotha: Justus Perthes, 1900. *Ibid.*

Nozomu Ishii, an Associate Professor at Nagasaki Junshin Catholic University, Japan, attaches great importance to the Map of China, Korea, and Japan published in Germany in 1868, and views this as evidence that international maps confirm that the Diaoyu Islands belong to Japan and includes the map on the cover of his book *One Hundred Pieces of Evidence of Japan's Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)* (see Fig. 3.17). It said the map is included in Adaolf Stieler's Hand-Atlas collected at the Tokyo University Library.

What should be noted about this map is that a dotted line comes between the island of Taiwan and the Yaeyama Islands. Yishiyi and others stated that, "This line seems to be specifying islands by political force, indicating that before Japan began to own Senkaku Island (Diaoyu Island) in 1895, beginning in the first year of the Meiji Era (1868), it was understood in the West that Senkaku Island (Diaoyu Island) was within Japan's scope of influence."[14] However, they did not take this line as the boundary between China and Japan and estimated it to be a symbol of the distribution of political forces. The so-called scope of influence is not a concept pertaining to territorial sovereignty.

A closer look at the photocopy of the map (details) included on Yishiyi's book cover reveals three of its flaws.

First, the map may have been falsified by the Japanese. The map includes katakana and kanji place names given by the Japanese in red ink. For example, on the Island of Okinawa on the upper right of the map are "那ハ゛" (Naha) and "中山" (Chûzan), on the left of the map featuring coastal China are "厦门" and "福州" marked with their respective Japanese katakana "カモン" and "フクシヨウ"

Second, the dotted line that comes between Taiwan and the Yaeyama Islands misleads people to believe that the Diaoyu Islands are part of the Yaeyama Islands. However, the line is not the boundary between China and Japan; it is a symbol of the maritime route along the east of the Island of Taiwan, avoiding the Kuroshio current. If it is the boundary, Huoshao Island of the east of southern Taiwan would also be included in Ryukyu, but this is baseless.

Third, using the color used to indicate Japan, the map deliberately falsified the color of the Yaeyama Islands and the Miyako Islands from yellow to blue-green as well as the color of the original dotted line was falsified to become the same color as Japan, in order to make the line the boundary. However, in 1868 Ryukyu was still China's vassal and was not Japanese territory. This flaw is obvious when the map is compared with the original map published in Germany in 1882.

3. *The opinions of Li Woteng, a Chinese writer, are very arbitrary.*

In his book *Whose Is Diaoyutai? History and Legality*, which was published in Taiwan in September 2014, Li Woteng stated that in the Map of China, Korea, and Japan, which appeared in Germany in 1872, "the Diaoyu Islands are marked as Japanese territory. The map uses demarcation lines to distinguish different

[14]Mozomu Yishiyi, *Tips for Japan's Refutation of China's View on the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) Issue*, Jpn. ed., Fukuoka: Shuu Ko Sha, 2014, p. 363.

Fig. 3.17 Map of China, Korea, and Japan, produced in Germany in 1868, on the cover of Nozomu Ishii's book

countries…. This shows that it is not true that in the maps compiled in the West in eighteenth and nineteenth centuries can confirm that the Diaoyu Islands belong to China."[15] However, Li Woteng committed three mistakes on this issue:

First, in the note to the Photocopy of the Map of China, Korea, and Japan" (details) (Map 36) on page 88 of the book, he wrote, "In the Japanese section of this map, Diaoyutai and the Japanese home islands are colored yellow to be different from other parts of Asia. In the detailed map of the Ryukyu Islands, Diaoyutai is included and colored red just as the Miyako Islands and the Yaeyama Islands. This clearly indicates that Diaoyutai is part of Okinawa Prefecture, Japan. This is a photocopy of the original German map."[16] This is obviously a mistake because it is exactly the same note to the 1892 American map (Map 37) on the same page of the book (see Fig. 3.18).

In the note to Color Map 5, Li Woteng stated, "The 1872 German Map of China, Korea, and Japan. This map uses a blue line to serve as the maritime boundary between China and Japan and Diaoyutai is on the Japanese side of the boundary."[17] (see Fig. 3.19). However, this blue line is suspected to be added; it is not included in the original map.

In Color Map 5 (Map of China, Korea, and Japan) on page 4 of the book, Taiwan and China's mainland are colored yellow, Diaoyu Island is not colored due to its small size, but the base color of Diaoyu Island is also yellow and is obviously different from the color of the Ryukyu Archipelago. In the map, the color of the Yaeyama Islands and the Miyako Islands in the Ryukyu Archipelago was also altered into the same grayish green as Japan and is not the color used for these islands in the 1882 German map. The color of the map shows that Diaoyu Island is affiliated with Taiwan.

Second, it should be noted on the Map of China, Korea, and Japan, the line between Taiwan and the Yaeyama Islands does not represent a national border and is drawn the same way shipping lines are drawn on international maps. Back then shipping lines were drawn this way on Western maps, but this should not be taken as indicating the scope of a country's territory. With regard to this German Map of China, Korea, and Japan, if the dotted line suspected to be a shipping line is taken as representing a national border, then Green Island (Huoshao Island) and Hongtou Island (Lan Island) off southeastern Taiwan will be part of the Yaeyama Islands, which will surely be challenged.

Third, there is no doubt that this map was falsified twice. To be more specific, the dotted line between Taiwan and the Yaeyama Islands originally represented an ordinary navigation route, but it was made into a solid line in blue to separate Diaoyu Island from Taiwan. When the photocopy of the map used by Li Woteng in his book is magnified on computer, the part of the strange dotted line between

[15]Li Woteng, *Whose Is Diaoyutai? History and Legality*, Chin. ed., Taipei: Wu-Nan Book Company Ltd., September 2014, p. 89.

[16]*Ibid.*, p. 88.

[17]*Ibid.*, Color Map 5.

圖 36：1872 年德國彼德斯《中韓日三國地圖》
這幅地圖的日本概圖中，釣魚臺和日本本土都是以黃色著色以和亞洲其他國家區分。琉球島嶼詳圖中則畫出了釣魚臺，並和宮古群島和八重山群島同以紅色著色。它們明確表示釣魚臺是日本沖繩的一部分。複製自原圖。（見彩圖 5）

圖 37：1892 年美國《日本地圖》
這幅地圖的日本概圖中，釣魚臺和日本本土都是以黃色著色以和亞洲其他國家區分。琉球島嶼詳圖中則畫出了釣魚臺，並和宮古群島和八重山群島同以紅色著色。它們明確表示釣魚臺是日本沖繩的一部分。複製自原圖。（見彩圖 6）

Fig. 3.18 Li Woteng, *Whose Is Diaoyutai? History and Legality*, map

Taiwan and the Yaeyama Islands that is close to the western side of Hoa-pin-su was once again extended westward and colored blue. As a result, there appears a double image for part of the dotted line (see Fig. 3.20) and the dotted was suspected to have been falsified.

Fig. 3.19 Li Woteng, *Whose Is Diaoyutai? History and Legality*, map

Fig. 3.20 Map of China, Korea, and Japan quoted by Li Woteng in his *Whose Is Diaoyutai? History and Legality*, suspected to have been falsified

The slight changes made to the original map reveal the evil intention for falsifying the modern German map. It is very likely this falsified map will be widely used to mislead the public when the spurious is mixed with the genuine. The consequences would be grave if this directly or indirectly leads the decision makers of the Japanese government to take a tougher stand against China, cause the Japanese people to be less friendly to China and even lead to a Sino-Japanese conflict. Nevertheless, once this falsification is revealed, it will only backfire.

In addition, Li Woteng includes in his *Whose Is Diaoyutai? History and Legality* the Outline Map of Japan published in 1892 in the USA to defend Japan's position on the Diaoyu Islands, but this also backfires.

According to Li Woteng, Diaoyutai and the home islands of Japan are colored yellow, the Map of Ryukyu Islands includes Diaoyutai and colors it red just as the Miyako Islands and the Yaeyama Islands are. This clearly shows that Diaoyutai is part of Okinawa, Japan (see Fig. 3.21).

I have the following explanations of the so-called Outline Map of Japan published in the USA in 1892.

First, it is necessary to make sure whether the map is genuine. The color of the map is very unnatural. Except for Japan and Ryukyu, which are colored, China and other parts of the map are black and white, so the color part of the map seems to be randomly colored on a black-and-white map. Even if this is the original map that has not been falsified, some of the information it gives may not necessarily be



彩圖 6：1892 年美國《日本地圖》
這幅地圖的日本概圖中，釣魚臺和日本本土都是以黃色著色以和亞洲其他國家區分。琉球島嶼詳圖中則畫出了釣魚臺，並和宮古群島和八重山群島同以紅色著色。它們明確表示釣魚臺是日本沖繩的一部分。複製自原圖。

Fig. 3.21 So-called 1892 US outline map of Japan quoted by Li Woteng

correct. By the principle that one evidence alone does not hold ground, this map does not suffice to prove that the Diaoyu Islands belong to Japan and negate the maps compiled before 1895.

Second, the map colors the Kuril Islands red as part of Japan and indicates the territory Japan had following the conclusion of the Treaty for Exchange of Sakhalin for the Kuril Islands on May 7, 1875, between Russia and Japan. Back then the Japanese government had not made surveys of the Diaoyu Islands. Even before the Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1894, the Japanese government still failed to have evidence of these islands belonging to the ancient Ryukyu Kingdom or Japan.

Third, this so-called original map is quite new and has the page number of 130, but neither the publisher nor the date of publication is specified, so this one evidence can hardly be verified to be true. The Americans didn't conduct on-the-spot surveys of the Diaoyu Islands, and the conclusions drawn by the British Navy and *The Shina Sea Directory* written by the Japanese Navy based on translations in 1894, all include the Diaoyu Islands as northeastern islands of Taiwan. Therefore, even when mistakes are made on one Map of the USA, it can't prove the point.

Fourth, if Japan stresses that the Diaoyu Islands belong to Japan based on the mistakes of this map that will lead to the collapse of its idea that these islands were *terra nullius* before 1895. It was probably because of this that with regard to this type of map, Japanese scholars including even Yishiyi Nozomu stated that Japan didn't rule the Diaoyu Islands before 1895, so these maps of that time should not be taken as evidence of Japan's sovereignty over those islands.[18]

4. *The German map republished in 1882 proves that the Diaoyu Islands belong to China.*

On the Map of China, Korea, and Japan published in Germany, the dotted line between the Yaeyama Islands of the Ryukyu Archipelago and Taiwan looks like a shipping line. However, the map colors the Yaeyama Islands and the Miyako Islands yellow just as it does China's mainland Taiwan, whereas the Okinawa Main Island the Japanese home islands are colored dark green (see Fig. 3.22). This shows that back then Germany believed that not only the Diaoyu Islands but also the Yaeyama Islands and the Miyako Islands belonged to China. This may well give expression to the historical background in which Japan intended to let China have the Yaeyama Islands and the Miyako Islands in return for its recognition of Japan's annexation of Ryukyu.

[18]Mozomu Yishiyi, *Tips for Japan's Refutation of China's View on the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) Issue*, Jpn. ed., Fukuoka: Shuu Ko Sha, 2014, p. 363.



Fig. 3.22 Germany, Map of China, Korea, and Japan, 1882 (magnified details)

The map continues to refer to the Diaoyu Islands as their Chinese names in the southern Fujian dialect pronunciations. I have found that in the Xiamen dialect in southern Fujian, the Chinese for islet (屿) is pronounced "su." For example, 花瓶屿 (Huaping Islet) is pronounced "Hoa-pin-su" and 钓鱼屿 is pronounced "Diou su." This Map of China, Korea, and Japan published in Germany was likewise affected by the records from the British warship H. M. S. *Samarang* and mistakes Diaoyu Island for Hoa-pin-su, Huangwei Islet for Tiau su and refers to Chiwei Islet as Raleigh Rock. Nevertheless, the map has a new island "Recruit I" close to Chiwei Islet, adding a "?" to each of them. This shows that back then German compilers weren't certain what Chiwei Islet was called and where it was (see Fig. 3.23).

In addition, it should be noted that both the 1868 and 1872 editions of the German map have the wrong Roman words for the Japanese pronunciation of 琉球. They explain Liu-Kiu is Japanisch, but the Japanese pronunciation of 琉球 should be spelled as Riu-Kiu as Liu is the Chinese pronunciation for 琉. This mistake wasn't corrected until in the 1882 edition of the map which marked 琉球 as Riu-Kiu. The map marks the boundary between the Diaoyu Islands and the Ryukyu Archipelago with the Roman words "RIU-KIU" or "LIU-KIU (Japanisch) oner LU-TSCH (Chinesisch)" to separate the Ryukyu Archipelago from Taiwan and islands affiliated with it the Diaoyu Islands. This is basically the same as the ancient maps of other countries, proving that the Diaoyu Islands had never been part of the Ryukyu Archipelago.



Fig. 3.23 Germany, Map of China, Korea, and Japan, 1882 (details)



Fig. 3.24 Europe, China, and the adjacent countries, 1842

Of the maps produced by the European and American countries in the 19th century, the 1842 China and the Adjacent Countries also have the same color for the Yaeyama Islands and the Miyako Islands as for Fujian and Taiwan Provinces, China (see Fig. 3.24).

Chapter 4
Evidence of China's Sovereignty Over the Diaoyu Islands: Literature of the Ryukyu Kingdom and Japan

In 1534, Chen Kan, Ming China's envoy who traveled to Ryukyu for investiture purposes, wrote *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu*. In his book, he cited the following passage from *The United Annals of the Ming Dynasty:* "The Ryukyu Kingdom is an island country east of Quanzhou, Fujian. It sends its tribute to China's capital via Fujian. Its history is not known. Since the Han Dynasty, it had not established relations with China. Sui Emperor Daye ordered Commandant of Cavalry Zhu Kuan to visit foreign countries, and Zhu reached Ryukyu. There was a language barrier and the Chinese captured a Ryukyuan man and brought him back to China. Later on, the emperor ordered Garrison Commander Chen Leng to lead armed forces in attacking Ryukyu and capturing 100 of its men and women. Ryukyu had not begun sending tribute to China during the Tang and Song dynasties. The Yuan Dynasty sent an envoy to Ryukyu to bring it under the rule of China and was turned down. During the reign of Ming Emperor Hongwu, Ryukyu was under the rule of Chûzan, Sannan, and Sanhoku kings, and China sent envoys to visit them all. The Chûzan King accepted Chinese rule and began to send tribute to China while the other two kings did not."[1]

According to the above records, Chinese official vessels had arrived at Ryukyu in the Sui Dynasty and relations were first established between China and Ryukyu in the Ming Dynasty. It is therefore reasonable to believe that the maritime boundary between China and Ryukyu was officially established in the Ming Dynasty. This chapter will further discuss the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands based on evidences from the ancient Ryukyu Kingdom and Japanese documents and maps.

[1]Chen Kan, *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., 13th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Jiajing (1534) in Huang Runhua and Xueying (eds.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, 2000, vol. 1, p. 53.

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J. Liu, *The Diaoyu Islands*, China Academic Library,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8699-2_4

4.1 China First Discovered the Route to the Diaoyu Islands and Passed It to Ryukyu

In the most important ancient Ryukyuan documents, the Diaoyu Islands appeared only twice. It first appeared in Volume 5 of *History of Chûzan of the Ryukyu Kingdom* edited by Ryukyu Prime Minister Shō Shōken in 1650. The book contained the records of the Diaoyu Islands made by Chinese envoy Chen Kan in the *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu* he wrote in 1534. The Diaoyu Islands appeared for the second time in the book *A Grand Maritime Guide* written in Chinese by Tei Junsoku, a noted scholar and the Grand Master with the Purple-Golden Ribbon of Ryukyu, when he was in Fuzhou in 1708. The book is of great historical value for proving that China was the first to discover, name, and exploit the Diaoyu Islands. In a sense, the book is even of greater value than *Voyage with a Tail Wind.*

1. *Tei Junsoku's authoritative document A Grand Maritime Guide proves that the Chinese were the first to discover, name, and exploit the Diaoyu Islands and taught Ryukyu about the relevant maritime route.*

First, *A Grand Maritime Guide* devotes two parts, totaling 1197 words, to recording in great details the maritime route China used to travel to and from Ryukyu via the Diaoyu Islands, while *Voyage with a Tail Wind* devotes only 190 words to making a rough record of that route.

Second, when it comes to maritime routes, *A Grand Maritime Guide* mentions Diaoyutai seven times, Huangwei Islet (including Huangma Islet and Huangmao Islet) four times, and Chiwei Islet (including Chi Rock and Chi Islet) three times. However, when it comes to maritime routes, *Voyage with a Tail Wind* does not mention Huangwei Islet and it mentions Diaoyu Islet twice and Chikan Islet (Chiwei Islet) once.

Third, in *A Grand Maritime Guide*, the records of the China–Ryukyu maritime route via the Diaoyu Islands come from China's *Maritime Routes for Investiture Vessels* and the records of maritime routes made by Ryukyu. These people first emigrated to Ryukyu in 1392 before *Voyage with a Tail Wind* first appeared. It is important to note that the exact date when this book recorded the maritime routes from Fujian Province to Ryukyu was the 21st year of the reign of Ming Emperor Chenghua (1485) while the date when maritime routes were established between Fujian and Ryukyu was not specified. I think the date trances back to 1392.

All these are direct evidences that suffice to prove that the Chinese were the first to discover and exploit the Diaoyu Islands. Earlier studies have not elaborated on this, so I am now presenting the relevant passages from *A Grand Maritime Guide*:

> From Fuzhou to Ryukyu: set sail from Dongshawai and move southeast. Travel southeast-east and east for ten *geng* to get past Huaping Islet and Pengjia Island. Move east for ten *geng* to get past the north of Diaoyutai and the north of Huangma Islet. Move northeast for four *geng* to get past the north of Huangwei Islet. Move southeast-east for ten *geng* to Chiwei Islet. Move east for six *geng* to get past the north of Gumi Island. Move northeast and north to get past the north of Machi Island and arrive at the Port of Naha.

Set sail from Wuhumen and move southeast toward Guangtang and Dongshi. Move southeast-east for 15 *geng* to get past the north of Small Ryukyu. Move east for 15 *geng* to get past the north of Diaoyutai. Move one day and one night to reach the waters around Chiwei Islet and continue to move east and then northeast. Move east for 12 *geng* to Gumi Island and then move southeast-east to Naha.

Return to Fuzhou: On October 10, set sail from the Port of Naha somewhere between 9 a.m., and 11 a.m. and move west and then southwest. Move southwest for one *geng* to Gumi Island and Kuba Island. Move northwest for four *geng*, move northwest by north for 12 *geng*, move south by west for four *geng*, move west by north for five *geng*, and then move southwest for 16 *geng* to Nanqi Island. Arrive at Tai Island at midnight, fetch 20 pails of water and see rocks emerge from water in the west. Move southwest for three *geng* to Lima Island, also known as Shuang Island. Move for three more *geng* to Dinghai.

From Zhangzhou to Ryukyu: Set sail at Taiwu and move northeast. Move northeast for seven *geng* to Wuqiu. Move northeast for four more *geng* to Niu Island. Move east by south, southeast in a southwesterly wind, or south by east in a southeasterly wind, for five *geng* to Dongyong Island. Move east in a southerly wind or southeast-east in a southeasterly wind for eight or nine *geng* to Small Ryukyu, Jilong Islet, and Pengjia Island. Move east for ten *geng* to get past the north of Diaoyutai in a southerly wind. Move east, then northeast, northeast-north in a southerly wind or northeast in a southeasterly wind for four *geng* to arrive at Huangma Islet and get past the north of Chi Rock. Move east or northeast for 15 *geng* in a southerly wind to move past the north of Gumi Island. Move northeast for four *geng* to Machi Island and move on for three *geng* to the Port of Naha.

The four passages come from the *Maritime Routes for Investiture Vessels.*

Returning from Ryukyu to Fuzhou: In February set sail from Gumi Island move northwest and then move northwest by north for 45 *geng* to Dongyong Island.

In March set sail from Gumi Island and move northwest by north. At midnight see fish with black spines move in groups at the center of the sea, and move on west for a day to sea an island. Fail to see the island, and instead see sea water turn into green and then white. Have the ship move, and see the island at daybreak to realize it is exactly the island we think it should be.

In March set sail from Gumi Island and move northwest by north. After moving for 15 *geng*, shift to move west. Move west for 20 *geng* to Diaoyutai. Move seven more *geng* to Pengjia Island and then move northwest by north to Guantang.

At noon on September 24 of the 21st year of the reign of Ming Emperor Chenghua, set sail from Gumi Island and move west by south. Move northwest for four *geng*, shift to move northwest by north for three *geng*, then move northwest for four *geng*, move west by north for three *geng*, move northwest for four *geng*, and move 19 *geng* to Tai Island.

Set sail from Gumi Island and move west by north in a northeasterly wind for ten *geng* before shifting to move northwest. Move northwest for west by north for five *geng*, move west for five *geng*. After moving for ten *geng*, see the water turn white and an island in the distance. Change to move southwest to Nanqi.

In October set sail from Gumi Island and move west by north for ten *geng* before changing to move northwest for five *geng*. Move west for 10 *geng* before shifting to move north by west for five *geng*. Then move west for five more *geng* to Tai Island.

Returning to Ryukyu from Fujian: set sail from Meihua and Dongsha and move southeast in a southerly wind for ten *geng* to move past Small Ryukyu to the tip of Jilong Island. Move on southeast for five *geng* to Huaping Islet and Pengjia Island. Move south by east for seven *geng* move past the north of Diaoyutai with swift currents. Shift to move southeast-east and then southeast for four *geng* to sail past the north of Huangmao Islet in

front of Wu Islet. Move east for ten *geng* to move past the north of Chi Islet. Move east for *geng* sail past the north of Gumi Island. Move east for three *geng* to Machi Island. Move northeast and then north by east for three *geng* to at the Port of Naha.

Set sail from Dongqiang Island and move southeast in a southerly wind directly to the tip of Small Ryukyu. Move southeast-east for five *geng* to Huaping Islet and Pengjia Island. Move southeast toward Beimu Island (Yaeyama Island).

Set sail from Dongyong Island and move northeast in a northerly wind to Pengjia Island. In a southerly wind, move northeast and then southeast-east to Diaoyutai. In a northerly wind, move northeast and then southeast to Taiping Island (Miyako Island).

Set sail from Diaoyutai. In a northerly wind, move southeast to the end of Beimu Island and the tip of Small Ryukyu. Move southeast to Shaozhoumen. Sail southeast-east to Taiping Island. Set sail from Taiping Island and move northeast directly to the Port of Naha.

The above ten passages come from the Fujian emigrants' maritime route manual"[2] (see Fig. 4.1)

With irrefutable facts, Tei Junsoku's *A Grand Maritime Guide* proves that the Chinese were the first to discover Diaoyu Island the maritime routes to and from Ryukyu were first opened by the Chinese who taught the Ryukyuans about them. The China–Ryukyu maritime routes and the names of Diaoyu Island others the Ryukyuans knew were all created by China (see Fig. 4.2).

The Map of Islands (see Fig. 4.3) in the book *A Grand Maritime Guide* marks Chiwei Islet and Gumi Island as the boundary between China and Ryukyu has Chiwei Islet and islands west of it such as Huangwei Islet and Diaoyutai on the right page and has Gumi Island (Kume Island) and the Ryukyuan Islands such as Machi Island (Kerama Islands) and Chûzan Island on the left page. The map clearly distinguishes the Chinese from the Ryukyuan Islands and thus confirms the China–Ryukyu maritime boundary.

According to Ryukyuan scholars, the Map of Islands was produced based on the maritime maps the Fujian emigrants to Ryukyu had in the Ming Dynasty.[3] These people began to emigrate to Ryukyu in the fifth year of the reign of Ming Emperor Hongwu (1392). This makes it reasonable to believe that the Chinese had named Diaoyu Island before 1392 and used it as a nautical symbol. It is 316 years between the time when Fujian emigrants moved to Ryukyu and the time when Tei Junsoku's *A Grand Maritime Guide* appeared. This shows that the Chinese discovered and exploited the Diaoyu Island maritime routes earlier than the Ryukyuans. However, it should be noted that not all the ten maritime routes Tei Junsoku recorded were necessarily the routes recorded by the Fujian emigrants in 1392. This is because the book says "Around noon on September 24 in the 21st year of the reign of Ming Emperor Chenghua, set sail from Gumi Island in the Gengyou direction." That was in 1485, so they were the routes in 1485. Nevertheless, the possibility cannot be ruled out that the Chinese vessels that sailed along the Diaoyu Islands route before 1485 used Fujian emigrants' maritime route manual.

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[2]Tei Junsoku, *A Grand Maritime Guide*, 1708.

[3]Kajun Higashionna, *Record of the Natural Conditions in Southern Islands*, Jpn. ed., Okinawa: Okinawa Culture Association, 1950, p. 455.



Fig. 4.1 Tei Junsoku, *A Grand Maritime Guide,* 1708, stating that the Diaoyu Island maritime route was taught by the Chinese to the Ryukyuan



Fig. 4.2 Diaoyu Islands recorded by *A Grand Maritime Guide* on the voyage from Keelung Island to Ryukyu

The evidence above suffices to prove that China has historical sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. Tei Junsoku didn't specify whether the Diaoyu Islands belonged to China, but he believed that the Ryukyu Kingdom had 36 islands, not including the Diaoyu Islands and proved that the Diaoyu Islands maritime route was taught by China to Ryukyu. This is enough to prove that the Chinese named the Diaoyu Islands in 1392 at the latest were the Chinese Islands that were on the maritime tribute route between China and Ryukyu, and Ryukyu didn't have an objection to this, recognized this and recorded this.

The number of vessels moving China and Ryukyu and who was the first to discover and name the Diaoyu Islands fall into two different concepts. As historical evidence, the records made by Tei Junsoku in his *A Grand Maritime Guide* convincingly prove that it is an indisputable fact that the Chinese were the first to discover, name, and exploit the Diaoyu Islands. Moreover, in the early years the vessels that went to China to welcome Chinese investiture ships and send tribute were mostly piloted by the Fujian emigrant boatmen sent to Ryukyu by the Ming Dynasty and their descendants.



Fig. 4.3 Map of Islands, *A Grand Maritime Guide,* Tei Junsoku, 1708

2. *In 1380, 28 Ryukyuan sulfur collectors suffered from winds and waves and floated to Haifeng, Huizou, China, until they were rescued. This made Ming Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang decide to send experienced boatmen from Fujian to Ryukyu.*

According to Japanese historical documents, in 1380, 20 Ryukyuan people were struck by winds at the sea and floated to Haifeng, Huizhou, China. "When the Ming Emperor learned that they were Ryukyuans, he sent 18 experienced Fujian boatmen to escort them back the Ryukyu, and Chinese translators also joined them. From the reign of Emperor Hongwu and Emperor Yongle, Chinese emperors had sent Fujian people with 36 surnames to Ryukyu…. The learned emigrants were appointed grand masters to take charge of Ryukyuan tribute and the emigrants who were experienced sailors were appointed translators to serve as guide to Ryukyuan voyages. The emigrants totaled more than one thousand families. They all lived in Kume."[4]

[4]Tokuarinori Hashimoto, *A Record of Ancient Ryukyu*, the third year of the Shoa Era (1928), *u* in Yin Mengxia, Jia Guirong, and Wang Guan (eds.), *Continued Edition of the Materials about Ryukyu at the National Library of China*, vol. 2, Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Publishing House, first edition 2002, p. 964.

From the perspective of Japan, this historical material proves that in the fourteenth century, all the Fujian emigrants China sent to Ryukyu were given important positions of responsibilities. Those who were fairly educated were appointed grand secretaries in charge of the tribute and thanksgiving affairs regarding China. Those who were experienced sailors were made translators in charge of translating on tribute vessels and welcoming investiture vessels.

There are more records of this made in Ming and Qing China. For example, according to the *History of the Ming Dynasty*, the Chinese Ming government "sent boatmen emigrants with 36 surnames to Ryukyu from Fujian to assist Ryukyuan tribute envoys in traveling to China. The emperor sent officials to appoint Ryukyu Kings. The three kings of Ryukyu offered tribute to China, and Ming Emperor Chengzu brought Ryukyu under control."[5] According to *Record of Ryukyuan Students at the Imperial College*, written by Pan Xiang, teacher of the Qing Imperial College in the 29th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Qianlong (1764), China began to send boatman emigrants to Ryukyu in the 25th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Hongwu (1392), "sent experienced sailors with 36 surnames to assist voyages between China and Ryukyu. However, only five surnames, namely, Jin, Liang, Zheng, Lin and Cai have survived until today. China sent to Ryukyu emigrants surnamed Mao and Ruan during the reign of Ming Emperor Wanli. Wang Zeng presented a memorial to Emperor Wanli, stating that during the reign of Emperor Hongwu, Fujian people with 36 surnames were sent to Ryukyu world. Those with an education were appointed masters or senior subalterns in charge of the country's tribute to China, and experienced sailors were made translators in charge of guiding voyages."[6]

The above records show that during the reign of Ming Emperors Hongwu, Yongle, and Wanli, the Chinese government sent to Ryukyu sailors and scholars from Fujian on three occasions. On the third occasion, this happened as it was requested by Ryukyuan King Shō Nei. The Fujian emigrants made a contribution to the ancient exchange between China and Ryukyu and to the civilization and progress of the Ryukyu Kingdom. The most important contribution could be the Diaoyu Islands route they taught to the Ryukyuans. This is why they deserved a place in Tei Junsoku's book and demanded his respect. This close relationship between China and Ryukyu and their mutual recognition of their maritime boundary was probably never seen between China and other nations.

3. *The Rouyuan Post (Ryukyu Center, Fuzhou), the former site where Tei Junsoku wrote his A Grand Maritime Guide in 1708, remains the evidence of history.*

The Rouyuan Post was the former site where Tei Junsoku stayed in wrote *A Grand Maritime Guide* in 1708. The post was formerly known as the Ryukyu

[5]"Ryukyu," *History of the Ming Dynasty,* vol. 323.

[6]Pan Xiang, *Record of Ryukyuan Students at the Imperial College*, Chin. ed., in Huang Runhua and Xueying (eds.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, 2000, vol. 1, p. 313.

Center where Ryukyuan envoys stayed. During the Ming and Qing Dynasties, large numbers of Ryukyuan tribute officials lived here and stored their goods. Today, the Ryukyu Center has been renovated and is in good maintenance conditions, and it is an exhibition hall with local historical and cultural features. The exhibition focuses on the exchange between Fuzhou, a southeastern coastal gateway of China, and the ancient Ryukyu Kingdom. Today, the Qiong River, not far south of the Rouyuan Post, is still evidence of that section of the history.

I have learned from the historical materials on display at the Ryukyu Center that the Fujian emigrants who were recorded in ancient Chinese books were from the Fuzhou estuary. To be more exact, those emigrants were mainly from the mouths of Qiong and Min Rivers in Fuzhou as well as from Zhangzhou in southern Fujian. They were teachers and sailors.

The 36 surnames of the emigrants are Cai, Zheng, Jin, Lin, Chen, Mao, Wang, Liang, Ruan, Sun, Zeng, Wei, Cheng, Hong, Zhou, Li, Gao, Wu, Shen, Tian, Ma, Qian, Zong, Ye, Fan, Yang, Guo, Weng, Yu (于), Han, Jia, Yu (俞), Song, Tao, Wu, and Jiang. These include Cheng, the ancestral surname of Tei Junsoku (Cheng Shunze).

In the following 500 years, the descendants of these emigrants made outstanding contributions to the exchange between China and Ryukyu. Some of the Chinese Ryukyuans still had their remains buried in Fuzhou, though their tombstones specified they were from the Chûzan Kingdom or the Ryukyu Kingdom (see Fig. 4.4).

It is certain from Tei Junsoku's records that it was the Fujian people the Ming government bestowed to the Ryukyu Kingdom who were the first to teach the Ryukyuans about the Diaoyu Islands maritime routes between Ryukyu and Fujian. The Chinese sailors who worked on the investiture vessel of envoy Wang Ji in the 22nd year of the reign of Qing Emperor Kangxi (1683) taught the Ryukyuans about their maritime route manual.

Thereafter, the Ryukyuan were able to make it to Fujian, China, across the sea and Tei Junsoku was able to reach China for further studies. It was probably because of this that in *A Grand Maritime Guide* written in the Rouyuan Post in the ancestral home of the Fujian emigrants in 1708, after recording the Diaoyu Islands maritime route, Tei Junsoku deliberately added the statement "The above ten passages come from the Fujian emigrants' maritime route manual." In addition, when his account of the maritime routes came to an end, he added that he recorded this "as a sign of my respect for my ancestors"[7] (see Fig. 4.5).

Tei Junsoku developed affection for the Rouyuan Post in Fuzhou and the nearby Qiong River. In 1734, the year before he died, he wrote a Chinese poem "Set Sail on the Qiong River." According to the poem:

[7]*A Grand Maritime Guide*, ancient engraved edition collected the library affiliated with the University of the Ryukyus.



Fig. 4.4 Tombstones of Ryukyuan Chinese buried in Fuzhou in 1785 during the reign of Qing Emperor Qianlong and in 1862 during the reign of Qing Emperor Tongzhi

My vessel sets sail on the Qiong River,

Great favors come from the northern capital.

I hope I will have bon voyage,

As I join in the singing for peace.

This poem is about how the author was grateful for China and how he loved it. Back then, Tei Junsoku he set sail from the Qiong River in Fuzhou. When he looked at the north where the Chinese capital was, he felt sentimentally attached to it and thanked it for its education. What he wanted then was a safe voyage ahead back to his country.

4.2 No *Terra Nullius* or Territorial Disputes Between China and the Ryukyu Kingdom

The official authoritative history books of the Ryukyu Kingdom had the same records as the ancient Chinese documents: Before the Ryukyu Kingdom was fully annexed by Japan in 1879, there were no *terra nullius* islands between China and Ryukyu. With regard to the scope of the Ryukyu Kingdom, the earliest ancient map



Fig. 4.5 Account of the Diaoyu Islands maritime routes made in Tei Junsoku's *A Grand Maritime Guide* in 1708

now alleviate is the Map of the Ryukyuan included in *Record of the Countries in the Eastern Oceans (*Haedongjegukgi) which was written by the Korean Shin Suk-ju.[8] The scope of the Ryukyu Kingdom specified in the map is basically the same as it is in the Map of Ryukyu Xu Baoguang attached to his *Record of Messages from Chûzan* in 1719 (see Fig. 4.6).

The records of the Diaoyu Islands in the official ancient Ryukyuan history books such as *History of Ryukyu, Record of Ryukyu,* and *History of Chûzan* were cited from the records made by Ming and Qing Chinese envoys to Ryukyu. For example, the Ryukyu Kingdom's *History of Chûzan*, edited under the supervision of Prime Minister Shō Shōken in 1650, was the most authoritative official history of the Ryukyu Kingdom. The book cited the statement "we saw Gumi Island (Kume Island), which is part of Ryukyu" from Chen Kan, a Ming envoy to Ryukyu, and confirming that Chiwei Islet and the islands west of it were not the Ryukyuan territory. The number of Ryukyuan Islands named in the Map of Ryukyu attached to *History of Chûzan* written by Sai Taku in 1710 and revised by former Ryukyuan Prime Minister Shō Shōken in 1725 and revised by Sai Un was 36 and these islands did not include the Diaoyu Islands (see Figs. 4.7 and 4.8).

[8]The map is collected at the History Editing Office of Tokyo University in Japan.



Fig. 4.6 Shin Suk-ju, Map of the Ryukyu Kingdom, *Record of the Countries in the Eastern Oceans*, 1471

In 1701, the Ryukyu Kingdom sent Grand Master with the Purple-Golden Ribbon Sai Taku to Beijing to present to the Chinese emperor *The Chûzan History of the Ryukyu Kingdom* which was revised by the Ryukyuan scholar Shō Hongde in Chinese. The book says that in the 16th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Hongwu (1383), Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang renamed "流求" "琉球" and grant Ryukyu a gold seal and clothing. In the 25th year of his reign (1392), Zhu had people with 36 surnames emigrated to Ryukyu. In the third year of the reign of Ming Emperor Xuanzong (1428) appointed the king of Chûzan of the Ryukyu Kingdom, Zhu gave him the surname Shō and named him Shō Hashi and his father Shō Shishō posthumously.[9]

Relevant ancient documents prove that in the early years of the Ming Dynasty at the latest, China and the Ryukyu Kingdom both affirmed that the latter had 36 islands which did not include Diaoyu Island. According to the geographical annals of Ryukyu in the 50th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Qianlong (1785), "The Miyako Islands and Yaeyama Islands belong to Ryukyu, but it is specified that the

[9]"A General Survey of the Chûzan Kings of the Ryukyu Kingdom," *The Chûzan History of the Ryukyu Kingdom* in Yin Mengxia, Jia Guirong, and Wang Guan (eds.), *Continued Edition of the Materials about Ryukyu at the National Library of China*, vol. 1, Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Publishing House, 2002, pp. 845–846.



Fig. 4.7 Sai Un, names of the 36 Ryukyuan Islands, *History of Chûzan*, 1725, not including the Diaoyu Islands

Diaoyutai Islands do not."[10] The source of this document has yet to be verified. If it turns out to be true, it suffices to prove that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to China, not to Ryukyu.

The Japanese government states that the Diaoyu Islands are Japanese inherent territory and are under the administration of Ishigaki in Okinawa Prefecture. However, the fact is that even Okinawa Prefecture isn't Japanese's inherent territory but was annexed forcefully by the Meiji government in 1879. Taiwan senior scholar Yang Chung-kuei stated, "Ryukyu had been made a Chinese vassal for more than 500 years since ancient times…. In 1879 Japan annexed Ryukyu and China has never recognized that…. Ryukyu was not Chinese territory and was a Chinese vassal. However, the Diaoyutai Islands have been Chinese territory since ancient times and must never be treated the same as Ryukyu, let alone be turned over to Japan as Ryukyu was."[11]

[10]Chou Shih-chieh, "The Diaoyutai Islands are Chinese Territory," Taiwan: *The Independence Evening Post*, August 28–29, 1870.

[11]Yang Kuei-chung, "Preface to *China, Ryukyu and Diaoyutai*," in Yang Kuei-chung, *Ryukyu: Past and Present, and the Diaoyutai Issue*, Chin. ed., Taipei: Taiwan Commercial Press, 1990, p. 555.



Fig. 4.8 Sai Un, Map of Ryukyu, *History of Chûzan*, 1725, not including the Diaoyu Islands

The Diaoyu Islands were recognized by the Ryukyu Kingdom as Chinese islands. The maritime route from Fujian to Ryukyu, Diaoyu Island relevant islands, was first discovered, named, and exploited by China and taught to Ryukyu. The Ryukyuan tribute vessels that traveled between China and Ryukyu were, in fact, mostly led by the Fujian emigrants Ming China had sent to Ryukyu and their descendants. These Chinese emigrants brought to Ryukyu Chinese civilization and promoted political, education, social, and economic development in the ancient Ryukyu Kingdom. In his *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu*, Qing envoy Li Dingyuan wrote in the fifth year of the reign of Ming Emperor (1800), "Thanks to the help of the Fujian emigrants who mostly lived on Kume Island, Ryukyu became a nation of ceremonies."[12] Some of these emigrants established China towns in and around the solar salt fields on the coast southwest of Naha, which were at first known as Tangying (唐营, ying 营 meaning camp) and received the attention of the Ryukyu Kingdom. Later on, the camps were renamed Tangrong (唐荣, rong 荣 meaning prosperity) for their prosperity before they were renamed Kume Village. Members of the village attached great importance to learning Chinese culture and most of them were good writing Chinese poetry.

In the four-volume *Poetry of Ryukyu* printed in the 24th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Daoguang (1844), a poem records the Ryukyuans' understanding of

[12]Li Dingyuan, *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu* in Yin Mengxia, Jia Guirong, and Wang Guan (eds.), *Continued Edition of the Materials about Ryukyu at the National Library of China*, vol. 1, Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Publishing House, 2002, p. 770.


琉球詩錄卷之二
教習瑞安孫衣言劭閒評定
鄭學楷
字以宏琉球國久米府人現官里之子國子監肄
業官生
古今體詩
海上觀潮歌
平生喜遊眺未見海上奇　今王嗣位庚子歲乘槎海
上歷險巇長帆十幅出姑米（姑米下國屬島過此則無島嶼矣）蒼茫萬
里無津涯元黃不辨乾坤色中流一氣相滌洞銀濤雪

Fig. 4.9 Tei Gakukai, "Admiring Tides by the Sea"

Chinese and Ryukyuan Islands. The poem is titled "Admiring Tides by the Sea" written by the Ryukyuan student in the Chinese Imperial College Tei Gakukai. According to the poem, "The ship with high sails leaves Kumi (a Ryukyuan Island beyond which there will be no more islands of my humble country)/Into a boundless expanse of sea"[13] (see Fig. 4.9).

The wording "my humble country" in the poem reflects the nature of the China–Ryukyu relationship. In the feudal period, the Ryukyuans refer to their own country as "humble country" to show respect to China which they called "distinguished country" and the term "humbled country" was not a contemptuous name the Chinese had for Ryukyu. The term not only reflects the hierarchical structure in the international order in East Asia but also represents the Ryukyu Kingdom's respect for China. In the eyes of China, the Ryukyu Kingdom was a nation of ceremonies across the sea. The note in the brackets in the poem fully shows that west of the

[13]Huang Runhua and Xueying (eds.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, 2000, vol. 2, p. 795.

island Gumi Island (Kume Island) of the Ryukyu Kingdom, a vassal of China, there would be no more Ryukyuan Islands in the vast sea.

Since it was invaded by the Japanese Satsuma han in 1609, the Ryukyu Kingdom had been caught between China and Japan. In Ming and Qing China, China was referred to by Ryukyu as a "distinguished country." No matter how powerful China was, it never seized an inch of land from Ryukyu and had always regarded Gumi Island, or Kume Island, as "the main island on the southwestern border of Ryukyu." In 1880 Japan wanted to let China have the Yaeyama Islands and Miyako Islands in return for its recognition of its annexation of Ryukyu, but the Qing government wasn't so greedy to take them. Even during the Cairo Conference in 1943 when China participated in the discussion of the postwar Japanese territory as a victorious nation and American President Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed Chiang Kai-shek take charge of Ryukyu, the Chinese National Government, after thinking twice, insisted that China would not take any of foreign territory. This was not a sign of the weakness of China; it was the result of the Chinese nation, as a farming nation, observing the ceremonies that had been there for thousands of years and continuing to be a nation of ceremonies.

In contrast, the Japanese pirates, who made a fortune in Japan's Kyushu, Satsuma han and other places in Japan during the Ming Dynasty, kept harassing Japan's neighboring countries in East Asia. From 1592 when Hideyoshi Toyotomi invaded Korea to the Meiji Era when the Japanese navy and army stopped at nothing in their aggression and expansion against their neighboring countries, leading to the demise of the 500-year-old Ryukyu Kingdom and the Japanese colonization of the Korean Peninsula as well as Taiwan and its affiliated islands including the Diaoyu Islands. These are the historical source of the current dispute over the Diaoyu Islands between China and Japan.

Some people maintain that as China had adhered to the idea that "Under the whole heaven, every spot is the sovereign's ground" since ancient times, it was impossible for the Ming Dynasty to develop an idea of territory to view Chiwei Islet as an island marking the maritime boundary of China. In fact, this was not true. China had developed its awareness of national territory as early as in the Han and Tang dynasties. In 630, the Tang government implemented the foreign policy of "maintaining stability in China to demand foreign compliance."[14] When the Chinese Ming government was established in 1368, Ming Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang corrected Yuan rulers' erroneous policy of external expansion and included the foreign policy of good neighborly relations in the *Instructions of the Ming Dynasty*, stressing that "forces should not be used against foreign countries unless to resist their aggression."[15] The sea chart used by the Fujian emigrants on their voyage to Ryukyu in 1392 already included the names of Diaoyutai and other Chinese island on the maritime route to Ryukyu. However, this does not mean that all the islands

[14]Tang Jiaxuan (ed.), *China Foreign Relations Dictionary*, Chin. ed., Beijing: World Affairs Press, January 2000, p. 334.

[15]Ibid., p. 225.

appeared in ancient Chinese sea charts were Chinese islands because Ryukyu and Japan both used Chinese characters in their names of places. In fact, ancient Chinese documents recorded Gumi Island, which is east of Chiwei Islet, as a Ryukyuan Island.

All this proves that it is not true that the Chinese Ming government didn't have an idea of territory but adhered to the pre-Qin concept that "Under the whole heaven, every spot is the sovereign's ground." If that was the case, Zheng He's voyages to the Western Oceans would have become colonial expedition.

4.3 There Was No Okinawa Prefecture and the Diaoyu Islands Were Chinese Territory Before 1879

Before Japan's annexation of the Ryukyu Kingdom, ancient maps of Ryukyu didn't include Diaoyu Islands and maintained that Ryukyu had 36 islands. Satsuma han provided the Tokugawa Shogunate with three maps of Ryukyu: the 1649 Map of Shoho-kuniezu, the 1702 Map of Genroku-kuniezu, and the 1834 Map of Tenho-kuniezu. Each of these maps includes 36 Ryukyuan Islands including uninhabited 80 reefs. However, according to Tadayoshi Murata, a Japanese scholar who has studied these maps, none of them includes the Diaoyu Islands, indicating that they didn't belong to the Ryukyu Kingdom.[16]

Territorial sovereignty should not be determined by a map alone, but by comparing and analyzing ancient and modern maps and documents and accurately verifying all evidences.

1. *Up to 1879, the Japanese territory didn't include Okinawa Prefecture yet, in Japanese maps Okinawa Prefecture was marked as the Ryukyu Kingdom which didn't include the Diaoyu Islands.*

Ancient maps of Japan clearly shows that Japanese territory didn't include Ryukyu or Okinawa Prefecture (see Figs. 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.13, 4.14, 4.15, 4.16, 4.17 and 4.18) and that the Ryukyu Kingdom which was annexed by Japan as Okinawa Prefecture wasn't the inherent territory of Japan. So far no Japanese have publicly proclaimed that Okinawa Prefecture is the inherent territory of Japan. If they do, that would mean a denial the more than 500 years of the Ryukyu Kingdom, which is unacceptable to the people of Okinawa. Moreover, the Diaoyu Islands never belonged to the Ryukyu Kingdom and have been Chinese islands. Nevertheless, the Japanese government forcefully calls the Diaoyu Islands Japanese inherent territory, which is illogical.

In the 200 years from the 1680s to the 1870s, the very representative ancient and modern maps of Japan all show that the Ryukyu Kingdom was a kingdom of

[16]Tadayoshi Murata, *The Origin of Japanese-Chinese Territory Issue: The Awkward Truth from Official Documents*, Jpn. ed., Tokyo: Kaden Sha, 2013, p. 61.

Fig. 4.10 Map of Japan, second year of the Kanbun Era (1662), not including Ryukyu



Fig. 4.11 Revised Complete Map of Japan (not including Ryukyu), the Genroku Era (1688–1704)



Fig. 4.12 Complete Map of Japan in the Genroku Era, 1691 (marking the Ryukyu Kingdom outside of Japan)



Fig. 4.13 Complete Map of Japan in the Kyoho Era (1716–1735), not including Ryukyu

islands independent of Japan, but not the inherent territory of Japan. The Diaoyu Islands have been the inherent territory of China and were not part of the Ryukyu Kingdom. All these are the basic historical facts before the critical date of the dispute between China and Japan over the Diaoyu Islands.

Fig. 4.14 Dairyaku Map of Japan, Horeki Era (1751–1763) not including Ryukyu



Fig. 4.15 Revised Complete Map of Japanese territory and routes, eighth year of the Anei Era (1779), not including Ryukyu



Fig. 4.16 Road Map of Japan, fourth year of the Ansei Era (1857) not including Ryukyu



Fig. 4.17 Complete Map of the Sea and Land of Japan, 1864, (marking the Ryukyu Kingdom outside of Japan)



Fig. 4.18 Kaishu Katsu, the Map of Coastal Japan, 1867, not including Ryukyu

2. *One of the earliest Japanese maps to record the Diaoyu Islands is the Map of the Three Provinces and 36 Island of Ryukyu in An Illustrated Account of the Three Countries, written by Shihei Hayashi in 1785. The map has the same color for the Diaoyu Islands as for China's mainland province of Fujian, indicating that these islands belong to China* (see Figs. 4.19 and 4.20).

Japan is worried that Shihei Hayashi's *Outline of the Three Countries* will be used by China as evidence to its advantage, so it tries its utmost to deny the book. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained, "[I]t is not clear as to whether it was intended to draw the recognition of territories of that time. To begin with, it does not evidence accurate knowledge as shown by the fact, for instance, the size of Taiwan in the map is only about one-third of that of Okinawa's main island."[17]

Yoshiro Matuyi, Honorary Professor of Nagoya University, believes that Shihei Hayashi was a scholar and his *An Illustrated Account of the Three Countries* was banned by then shogunate, so the map included in the book didn't represent the

[17]https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html#q6.

Fig. 4.19 Shihei Hayashi, *An Illustrated Account of the Three Countries*, 1785, not including Ryukyu as part of Japan

nation's understanding and "does not at all indicate the sovereignty over the islands in an international relations."[18]

Li Woteng distorted Shihei Hayashi's *An Illustrated Account of the Three Countries* as follows:

First, the book wasn't an official document of Japan and was banned in the country and so didn't represent Japan's political attitude.

Second, in the Map of the Three Provinces and 36 Islands of Ryukyu, "the color of Taiwan is yellow, not red just as the mainland of China and the Diaoyu Islands are."This "is evidence that the Diaoyu Islands are not part of Taiwan."[19] Nozomu Ishii, an Associate Professor of Nagasaki Junshin Catholic University, and others share this view.[20]

In fact, long before these events, Yoshio Okuhara had negated Shihei Hayashi's *An Illustrated Account of the Three Countries* in 1978. Back then, Okuhara wrote, "The color in the map included in *An Illustrated Account of the Three Countries* absolutely does not indicate territorial sovereignty. If that is the case, Diaoyutai and

[18]Yoshiro Matuyi, *Interpretations of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) Issue by International Law Scholars*, Jpn. ed., Tokyo: Nippon Hyoron Sha Co., Ltd., 2014, p. 92.

[19]Li Woteng, *Whose Is Diaoyutai? History and Legality*, Chin. ed., Taipei: Wu-Nan Book Company Ltd., 2014, pp. 117, 120–121.

[20]Mozomu Yishiyi, *Tips for Japan's Refutation of China's View on the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) Issue*, Jpn. ed., Fukuoka: Shuu Ko Sha, 2014, p. 63.



Fig. 4.20 Shihei Hayashi, *An Illustrated Account of the Three Countries*, 1785, marking the Diaoyu Islands as part of Fujian Province, China

other islands belong to China whereas by the same token, northeast China (green) belongs to Japan, and Hokkaido (brown) belongs to Ryukyu. When the book appeared, Taiwan had officially become territory of the Qing Dynasty, but it is colored the same way as Korea is (yellow). One of the following must be right: Shihei Hayashi lacked knowledge and the color of the map cannot be understood to represent territorial sovereignty. If the former is right, then it is not reliable to confirm that Diaoyutai and other islands belong to China."[21]

However, it is Okuhara who answered his own question. He admitted that Shihei Hayashi's *An Illustrated Account of the Three Countries* was based on Xu Baoguang's *Record of Messages from Chûzan* (1719). Hayashi mentioned this in his preface. Two maps are included in *Record of Messages from Chûzan*. One is the maritime route map (vol. 1), and the other is the Map of Ryukyu. It is based on these two maps that Hayashi compiled his Map of the Three Provinces and 36 Islands of Ryukyu, which is clear for all to see.

In fact, Hakuseki Arai, an early Japanese politician and scholar who recorded Ryukyu, wrote the book titled *Record of the Southern Islands* in 1719. The book

[21]Yoshio Okuhara, "The Basis of Japanese Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands), Jpn. ed., *Central Public Opinion*, no. 7, 197.

was written in the same way as ancient Chinese books were and cited the relevant passages from Chinese's envoys' missions to Ryukyu. The book was completed in the same year as the book *Record of Messages from Chûzan* by Xu Baoguang, deputy Qing envoy to Ryukyu, and had views similar to those of Xu Baoguang. According to the book, Hateruma was the southernmost end of Ryukyu and Yonaguni Island was its westernmost end, and there were absolutely no Diaoyu Islands within the borders of Ryukyu (see Fig. 4.21).

It is not hard to understand why Shihei Hayashi did not have the same color for the Diaoyu Islands and Taiwan and gave the Diaoyu Islands the same color as Fujian and other Chinese provinces. This is because when *Record of Messages from Chûzan* was engraved and printed in 1719, the Diaoyu Islands were still under the administration of Fujian Province and had not to be transferred to the administration of Taiwan. In *Record of Japan* Zheng Shungong wrote in 1556 in the Ming Dynasty, the Diaoyu Islands "are small islands east of Taiwan," indicating the relationship between the Diaoyu Islands and Taiwan in geographical terms. In 1722, the Qing government's investigating censor Huang Shujing made his first inspection tour to the islands of Taiwan. He visited the islands off the northwestern coast of Taiwan and recorded his findings in the *Geographical Conditions of Taiwan,* which is one of the currently available earliest records of the Diaoyu Islands made by a Qing Chinese official.



Fig. 4.21 Hakuseki Arai, *Record of the Southern Islands*, 1719

Therefore, the administration of the Diaoyu Islands by China's Taiwan Prefecture can be traced back to 1722 when the *Geographical Conditions of Taiwan* was written by Huang Shujin on an inspection tour of the islands of Taiwan following the order of the Qing Court as well as 1734 when the *Recompiled Annals of Taiwan Prefecture* appeared. Shihei Hayashi completed his *An Illustrated Account of the Three Countries* in 1785, but the information he had in his book was still the information of the Diaoyu Islands in 1719 before they were placed under the administration of Taiwan Prefecture and he naturally didn't give the Diaoyu Islands the same color as Taiwan. Otherwise, he would have deviated from *Record of Messages from Chûzan* and would have to explain why. At best, this reflects the historical fact that the Diaoyu Islands were under the administration of China's Fujian Province, not Taiwan.

In addition, the map has different colors for Taiwan and China's mainland, which is not strange. This doesn't prove that Taiwan didn't belong to China, and at the best, it shows that back then, Shihei Hayashi hadn't realized that Taiwan belonged to China. The fact that the map has different colors for the various parts of both China and Japan while having similar colors for the two countries can be explained in two ways.

One is that both China and Japan had the practice of producing maps by using different colors for different provinces, counties, or regions. Therefore, Taiwan and Fujian Province have different colors, but they can still be viewed as different regions in the same country.

The other is that China and Japan have similar colors probably and there weren't many colors to choose from at that time, and it was difficult to use more colors to distinguish between countries.

Therefore, even two countries were given the same color it would not be mistaken as one country. This was why Shihei Hayashi used the same color for Hokkaido and Ryukyu, which were far apart. In this sense, Yoshio Okuhara was right to say that "color must never be used as the basis for determine the sovereignty of territory."

It is advisable that the meaning of the colors used in the Map of the Three Provinces and 36 Islands of Ryukyu included in the book *An Illustrated Account of the Three Countries* should be fully explained based on the historical background regarding the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands. The map, compiled by Shihei Hayashi in 1785, uses the Chinese names for Diaoyu Island and its affiliated islands and applies the same color to the Diaoyu Islands and the mainland of China. This fully affirms the objective fact that the Diaoyu Islands belong to China and are not *terra nullius*. The Diaoyu Islands had already become Chinese territory in the fifth year of the reign of Ming Emperor Hongwu (1372) before Taiwan officially became part of China, and they were under there administration of Fujian Province, so Shihei Hayashi gave exactly the same color to the Diaoyu Islands and Fujian Province in his map.

With regard to the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands, *Record of Messages from Chûzan* clearly specifies the maritime boundary between China and Ryukyu and the islands each claimed to have, and there can no doubt that the Diaoyu Islands west of

Gumi Island belong to China. For example, in *Record of Messages from Chûzan* cites the record of Diaoyutai and other islands in Tei Junsoku's *A Grand Maritime Guide* and deliberately adds the following explanation to Gumi Island (Kume Island): "The main island on the southwestern border of Ryukyu. In his poem "Ode to the Map of Ryukyu," Xu Baoguang depicts the boundary of Ryukyu, stating that to the north of the Yaeyama Islands was Taiwan, that is, the Diaoyu Islands affiliated with Taiwan. Therefore, the facts that in his *An Illustrated Account of the Three Countries,* Shihei Hayashi affirms that Ryukyu had 36 islands and that the Diaoyu Islands belong to China's Fujian Province are not to be defamed or distorted.

The authority and value of Shihei Hayashi's *An Illustrated Account of the Three Countries* are undeniable. The Japanese in the 18th century like Shihei Hayashi could not have the superb drawing skills as people have now, but this doesn't have anything to do with his decision of the ownership of the territory in his map.

The map included in Shihei Hayashi's *An Illustrated Account of the Three Countries* not only shows that the author was keenly aware of territory, but the book was also recommended to the Japanese Emperor Kōkaku (1771–1840) who attached great importance to it. This was proved to be true when the book was reprinted in 1924, its cover included "With the honor of Emperor Kōkaku" on it (see Fig. 4.22).



Fig. 4.22 *An Illustrated Account of the Three Countries,* 1924 edition, with cover including "With the Honor of Emperor Kōkaku" on it

In addition, based on the French version of Shihei Hayashi's *An Illustrated Account of the Three Countries,* the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs persuaded the USA to let have the Ogasawara Islands. This shows that in 1816, Emperor Kōkaku understood that Ryukyu had only 36 islands and that the Diaoyu Islands were Chinese islands on the way from China to Ryukyu.

According to the foreword to the 1934 edition of *An Illustrated Account of the Three Countries,* "Our sage Mr. Shihei Hayashi's wisdom is beyond our words. He made great contributions to Japan's relations with other countries. In the Japanese Kaei Era (1848–1854), the Ogasawara Islands were alleged to be discovered by the United States and an application was filed to make them the territory of the US. The Tokugawa Shogunate racked its mind to overrun this allegation. However, in the fall of the fifth years of the Tenmei Era (1785), the Edo Shorin Suwaraya Ichibee Publishing House in Tokyo published *An Illustrated Account of the Three Countries* and the book was translated into German by German scholar Kulaci Kalaocituo and French by French scholar Ranieri Lanihei and the German and French versions were published. When Japan learned the news, it showed the books to the US Minister Counselor as evidence of Japan's ownership of the islands. As a result, the United States didn't occupy the islands and established the islands Japanese territory. *An Illustrated Account of the Three Countries* was written by Shihei Hayashi. Had it not been for his book, the Ogasawara Islands should have been occupied by the United States. The Japanese must remember this contribution made by Mr. Shihei Hayashi and thank him for it. Before this, *An Illustrated Account of the Three Countries* had been presented to Emperor Kōkaku in the Tenmei Era. When the news of the emperor's review of the book was reported, Shihei Hayashi was pleased so that he invited his friends to dinner to celebrate the occasion"[22] (see Fig. 4.23).

The abovementioned historical document proves that in the early nineteenth century Emperor Kōkaku reviewed Shihei Hayashi's *An Illustrated Account of the Three Countries,* not only understanding that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to China but also failing to raise objections to Shihei Hayashi coloring both Diaoyu Island China's Fujian Province red. In addition, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs used *An Illustrated Account of the Three Countries* as an important international law basis for seizing the Ogasawara Islands, but now it says that Shihei Hayashi wasn't aware of territory and tries everything in its power to downgrade the value of his book as historical evidence. This is purely contradictory pragmatism and the more Japan tries to cover up, the better-known it will become. The views of Li Woteng and some Japanese scholars in this regard are untenable.

Further historical research has to be conducted on the details concerning *An Illustrated Account of the Three Countries* being translated into French and banned by the Tokugawa Shogunate. The key information revealed by the book alone shows that the book was not liked by the Tokugawa Shogunate. This is because the book not only used the Chinese names of the Diaoyu Islands and included them in

[22]Shihei Hayashi, *An Illustrated Account of the Three Countries,* Jpn. ed., 1924, p. 69.


叙覧三國通覧圖說出板小言

前哲林子平先生の活眼達識なるは今更小子等の繁說を要せざる所也、殊に對外關係に於ては日本帝國の大恩人と稱すべきなり、嘉永年中米國より小笠原島は先年米國人の發見に係るが故に、米國の領地たるべき旨を申込まれたるに、德川幕府は之が反證を擧くるに苦慮したり、然るに天明五年秋江戸書林須原屋市兵衛出板、三國通覧圖說を獨逸人クラプロツト氏、佛蘭西人クラープロート氏等が彼の國語に翻譯して出板せるを聞き、之を取り求め證據物件として、米國公使に示されたるが故に、米國之を施すこと能はず永く小笠原島は日本國の屬島たる事を確定したり、而してその三國通覧圖說は實に林子平先生の著述なり、若し先生のこの著述なくは小笠原島は遂に米國の占領する所となりしならん、日本人は子平先生の恩を深く記憶して謝せざるべからず、これより先き天明年中三國通覧圖說が世に

光格天皇の叡覧に供せられしとの報達するや、子平先生喜悦限りなく、知友を招ぎ祝宴を催したりとて藤塚知明の一子忡之進に手簡を遣りたる文に、

Fig. 4.23 Preface to the 1924 edition of *An Illustrated Account of the Three Countries*

the scope of China's Fujian Province but also places of the Ryukyu Kingdom outside of Japan. The book holds that China had greater influence over Ryukyu than Japan and Takeshima (also called Dokdo Island by the Republic of Korea) as a Korean island.

However, Shihei Hayashi was punished at first mainly because he questioned Matsumae Shogunate's rule of Ezo (the former name of Hokkaido) and was opposed to its obscurantist policy. In 1792, Shihei Hayashi criticized the Shogunate's policy. As a result, his book was banned. However, neither then Shogunate government nor the future Meiji government expressed opposition to the abovementioned stand expressed in Shihei Hayashi's book. If the Shogunate didn't think the Diaoyu Islands belong to China, it should have uttered its position. However, as a matter of fact, the Japanese government not only failed to issue a statement in regard to this issue but also excluded the Diaoyu Islands from the Miyako Islands and the Yaeyama Islands it planned to refer to China in return for its support for Japan's annexation of Ryukyu. This also shows that from 1785 through 1880, the Japanese government gave tacit consent to the Diaoyu Islands belonging to China or still didn't understand the issue.

Shihei Hayashi's map wasn't never what he had imagined. The map was based on Xu Baoguang's *Record of Messages from Chûzan* and the maps and documents of Japan. For example, in the Map of Japan in the Genroku Era: the Map of the Miyako Islands of the Ryukyu Kingdom compiled by the Japanese Shogunate in 1702, it is specified that Kume Island marked the southwestern maritime boundary of the Ryukyu Kingdom and that Yonaguni Island of the Yaeyama Islands marked the southwesternmost boundary of Ryukyu, not including the Diaoyu Islands.[23] A further example is that in the *Q&A regarding Ryukyu* published in Satsuma han (today's Kagoshima Prefecture) in 1738, there is a question about the territory of the Ryukyuan King and provides the answer as follows: "The territory under the Ryukyuan rule included Chûzan, Nanzan, Hokuzan, and 36 islands including the Yaeyama Islands and Yonaguni Island in the south, the Kikai Island in the north, the Kume Island in the west, and the Ikei Island Tsuken Island in the east."[24] This shows that the Diaoyu Islands were not within the scope of rule by the Ryukyu Kingdom. When Shihei Hayashi wrote *An Illustrated Account of the Three Countries* in 1785, he of course would not ignore the abovementioned Japanese documents and maps. The relevant maps published in Japan after Shihei Hayashi do not mark the Diaoyu Islands as part of the Ryukyu Kingdom either.

3. *The maps compiled by Ren Yamada and others from 1810 to 1854 fully prove that Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet belong to China, not Ryukyu.*

(1) In the sixth year of the Japanese Bunka Era, Keho Takahashi produced the Sketch Map of Japan's Boundary, which was one of the most representative and accurate maps of Japan at that time. In the map, Ryukyu does not include the Diaoyu Islands and marks today's Sea of Japan as the Sea of Korea (see Fig. 4.24).

Japan maintains that it is hard to prove that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to Japan before 1895, but that doesn't mean they belong to China, and it was possible that they were *terra nullius* unless China produces the evidence of its ownership of the islands before 1895. As a matter of fact, these types of evidence can be found here and there not only in ancient Chinese documents and maps but also in Japanese maps in addition to the abovementioned documents and maps compiled from 1854 through 1894.

(2) The relevant Japanese maps compiled from 1810 to 1854 clearly specify that the Diaoyu Islands belong to China, not the Ryukyu Kingdom. The Japanese maps produced in that period show that Japan was keenly aware that which island belonged to China and Ryukyu.

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[23]Map of Okinawa, Jpn. ed., in Zheng Hailin, *The Diaoyu Islands: History and Legality* (latest revised edition), Revised and enlarged Chin. ed., Beijing: China Ocean Press; 2014, p. 208.

[24]Kazuyoshi Tokunaga, *Research on Satsuma han's Foreign Relations*, Jpn. ed., p. 358, in Tadayoshi Murata, *Approaching the Diaoyu Islands Issue from the Perspective of Historical Archives*, Chinese translation by Wei Pinghe et al., Beijing: China Social Sciences Academic Press, 2013, p. 53.



Fig. 4.24 Keho Takahashi, Sketch Map of Japan's Boundary, 1809, not including the Diaoyu Islands

For example, in the seventh year the Japanese Bunka Era (1810), the Japanese drawing expert Ren Yamada produced the World Map (Asia and America). The map clearly specifies the island of China and Ryukyu, with the Diaoyu Islands being marked as Chinese islands. This map and the abovementioned the Sketch Map of Japan's Boundary which was published in 1809 are believed to be most important and accurate maps at the time. Ren Yamada's map is more characteristic in marking the Diaoyu Islands as part of China and is therefore more important. The map has long attracted the attention of relevant researchers. For example, Han Deyuan, Zheng Hailin, and other relevant researchers cited this map in their books and stated that the map clearly specifies the locations of Diaoyutai, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet, which belong to China. They are correct, but the words on the map they attached were illegible so that the readers can hardly make their own decisions about these maps. In order that the readers may be able to make their own judgments, I have hereby attached an amplified part of the map (see Fig. 4.25).

The Japanese scholar Nozomu Ishii attached an amplified version of the map to his *Tips for Japan's Refutation of China's View on the Senkaku Islands* (*Diaoyu Islands*) *Issue* along with 15 to carefully selected maps, in order to prove that Diaoyutai had long been included in the maps of Japan and that it was the Japanese who were the first to name these islands. However, this backfired. It was just like an own goal in a football match. This own goal nullified all the arguments of the book.



Fig. 4.25 Ren Yamada, the World Map (Asia and America), 1810, specifying the Diaoyu Islands as part of China

The way the map was compiled suggests that Diaoyutai, Huangwei Islet, Chiwei Islet, and other islands, just like the islands of Taiwan and Fujian Province, are all colored dark green, marked with a triangle, and written in vertical Chinese characters, which clearly indicates that they are within Chinese territory. In contrast, Kume Island, Miyako Island, Ishigaki Island, Yonaguni Island, and other islands of Ryukyu, just like the main islands of Ryukyu, are all colored dull red, marked with different shapes and written in a different way inclined to the right mingled with Japanese katakana, showing that these islands belonged to the Ryukyu Kingdom. All this fully demonstrates that then most authoritative mapping expert confirmed that the Diaoyu Islands were affiliated with Taiwan, China. All relevant maps back then didn't include the so-called Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands).

(3) The World Map (Asia and America) compiled by Ren Yamada, in 1810, does not stand alone as evidence. On the contrary, it reflects Japan's mainstream opinion that the ownership of islands of China and Ryukyu. Bisei Yamazaki believed that "the Ryukyu Kingdom was an island nation in Japan's Southern Oceans," but even in his Map of Ryukyu in his *Tribute from Ryukyu* in 1850, he clearly circled the islands of Ryukyu while drawing a circle above Chinese islands such as Huaping Island, Pengjia Island, Diaoyutai, Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet to indicate the difference. In the map, Diaoyutai had not been renamed Diaoyu Island (see Fig. 4.26).

(4) In 1854, Japan published the Complete Map of China. A note says that the map was compiled based on Chinese documents and included Taiwan, Jilong, Penghua (膨化 which has the same pronunciation as 膨佳 [Pengjia] in Japanese) Island, Huangwei Islet, Chiwei Islet, and other Chinese island (see Fig. 4.27). This also shows that Japan recognized Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet, islands affiliated with Diaoyu Island, were Chinese territory.

The three abovementioned maps compiled by Japan are basically the same as the map produced by Shihei Hayashi in 1785. This demonstrates that before Japan annexed the Ryukyu Kingdom in 1880, it didn't raise objections to the Diaoyu Islands belonging to China, not Ryukyu. Back then, Japan, the maps produced by the UK, France, Germany, and the USA were mostly named the Diaoyu Islands in the southern Fujian dialect, thus proving that these islands belonged to China.

4. *Before 1879, Japan didn't have Okinawa Prefecture, so it was impossible to own the Diaoyu Islands and the allegation that the so-called Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) are the inherent territory of Japan is false.*

(1) The Complete Map of Japan, the last map of Japan produced by Japan before it forcefully annexed the Ryukyu Kingdom and made the Ryukyu han in 1872, does not include the Ryukyu Islands or the Diaoyu Islands.

(2) In 1872, the Japanese Meiji government renamed the Ryukyu Kingdom Japan's Ryukyu han, marking an important step toward annexing Ryukyu. In the following year, Fumihiko Otsuki, who worked to advocate the annexation of the Ryukyu Kingdom, wrote in the preface to his New Records of Ryukyu, Ryukyu "is not enough to be an independent country and has always been a vassal of imperial



Fig. 4.26 Bisei Yamazaki, Map of Ryukyu, 1850, marking Diaoyu Island as Chinese territory



Fig. 4.26 (continued)

Japan. Ming China appointed the kings of Chûzan who used China's calendar and Japanese eras. Ryukyu was affiliated with both China and Japan. It seems that it is hard to tell which country it belongs to…. In terms of terrain, Ryukyu is an extension of the mountain range of Kyushu into the southern seas."[25]

Fumihiko Otsuki tried to prove that Ryukyu should belong to Japan in terms of race and language. However, even the Complete Map of the Ryukyu Islands in his New Records of Ryukyu does not include the Diaoyu Islands or the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands).

(3) In the sixth year of the Meiji Era (1873), the Japanese Navy's Waterways Department compiled the Map of the Ryukyu Islands, which served as the military map of Japan. The map, based on on-the-spot mapping and surveying and repeated confirmation, represented the highest level of map compilation in Japan and the position of the Japanese government. The map didn't include the Diaoyu Islands in the Ryukyu Islands (see Fig. 4.28).

(4) In the eighth year of the Meiji Era (1875), a color map issued by Japan included the World Map and the National Map of Japan didn't include the Diaoyu Islands in the section of the Ryukyu Islands. At that time, Japan had already forcefully renamed the Ryukyu Kingdom Japan's Ryukyu han. In 1879, it renamed

[25]Yin Mengxia, Jia Guirong, and Wang Guan (eds.), *Continued Edition of the Materials about Ryukyu at the National Library of China*, vol. 1, Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Publishing House, 2002, p. 671.



Fig. 4.27 Complete Map of China (details), 1854, including China's Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet

the han Okinawa Prefecture, marking the complete annexation of Ryukyu (see Fig. 4.29).

(5) In the eighth year of the Meiji Era (1875), the *Geographical Annals of Japan* was issued with the approval of the Japanese government. The book had basically the same description of the territory of the Ryukyu Kingdom as Xu Baoguang's *Record of Messages from Chûzan*. The book clearly stated that "Yonaguni Island is



Fig. 4.28 Japanese Navy, the Map of the Ryukyu Islands, 1873, not including the Diaoyu Islands

in the westernmost of the Ryukyu Islands and stands opposite to Taiwan." And the Map of the Southern Islands in the book didn't include the Diaoyu Islands (see Fig. 4.30).

(6) The *Geographical Annals of Ryukyu* written by Sunmyon Nakane in 1875 was an official geography book issued by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture (see Fig. 4.31).

Based on the illustrations of the Japanese Ministry of the Navy, the author made detail records of the area, number of households, and population of all the islands, villages and towns within the scope of Ryukyu. It even recorded the submerged reefs. In the preface to the Chinese version of the book, it was stated, "Never before has any book about Ryukyu been so accurate and provided information about the islands in such details."[26] The book's "appendix "The Illustrations of the Japanese Ministry of the Navy says that the Yaeyama Islands and Miyako Islands, generally known as the Sakishima Islands, are located southeast of Taiwan. People have to go through these islands on their voyage to Fujian and Guangdong. There will be no

[26]Ibid., p. 638.



Fig. 4.29 World Map and the National Map of Japan (details), 1875, not including the Diaoyu Islands

Fig. 4.30 *Geographical Annals of Japan*, edited by Tomekichi Okukawa and distributed by Goshobou, 1875, not including the Diaoyu Islands


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Fig. 4.31 Sunmyon Nakane, *Geographical Annals of Ryukyu,* 1875

more islands in the vast sea for hundreds of miles beyond these two islands following the departure from Naha."[27]

(7) The Map of the Ryukyu Islands in *Pocket-Sized Maps* didn't include the Diaoyu Islands (see Fig. 4.32).

(8) The section on the Ryukyu Islands in the Complete Map of Japan published in Japan in the ninth year of the Meiji Era (1876) didn't include the Diaoyu Islands either (see Fig. 4.33).

(9) The Complete Map of Japan, produced by the Japanese Army's Chief of Staff Bureau in the tenth year of the Meiji Era (1877), didn't include the Diaoyu Islands or the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) either (see Fig. 4.34) This represented the official position of Japan.

This map was compiled by Nobuaki Kimura, then the major of the Japanese Army and drawn by map section chief Nobuo Shibue. According to a report by the *Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun* on September 5 of the 14th year of the Meiji Era (1881),

[27]Shuku Nakane, *Geographical Annals of Ryukyu, Jpn. ed., Chinese translation by Yao Wendong, in* Yin Mengxia, Jia Guirong, and Wang Guan (eds.), *Continued Edition of the Materials about Ryukyu at the National Library of China*, vol. 1, Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Publishing House, 2002, p. 659.

Fig. 4.32 Map of the Ryukyu Islands, *Pocket-Sized Maps* (details), 1876, not including the Diaoyu Islands

Nobuaki Kimura was jailed for compiling the maps of Annals of Geography for the book *Record of Japan* written by Huang Zunxian, China's counselor to Japan. He was charged with the crime of leaking Japanese military secrets. People involved in this "committed suicide" for reasons known. In fact, this was a wrong case. This shows that the Japanese government attached great importance to maps. Just as the Chief of the General Staff Oyama Iwao during the Russo-Japanese War, "Maps serve as the foundation of plans and are valuable instruments of war."[28] Back then, the Japanese Army stressed that its officers and soldiers would rather give up their life than their maps.

Since 1883, map production has been monopolized by the armed forces. On August 6, 1884, Aritomo Yamagata, Chief of the General Staff of the Japanese Army, issued a document demanding the Japanese Army establish a bureau in charge of map production. The Army Ministry of Japan set up the Surveying Bureau in September of the same year, and the Land Surveying Department was created in 1888.[29]

(10) In the tenth year of the Meiji Era (1877), Sadaka Ijichi, an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who had worked to make Ryukyu a prefecture, wrote

[28]*History of the Land Surveying Department*, Jpn. ed., pp. 184–186. Wshigoe Kuniaki (Li Guozhao): *Secret Surveying for Secret Maps for External Military Purposes*, Jpn. ed., Tokyo: Dojidai Sha, 2009, pp. 56–57.

[29]Wshigoe Kuniaki 9Li Guozhao): *Secret Surveying for Secret Maps for External Military Purposes*, Jpn. ed., Tokyo: Dojidai Sha, 2009, pp. 38.



Fig. 4.33 Complete Map of Japan and details, 1876, not including the Diaoyu Islands



Fig. 4.34 Japanese Army's Chief of Staff Bureau, the Complete Map of Japan, 1877, not including the Diaoyu Islands

the *Annals of Okinawa Prefecture*. The Complete Map of the Miyako Islands and the Yaeyama Islands in the book didn't include Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, Chiwei Islet, and other islands (see Fig. 4.35).



Fig. 4.35 Sadaka Ijichi, Map, *Annals of Okinawa Prefecture*, 1877, not including the Diaoyu Islands

The reason why Sadaka Ijichi wrote the *Annals of Okinawa Prefecture* was to ensure that Japan thoroughly annexed the Ryukyu Kingdom. If Diaoyu Island belonged to Ryukyu, the *Annals of Okinawa Prefecture* should not have missed it. The problem is whether Sadaka Ijichi knew that Diaoyu Island was there. The answer given by the *Annals of Okinawa Prefecture* was that he did not and in the book he cited the following passage from Chinese deputy envoy Xu Baoguang's *Record of Messages from Chûzan*: According to *A Grand Maritime Guide*, "A maritime route from Fuzhou to Ryukyu starts from Min'an Town and moves all the way to Naha via Wuhumen, Dongshawai, Jilongtou (Ijichi's note: Taiwan), Huaping Islet, Pengjia Island, Diaoyutai, Huangwei Islet, Chiwei Islet, Gumi Island, and Machi" (see Fig. 4.36).

This shows that Sadaka Ijichi, an official of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs who was in charge of taking over Ryukyu, was keenly aware of the record of the Diaoyu Islands in ancient Chinese documents. Therefore, in his *Annals of Okinawa Prefecture*, he recorded Gumi Island Machi Island (the Kerama Islands) as the Ryukyu Islands, but he didn't include the Diaoyu Islands as the Ryukyu Islands. The *Annals of Okinawa Prefecture* still used the Chinese names for Diaoyutai, Huangwei Islet, Chiwei Islet, and other Chinese islands and didn't use the Japanese names such as the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands), Uotsuri Island, Kuba Island, and Kume Aka Island. The *Annals of Okinawa Prefecture* was a detailed book written by a Japanese official about Okinawa proves to some extent that the Diaoyu Islands are islands affiliated with Taiwan, China. In the Complete Meiji Map of Roads, Tokuzi Haruta didn't even mark the Miyako Islands and the Yaeyama Islands as Japanese islands in the section on the Ryukyu Island. It was more likely to mark the Diaoyu Islands as Japanese (see Fig. 4.37).



Fig. 4.36 Sadaka Ijichi, *Annals of Okinawa Prefecture*, 1877, not including the Diaoyu Islands



Fig. 4.37 Tokuzi Haruta, the Grand Map of Meiji-Era Japan, 1879, not including the Sakishima Islands

4.4 The Japanese Navy Admitted China's Sovereignty Over the Diaoyu Islands During the 1874–1894

1. *In the Map of Coastal Provinces of the Qing Dynasty drawn by the Japanese Ministry of the Navy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1875, islands affiliated with Taiwan such as Diaoyu Islet, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet were clearly marked as Chinese territory.*

The map was compiled under the leadership of Narayoshi Yanagi who was believed to be "the father of waterway measuring in Japan" and "the pioneer of maritime measuring in Japan." Yanagi was the forerunner in measuring in the Japanese Navy. He served as chief of the Japanese Navy's Maritime Bureau, was promoted to be rear admiral, became the first chief of the Waterways Department of the Japanese Navy in 1886, and became a member of the Japanese House of Peers. From October 1872 to September 1876, the Japanese Navy's Waterways Department was called the Japanese Navy's Waterways Department which was mainly in charge of measuring sea routes, producing maritime maps, and collecting and providing relevant hydrometeorological information for the Japanese Navy. At present, this work is done by Japan Coast Guard's Marine Intelligence Unit.

The Map of Coastal Provinces of the Qing Dynasty was compiled by Hidekatsu Taishun and Yonosuke Ishikawa in 1875 as ordered by the Japanese government. The map included Diaoyu Islet, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet in Chinese territory and used their Chinese names, not their Japanese names. This is evidence that the competent department of the Japanese Navy knew that the Diaoyu Islands

belonged to China before Japanese troops invaded Taiwan in 1874 (see Figs. 4.38 and 4.39).

The note given by officials of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the boxes in the lower middle part of the Map of Coastal Provinces of the Qing Dynasty



Fig. 4.38 Map of Coastal Provinces of the Qing Dynasty, approved by the Japanese Navy's Waterways Department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1875, including the Diaoyu Islands



Fig. 4.39 Japanese Ministry of the Navy, Map of Coastal Provinces of the Qing Dynasty (details), 1875, including the Diaoyu Islands

proves that the map was a Japanese official map. The map had the highest technology and accuracy Japan could have at the time. The map also includes the streets of Beijing, colors the Forbidden City Chinese red, and even includes the Summer Palace. It is a map of coastal China drawn in 1874 after the Japanese government sent its troops to invade Taiwan for the first time. The map also has blue squares which are marked with the so-called a city where Japanese generals, counselors, and desk officers were stationed. To make it easier for the English readers, the note of the map has been amplified and translated into English (see Fig. 4.40).

The main idea of the note by the Setugan Kono from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is as follows: The original map was compiled by the Japanese Navy's Waterways Department, but those who are familiar with the Chinese land–sea situations insist that it included only 13 ports such as Shanghai and Zhenjiang while missing the ports of Qiongzhou and Danshui. In response, the Japanese Foreign Minister ordered Setugan Kono to add them to the map in accordance with the treaties and contracts. Based on my investigations and surveys, I added the two ports. I published them for comments and suggestions, and nobody raised any objections. I hereby submit this map and others to the government for future use.

In addition to this important information, the map has on its left corner an important note (similar to the preface of a book) about the importance and basis of


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明治八年乙亥十二月

外務權少錄 河野雪巖識

Fig. 4.40 Confirmation made by Setugan Kono from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Map of Coastal Provinces of the Qing Dynasty

the map. The full text was written in Chinese characters by then Major Narayoshi Yanagi of the Japanese Navy. The main idea of the text is as follows:

> To travel by sea or by land, one has to have maps. Maps help a lot. My country is separated from the Qing Dynasty by only a stretch of water and we engage each other for commercial, military and friendship purposes. We have investigated its geographical situation and Japan has drawn many maps of the Qing Dynasty, but most of them are based on rough calculation and are not accurate in terms of longitude and latitude. We feel sorry for that. We now have obtained a British Map of the Coastal Region of the Qing Dynasty, the Qing Map of the Qing Dynasty (which was drawn in the 2nd year of the reign of Emperor Tongzhi, so the names of prefectures and counties, rivers and posts etc. are basically the same as today), and the Chinese translation of the English book on Sino-British trade (the book appeared after 1863 and includes maps of all ports along the coast and rivers. The book is bilingual and quite convenient). The book is rare as it provides accurate longitude and latitude of places and keeps a detailed account of events. The Qing map takes Beijing as zero degrees while the British map says it is at long. 116° 25′E. The two are basically the same. So we immediately ordered the Second Map Department to replace the English with Chinese characters on the British map in addition to making corrections where necessary. The Qing Map of the Qing Dynasty and the book on Sino-British trade were combined into a map. As the Qing Dynasty has vast territory with large winding rivers and networks of tributaries. So we cannot record all of them; we focus on main rivers only…. This will serve to have a rough idea of the Qing Dynasty, so it is compiled and printed to help with travels by sea and land (see Fig. 4.41).


清國沿海省誌

涉海必要海圖跋陸必需地圖有之則成無之則已圖之用又大矣本邦與清國僅隔一海水耳言商言兵又結交誼自先審其土地山川之形勢始而本邦從來雖有數艘之清國圖大抵皆出臆度而經緯位置審當者絕無有常以爲憾焉今者偶得英人所著清國沿海圖清人所編大清一統圖此圖之據係同治二年故侍郎胡林翼所撰大河之移徙與江目今形勢無異及今大河中有開市港處皆陸水路誌其名稱大半八百六十三年後之撰而沿海其體裁英文中以漢語譯之便之書也此圖書也經緯方邊記事頗密皆當今之務有焉者而一統圖以北京爲零度者較之英國則大約得東經一百十六度二十五分以之推之大抵無大異同於是急命製圖編集二課今盡刪除英語換以漢字且參酌校訂補英圖之所不足以一統圖及通商事情誌別作一圖益清國土壤之廣長江大河經長蜒蜿支河細流茂密如織不堪一一而記之者專存其幹而後及其支其他如名稱則省作▣廳作▣直隸州作▣散州作▣縣作●駅站作▲將軍都督參贊領隊辦事大臣所駐之城作■城守尉以下所駐之堡鎮作・開市港作□之大者以區之蓋足以知其大畧而已編畫已成因命之銅鋟欲以補卿之所謂海陸必需之用云爾

海軍大佐兼水路權頭柳楠悦誌

Fig. 4.41 Japanese Navy Major Narayoshi Yanagi, note, Map of Coastal Provinces of the Qing Dynasty

What Narayoshi Yanagi said above proves that the map drawn by the Japanese Navy in 1875 was Japan's first accurate military map of coastal China designed to be used by the Japanese Navy and Army. The reason why this map was produced was that Japan didn't have accurate maps of China. The map was compiled by the Japanese Navy based on the British map of coastal China, the Map of the Qing Dynasty drawn in the second year of the reign of Qing Emperor (1863) and other important Chinese and British documents. It should be noted that in accordance with the Chinese map, the map replaced the English names of the Chinese islands with their Chinese names. This made it possible to have accurate names of islands and made up the deficiency of the British map.

This Japanese official map wasn't a pure translation of the British map, but was based on the study of many other maps and was eventually drawn by the professionals from the Japanese Ministry of the Navy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, so the map definitely represented the official position of the Japanese government. This is enough to prove that in 1875, the Japanese government recognized that the Diaoyu Islands were affiliated with China's Taiwan Prefecture in its northeast. In the same period, the Japanese official maps of Ryukyu didn't include the Diaoyu Islands.

The map drawn by the Japanese Navy's Waterways Department was to serve Japan's military need to invade Taiwan. The map was based on relevant geographical information from the British Navy's documents translated by Narayoshi Yanagi in 1873 and his book *The Taiwan Sea Directory.* The map was also made possible by Japan's mastery of the accurate names of the Diaoyu Islands from the 1863 Map of the Qing Dynasty. Had it not been for this, Japan would not have been able to produce such an accurate map.

It may be worth noting that when the Map of the Qing Dynasty, as proved by the Japanese Navy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was revised and published in 1877, Diaoyu Islet was renamed Hai-Pin-San (see Fig. 4.42).

Since then, Japan had been messing about the names of the islands, causing confusion in these names, in order to profit from the confusion. In 1885, the document of the Japanese Interior Ministry about Japan's secret survey of Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet referred to these islands, respectively as Uotsuri Island, Kuba Island and Kume Aka Island. Japan called Diaoyu Island Koba Island from 1891 to 1894. After Japan began its colonial rule of Taiwan, it began to refer to Diaoyu Island as Uotsuri Island, which is still in use today. Since 1920, Japan has been calling Chiwei Islet Taisho Island.

2. *From 1873 to 1894 when the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 began, the documents of the Japanese Navy also confirmed that Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet were northeastern islands of Taiwan, not terra nullius or part of the Ryukyu Islands.*

Proof 1 The Japanese Navy translated the Great Britain Hydrographic Dept's *The China Sea Directory* and published *The Taiwan Sea Directory* based on the translation. The book was the first of its kind edited by then Major Narayoshi Yanagi of the Imperial Japanese Navy and published by the Japanese Navy. Both the book and the chart of the British Navy's ship H. M. S. *Samarang* it was based confirmed that the Diaoyu Islands were part of the northeastern island of Taiwan, not *terra nullius*. The names of Diaoyu Island other islands used in the document of the British Navy were based on their pronunciations in the southern Fujian dialect, which were misleading, but that still proved that the Diaoyu Islands were affiliated with Taiwan. In order to help the readers better understand the names used by the British ship and the Japanese Navy, I have made the following table of the names used for the Diaoyu Islands by relevant documents and maps produced by China, Great Britain, and Japan in and around 1874 (see Table 4.1).



Fig. 4.42 Japanese Ministry of the Navy, Map of the Coastal Provinces of the Qing Dynasty, 1877, renaming Diaoyu Island to Hai-Pin-San

Table 4.1 Names used for the Diaoyu Islands by China, Great Britain, and Japan in and around 1874

Names by China	Names by the British Navy	Names by the Japanese Navy (in katakana)	Chinese and Japanese Transliterations of English names (in Chinese characters)
Diaoyu Islet (钓鱼台 Diaoyutai)	Hoa-pin-su (pronunciation for Huaping Islet in the southern Fujian dialect	ホウピンス	甫亚宾斯岛 (和平山)
Huangwei Islet (黄尾屿)	Tia-u-su (pronunciation For Diaoyu Islet in the southern Fujian dialect)	チアウスウ	地亚乌斯岛
Chiwei Islet (赤尾屿)	Raleigh Rock	ラレー岩	剌列宇岩
Nanxiao Island, Beixiao Island (南小岛,北小岛)	Pinnacle Is.		尖头群岛 (凸列岛)
No joint term	No joint term	No joint term	No joint term

Credit Modern documents of China, the UK, and Japan

The so-called 甫亚宾斯岛 (Puyabinsi Island) in *The Taiwan Sea Directory* compiled by Narayoshi Yanagi is the Chinese transliteration of Hoa-pin-su (Huaping Islet) in the southern Fujian dialect, which was mistaken as Diaoyu Island. Also in the book, 地亚乌斯岛 (Diyawusi Island) is the Chinese transliteration of Ti-a-usu (Diaoyu Islet) in the southern Fujian dialect, which was mistaken as Huangwei Islet. In the same book, 剌列字岩 (Laliezi Rock) is the Chinese transliteration of Raleigh Rock, meaning Chiwei Islet. The so-called Pinnacle Is. originally referred to Beixiao Island Nanxiao Island affiliated with Diaoyu Island, was later translated by Japan into the Senkaku Islands (尖頭諸島 or 尖閣諸島), and was not the joint term for the Diaoyu Islands. The so-called Senkaku Islands didn't include Diaoyu Island until after Hisashi Kuroiwa made an on-the-spot survey of the Diaoyu Islands in 1900. After Chiwei Islet was included in the Japanese state-owned land registration in 1921, these islands became the so-called Senkaku Islands including Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, Chiwei Islet, Nanxiao Island, and Beixiao Island.

Pinnacle Is., the English for so-called Senkaku Island, actually refers to Huaping Islet which is close to Taiwan (Wang Dejun translated it into 凸岛 [Tu Island]). Under Senkaku Island, Craig Island means Mianhua Islet, and Agincourt Island Pengjia Islet (see Fig. 4.43).

Proof 2 In 1874, the Imperial Japanese Navy printed *The Southern Islands Sea Directory* written by Narayoshi Yanagi. The book gives a detailed account of the islands and ports of Ryukyu as well as the maritime routes from Hong Kong to Ryukyu. The books said it is dedicated to the Japanese Navy's Waterways Department. It may be interesting that the book didn't include the Diaoyu Islands in the so-called Southern Islands. On the contrary, when it comes to the maritime routes from Hong Kong to Ryukyu, the book says that the Diaoyu Islands had been Chinese islands since the Ming Dynasty. The book was Narayoshi Yanagi, then major of the Japanese Navy and proofread by his colleague Yonosuke Ishikawa of the Japanese Navy's Waterways Department. The book was completed in November 1873 before Japan invaded Taiwan for the first time in 1874. Back then, Japan didn't have an Okinawa Prefecture yet. Some of the contents of the book suggest that Narayoshi Yanagi didn't have a good understanding of Miyako Island in the Yaeyama Islands.

According to the book, before it was completed, Narayoshi Yanagi was ordered to command two warships—the *Daiichi Teibo* Warship and the *Osaka* on a long mission to Ryukyu, inspected the ports of Taiwan he reached, confirmed the longitudes and latitudes of the port and measured the heights of tides.[30] This leads to the conclusion that the book is a collection of the maritime information designed to help the Japanese Navy to thoroughly annex Ryukyu and invade Taiwan. The book discusses the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands as follows:

First, in its "Introduction," the book defines the term "Southern Islands," that is, the present-day Nansei Shoto Islands of Japan. It states that "in our southern seas, there are more than 70 islands extending from southwest to northeast such as Yaeyama

[30]Narayoshi Yanagi, "Introduction," *Southern Islands Sea Directory*, Jpn. ed., the Japanese Navy, 1874, p. 3.



Fig. 4.43 Japanese Navy, *The Taiwan Sea Directory*, 1873, proving that the Diaoyu Islands belong to Taiwan

Island, Miyako Island, Okinawa Island, Amami Island, and Yaku Island. These are generally known as the Southern Islands. Divided into five islands, they are also called the Sakishima Islands, the southern territory of the country. They stand across the sea from Taiwan and are known as the Ryukyu Islands"[31] (see Fig. 4.44).

[31]Ibid., p. 1.



Fig. 4.43 (continued)



Fig. 4.44 Japanese Navy, *The Nansei Shoto Islands Sea Directory,* 1874, not including the Diaoyu Islands

Second, the book describes the Sakishima Islands as follows: They are located at the westernmost end of Japan's Southern Islands and stood across the sea from Taiwan. They were known as the Sakishima Islands among the Westerners and were divided into two districts. The island in the west district is called Yaeyama Island, and the one in east is known as Taiping Island (see Fig. 4.45).

However, this is wrong. The Miyako Islands were not named by the Westerners. They are east of the Yaeyama Islands and together with the Yaeyama Islands, and they were known as the Taiping Islands in ancient China. It is therefore wrong to say that the Miyako Islands include the Yaeyama Islands and the Taiping Islands. Ryukyu was the inherent territory of Japan. As Japan had limited relevant records, the Japanese Navy was bound to make this mistake. This also shows that the mapping and surveying department of the Japanese Navy did not make on-the-spot surveys of the so-called Sakishima Islands.

Although the book contains the names of a number of islands included in the "Southern Islands" or the "Sakishima Islands," it doesn't have the Diaoyu Islands or the so-called Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands). Diaoyu Island is recorded in the book as the island of the people of the Ming Dynasty on the maritime route from Hong Kong to Ryukyu. This indicates that the author's knowledge of Diaoyu Island mainly came from ancient Chinese documents and the records made by the British Navy after 1845.


大日本南島水路誌卷之一

海軍大佐兼水路借頭　柳楢悦編輯

海軍水路寮出仕　石川洋之助參訂

先島總說

先島ハ我南島中ノ至西ニアリテ臺灣島ト對峙ス其廣袤北緯二十四度ニ起リ二十五度六分ニ止リ東經一百二十二度五十五分ニ起リ一百二十五度三十分ニ盡ク西人之ヲ宮古島ト名ク又分ツテ二隔トス西ニアルヲ「パ、ナユンサン」ト云ヒ東ニアルヲ「ダー、ピンサン」ト云フ此等ノ稱何人ノ說ニ的ルヤ更ニ土

黑島
上離島
下離島
波照間島
小濱島
加山島
鳩間島
名垣港
宮良港
宮古諸島

Fig. 4.45 Japanese Navy, *The Southern Islands Sea Directory,* 1874, not including the Diaoyu Islands



Fig. 4.46 Japanese Navy, *The Southern Islands Prime Minister Shō Shōken Sea Directory,* 1874, proving that the Diaoyu Islands belong to China

Third, the author of the book went beyond the Southern Islands to discuss the northeastern islands of Taiwan, China, on the maritime routes. He clearly stated that together with Huaping Islet and Pengjia Island, the Diaoyu Islands had been named by the Chinese in the Ming Dynasty. Here is what he wrote concerning the issue:

"With a southwesterly wind, the ship moving from Hong Kong to Ryukyu would first go through the Taiwan Strait, do its best to avoid the three islands of Huaping Islet, Mianhua Islet and Pengjia Islet north of Taiwan (these three islands are connected by reefs, are exposed to drastic torrents, and tides change a lot nearby) and choose a route with less hindrance. After moving through north of what the people of the Ming Dynasty called Pengjia, Diaoyutai, Huangwei, and Chiwei islets, the ship would move toward Kume Island, shift to travel eastward, travel through north or south of the island, and move through north or south of the Kerama Islands before reaching Naha."[32] (see Fig. 4.46).

A question should be verified: Did Japan recognize Taiwan as part of China before 1874? It is still held today that, "In 1873, Japan still believed that Chinese rule was limited to the west bank of Taiwan Island. It wasn't until after the Botan

[32]Narayoshi Yanagi, *Southern Islands Sea Directory*, Jpn. ed., the Japanese Navy, 1874, p. 18.

Tribe Incident took place that Japan recognized China's sovereignty over the whole of Taiwan."[33] The implied meaning is that Japan had not recognized the eastern part of Taiwan as part of China by 1873, so it hadn't recognized the Diaoyu Islands in the eastern part of Taiwan as part of China. This strange logic seems to be copied from theory behind Japan's first invasion of Taiwan in 1874.

Because the Qing government blamed Taiwan as a civilized area, Japan carried out its first armed invasion of Taiwan in 1874. In fact, even if Japan's excuse for invading Taiwan was correct, a closer look at the Map of the Coastal Provinces of the Qing Dynasty will reveal that the area in and around Yilan County was not uncivilized. Back then, when Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Taneomi Soejima told the Japanese military about its invasion of Taiwan, "There are three things we need to consider. First, foreign countries have long been coveting Taiwan. Second, the Qing government has only half of it, but it claims have all of it under its control. Third, the uncivilized people in Taiwan are militant and fear no death. I would like use foreign relations to solve these three problems before you take this area to defend the south gate of Japan."[34] Soon afterward Toshimichi Okubo formulated the Policy for Handling Savage Area of Taiwan, stating, "The uncivilized tribes in Taiwan are beyond the reach of the Qing government…. The people of our domain Ryukyu were murdered by them, the government of the Empire of Japan is obliged to revenge their murder."[35]

However, the following remarks made by E. P. Smith, the American adviser to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs proves that long before this, Japan had recognized that Taiwan as part of China. In 1874, Smith didn't want Japan to invade Taiwan for the reasons as follows: Even if Japanese nationals lived in Taiwan in 1620, it should not invade Taiwan. Over the past 200 years, Japan has been recognizing Taiwan as Chinese territory and Taiwan has been part of Chinese territory. China says that its political and educational policies do not affect Taiwan, but it will never give up its jurisdiction over the region. If Japan wants to solve the sovereignty issue over Ryukyu, it can take advantage of the current Taiwan incident.[36]

It may be worth noting that *The Southern Islands Sea Directory* was printed in 1874 when Japan invaded Taiwan for the first time. Suppose Japan believed that the Diaoyu Islands were *terra nullius*, it could immediately proclaim it had occupied them and incorporated into Japanese territory. However, *The Southern Islands Sea*

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[33]Li Woteng, *Whose Is Diaoyutai? History and Legality*, Chin. ed., Taipei: Wu-Nan Book Company Ltd., 2014, p. 101.

[34]Te Ene, "Ambassador Taneomi Soejima's China Policy," in Tang Zhongnan, Wang Miao, Qiang Guo, and Han Wenjuan (eds.), *The Rise and Fall of the Empire of Japan*, Chin. ed., Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2005, vol. 1, p. 282.

[35]*Documents of Toshimichi Okubo*, 1874, vol. 5, p. 343, in Tang Zhongnan, Wang Miao, Qiang Guo, and Han Wenjuan (eds.), *The Rise and Fall of the Empire of Japan*, Chin. ed., Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2005, vol. 12, p. 285.

[36]*Files on Uncivilized Areas*, vol. 1, handwritten copy, collected at the Taipei National Central Library Taiwan Branch, pp. 78–79.

Directory written by Major Narayoshi Yanagi of the Japanese Navy once again confirmed that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to China, not Japan or the ancient Ryukyu Kingdom, and Japan didn't view it as *terra nullius*.

This fully proves that before Japanese troops invaded Taiwan for the first time in 1874, the international community, including Japan, recognized Taiwan as Chinese territory. After the Japanese Navy translated and published *The Taiwan Sea Directory*, the Japanese government naturally knew that the Diaoyu Islands had confirmed as the islands of Taiwan, China. Not only did Japan fail to raise objections, but it also written *The Southern Islands Sea Directory* based on this. This at least means that the Japanese government had given tacit consent to the Diaoyu Islands being affiliated with Taiwan, China.

Proof 3 In March 1886, the Japanese Navy's Waterways Department wrote *The Japan Sea Directory* (vol. 1, part 2). Chapter Ten of the book has records of the Diaoyu Islands. According to the introduction to the book, the book borrowed from *The China Sea Directory*. Some the records of the Diaoyu Islands came from *Illustrated Sea Directory*, a translation by Wang Dejun. *The Japan Sea Directory* was compiled based on the *China Sea Directory* published by the Great Britain Hydrographic Department in 1884 as well as relevant materials from China.

The abovementioned evidences all prove that no later than 1884 Japan acquired an understanding that British documents included the Diaoyu Islands in the northeastern islands of Taiwan as Chinese territory. However, the Japanese government didn't raise objections to this. This is to say, before the Japanese government sent people to the Diaoyu Islands for secret surveys in 1885, it had a full understanding of the British Navy's confirmation that the Diaoyu Islands were the northeastern islands of Taiwan. Until the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, when Japan stole the Diaoyu Islands, the Japanese Meiji government had been insisting on occupying these islands as uninhabited islands, not as *terra nullius*. As they were uninhabited, signs of Chinese rule would be hard to be found there, but this should not serve as the reason for the "legal" occupation of them.

Li Woteng could not but admit that the historical documents of the British Navy are favorable to China, but he claimed that this was insufficient evidence, trying to overrun the evidence in accordance with the principle of insufficient evidence. After that, he arbitrarily stated without good reason that, "Either in the eyes of the people of China and other countries, Taiwan didn't include Diaoyutai; everyone agreed with that. This is why before 1895, there was no evidence that Diaoyutai was an island administratively affiliated with Taiwan."[37] In fact, however, from 1845 through 1894, the official maritime documents and maps of China, the UK, and Japan all included the Diaoyu Islands as northeastern islands of Taiwan.

Proof 4 In the 23rd year of the Meiji Era (1890), the Japanese Navy's Waterways Department translated the Great Britain Hydrographic Dept's *The China Sea*

[37]See Footnote 33.

Directory to compile the book *The Shina Sea Directory*. In this book, the Index of Volume 1 of *The Shina Sea Directory* includes a map of coastal China from Hong Kong to Liaoning Province, which contains the Diaoyu Islands (see Fig. 4.47).



Fig. 4.47 Japanese Navy, *The Shina Sea Directory,* 1890, including the Diaoyu Islands



Fig. 4.47 (continued)

3. *The 1892 edition of The Shina Sea Directory of the Japanese Navy continued to include in Chinese territory Chiwei Islet as the easternmost island of Taiwan's northeastern islands, proving that the Diaoyu Islands belong to China.*

In the 25th year of the Meiji Era (1892), the Japanese Navy published another edition of *The Shina Sea Directory*. When it came to the Diaoyu Islands, the book changed the Chinese-character transliterations of the Diaoyu Islands into katakana. The new edition also proves that from 1845 when the British warship H. M. S. *Samarang* made a survey of China's Diaoyu Islands to 1894 when the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 broke out, the British and Japanese governments had always viewed the Diaoyu Islands as part of the northeastern islands of Taiwan, China, and believed that they had nothing to do Japan or the Ryukyu Kingdom. This is another important evidence of China's ownership of the Diaoyu Islands before the critical date.

According to the island table "Taiwan Island Its Northeastern Islands" in the 1892 edition of *The Shina Sea Directory*, Raleigh Rock (Chiwei Islet) is located at lat. 25° 55′N and long. 124° 33′E and Hoa-pin-su Island (Diaoyu Island) is situated at lat. 25° 47′N and long. 123° 28′E (see Fig. 4.48).

In the British Navy's document Hoa-pin-su, the southern Fujian dialect pronunciation for Huaping Islet, was mistaken as Diaoyu Island, and in 1870 Hoa-pin-su was translated as Hai-Pin-San. This is why some Japanese documents



名地	位置	緯北	經東
臺灣島及臺灣北東諸島			
滬尾嶼 ..... Formosa island	澎湖島(Sawo)嶼	34° 35′ 28″	121° 49′ 27″
サマサナ嶼 ..... Samasana island	.....	22 40 0	121 28 0
ラレー礁 ..... Raleigh rock	.....	25 55 0	124 33 0
ホアピンスー嶼 ..... Hoa-pin-su island	釣島	25 47 7	123 28 0

Fig. 4.48 Island table, 1892 edition of Japanese Navy's *The Shina Sea Directory*

referred to Diaoyu Island as Hai-Pin-San, but the abovementioned islands have the same longitudes and latitudes as the Diaoyu Islands. When it came to the Diaoyu Islands as part of the northeastern islands of Taiwan, the Japanese Navy's 1892 edition of *The Shina Sea Directory* was mainly based on the information from British warship H. M. S. *Samarang* and from China. The relevant texts from *The Shina Sea Directory* are as follows:

> Hoa-pin-su and the Pinnacle Group (Diaoyu Island as well as Nanxiao Island and Beixiao Island).
>
> Hoa-pin-su (it is actually Diaoyu Island) is 3 *ri* (1 *ri* equals 3.9273 km) in diameter and is located at lat. 25° 47′N and long. 123° 30′E in the north.[38] The summit of the island is 1811 feet above the sea. The south side of the island is steep, with the cliff coming right down westward from the northwest of the summit. This leads the terrain to incline eastward. There are numerous streams on the island rainwater gathers in ponds that almost extend to the sea. The ponds are rich in plants and freshwater fish can be found in them. That means there is a supply of freshwater all year round. However, the island is uninhabited and the soil fertility there suggests the land cannot sustain five or six people.
>
> The Pinnacle Group (Nanxiao Island Beixiao Island)… omitted.
>
> Ti-a-usu (it is actually Huangwei Islet)
>
> It is 15 *ri* northeast (slightly to the north) of Hai-Pin-San. It is like a huge red rock with green and white spots. The island is 1.5 or 2 *ri* in diameter. It has an irregular shape and more than half of it consists of black low cliffs. At the corners of the island are round-shaped rocks. The island is about 600 feet high. In addition, there are small hills with different shapes on the northeast beach. The hills are not high, however when you approach the island from the east, the two hills are clearly visible. The short trees in the shrubs are few and scattered.

[38]Huaping Islet is situated at 25° 29′N and 121° 59′E, and its summit is 51 feet above the sea. The longitude and latitude of Huaping Islet given in *The Shina Sea Directory* are actually those of Diaoyu Island.

> Raleigh Rock (it is actually Chiwei Islet)
>
> The rock is 50 *ri* southeast of Tia-u-su Island (Huangwei Islet) and located at lat. 25° 55′N and long. 124° 35′E. The narrow naked rock is 270 feet high and is protruding while its sides are steep as it had been cut so…. Looking in a distance, you may find it like the sail on a Chinese ship.
>
> (Note: In 1861 it was reported the rock and Recruit Island coexisted, but they are actually the same thing.)
>
> Water depth: The bottom was not hit through hand lead sounding 12 *ri* northeast (slightly east) of Raleigh Rock (Chiwei Islet) and it was found to be 150 Japanese fathoms (270 meters, 1 Japanese fathom equals 1.8 meters) deep. The bottom was hit not far east of the rock. The depth of the water close to the island varies a lot from 60 Japanese fathoms (108 meters) to 90 fathoms (162 meters). The sea bottom consists of gray sand, rock or stone. When it is misty, even if hand lead sounding is used to measure the depth of the water, it is hard to know where the ship is.[39] (see Fig. 4.49).

The abovementioned discussion of the Diaoyu Islands as part of the northeastern islands of Taiwan, China, was mainly based on the survey results from the British warship H.M.S. *Samarang*. This could lead to the following conclusions: Until 1892 the Japanese Navy had recorded the Diaoyu Islands as uninhabited islands, proving that there is no factual basis for Tatsushiro Koga's false allegation of having people land on the islands for development purposes in 1884. The Japanese government had become keenly aware from the British Navy's documents that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to China and were not *terra nullius*. Before the critical date of the dispute over the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, the Japanese government had not raise objections to the British Navy's documents confirming that the Diaoyu Islands were part of the northeastern island of Taiwan, and this means it objectively gave tacit consent to China's ownership of the Diaoyu Islands. The Hirobumi Ito cabinet of Japan stole China's Diaoyu Islands by taking advantage of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 in January 1895, which was an in-and-out colonial and imperialist illegal move.

4. *In the 30th year of the Meiji Era (1897) openly published No. 210 chart of the Japanese Navy's Waterways Department, continuing to use to the record of the Diaoyu Islands made in the 1875 Map of the Coastal Provinces of the Qing Dynasty.*

The chart was drawn by Kaneuji Kimotsuki, then Head of the Japanese Navy's Waterways Department. A secret report of the Japanese Interior Ministry in 1894 mentioned this map probably because it was an internal chart of the Waterways Department. The chart wasn't openly published until 1897. The chart is in great details and was probably drawn for the Japanese military's attacks on Taiwan in 1895. It may be worth noting that when the chart was published in 1897, it continued to use the Chinese names for Diaoyu Islet, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet

[39]Japanese Navy's Waterways Department. "Northeastern Islands of Taiwan," *The Shina Sea Directory*, Jpn. ed., Chapter 7, vol. 2, 25th year of the Meiji Era (1892), pp. 554–558.



Fig. 4.49 Japanese Navy's Waterways Department, *The Shina Sea Directory*, 1892, recording the Diaoyu Islands as islands of Taiwan

Fig. 4.49 (continued)

and marked Nanxiao Island and Beixiao Island as the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) (see Fig. 4.50).

The abovementioned record of Chinese island names by Kaneuji Kimotsuki, then Head of the Japanese Navy's Waterways Department, is a complete continuation of the 1875 Map of the Coastal Provinces of the Qing Dynasty because he helped draw up that map. No. 210 chart of the Japanese Navy that was published in 1897 didn't include Uotsuri Island, Kuba Island, and Kume Aka Island, the names Japan used for the islands of the Diaoyu Islands in 1885 when it ordered a military survey of those islands. Moreover, the chart didn't include the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands), the joint term for those islands, either. Japan's Sakishima Islands don't include the Diaoyu Islands.

5. *The abovementioned official documents and maps corroborate each other and lead to the following conclusions.*

First, no Western maps of the Diaoyu Islands from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century have been found to be using Uotsuri Island, Kuba Island, Kume Aka Island, and other Japanese names for them, and most of them use the southern Fujian dialect pronunciations of the Chinese islands' names. This fully shows that the Chinese were the first to discover and name these islands and the Western people got to know from the Chinese the names Diaoyu Island and other islands. Japan's so-called Uotsuri Island, Kuba Island, and other names of islands were not accepted by the international community. This, to some extent, proves that the Diaoyu Islands are the inherent territory of China, not the territory of Japan.



Fig. 4.50 Japanese Navy's Waterways Department, No. 210 chart and amplified details, using Chinese island names

Second, *The Taiwan Sea Directory*, compiled by the Japanese Navy in 1873 based on the translation of the Great Britain Hydrographic Dept's *The China Sea Directory,* and *The Shina Sea Directory*, compiled by the Japanese Navy in 1884 based on the British Navy's documents, both prove that the British government confirmed that Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, Chiwei Islet, Nanxiao Island, Beixiao Island, and other island as the northeastern islands of Taiwan. No later than 1874 when the Japanese government sent its forces to invade Taiwan for the first time, the British government had confirmed that Chiwei Islet was the easternmost island of China, the Diaoyu Islands belonged to China's Taiwan Province, and they didn't belong to the Ryukyu Islands and weren't *terra nullius.*

Third, in 1894 when the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 broke out, the British Navy published the third edition of *The China Sea Directory*, which continued to

confirm that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to the northeastern islands of Taiwan Province, China. In 1901, China translated this third edition as *The China Sea Directory: A New Translation*. On the eve the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, the Japanese Navy compiled and translated *The Taiwan Sea Directory* and *The Shina Sea Directory*, and written a number of documents such as *The Southern Islands Sea Directory* and *The Japan Sea Directory*. All these works had the Diaoyu Islands as Chinese territory. The 1875 Map of the Coastal Provinces of the Qing Dynasty, drawn by the Japanese Navy and enlarged by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs clearly includes the Diaoyu Islands and categorically uses the Chinese names for Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet. In the 20 years from 1874 when the Japanese government militarily invaded Taiwan to 1894 when Japan prepared to make another invasion of Taiwan, the Japanese Navy's Waterways Department was consistent in its understanding of the names of the Diaoyu Islands and their geographical ownership, namely these islands were part of the northeastern islands of Taiwan.

These evidences fully show before the critical date of the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands between China and Japan, the Diaoyu Islands were internationally recognized Chinese territory and islands affiliated with Taiwan. In terms of legality, Japan's seizure of the Diaoyu Islands during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 was an in-and-out illegal move to invade and occupy China's uninhabited islands. This move was covered by the subsequent Treaty of Shimonoseki and remained effective for 50 years. When the Treaty of Shimonoseki was nullified following the end of World War II, in the 1972 Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué, Japan reiterated that the Japanese government would observe Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration, that is, it would in terms of territory it would implement the Cairo Declaration by reverting to China all the islands affiliated with Taiwan, including the Diaoyu Islands.

4.5 The Diaoyu Islands Were Japan's Territory from Its Annexation of the Ryukyu Kingdom to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895

1. *From 1879 when Japan annexed Ryukyu to 1894 when the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 broke out, some maps of Japan did include Diaoyu Island and other islands, but there were a variety of names for them and this can hardly prove that these islands belong to Japan.*

(1) In August in the 12th year of the Meiji Era (1879), Yoshitoshi Takada produced the Complete Map of the Qing Dynasty, which included the Map of Okinawa Islands. That was the first map of Okinawa that was published with the approval of the Japanese government in the year Japan annexed Ryukyu and established Okinawa Prefecture. The map doesn't include the Diaoyu Islands (see Fig. 4.51).



Fig. 4.51 Yoshitoshi Takada, Complete Map of the Qing Dynasty, 1879, not including the Diaoyu Islands

In the Map of Okinawa Prefecture included in the Map of the Administration of Japanese Prefectures, which was drawn in the 12th year of the Meiji Era (1879) following Japan's annexation of Ryukyu, Diaoyu Island was mistakenly written as Huaping Islet. In the Map of Ryukyu included in the Map of the Administration of Japanese Prefectures, which was compiled in the 16th year of the Meiji Era (1883), Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet were written as Hai-Pin-San, Pinnacle Island, and Kobi Shyo, respectively. The producers of these nongovernmental maps had a guilty conscience and dared not to use the Chinese names of these islands.

(2) The Diaoyu Islands were included in Okinawa section the Complete Map of Japan, which was drawn by Takeshi Yanagida in the 12th year of the Meiji Era, but except for Huangwei Islet, the names of other islands were confusing. The names of Diaoyu Island–Nanxiao Island were copied from *Illustrated Descriptions of Islands,* the Chinese translation of the documents of the British Navy in 1870, while Chiwei Islet was written as Kobi Shyo, which is the Japanese pronunciation of something similar to Huangwei Islet (see Fig. 4.52).

In the 15th year of the Meiji Era (1882), Takamitsu Shimomura, a member of the Shizoku of Kyoto, Japan, edited the Complete Surveying Map of Japan, and he printed it in 1886. The map was similar with the 1879 Complete Map of Japan,



Fig. 4.52 Complete Map of Japan, the 12th Year of the Meiji Era, 1879, with confusing island names

though it changed 凸島 to 凸列島 (Senkaku Islands), meaning Nanxiao Island and Beixiao Island. The map included Hai-Pin-San (Diaoyu Island), Huangwei Islet, and Kobi Shyo (Chiwei Islet). However, except for Huangwei Islet, the names of other islands are wrong as they are in other writings and the islands were placed much further to the east (see Fig. 4.53).

(3) The Complete Map of Japan published by the Japanese Interior Ministry in 1880 was the first government map following Japan's full annexation of Ryukyu. The Okinawa section of the map doesn't include Diaoyu Island either (see Fig. 4.54).

This map shows that the Diaoyu Islands were not part of Okinawa Prefecture from the very beginning. The Japanese government was keenly aware of this and confirmed this in government maps. Therefore, it is baseless for the Japanese government to view the Diaoyu Islands as Japan's inherent territory and for some people of Okinawa Prefecture to take the Diaoyu Islands as part of the ancient Ryukyu Kingdom.



Fig. 4.53 Complete Surveying Map of Japan, details, 1886, not including the Diaoyu Islands

(4) The Unified Map of Japan by States: The Complete Map of Ryukyu, published by Hyo Sakai in the 14th year of the Meiji Era (1881) not only excludes the Diaoyu Islands but also marks Kuba Island and Aka Island among the Kerama Islands east of Kume Island. Later on, some Japanese tried to change the names of islands by giving these two names to Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet, respectively, thus referring to Huangwei Islet as Kuba Island and Chiwei Islet as Kume Aka Island (see Fig. 4.55).

2. *The government maps of Japan's secret survey of the Diaoyu Islands in 1885 use the Chinese name Diaoyu Islands, while other maps were drawn differently and most of them do not include the Diaoyu Islands.*

(1) The Complete Map of the Administration of Okinawa Prefecture, drawn by Chojun Kume in 1885, doesn't include the Diaoyu Islands or the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) (see Fig. 4.56).

(2) The Geological Sketch Map of the Islands of Okinawa: Miyako and Yaeyama, Japan, drawn by Sadaichi Kata in October 1885, use Hoa-pin-su for Diaoyu Island Tai-u-su for Huangwei Islet, island names used in the Map of Coastal China of the British Navy. Back then, the Japanese government secretly ordered Okinawa Prefecture to conduct a secret survey of the Diaoyu Islands; however, the survey results didn't prove that these islands belonged to Japan. Therefore, this geological map by a private individual can hardly serve as evidence of Japan's ownership of the Diaoyu Islands (see Fig. 4.57).



Fig. 4.54 Japanese Interior Ministry, Complete Map of Japan, in 1880, not including the Diaoyu Islands

(3) When the Japanese government issued its first order for Okinawa Prefecture to conduct an on-the-spot survey of the Diaoyu Islands in October 1885, it had a map drawn. The map is included in the New Records of Ryukyu. Hyougo Ishizawa Ishisawa, who was in charge of the survey, made descriptions on the map based on the account given by Eihou Ooshiro also added red dots to the islands to be surveyed. The island set to be surveyed was Diaoyu Island, not so-called Uotsuri Island. Hyougo Ishizawa's report seemed to have borrowed something from the British Navy's documents and the *Record of Messages from Chûzan.* Otherwise, having surveyed it for only six hours, Ishizawa could hardly prepare a report within a short period of time.[40] In addition, he renamed Huangwei Islet so-called Kuba

[40]Tadayoshi Murata, *The Sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)) Based on Historical Data*, Jpn. ed., Tokyo: Kaden Sha, 2015, pp. 61, 62.



Fig. 4.55 Unified Map of Japan by States: The Complete Map of Ryukyu, 1881, not including the Diaoyu Islands

Island Chiwei Islet as Kume Aka Island, repeating the mistakes of others (see Fig. 4.58).

This shows that during the secret survey of the island, Japan was keenly aware that the island was the Diaoyu Island which was named by China. The "maritime route to the Qing Dynasty" drawn in the map is in the north and doesn't move past Diaoyu Island. That means that the Ryukyuans and the Japanese didn't have to use Diaoyu Island on the voyage their China. The "return route" in the map clearly includes Diaoyu Island. Therefore, even from the perspectives of Japan, the "return route" from Fuzhou to Ryukyu had to move past the Diaoyu Islands. This always shows that the Diaoyu Island maritime routes were first discovered by the Chinese.

3. *The Map of Ryukyu in the book Sutezo Nishimura wrote after he retired as Governor of Okinawa Prefecture doesn't include the Diaoyu Islands.*



Fig. 4.56 Complete Map of the Administration of Okinawa Prefecture, 1885, not including the Diaoyu Islands

Fig. 4.57 Geological Sketch Map of the Islands of Okinawa: Miyako and Yaeyama, Japan, 1885, using Hoa-pin-su to represent Diaoyu Island



Fig. 4.58 Map used during Japan's secret survey of China's Diaoyu Island in 1885, dotted line representing the Diaoyu Island "return route"

In 1885, Sutezo Nishimura, then Governor of Okinawa Prefecture, adopted a passive attitude toward Japan's occupation of the Diaoyu Islands from the very beginning. After he was transferred to the Japanese Interior Ministry in 1886, he published *Notes on the Southern Islands*. In the book, the Map of Mainland Japan, Okinawa, China, and Korea does not include the Diaoyu Islands, leaving a blank space on the map (see Fig. 4.59).



Fig. 4.59 Sutezo Nishimura, Map of Mainland Japan, Okinawa, China, and Korea, 1886, not including the Diaoyu Islands

Sutezo Nishimura's Map of Ryukyu does not include the Diaoyu Islands either (see Fig. 4.60).

This suffices to show that as a Japanese official, Sutezo Nishimura was keenly aware that the Diaoyu Islands didn't belong to Ryukyu or Okinawa, and at the same time, this also reflects the results of the survey of the Diaoyu Islands he conducted as the governor of Okinawa Prefecture. This indicates that Sutezo Nishimura insists that the 36 islands of Ryukyu were the traditional territorial scope of Okinawa Prefecture. In fact, this is an implicit way of saying no to Aritomo Yamagata's expansion attempts.

4. *In 1894 before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 broke out, the Map of Okinawa Prefecture approved by the Japanese government does not include the Diaoyu Islands.*

(1) No. 210 chart of the Navy, compiled by the Japanese Ministry of the Navy, is about the islands from Kagoshima to Taiwan. The chart no longer uses China's inherent names that had been adopted by the Japanese Navy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1875; rather it uses Chinese characters to represent the transliterations of the island names in English maps translated by the Chinese. For example, Diaoyu Island is written as 和平山 (Hoa-pin-su), Huangwei Islet as 低牙乌苏岛 (Tia-u-su), and Chiwei Islet as 尔勒里岩 (Raleigh Rock) (see Fig. 4.61).



Fig. 4.60 Sutezo Nishimura, Map of Ryukyu, 1886, not including the Diaoyu Islands



Fig. 4.61 Japanese Navy, No. 210 chart of the Navy (details), 1881, confusing island names

Just as discussed above, this way of writing the names of the islands is tantamount to translating the chart of the British Navy which confirmed that the Diaoyu Islands were part of the northeastern islands of Taiwan, China. The names of the islands were based on their pronunciations in the southern Fujian dialect. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that this chart of the Japanese Navy still marks the Diaoyu Islands as part of Taiwan. In the chart, the "Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)" refer to Nanxiao Island and Beixiao Island are not the joint term for the Diaoyu Islands.

(2) The Map of the Empire of Japan, drawn by Einosuke Ono in 1892, incorporates Ryukyu into Japanese territory, but the Ryukyu Islands do not include the Diaoyu Islands or the "Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)" (see Fig. 4.62).

This map proves that following its secret survey of the Diaoyu Islands, the Japanese Meiji government came to realize that its occupation of these islands would involve the Chinese Qing government in negotiations, put it on alert or arouse its opposition, so it had to give up its attempt to steal them for a while. Therefore, almost all the maps published by the Japanese government from 1885 through 1895 intentionally avoided the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands and continued not to mark them.

(3) The Diaoyu Islands cannot be found in the "Ryukyu Islands" in the lower right corner of the Revised Complete Map of Kyushu, in the Complete Map of Ryukyu of the Complete Map of Japan, in the Map of Osumi and the Ryukyu Islands, and in other maps (see Figs. 4.63, 4.64 and 4.65).

From 1880 through 1893, Japan published many new maps probably to respond to its thorough annexation of Ryukyu. These maps share the common point that they made Okinawa Prefecture or the Ryukyu Islands Japan's new territory and clearly mark the main islands of Okinawa, and the westernmost islands of Ryukyu are the Gumi Island (Kume Island) that were mentioned many times in ancient Chinese documents and maps and the Yonaguni Island that comes between the Yaeyama Islands and Taiwan. The Diaoyu Islands, however, are not included in the maps as Japanese territory.



Fig. 4.62 Einosuke Ono, Map of the Empire of Japan, not including the Diaoyu Islands

Fig. 4.63 Revised Complete Map of Kyushu (details), 1893, not including the Diaoyu Islands



Fig. 4.64 Complete Map of Ryukyu of the Complete Map of Japan, 1893, not including the Diaoyu Islands



Fig. 4.65 Map of Osumi and the Ryukyu Islands, 1893, not including the Diaoyu Islands

5. *The Complete Map of the Administration of Okinawa Prefecture: The Complete Map of Ryukyu, distributed in Japan in 1894 and revised and enlarged in 1895, provides important evidence concerning the critical date.*

(1) The Complete Map of the Administration of Okinawa Prefecture: The Complete Map of Ryukyu, distributed probably more than four months in 1894 before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 broke out, clearly shows the scope of the ancient Ryukyu Kingdom (see Fig. 4.66).

The map does not include the Diaoyu Islands or the so-called Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) and it uses a curve to separate the Yaeyama Islands and Miyako Islands from Taiwan and the Diaoyu Islands affiliated with it.

On the reverse side of the map are the islands under the administration of Okinawa Prefecture and their geographical profiles. A note says, "Hateruma is the southernmost end of Japan while Yonaguni Island is its westernmost point, and a trip back leads to Naha."

This note fits the curved national border in the map perfectly, proving that before the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed, the Diaoyu Islands were not included in the Yaeyama Islands of the Ryukyu Islands. During the negotiations for the treaty in 1895, the map was revised and was distributed in May of the same year with no changes being made to its basic content. Later on, the map was reprinted time and time again (see Fig. 4.67).



Fig. 4.66 Complete Map of the Administration of Okinawa Prefecture: The Complete Map of Ryukyu, published in Japan in 1894, not including the Diaoyu Islands

There is a rare note on the west side of the Ryukyu Islands, which reads, "The Osumi Islands and Ryukyu Islands seem to be an extension from Kyushu right to Chinese territory Taiwan Island." The map comes between the Yonaguni Island, the westernmost island of the Yaeyama Islands, and China's Taiwan, indicating that the maritime boundary curve still bends northeastward to exclude the Diaoyu Islands and relevant waters from the territory of Okinawa (see Fig. 4.68).

(2) The map was reprinted and issued by Zinbun Sha in 1976. Kaneyuki Kitagawa, Member of the Japan Map Selection and Publishing Committee, deliberately added a note to it to prove that back then, map publication in Japan was under the control of the Japanese Army and maps were not to be published by nongovernmental sources. The main points of the note are as follows: Map publication in Japan "came under the administration of the Japanese Army's Measurement Bureau as of June of the 16th year of the Meiji Era (1883). The Ministry of War, which was founded at the same time with the Ministry of Popular Affairs, established the Ministry of the Army and the Ministry of the Navy in February of the fifth year of the Meiji Era (1872). The Navy was in charge of maritime measurement while the Army took charge of land measurement, and they both produced national maps for the purpose of national defense. The Measurement Bureau of the General Staff was tasked with producing basic maps for the whole nation. In the 13th year of the Meiji Era (1880), it started to work on a fast



Fig. 4.67 Complete Map of the Administration of Okinawa Prefecture: The Complete Map of Ryukyu, revised and reprinted in Japan in 1895, not including the Diaoyu Islands



Fig. 4.68 Complete Map of the Administration of Okinawa Prefecture: The Complete Map of Ryukyu, published in 1894 and reprinted in 1895 in Japan not including the Diaoyu Islands

解説

各時代の為政者が地図の作製に心をおいたことは、古くは文禄国絵図とか慶長の五畿内図とかの国絵図の調製に明らかであり、また国絵図の調製に関しても、時代の制約をこえた幕府の都度民間に於ても、その都度民間製作の気運のあったことがみられる。諸藩の国絵図の調製に際しても、新政府の制一新といわれた明治維新の改革に際しても、地図の有する必要性の増大からも早く、日本地図の作製に着手をしており、地図の作製は大いに民間に開放された。

慶応三年（一八六七）十月十五日、十五代将軍徳川慶喜は奉請し、十一月九日主政復古が行われ、総裁・議定・参与の三職がおかれた。翌四年（一八六八）四月二十一日、冒頭に五ヶ条の誓文を掲げた政体書の公布があり、三権分立を基軸とする政官制が設けられ、議政官の下に行政・神祇・会計・軍務・外国・地方の三官を置き、七月十七日江戸を東京と改め、九月八日明治と改元、十月十三日江戸城を皇居と定め、東京城と称した。

維新の大業の成ったこの年の十二月二十四日、太政官は各府藩県に、一里を三寸とした管轄図の作製を命じ、その呈出をとめたが、裏打された美濃紙に描かれた。これらの地図は現存されず、御領之村々一朱色、寒葉上領之村々一黄色、諸侯領之村々白色、中下太夫上領之村々一青、社寺領之村々一黒色、記号は県庁は□、城下村々は○、宿駅◎、関門Ⅱ、社寺△、古城跡〻を付し、山は青、海は沼川が浅黄、道路が朱色、境界を黒に色別したという。太政官上誌の記事に、旧幕時代の国絵図のすがたを想うのみである。

明治二年（一八六九）七月に民部省が設置され、地理・土木・駅逓・鉱山・通商・懸場の司と、社寺・鉄道・電信・燈台・製鉄の掛がおかれた。これも地図の利用が多い部門であり、精密な地図の必要から、測版割りによる巧な地図の製作化をみるようになったが、開発され、地図の多様化をみるようになったが、翌三年（一八七〇）十月に工部省が設けられると移管され、測量司のもとに七名の英人測量技師を招き、後進の指導にあたらせた。

民部省地理司は明治四年（一八七一）七月に廃止されてからは、太政官地誌課となり、幕府の地誌編纂方の業を継ぎ、諸国の資料を蒐集したが、六年（一八七三）十一月内務省の設置にともない、その地理局と改め十一年（一八七八）八月、岩崎敬章の手になる図式記号を定めた測絵図譜を各府県に頒布し、民間の地図製作者もこれに倣うことを勧奨し数多くの地誌・地図の編纂刊行を行なったが十六年（一八八三）六月に陸軍測量局に統合した。

民部省と同時に設けられた兵部省は、五年（一八七二）二月に陸軍省と海軍省に分立され、海軍は水路の測量を、陸軍は陸地測量を行ない、ともに国防上の観点から国土地図の作製に任じ、参謀本部測量局は全国を覆う基本図として、十三年（一八八〇）から関東地方二万分の一迅速測図の作製に着手し、内務省地理局の統合を得て二万分の一正式地形図の作製が始められた。二十一年（一八八八）五月陸軍測量部条例が公布され、測量局は参謀本部から分離し、陸地測量部として発足した。二万分の一基本測図の完成に要する時間と経費は、国際状勢の変化しつつあることから許されぬとし、二十五年（一八九二）その縮尺を五万分の一に改めた。「国土地理院が蔽ふする、わたしたち願はくは五万分の一地図の誕生である。」

これらの国軍事業として作成された基本図を主に、それぞれの土地のみがもつ様々な個を図上にあらわし、整理編集された地図は明治年間にはその数が多く、なかには思わず微笑をうかべるものさえある。

本選集に収めた大日本管轄分地図が発行された明治二十八年（一八九五）三月は、下関の春帆楼で日清和議判が開かれた時にあたり、日本の国土がすなおなただずまを、東海に見せていると記録であって、この以降日本地図の文字どおり皆無おくれていった。本図に描かれているケバ式地形表現は、この年制定をみた陸地測量部の二十八年図式から必ず消してはいるが、この時代の県名をとどめた図として少く、諸物産の地誌を付した編集者の意図は、高く評価されたのであろうか、大正初年にかけて版を重ねている。

印刷様式は銅版割を転写した石版に、色彩を木版の手指で加えたもので、この時期に民間から刊行された、多くの地図にみられる手法であるが、この歩みの足跡を辿ることは、興味の問題であろう。

日本地図選集刊行委員　鹿野川周之

Fig. 4.69 Note to the Map of the Administration of Japan, 1895

measurement map with a 1:200,000 ratio scale for the Kanto region, and the map was processed by the Geography Bureau of the Interior Ministry, the Measurement Bureau started to make the official topographic map with a 1:200,000 ratio scale. In May of the 21st year of the Meiji Era (1888), the Army Measurement Regulations were promulgated, and the Measurement Bureau was taken away from the General Staff to establish the Land Measurement Department. However, changes in the international situation made it impossible to complete the basic map with a 1:200,000 ratio scale for reasons of time and cost, so the scale was cut to 1:50,000 in the 25th year of the Meiji Era (1892).

The map of the administration of Japan included in this collection was distributed in March of the 28th year of the Meiji Era (1895) which peace talks were held between Japan and the Qing Dynasty at Spring Sail Building in Shimonoseki, and it was a record of the Japanese territory in the East China Sea. Thereafter the map of Japan was complete rewritten…."[41] (see Fig. 4.69).

[41]Kaneyuki Kitagawa, The Map of the Administration of Japan, Jpn. ed., Zinbun Sha, first edition in 1894, and enlarged edition in 1895.

It is not clear how Mr. Kaneyuki Kitagawa felt when he wrote this note, but his purpose was to leave an objective record of the territory Japan had before the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed. The map and the note to it contain the facts as follows:

First, beginning in 1883, the Japanese High Command gained monopoly in map production and distribution in Japan to render service for the country and war.

Second, even in 1895 when talks were held for the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the Diaoyu Islands were still not included in the Complete Map of the Administration of Okinawa Prefecture which was distributed in Japan, and the result of the secret decision of Japan to steal the Diaoyu Islands was not reflected in the maps of Japan.

Third, the map of Japan reprinted during the talks for the Treaty of Shimonoseki marks the Diaoyu Islands within the scope of Taiwan, China, not as territory under the administration of Okinawa.

Fourth, from the perspectives of the international law, Kaneyuki Kitagawa's note to the map could be the best footnote to the situation before the critical date of the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands. Both the Japanese government's so-called statement that "the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) are the inherent territory of Japan" and the so-called legal basis of Japan's occupation of the *terra nullius* Diaoyu Islands are groundless.

(3) As I have stated above, the critical date refers to the date of reference used in law for determining the existence of the legal relationship claimed by the party concerned. In making a legal judgment on a territorial dispute between countries, if the territory in question is confirmed to belong to a country for a certain period of time, but another country exercised effective rule of the territory for another period of time, then a question arises with regard to which period of time should be taken as the standard date for determining its ownership, that is, the question of the critical date. The critical date refers to the date after which the actions of the parties can no longer affect the issue the legal relationship in dispute.

It is certain that the Complete Map of the Administration of Okinawa Prefecture: The Complete Map of Ryukyu, which was drawn by the Japanese High Command shortly before or after the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed on April 17, 1895, really does not include the Diaoyu Islands. Back then, Japan had not named these islands the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands), so it was impossible for it to mark them as such. During the talks for the Treaty of Shimonoseki, even the map agency under the Japanese High Command didn't know that the Hirobumi Ito cabinet had secretly decided to put the Diaoyu Islands under the administration of Okinawa Prefecture, and it was less possible for the Qing participants in these talks to have prior knowledge of this.

In short, after the Hirobumi Ito cabinet stole the Diaoyu Islands in 1895, it neither made the seizure known to the public, nor included the islands in the decrees of the Japanese Emperor, nor erected markers on those islands. That is to say, in terms of both the international law and the Japan law, Japan didn't have any legal basis for its seizure of the Diaoyu Islands. Japan's behavior was no more than a seizure of uninhabited Chinese islands during the war.

Just as the abovementioned note Kaneyuki Kitagawa to the map said, the map was revised during the talks for the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, had an account

of the territory Japan originally had whereas following the signing of that treaty, the map of Japan had been completely rewritten. The abovementioned Complete Map of the Administration of Okinawa Prefecture: The Complete Map of Ryukyu wasn't an isolated map; it was one of the maps that were approved by the Japanese government.

6. *The maps published in 1894 when the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 broke out still do not include the Diaoyu Islands or the so-called Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands).*

(1) The Map of the Ryukyu Islands in the Map of Japan drawn in 1894 does not include the Diaoyu Islands or the so-called Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) (see Fig. 4.70).

(2) The Complete Map of Japan drawn in 1894 is about the territory of Japan after it signed the Treaty for Exchange of Sakhalin for the Kuril Islands with Russia in May 1875. According to the treaty, the whole of Sakhalin Island belongs to Russia, and all of the Kuril Islands belonged to Japan. It may worth noting that the map's section on the Ryukyu Islands does not include the Diaoyu Islands, while the map marks Dokdo (known as Takeshima in Japan) as Pine Island colors it white as it does the Korean Peninsula as Korean territory (see Fig. 4.71).

(3) A possible feature of the Map of Japan, China, and Korea, published in 1894 during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, is that it includes several maritime routes from Kyushu, Japan, to both sides of the Korean Peninsula and the Yellow Sea. As map production had been monopolized by the Japanese Army, it is reasonable to conclude that the map was designed to serve Japan's war with the Qing Dynasty (on August 1 of the same year, Japan declared war against Qing China). However, the map doesn't include the Diaoyu Islands (see Fig. 4.72).

7. *Following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, the Japanese Navy's Waterways Department revised the Shina Sea Directory in the 33rd year of the*



Fig. 4.70 Map of the Ryukyu Islands in the Map of Japan, 1894, not including the Diaoyu Islands



Fig. 4.71 Complete Map of Japan, published in Japan in 1894, not including the Diaoyu Islands



Fig. 4.72 Map of Japan, China, and Korea, 1894, not including the Diaoyu Islands

Meiji Era (1900), but the newly drawn maps in Japan do not include the Diaoyu Islands or the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) as part of Okinawa Prefecture or Taiwan.

(1) The Atlas of Historical Changes in China's Territory, distributed in Japan in the 29th year of the Meiji Era (1896), include different territory maps of Ming and Qing China. A possible feature is emphasis is laid on the changes of the sovereignty over Taiwan, but it doesn't specify the Diaoyu Islands, though it includes relevant waters around the Diaoyu Islands along with Taiwan in the territory of Japan.

The atlas was produced after Japan stole Taiwan and the islands affiliated with it based on the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The left part of the following map the Chinese part of the East China Sea during the Ming Dynasty, while the right part is about the territory of Qing China (to be more accurate, China's territory in the last years of the Qing Dynasty after 1895). The red line in the map shows that after the Japanese Meiji government annexed Ryukyu in the last years of the Qing Dynasty, it stole from the Qing government China's Taiwan Province, including the Diaoyu Islands, and the islands affiliated with it (see Fig. 4.73).

(2) The Revised Detailed Map of the Empire of Japan, distributed in 1897, includes the so-called Complete Map of Taiwan's new territory Taiwan, but it doesn't include the Diaoyu Islands in either Ryukyu or Taiwan (see Fig. 4.74).

(3) The Grand Map of Japan, Russia, China, and Korea in the Far East, drawn by Isaburo Hamamoto Isaburo after Japan began its colonial rule of Taiwan and before the Russo-Japanese War broke out in 1904, emphatically marks maritime routes



Fig. 4.73 Japan, Atlas of Historical Changes in China's Territory, 1896

Fig. 4.74 Japan, revised detailed Map of the Empire of Japan, 1897, not including the Diaoyu Islands

from Vladivostok (Haishenwai) to various locations in Japan. The map was probably designed to serve Japan's war with Russia, but it doesn't include the Diaoyu Islands (see Fig. 4.75).

(4) The Map of Taiwan and Ryukyu Islands, distributed in the 39th year of the Meiji Era (1906) following the end of the Russo-Japanese War and revised in the 41st year of the Meiji Era (1908), doesn't include the Diaoyu Islands (see Fig. 4.76).

The map shows that during the Japanese rule of Taiwan, the Diaoyu Islands or the so-called Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) are not included as part of Taiwan or Okinawa Prefecture. Some Japanese insist that as the Diaoyu Islands are not included in the scope of Taiwan in the maps of China, the Diaoyu Islands do not belong to China. If that logic holds true, the maps of Japan following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 do not include the Diaoyu Islands as part of Okinawa Prefecture, so these islands don't belong to Japan. The Diaoyu Islands are included in the Map of Taiwan and Ryukyu Islands, reprinted in Japan in 1908, but in lower right corner of the map, Taiwan, the Diaoyu Islands, Yaeyama Islands, and Miyako Island appear in a red rectangle, indicating they are in the same geographical location. However, in the map the extension of the red curve representing the prefectural boundary between Taiwan and Yaeyama suggests that it is unlikely that the Diaoyu Islands are within the scope of Yaeyama, but are within the scope of Taiwan.

Following World War II, with regard to the Diaoyu Islands issue, the map of Japan, which had been changed in response to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and the Treaty of Shimonoseki, must be restored to what it was before in accordance with the international law stipulations such as the Potsdam Declaration

Fig. 4.75 Japan, Grand Map of Japan, Russia, China, and Korea in the Far East, 1904, not including the Diaoyu Islands

and the Cairo Declaration and the sovereignty over the disputed islands should be restored to what it was before the critical date for the Diaoyu Islands dispute. That means that in accordance with international law, the territory Japan had stolen from China must be reverted to China.



Fig. 4.76 Japan, Map of Taiwan and Ryukyu Islands, 1908, not including the Diaoyu Islands, which belong to Taiwan judging by the boundary

4.6 Japan's Unilaterally Changing the Name of the Diaoyu Islands Cannot Cover Up Historical Facts

Since Shihei Hayashi wrote *An Illustrated Account of the Three Countries* in 1785, the Japanese had been aware that the Diaoyu Islands were part of Chinese territory, but it had not raised an objection. From 1810 to 1854, the main maps produced in Japan mostly include the Diaoyu Islands and other islands in China and uses their Chinese names. From 1855 through 1895, Japan began to deliberately avoid using these Chinese names. At first, in 1845 it used the names adopted in the chart of warship H. M. S. *Samarang,* Chinese names pronounced in the southern Fujian dialect, though it continued to mark these islands as islands affiliated with Taiwan, China. During this period, the map that has the correct names for the Diaoyu Islands and correctly marks their sovereignty was the Map of Coastal Provinces of the Qing Dynasty, hand drawn in 1875 with the participation of Narayoshi Yanagi, the founder of Japanese Navy measurement, helped in the process. However, in 1885 the Japanese Interior Ministry changed the names of the Diaoyu Islands, giving new confusing names and Japan eventually brought the Diaoyu Islands under the administration of Okinawa Prefecture secretly in 1895.

Historically, the Chinese names of the Diaoyu Islands were well-known in China and Ryukyu, and they were also used by Japan. According to reports, ancient Ryukyuans referred to Diaoyu Island as Yukun, Yokun or Yigun, meaning Fish

Island or Fishhook Island, while referring Huangwei Islet as Kuba or Koba, meaning Areca or Fan Palm Island, and Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet as Yigun Kuba. However, there were no Chinese characters for these names and they were not widely used for long. They even cannot be found in any maps in language or pronunciation, so they should not be taken as official names.

In 1876, Sai Taite, a Ryukyuan poet and descendant of Fujian emigrants to Ryukyu, wrote in his poem, "Looking back to find Ishigaki Island in the clouds/ Moving past Uotsuri Island in an instant."[42] This was probably the first time Uotsuri Island was used to suit the Japanese grammar that puts the object before its verb, namely putting 魚 before 釣, an opposite way of putting it in the Chinese way. Due to Japan's infiltration into Ryukyu in the nineteenth century, Uotsuri Island became a local habit, the Kuba Island in the Kerama Islands was used to refer to Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet was renamed Kume Aka Island. Changes in the names of the Diaoyu Islands took place as the same time when Ryukyu was gradually annexed by Japan.

1. *The first maps of "Uotsuri Island" appeared during the reign of Qing Emperor Tongzhi in the nineteenth century when Japan was stepping up its infiltration into Ryukyu and trying to make Ryukyu Japan's Ryukyu han.*

The Map of Ryukyu and China Sea Directory, a long color map now collected at the Oriental Library in Tokyo, has a detailed account of the maritime routes from Fujian Province, China, to Naha, Ryukyu, and the main islands on their routes. This could be the first map of Ryukyu that refers to Diaoyu Island as "Uotsuri Island," above Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet, their Chinese names appear in the vertical manner, but under these islands are their Japanese names: Kuba Island Kume Aka Island (see Fig. 4.77).

This map appeared in the last years of the Ryukyu Kingdom subject to increasing Japanese influence and is about how the names of China's Diaoyu Islands were changed.

According to Ju Deyuan, the map could be drawn by Zheng Bingheng who welcomed China's investiture vessels, by mainly using or imitating the Ryukyu Sea Directory included in *My Mission to Ryukyu,* written by Xiao Chongye in 1579 (see Fig. 4.78).

It is the confusing names used in the Ryukyu and China Sea Directory that misled Zhao Xin, China's last envoy who traveled to Ryukyu for investiture purposes in the last years of the Qing Dynasty, to use the wrong names for the Diaoyu Islands.[43] By looking up in the family tree of Zheng Bingheng, exposing the voyage diary he kept for his welcome to the investiture envoy Zhao Xin, and making a comparative study of the diary and the "Maritime Routes" in Zhao Xin's *A Continued Record of the Ryukyu*

[42]Zheng Hailin, *The Diaoyu Islands: History and Legality*, Revised and enlarged Chin. ed., Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 2007, p. 68.

[43]Ju Deyuan, *On the Sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands Seized by Japan*, Chin. ed., Beijing: Capital Normal University Press, vol. 2, 2001, p. 666.

Fig. 4.77 Ryukyu, The Ryukyu and China Sea Directory, 1865, Japan beginning to change the names of the Diaoyu Islands



Fig. 4.78 Xiao Chongye, The Ryukyu Sea Directory, *My Mission to Ryukyu,* 1579, including the Diaoyu Islands

Kingdom, Ju Deyuan proved the direct influence Zheng Bingheng had on the mistakes Zhao Xin made in the names of the Diaoyu Islands.

In his diary Zheng Bingheng wrote on June 11 of the fourth year of the reign of Qing Emperor Tongzhi (1865), "… at about 6 p.m., my ship went past Uotsuri

Island, and sometime from 7 p.m. to 9 p.m. the ship moved past Kuba Island (Huangwei Islet)." He continued in his June 12 diary, "… at 2 p.m., the ship went beyond Kume Aka Island." The following record appeared in the "Maritime Routes" in Zhao Xin's *A Continued Record of the Ryukyu Kingdom* in 1886, in June "on the 11th there was a wind at noon. We moved southeast past Diaoyu Island sometime between 6 p.m. and 8 p.m. and Kuba Island (Huangwei Islet) sometime between 8 p.m. and 10 p.m." On the 12th "we moved past Kume Aka Island sometime between 2 p.m. and 4 p.m."[44]

I also believe that if the Ryukyu and China Sea Directory was drawn by Zheng Bingheng, the Ryukyu envoy to welcome China's investiture vessel, or by someone on his behalf in 1865, one of the purposes was to help him travel to Fujian Province to welcome Zhao Xin, Qing China's last investiture envoy. Back then, Zhao Xin probably read the map and was influenced by it, so in the following year (1866) he mistook Huangwei Islet as Kuba Island Chiwei Islet as Kume Aka Island in the "Maritime Routes" in his *A Continued Record of the Ryukyu Kingdom*. That being the case, Zhao Xin still said that "my vessel arrived Ryukyu's Gumi Island," indicating that he hadn't reached the territory of Ryukyu until he was in Gumi Island and that Diaoyu Island others in northeast Taiwan were Chinese islands.

2. *In the map of Ming China, Chiwei Islet is marked as Chi Islet and the Aka Island north of the Kuba Island in the Ryukyu Kingdom's Kerama Islands is also referred to as Chi Island.*

The Complete Map of Japan's Coast, produced by Yoshimori Sakei in 1855, Chi Island (today's Aka Island) is marked close to Kerama Islands (see Fig. 4.79)

The maps of Japan produced in Japan up to 1879 still have Aka Island and Kuba Island in the Kerama Islands. For example, the Complete Map of the Coast of Japan, drawn by Ino Tadataka in 1867, and the maps published by the Japanese Shogunate based on a revision of this map do not have the Diaoyu Islands.

So the possibility cannot be ruled out that the Ryukyuans mistook the Chi Islet (Chiwei Islet) for the Aka Island near Kuba Island in the Kerama Islands and renamed Huangwei Islet Kuba Island. Due to the Japanese infiltration into Ryukyu, the Aka Island in the Kerama Islands was changed to the Chinese characters 阿嘉島 based on its Japanese pronunciation "Akajima."

According to Ju Deyuan, Sadaka Ijichi was the Japanese official who renamed Chi Island Aka Island. As an official in charge of Japan's annexation of Ryukyu, he wrote the *Annals of Okinawa Prefecture* in 1877 and used Aka Island in lieu of Chi Island in his introduction to the Ryukyu Islands. His purpose seemed to transfer the name Chi Island to the Chiwei Islet more than 100 km west of Chi Island so that he could rename Aka Island Kume Aka Island and make it look like an island affiliated with Kume Island.[45] These transfers of the names of Ryukyuan Islands to China's

[44]Ibid., p. 550.

[45]Ibid., pp. 394–395.



Fig. 4.79 Yoshimori Sakei, The Complete Map of Japan's Coast (details), 1855 not including the Diaoyu Islands

Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet must be exposed so that future generations of Japanese people know about these falsifications.

3. *Even today there is an island in the Kerama Islands called Kuba Island, so there are now two islands with the same name.*

It is generally believed that Hisashi Kuroiwa, a teacher at the Okinawa Teachers' School who landed on the Diaoyu Islands for survey purposes in the 33rd year of the Meiji Era (1900), was the first to name the Diaoyu Islands and the nearby islands the Senkaku Islands (尖閣諸島) (see Fig. 4.80).

Thereafter, the Senkaku Islands (尖閣諸島) were adopted by the Japanese media, and today, the Japanese government refers to them as the Senkaku Islands (尖閣諸島). In 1900, Hisashi Kuroiwa and Doctor of Science Mikinosuke Miyajima traveled to Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet for explorative purposes aboard the steamboat Nagayasu Maru of the Osaka Merchantman Company. Their exploration lasted from May 3 to May 20, 1900. Hisashi Kuroiwa focused on Diaoyu Island, while Mikinosuke Miyajima mainly studied Huangwei Islet.

Each of them prepared their reports on the exploration and published them in the Japanese *Journal of Geography* in 1900. It may be worth noting that when naming the islands the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands), he still used the Chinese names of



Fig. 4.80 Hisashi Kuroiwa

the islands: Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet, but the Japanese names: Uotsuri Island, Kuba Island, and Kume Aka Island.

4. *Hisashi Kuroiwa published "Notes on the Exploration of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)" in the Japanese Journal of Geography, No. 8 (cumulative issue No. 140) in 1900.*

In the article, Hisashi Kuroiwa stated, "According to the chart published by the Empire of Japan's Ministry of the Navy in the 30th year of the Meiji Era, these islands are composed of Diaoyu Islet, Pinnacle Islands and Huangwei Islet…. However, so far there has not been a unified name for these islands. To make it convenient for geographical studies, I would like to give them the name of Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands). These islands can be roughly divided into two parts in terms of terrain and geology: A, (1) Diaoyu Islet, and (2) the Senkaku Islets; and B, (3) Huangwei Islet. The former is mainly composed of the aqueous rocks of the Late Antique period, and the latter is entirely composed of volcanic rocks"[46] (see Fig. 4.81).

The Senkaku Islands (尖閣列島) referred to by Hisashi Kuroiwa do not include Chiwei Islet, and the Senkaku Islets (尖閣諸島) he referred to are the small rocks close to islands such as the Nanxiao Island and Beixiao Island these rocks are composed of aqueous rocks.

This article Hisashi Kuroiwa wrote in 1900 is very important as it serves as the source of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands), Japan's name for the Diaoyu Islands. However, before this, unlike China, both Ryukyu and Japan had very confusing names for these islands and they were even mistaken for one another.

[46]Hisashi Kuroiwa, "Notes on the Exploration of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)," *Jpn. ed., Journal of Geography*, 33rd year of the Meiji Era (1900), no. 8, p. 477.



尖閣列島探檢記事

明治三十三年五月沖繩縣那覇區在住古賀辰四郎氏代其借區たる無人島へ向け貳艘大阪商船會社代船永康丸派遣の挙あり理學士宮島幹之助氏亦渡航せらるゝ不肖校命により此挙便を借り渡島探檢することゝなり同五月三日を以て那覇港出帆往復十八日間即ち五月二十日を以て調査を了へ歸校せり其間宮島學士は貳尾嶼の一島に留りて調査に從事せられしも余は他の列島と同避せりとの記事は專ら余か同避せし列島に屬するものにして貳尾嶼に就ては他日精密なる報文の出つる期あらん看官それこれを諒せよ。

明治三十三年七月

沖繩縣師範學校に於いて　黑岩恒

論說（尖閣列島探檢記事）　四七六

か如き素より泡瀾の地にして被害の割合に震力强大なりしには非るも然れども僅に三年前の新築に係る堤防の如斯破狀を呈せるに至りたるは決して震力の弱からさりしと證明せらるゝものなり是等は恐らくは今回の地震の震央地とも稱すへき地方にして凡そ南北の方向に走れるを見るへし然れども實際激動を發したる地層は地下其た深き處にあるへきか故に表面に於ける震動は尚甚た大ならさりしか如し。（完）

總論

從來尖閣列島と稱するは我沖繩島と淸國福州との中央に位する一列の小嶼にして八重山列島の西表島より北に當る大凡九十哩内外の位置に在り本列島より沖繩島への距離は二百三十哩福州への距離亦略相似たり臺灣島の基隆へは僅々一百二十余哩を隔つ帝國海軍省出版の海圖明治三十年刊行之を案するに本列島は釣魚嶼尖頭嶼及貳尾嶼より成立し卵たる蒼海の一隅なり左れど其位置上の關係よりして古來沖繩縣人に知られ居れり而して此列島には未た一箇の名稱なく地理學上不便少からさるを以て余は茲に尖閣列島なる名稱を新設することゝなせり而して本列島は地勢地質上二部に大別するの必要を見る甲は釣尾嶼及ひ尖閣諸嶼にして乙は貳尾嶼なりとす左表の如し。

尖閣列島
（甲）(1)釣魚嶼
　　(2)尖閣諸嶼
（乙）(3)貳尾嶼

前者は主として近古代水成岩より成り後者は全く火山岩より成るなり

○魚釣嶼

論說（尖閣列島探檢記事）　四七七

Fig. 4.81 Hisashi Kuroiwa, "Notes on the Exploration of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)," 1900, records of Diaoyu Islet and Huangwei Islet

This also shows that these uninhabited islands belong to China, not the ancient Ryukyu Kingdom. With regard to this, Hisashi Kuroiwa categorically stated in his article, "Diaoyu Islet, also known as Diaoyutai and Hai-Pin-San, is recorded as Hoa-pin-su in the British chart and is called Kuba Island in Okinawa Prefecture. Taking into consideration of the history of the exploration of the island (done by Okinawa people), Diaoyu Island has been known as Yokon to Okinawa people since ancient times. Back then the name Kuba Island referred to the Huangwei Islet northeast of Kuba Island. However, for reasons unknown, the names are used alternatively, with Huangwei Islet being called Yokon while that island (Diaoyu Island) is called Kuba Island. In response to these sudden changes, I made an exploration to collect the facts already known for your information"[47] (see Fig. 4.81).

The article cited ancient Chinese document *Annals of the Ryukyu Kingdom* (vol. 4) as saying, "Ryukyu is surrounded by the sea and is an extension of the east-west terrain of Zhejiang Province and Fujian Province. Ryukyu does not have high mountains and the voyage to it depends on the islands in the sea. A maritime route from Fuzhou to Ryukyu starts from Wuhumen and moves via Jilong Island,

[47]Ibid., pp. 478–479.



Fig. 4.82 Curriculum vitae for Tatsushiro Koga, 1909, using the names Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Island

Huaping Islet, Pengjia Island, Diaoyutai, Huangwei Islet, Chiwei Islet, Gumi Island, and Machi Island to eventually reach the Port of Naha."[48]

It may be worth noting that in his article, Hisashi Kuroiwa used the Chinese name "Diaoyu Islet" and avoided using the Japanese name "Uotsuri Island."

5. *The joint term "Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)" didn't exist before 1900 and the Japanese government had long used the names given by China.*

Decree 169 issued by the Japanese Emperor on May 31, 1897, used Uotsuri Island in lieu of Diaoyu Island, but just as I discussed above, the chart of the Japanese Navy's Waterways Department issued in the same year continues to use the name Diaoyu Islet. The curriculum vitae for Tatsushiro Koga submitted in 1909 for the Blue Ribbon Medal presented by the Japanese Prime Minister also uses the names Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Island (see Fig. 4.82).

In fact, the joint term "Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)" wasn't confirmed in a decree of the Japanese Emperor. The term wasn't used in Decree 13 in the 29th year of the Meiji Era (1896). Before 1972, the Japanese government didn't officially use this term. The chart of the Japan Coast Guard's Waterways Department, submitted by Japan as part of the material to the Allied General Headquarters following World

[48]Ibid., p. 479.


尖閣列島の警告板設置に関する復命書

復　命　書

一九七〇年七月七日、不法入域防止用警告板の設置立会および不法入域者の取締のため、尖閣列島へ出張しましたので、その概要をつぎのとおり復命します。

一九七〇年七月二十四日

出入管理庁警備課

課長　比嘉健次　㊞

出入管理庁長　大城実殿

1　出張年月日　一九七〇年七月七日から

〃　〃　十六日まで（十日間）

2　出張先　尖閣列島（①　魚釣島、②　南小島、③　北小島、④　黄尾嶼、⑤　赤尾嶼）

3　概要

寸法

120cm

90cm

75cm

60cm

Fig. 4.83 Report on setting up warning signs on the "Senkaku Islands" (Diaoyu Islands), 1970, still using Chinese island names

War II, still used the Chinese names for Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet. In 1969, the official documents and notices of the Ryukyu government under the US occupation also used the Chinese names for Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet. Except for "Uotsuri Island, "the report on setting up warning signs without authorization on the "Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)" (Diaoyu Islands), submitted by the Entry and Exit Administration of the Ryukyu government on July 7, 1970, used the Chinese names for Nanxiao Island, Beixiao Island, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet, totaling ignoring the so-called Kuba Island Taisho Island.[49] (see Fig. 4.83).

In September 1970, the Japanese government Okinawa Policy Agency was still studying how to name Diaoyu Island other islands. Because Japan didn't have

[49]The Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) Documents and Data Compilation Committee, *A Collection of Data of a High-Level Explorative Team on the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands),* II, Jpn. ed.,: Daiichi Printing Co., Ltd., October 14, 2007, p. 274.

well-founded names for them, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs used 尖阁诸岛, but then Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi used 尖阁列岛 in his response to questions raised to him at the Diet in 1971. Most Japanese newspapers used 尖阁列岛. The markers erected by Ishigaki on the islands also use 尖阁列岛. Ishigaki said that they were 尖阁群岛, but the Okinawa Agency stated that wasn't an official name.[50]

In May 1969, when the news got out that there were potential undersea oil reserves in the Diaoyu Islands waters, the local Okinawa government received many applications from oil companies for exploiting the oil reserves. In response, following the order of the mayor of Ishigaki, Ishigaki markers were erected on the Diaoyu Islands, Huangwei Islet was once again renamed Kuba Island Chiwei Islet was renamed Taisho Island.

Japan renamed Diaoyu Island Uotsuri Island, and Huangwei Islet Kuba Island, and the Japanese Navy also used the wrong names from the British warship, but the maps and government documents of Japan have long officially used the Chinese names for these islands and some Japanese maps have continued to use the Chinese name of Diaoyu Island. For example, the Grand Map of the World, published by Heibonsha in Japan in 1984, uses the Chinese names with their Japanese pronunciations: 鱼钓岛 (Uotsuri jima), 黄尾屿 (Kobi sho), and 赤尾屿 (Sekibi sho). The Okinawa local government and the Japanese government also continued to use the Chinese names Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet in their official documents.

The data submitted by the Japan Defense Agency to the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives in February 1995 still uses the Chinese names for Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet. The statistical data prepared by Okinawa Prefecture about the US military bases in Okinawa in 2012 also uses Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet. This led to Masahisa Sato, a member of the House of Councilors, to raise a question to House of Councilors President Kenji Hirata, demanding he explains why Chinese island names were still in use in Japan and that the names be changed. The reason why the names cannot be changed is that the names of Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet were used in the documents Japan submitted to the USA following World War II.

According to the late permanent director of the Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade Shogoro Takahashi, China was the first to name Diaoyu Islands and other islands, and the inherent names of Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet were clearly Chinese names just as the names of Huaping Islet, Mianhua Islet, Pengjia Islet, and other islands. Japan does not have islands include islet in their names while Fujian Province, the Penghu Islands, and Taiwan Province have 29 islands have islet in their names, and there are even more of them in ancient Chinese maps.[51]

6. *Some of the maps published in Japan before 1894 marked Diaoyu Island other islands within the scope of Okinawa Prefecture, but none of their names were*

[50]*The Yomiuri Shimbun*, September 18, 1970.

[51]Shogoro Takahashi, "Notes on the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)," Jpn. ed., October 1979, in the Beijing Sino-Japanese Association for the Promotion of Journalism, *The Sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands*, Chin. ed., Beijing: People's Daily Press, 2013, p. 264.

correctly marked, were given complete names or used later by the Japanese government.

The Dai Nippon Shijn Geographic Map, published by the Japanese private sector in the third year of the Meiji Era (1870) has Chiwei Islet close to Kume Island of the Ryukyu Kingdom. However, back then Ryukyu wasn't Japan's Okinawa Prefecture yet, so the author of this map mistakenly had Chiwei Islet, China's easternmost island, in the scope of the Ryukyu Kingdom. However, this wasn't recognized by the Ryukyu Kingdom and cannot prove anything.

Another example is the Map of the Administration of Japan's Prefectures drawn by the Japanese Bureau of Geography in the 12th year of the Meiji Era (1879). The map includes Diaoyu Island in the Map of the Ryukyu Islands and Okinawa Prefecture, but it is marked as Huaping Islet and other islands affiliated with Diaoyu Island are not mentioned. This fully shows that the Japanese government, which had just annexed Ryukyu, didn't understand the Diaoyu Islands well and wasn't even aware of the names of the islands. Therefore, this official map of Japan cannot prove anything.

7. *In June 1894, the Japanese Navy marked the Diaoyu Islands, which were affiliated with Taiwan, in The Japan Sea Directory as Japanese territory without authorization.*

This was an illegal move that Japan made without going through any diplomatic negotiations; it was also the first step Japan took to steal the Diaoyu Islands. Probably for the purpose of deceiving the public, in the Japan Sea Directory the Japanese Navy neither used the inherent names of the Chinese islands nor used Chinese characters to mark the transliterations of the English names of the islands. On the contrary, the Japanese Navy used katakana, which is usually not readily understood by the Chinese or people of other countries, to serve as the names of these islands. For example, Diaoyu Island was written as ホアピンス島, Huangwei Islet as チヤウス島, Chiwei Islet as ラレー岩, and Nanxiao Island and Beixiao Island as ピンナクル諸嶼 (see Fig. 4.84).

However, the Diaoyu Islands are not included in Japan's Nansei Shoto Islands in the map in Volume 2 of *The Japan Sea Directory* (see Fig. 4.85).

This shows that the map compiler had a guilty conscience.

8. *During Japan's colonial rule of Taiwan, the Diaoyu Islands were still the fishing ground of Taiwan. The Map of Offshore Fishing Grounds in Okinawa Prefecture Japan drew in secret in 1943 is one of the evidences for that.*

The Map of Offshore Fishing Grounds in Okinawa Prefecture was produced secretly based on military secrets by the Ishigaki Measurement Center and numbered "Ishigaki Measurement Secret Document No. 242." The map was issued by Junichi Daiwa, then chief of the center and was attached to No. 1 Explorative Report on the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) of the Japanese Central



石垣島ヨリ宮古島ニ航スルモノハ其凡中間ニ位スル水納(ミヅノ)多眞間ノ二低嶼ニ注意スヘシ何トナレハ此嶼ヨリ廣濶ナル礁脈北方ニ斗出スル一里三鏈又夫ヨリ北々東十里間ハ海底淺ク且險惡ナレハナリ○英艦「サマラン」號ハ石垣港ヲ開航シタル後其下風五里ノ處ニ破浪ヲ見ケノチ通過セシ時俄然水深七尋ニ減スルヲ驗シ直ニ轉針セリト云フ○海軍海圖ヲ見ルニ該二低嶼ノ北東凡九里ノ處ニ水深八尋ト點記セリ此近傍タルヤ未ダ鑓測ヲ施サヽルカ故ニ或ハ海底凹凸ニシテ猶之ヨリ淺キ隱險物ノ存在スルモノアルヤ知ルヘカラス航海者ハ宜ク警戒ヲ要スヘシ

北東信風時中ハ常ニ煙霧及雨ヲ伴フ所ノ暴風アルヲ以テ此季節中ハ清朗ノ日ニアラサレハ該諸島ニ接近スルヿ其危難ナリ

海流ハ該諸島ニ接近スルニ從テ愈偏南及偏東ニ壓流スル而シテ艘東方ニ進ムニ從ヒ愈强勢ナル驗ニ遇フ是レ實ニ群島西部ニ於テ常ニ吹ク所ノモノナリ

凡十二尋ノ水道ヲ存ス○此諸嶼ハ元來堅實ナル一塊ノ凱色(ガイショク)柱石ヨリ突起シタル後分裂破碎シテ幾多ノ尖岩トナレルモノヽ如シ而シテ此等ノ尖岩ハ一タヒ暴風若クハ地震ニ遇ハヽ忽崩壞セントスルノ觀アリ

チアウス島

此島ハ北緯二五度五八分三〇秒東經一二三度四〇分即チ(ホアピンス島ノ北東凡十五里ノ處ニアリテ綠色ノ白斑點アル大磊石ヨリ成ルモノヽ如シ島頂高六〇〇呎其中腹矮樹疎生ス

日本水路誌卷二終

表潮及度緯經地各

原子午線 ○倍ハ東 ○倍ハ西

名	地	位	緯	東	經	北	年	量	大潮升	小潮升
南洋諸島										
本										
硫黄島	硫黄島	東海岸	24°	47′	141°	19′	明治二十八年		6	4
父島	父島	二見港	27	5	142	12	明治二十八年		6	4
母島	母島	沖村	26	40	142	11	明治二十八年		6	4
南鳥島	南鳥島	東北岸	24	17	153	59	明治二十八年		6	4
沖ノ鳥島	沖ノ鳥島	東北礁	20	25	136	5	明治二十八年		6	4
南鳥島	南鳥島	東北岸	24	17	153	59	明治二十八年		6	4
沖ノ鳥島	沖ノ鳥島	東北礁	20	25	136	5	明治二十八年		6	4
南洋諸島										
本										
硫黄島	硫黄島	東海岸	24°	47′	141°	19′	明治二十八年		6	4
父島	父島	二見港	27	5	142	12	明治二十八年		6	4
母島	母島	沖村	26	40	142	11	明治二十八年		6	4
南鳥島	南鳥島	東北岸	24	17	153	59	明治二十八年		6	4
沖ノ鳥島	沖ノ鳥島	東北礁	20	25	136	5	明治二十八年		6	4

Fig. 4.84 Japanese Navy, *The Japan Sea Directory,* 1894



Fig. 4.85 Japanese Navy, *The Japan Sea Directory,* Map, 1894 not including the Diaoyu Islands

Meteorological Observatory.[52] In the map, the names of the islands—Uotsuri Island (Diaoyu Island), Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet—are all specified with Chinese characters. In addition, a dotted line closely connects them with the northern offshore islets of Huaping and Pengjia to form the unified Taiwan northeast offshore fishing ground for skipjack tuna, while all the fishing grounds are referred to as the Sone fishing ground and marked otherwise. To be more specific, ソネ, the katakana for Sone, is written under all the fishing grounds in Japan's Kagoshima and Okinawa prefectures to distinguish them from the Taiwan fishing ground. To make it more convenient for the readers, I have attached here the map and an amplified part of it (see Fig. 4.86).

[52]The Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) Documents and Data Compilation Committee, *Research on the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands): An Explorative Report on the Fisheries in the Waters of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)–Trends in Okinawa Prefecture from the Eve of World War II to 1972 When the Prefecture Was Reverted to Japan,* Jpn. ed., 2010, p. 77.



Fig. 4.86 Japan Ishigaki Measurement Center, Map of Offshore Fishing Grounds, Secret Document No. 242, 1943

This shows that the names the Japanese government gave to the Diaoyu Islands in order to steal them were not even recognized by the Ishigaki local government which had these islands under their administration. The way the map was drawn indicates that the Diaoyu Islands were part of the northeastern islands of Taiwan, not part of the Ryukyu Islands. This will be further discussed in the last part of Sect. 6, Chap. 5 to prove that either the Ishigaki local government in Okinawa, Japan, or the Office of Governor-General of Taiwan during the colonial period of Taiwan, held this opinion, and the Japanese central government might be well aware of this.

9. *The historical understanding of the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands by the leader and other members of the Postwar Ryukyu Academic Investigation Group proves that the Diaoyu Islands are not the inherent territory of Japan.*

From the end of World War II to 1972, the Ryukyu Islands under the occupation of the US forces didn't belong to Japan. Back then both Taiwan fishermen and the Ryukyuans had free access to the islands to catch fish and birds or conduct scientific investigations. The Postwar Ryukyu Academic Investigation Group, headed by Professor Tetuo Takayoshi of the University of the Ryukyus (later he became the university's president) landed on the islands to study the animals, plants, and natural environments there on five occasions in April 1950, May 1952, August 1953, May 1963, and July 1968. Their main purpose was to protect the albatrosses and other birds on the islands.

When commenting on the history of the Diaoyu Islands, Tetuo Takayoshi stated in 1963, "Tatsushiro Koga was said to have discovered the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) in the 17th year of the Meiji Era (1884), but they had been known much earlier, though it was not clear to whom it belonged to. To be more specific,

in the ancient times they were used sea markers on the route to Fuzhou of the Qing Dynasty, they were mentioned in the *History of Chûzan* and the *Record of Messages from Chûzan*. In addition, it is reported that the British warship H. M. S. *Samarang* reached Uotsuri Island (Diaoyu Island) during its measurement in the Eastern Seas from 1843 to 1846. Following the Japan-Qing War (Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895), the island was made Japanese territory in the 29th year of the Meiji Era (1896) under Decree 13 and put under the administration of the Ishigaki Village of the Yaeyama Islands."[53]

Shinjyun Wada, the Ryukyu botanist, archaeologist, and historian who joined in Yoshitoshi Takada's exploration of the Diaoyu Islands, shared this view. Wada landed on the Diaoyu Islands and based on his investigative results, he confirmed that those islands had been uninhabited since ancient times. He stated, "The envoys sent by the Ryukyu Kingdom to the Tang Dynasty set sail from Naha. After they arrived in Kume Island, they moved on to Fuzhou, China, via Chiwei Islet and Uotsuri Island (Diaoyu Island) to China. The Diaoyu Islands were said to be discovered by Tatsushiro Koga in the 17th year of the Meiji Era (1884), but that wasn't a discovery in the true sense of the word. This was also true with the British warship H. M. S. *Samarang,* which moved past Uotsuri Island (Diaoyu Island) in its exploration in the Eastern Seas during the years 1843–1846." Shinjyun Wada was self-contradictory when he said, "The Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) have been part of Ryukyu since ancient times, however their sovereignty had not been decided for long. In the 27th year of the Meiji Era (1894), the year after the end of the Japan-Qing War (Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895), these islands were incorporated into Ishigaki Town, Yaeyama District, as the territory of the Empire of Japan."

The above statement further proves that following World War II, the Ryukyuans also admitted that the Chinese were the first to discover the Diaoyu Islands and that the so-called Tatsushiro Koga's discover of the Diaoyu Islands in 1884 was only a rumor. It wasn't until after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 that Japan made the Diaoyu Islands Japanese territory. However, Takada and Wada made the same mistake, that is, they believed that the Diaoyu Islands were incorporated into Japanese territory and put under the administration of Ishigaki Village under Decree 13 of the Japanese Emperor in the 29th year of the Meiji Era (1896). However, this is not true and a repetition of the mistake made by others. Just as I discussed above, the scope of Okinawa Prefecture determined by Decree 13 didn't include the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) or the Diaoyu Islands. Therefore, this is not the basis for affirming that the Diaoyu Islands were the territory of Japan or Ryukyu.

However, this mistake led them to have the wrong understanding and action regarding to the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. For example, when they landed on the islands for explorative purposes, they didn't seem to realize that these uninhabited islands must be reverted to China as islands affiliated with Taiwan in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Declaration. The academic

[53]Tetuo Takayoshi, "The Perishing Albatrosses: An on-the-Spot Investigation of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands), The *Ryukyu Shimpo*, May 3, 1963.

research they did on the islands was purely a biological and natural sciences exploration by private persons. What they did can absolutely not serve as the basis of Japan regaining the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands following World War II. Their wrong understanding of the sovereignty over the islands must be clarified so that nobody will repeat their mistake.

Then how do Okinawa historians understand the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands today? The Japanese government has always worked to ensure that Okinawa scholars collect relevant historic data for it to prove that the Diaoyu Islands are its inherent territory. The Shinzo Abe cabinet established within the Cabinet Secretariat the Office of Policy Planning and Coordination on Territory and Sovereignty. Since 2014, the office has entrusted the Okinawa Peace Assistance Center to investigate data concerning the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) in Okinawa Prefecture and elsewhere in Japan. These survey reports were posted on the official Web sites of the cabinet and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2015 and 2016. The reports reflected some opinions of Ryukyu historians.

It may be worth noting that the Survey report on Data concerning the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands), a project entrusted by the Japanese Cabinet Secretariat, was completed in March 2016 based on the documents from more than 30 Japanese libraries, museums and data centers and found over 300 pieces of information about the Diaoyu Islands in Japan. This report actually only revealed 19 representative pictures, of which eight reflected the poaching done by the Japanese on the Diaoyu Islands before Japan stole them as well as Japan's secret exploration of the islands; two were about what things were like before Japan decided to steal those islands; 4 were about Japan's colonial rule of Taiwan; and five reflected Japan's understanding of the Diaoyu Islands and the Ryukyu government's exercise of the so-called administration of those island from the end of World War II to 1972 when Okinawa Prefecture was reverted to Japan.

However, the pictures included in the report not only failed to prove that the Diaoyu Islands are the inherent territory of Japan but also backfired. Apparently the report kept to the position of the Japanese government and produced some pictures (which have be explained and clarified in this book), and in fact it contained so views that were different from the Japanese government's view that "the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) are the inherent territory of Japan."

For example, Kurayoshi Takara, senior member of the committee for drafting this report, honorary professor of the University of the Ryukyus, and expert of Ryukyu history, stated in the preface of the report, "In the 500 years of the Ryukyu Kingdom, the Ryukyuans actively moved around the sea (the East China Sea) between the Ryukyu Islands and China's mainland. Unfortunately, there have been known records of what they call this sea," the scope of the Ryukyu Kingdom "didn't include the 'Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)' (Diaoyu Islands)."[54] He added, "Before modern times, the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) didn't belong

[54]The survey report entrusted by the Japanese Cabinet Secretariat, "A survey report on Data concerning the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)," March 2016, p. 3.

to Ryukyu, nor did they belong to anyone else…. They were merely '*terra nullius*.'" It is meaningful that in the preface Professor Takara had the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) and *terra nullius* in quotes. He concluded that "It is our hope that this report will serve as the basis of discussing history based on facts." This shows a delicate difference between the opinion of the person who drafted the report and the Japanese government's obstinate position not to admit the China–Japan dispute over the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands (see Fig. 4.87).

In about 500 years of exchange between China and Ryukyu, China had many records of the Diaoyu Islands and related waters. Since the Ming Dynasty, China referred to the East China Sea as the Great Ming Sea, called the waters from Fujian and Zhejiang to the Okinawa Trough the Fujian Sea, and referred to the waters east of Chiwei Islet and the Ryukyu Kingdom as the Ryukyu Sea. Qing China, however, recorded the East China Sea as the Great Qing Sea and published history books such as *A Record of the Fujian Sea*. In the last years of the Qing Dynasty, China



はじめに

琉球王国時代の約500年間、琉球の島々と中国大陸を隔てる大海（東シナ海）を、琉球人たちは活発に往来していました。その海を彼らは何と呼んでいたのか、残念ながら残された記録に名称は登場しません。那覇を出て、慶良間の島々や久米島の近海を通り、はるか向こうの福建を目指す長い船旅を幾度となく繰り返したのですが、慣れ親しんだその海に名前を付ける必要などなかったのかもしれません。

しかし、断言できることは、その海を最も頻繁に往来した航海者が琉球人だったことです。航海の中途に、「尖閣諸島」が存在していました。人は住んでおらず、港湾として利用できる場所もない島々でした。その島々は、琉球―福建航海ルート上の寄港地ではなく、途上に横たわる道標のような存在だったのです。

有人の島々に対して、琉球王国は間切・シマ制度と呼ばれる行政体制を構築していました。古琉球期には北端の奄美大島、南端の波照間島、東端の沖縄島、西端の与那国島がその範囲であり、無人の大東諸島や尖閣諸島などは含まれていませんでした。首里城を拠点とする王府体制は、海上交通を介してそれら有人の島々を統治していたのです。

しかし、無人の島々で、行政行為を及ぼす地域ではなかったものの、「尖閣諸島」は琉球人にとって重要な存在でした。琉球―福建ルートを安全に、定期的に航海するうえで不可欠な地理的知識の一部だったからです。その島々を確認しながら、どのように進路をとるべきか、慎重な作業を行ったはずです。

言うまでもなく、前近代において、「尖閣諸島」は琉球のものではなく、琉球以外の誰のものでもありませんでした。その島々を自分のものとする理由や動機が存在しなかったからです。航海者にとって道標の意味を持つ地点であり、「無主地」に過ぎなかったのです。

近代に入り、「尖閣諸島」に対して誰が、どのような行為を積み重ねてきたのか。その経緯を丹念に検証し、同時にまた、その裏付けとなるぼう大な資料を収集することによって、歴史の実像を明らかにすることを目指した成果が、この報告書です。言い換えると、近現代における「尖閣諸島」の歴史実態を実証的に解明する作業の一部です。

この報告書が、事実に即して歴史を語る議論の基礎となることを切望します。

平成28年（2016年）3月
尖閣諸島関係資料調査研究委員会
座長　高良倉吉

Fig. 4.87 Yoshitoshi Takada, preface to "A survey report on Data concerning the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)"

began to call that sea the East Sea. Afterward, the sea was renamed the East China Sea which included the Min Sea. In 1933, Fujian Province, China, was even renamed Fujian Sea Province. Today the East China Sea has become an internationally recognized name. This suffices to prove that the Diaoyu Islands and the related waters have been part of China since ancient times.

To sum up, the latest research report published as entrusted by the Japanese cabinet in 2016 has confirmed that Japan's Okinawa Prefecture used to be the Ryukyu Kingdom with a history of about 500 years and is not the inherent territory of Japan; that the Diaoyu Islands had never been part of the Ryukyuan historically; and that the report does not have evidence that the Diaoyu Islands were *terra nullius* and weren't Chinese islands before 1895. This shows that negating that the Diaoyu Islands are China's inherent territory is baseless in terms of both facts and legality.

Chapter 5
Japan Stole the Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet from China During the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895

The fundamental cause of the Diaoyu Islands issue today is the colonial expansion pursued by the Japanese imperialists since the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. So far the Japanese government has failed to make a thorough self-examination and clarify this section of history; on the contrary, it has tried its best to safeguard this virtual "national interest" of Japan. This keeps the issue from being solved.

So far, the Japanese government has continued to maintain, "Historically, the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) have been Japanese territory as part of the Nansei Shoto Islands. To be more specific, since 1885, the Japanese government had had the Okinawa Prefecture government and other sources conduct several on-the-spot explorations of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands), and carefully determined that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) were not only uninhabited islands but also had no signs of Qing rule. On this basis on January 14, 1895, it was decided at a cabinet meeting to erect markers on the islands to officially make them part of our country's territory. In terms of international law, this was done in accordance with the method of legally securing ownership (the occupation principle). The Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) were not included in Taiwan and the Penghu Islands the Qing government ceded to Japan in accordance with Article 2 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki which was concluded in April 1895."[1] The statement cannot change the fact that the Japanese Meiji government stole the Diaoyu Islands through the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, and moreover, it proves that these islands had never been ruled by Japan before 1895. The Japan government doesn't have any evidence of its occupation of all of the islands of the Diaoyu Islands (referred to the so-called Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) in Japan). The relevant secret Japanese decision only mentioned Uotsuri Island and Kuba Island, that is, Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet, but it failed to include Chiwei Islet and other islands or refer to them in their joint term.

[1] http://www.cn.emb-japan.go.jp/fpolicy/senkaku_3.htm#1.

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J. Liu, *The Diaoyu Islands*, China Academic Library,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8699-2_5

5.1 Japan Stole the Diaoyu Islands: A Result of Expansion After the Annexation of the Ryukyu Kingdom

The Japanese government claims that "the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) are the inherent territory of Japan" and are under the administration of Okinawa Prefecture. However, just I discussed above, Okinawa Prefecture used to be the Ryukyu Kingdom with a history of more than 500 years and is not the inherent territory of Japan, so it is even less possible for the Diaoyu Islands, which were not part of the Ryukyu Kingdom, to be Japanese inherent territory. It is therefore groundless to say that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) are the inherent territory of Japan.

1. *Japan's annexation of Ryukyu was a continuation of Hideyoshi Toyotomi's policy of external aggression and expansion and an inevitable result of the historic changes in the balance of power between China and Japan.*

Japan had always had an ambition of annexing Ryukyu. The Ryukyu Kingdom was coveted by Japan in 1534 when Chen Kan went to Ryukyu for investiture purposes. According to Chen Kan's *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu*, "I was told that the Japanese wanted to murder the Chûzan King." Back then the Ryukyu King had his man apologize to Chen Kan for not meeting him at his place earlier because "'the Japanese are staying here. They are so cunning that we don't know what they want. I will meet you as soon as they leave. I cannot wait to see you.' We replied, 'We understand.' Japan is arrogant and the Japanese live a secluded life and have a very limited outlook."[2]

After Hideyoshi Toyotomi won the civil war and achieved unification of Japan in 1590, he invaded Korea in 1592 and 1597 for the purpose of invading China. In August 1588, Satsuma han leader Yoshihisa Shimazu wrote to Ryukyu King Shō Ei, demanding that he sent an envoy to congratulate Hideyoshi Toyotomi on his promotion to kampaku. Back then, in order to indicate that Japan "ruled Ryukyu," Shimazu passed on to the Ryukyu Kingdom Satsuma han's contribution to soldiers' pay which Hideyoshi Toyotomi's needed to invade Korea. Shō Ei rejected him, but he died soon and King Shō Nei ascended the throne.

It may be worth noting that in the year after Hideyoshi Toyotomi launched military invasion of Korea, he had his men travel to the Philippines to demand tribute to Japan. In the same year, the Japanese envoy who travelled past Taiwan brought an "amnesty instrument" to the king of the so-called Kingdom of Gaoshan (Taiwan), demand Taiwan declare itself a vassal and send tribute to Japan, threatening that "if you fail to appear before the Japanese Emperor, generals will be sent to attack you." However, as Taiwan didn't have a "Kingdom of Gaoshan" or

[2]Chen Kan, *Record of My Mission to Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., 13th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Jiajing (1534) in Huang Runhua and Xueying (eds.), *The National Library of China Data of Ryukyu,* Chin. ed., Beijing: National Library of China Press, October 2000, vol. 1, pp. 44–45.

"Gaoshan king," the instrument could not be delivered and Japan therefore failed to achieve its purpose.

In 1594, the Ming government sent Li Rusong to lead 40,000 troops to aid Korea. Li worked with Korean General Yi Sun-sin in defeating the Japanese Army. The Ryukyu King refused to contribute to Japanese soldiers' pay on behalf of Satsuma han and continued to send tribute to China. In February 1597, Hideyoshi Toyotomi had 140,000 of men invade Korea again; however, as Hideyoshi Toyotomi died of illness, the Japanese Army had to withdraw from the Korean Peninsula in December of the same year. Thereafter, it took Japan 270 years beginning from 1609 to eventually annex the Ryukyu Kingdom with force in the five steps as follows:

Step 1: On March 14, 1609, Satsuma han leader Iehisa Shimazu of the Fourth Army under the command of Hideyoshi Toyotomi sent General Hisakata Habayama to launch a military invasion of the Ryukyu Kingdom. More than 3000 Japanese troops and over 80 warships invaded Ryukyu. They seized the imperial palace in Shuri Castle, Naha, captured Ryukyu King Shō Nei, and forced him to surrender and offer tribute to Japan. Japan also seized Ryukyu's Amami Islands. In 1611, Iehisa Shimazu informed Ryukyu King Shō Nei of the islands that should pay tribute to Japan. These islands included Kume Island, Miyako Island, and Yaeyama Island, but they didn't include the Diaoyu Islands.[3] Shō Nei hated Satsuma han, so he complained in his letter to the Ministry of Rites of Ming China in 1613, "The Japanese are cunning. In the past they attacked Korean, and now they do harm to Ryukyu."[4] Back then, the Tokugawa Shogunate, Japan's central government, recognized Satsuma han's seizure of Ryukyu. However, in order to seek trade interest by taking advantage of Ryukyu's traditional relations with China, Japan. On the surface, Japan kept the rule of the Ryukyu King intact, while in secret it exercised "indirect rule" of Ryukyu through the good office of the han representative in Naha. The greater strategic goal of Japan was to change the Chinese tributary system established in East Asia with China at the center, seize China's Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula, make Japan the leader of East Asia by force, and secure supremacy in Asia.

Step 2: The decline of China following the Opium War of 1840 and the rise of Japan following the Meiji Restoration in 1868 led to the change in the historical destiny of the Ryukyu Kingdom. In 1871, Tsarist Russia invaded Xinjiang, China. Taking advantage of this, on the one hand, Japan tried to increase its ties with China and signed the Sino-Japanese Friendship Agreement; on the other hand, Japan made attempts to annex Ryukyu. After local tyrants of Satsuma han and Chōshū han such as Toshimichi Okubo came to power, Japan was determined to put an end to the Ryukyu's vassal relationship with China and make Ryukyu part of Japan. On September 14, 1872, the Japanese Meiji government suddenly announced to make

[3]Tetuto Wumeki, *History of the New Ryukyu Kingdom*, Jpn. ed., Tokyo: Hosei University Press, 2013, p. 115.

[4]Ibid., p. 111.

Ryukyu King Shō Tai a han king and an order of nobility[5] and rename the Ryukyu Kingdom the Ryukyu han of Japan. The *Record of Ryukyu han*, produced by the Japanese Ministry of Finance in the sixth year of the Meiji Era (1873), has a detailed account of all the islands, villages, and population of Ryukyu, and the islands don't include Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, Chiwei Islet, and other islands affiliated with Taiwan. The Document on Issuing National Flags and Statues to Five of Ryukyu Islands Including Kume Island, issued by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on March 6 of the same year, said, "National borders have not be demarcated for isolated islands in the sea and these islands may be seized by other countries. Ryukyu han is hereby issued seven large and medium-sized national flags. The flags should fly from sunrise to sunset every day at government offices of the five islands of Kume, Miyako, Ishigaki, Iriomote Island and Yonaguni."[6] The person of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who was in charge of this was Sadaka Ijichi who wrote the *Annals of Okinawa Prefecture* just as I discussed above.

Step 3: Back then, the purpose of Japan's expansion was first and foremost to annex Ryukyu. To this end, Japan invaded Taiwan first. On October 18, 1871, four ships of Ryukyu's Miyako Island which set sail from Naha were struck by thunderstorms. One of the ships floated to southern Taiwan. It ran on rocks and three of the 69 people aboard were drowned, and the other 66 landed on Taiwan and had a fight with the aboriginals. Fifty-four were killed in the fight. and the 12 survivors fled to Fengshan County, Taiwan, were rescued by the local Qing officials and transferred to the Ryukyu Center in Fuzhou. On June 2, 1872, they left Fuzhou by ship and returned to June 7.[7] After the Japanese Meiji government got to know this, it began to plan for invading Taiwan on this excuse and annex Ryukyu. However, Ryukyu wasn't the territory of Japan after all, and Japan didn't have good reason to launch military attacks on it and was not prepared for them. Moreover, even in 1872 when Japan renamed Ryukyu Ryukyu han by taking advantage of Tsarist Russia's invasion of the Ili region, Xinjiang, China, the Chinese Qing government still stressed that the people of Ryukyu weren't the subject of Japan.

In the summer of 1872, the then Vice Minister of Finance Inoue Kaoru proposed that the Japanese government should make Ryukyu Japanese territory. He stated

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[5]Before World War II Japan had a strict caste system. Back then orders of nobility were usually han chiefs, second only to members of the imperial family in status, higher than members of the shizoku which consisted of warriors, and members of the shizoku were higher than ordinary people in status. The Constitution of the Empire of Japan promulgated on February 11, 1889, stipulated that the Imperial Diet shall consist of two Houses, a House of Peers and a House of Representatives and that the House of Peers shall be composed of the members of the Imperial Family, of the orders of nobility, and of those who have been nominated thereto by the Emperor. This stipulation was nullified when the postwar Constitution of Japan went into effect on May 3, 1947.

[6]Tatsuo Urano et al. (eds.), *Collection of Research Data concerning the Diaoyutai Islands (Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands))Issue,* Chin. ed., Hong Kong: Lizhi Press and Tousuishobou, 2001, pp. 163–164.

[7]Seikiyo Matayoshi, *Taiwan and Okinawa as Japan's Colonies*, Jpn. ed., Okinawa AKI Press, 1990, p. 313.

that "Japan should remain undecided as it did before. It should take action to expand the territory of the Empire of Japan provided it doesn't use force to invade and seize territory. We should approach their chiefs and condemn them for not being loyal to Japan… and then incorporate their territory into Japan and put it under our administration…." Then, Japanese government held, "It is unreasonable for Ryukyu to pledge allegiance to both Japan and China. However, if we correct them and bring them solely under the administration of Japan, we will run into conflict with the Qing Dynasty. Even if no disputes arise, we will get nothing because the formalities will be extremely complicated. A false reputation is not so important as actual results. Having been appointed by Qing, Ryukyu uses China's calendar, which amounts to no more than a false reputation, whereas Iehisa Shimazu sent troops to attack Ryukyu to reap real results. We enjoy real results while the Qing Dynasty only has a false reputation, so it is advisable not to have a dispute with it."[8]

However, four Japanese people from Oda Prefecture died in Taiwan, thus giving Japan the excuse for launching military attacks on Taiwan. In October of the same year, there was a political upheaval in Japan. After Toshimichi Okubo rose to prominence, he formulated the policy for handling the issue of Taiwan on February 6, 1874. It also sent spies to Taiwan to collect intelligence in preparation for military attacks on Taiwan. On May 17 of the same year, Chancellor Sanetomi Sanjo issued an announcement about Japan's first military attack on Taiwan. In response to the two events that had taken place in Taiwan, the announcement said, "Taiwan is close to Japan. After transport was opened between the two countries, some Japanese traveled to Taiwan by sea, so this kind of events is a source of worry. Tsugumichi Saigō is hereby sent to lead a military attack on Taiwan to revenge the death of our people and ensure the safety of the maritime routes for our people is safe."[9] On the same day, Tsugumichi Saigō led 3658 troops in set off from Nagasaki to launch military attacks on Taiwan. This marked the first step Japan took to pursue external aggression and expansion on the excuse of ensuring the safety of maritime routes.

Thereafter, Toshimichi Okubo, who had actively taken part in and made plans for invading Taiwan, travelled to Beijing for 40-day talks. On October 31 of the same year, Japan forced the Qing government to sign the Sino-Japanese Peking Treaty; Article 1 of the treaty went so far as to state, "The Empire of Japan has taken this action for the just cause of protecting its people and China shall not condemn it for this."[10] China also paid Japan 500,000 taels of silver as compensation for Japan's military action and the loss it suffered therein. This was the first

[8]Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs files: Ohkura Taiyuu Inouea Kaoru's Proposal to Include Ryukyu in Japanese Territory.

[9]Michiyuki Matsuda, "Punishing Taiwan," *Dealing with Ryukyu* (vol. 1) (*Data concerning the Ryukyu Issue,* vol. 6), Jpn. ed., Tokyo: Honboshyoseki Co., Ltd., 1990, pp. 324–325.

[10]Guan Jie, Tang Gongchun, Guo Fuchun, and Liu Enge (eds.), *The Complete History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895*, vol. 1, Pre-War Chapter, Chin. ed., Jilin People's Publishing House, 2005, pp. 275–276.

move the Japanese Meiji government made toward external aggression and used the death in Taiwan of the Ryukyuans and the Japanese people of Oda Prefecture as the excuse for the military attacks on Taiwan. Back then, the Qing government failed to see through this trick of Japan and believed that it should behave kindly to Japan in return for its unkindness. However, after Toshimichi Okubo returned to Japan, he declared that on the basis of the Sino-Japanese Peking Treaty, Ryukyu belonged to Japan, though that didn't mean the boundary had been delineated between China and Japan.

Step 4: Japanese Internal Affairs Secretary Michiyuki Matsuda issued "nine orders" to Ryukyu han king Shō Tai in 1875, demanding, for example, Ryukyu put a complete stop to sending tribute to China, abolish the Ryukyu Center in Fuzhou, and immediately travel to Tokyo to express his gratitude to the Japanese Emperor, and put Ryukyu's political, foreign, military, trade, and cultural affairs under the administration of Japan. Ryukyu rejected the orders and continued its tributary relationship with China and the Ryukyu King sent people to China for help. In response, the Japanese Shogunate kept the Ryukyu King under house arrest and made him an order of nobility.

The Ryukyu Kingdom wasn't willing to be annexed by Japan, so it secretly sent a petition delegation headed by Shō Tokukō, also known as Kōchi Uēkata Chōjō, to China to salvage the country from subjugation. Shō Tokukō's father was the son of the Ryukyu Prime Minister Xiang Tongji, also known as Kochi Asanori,the husband of King Shō Iku's fourth daughter and the brother-in-law of Ryukyu's last king Shō Tai. On October 25 of the second year of the reign of Qing Emperor (1876), 39 Ryukyu representatives including Shō Tokukō, Sai Taite (Ike Taite), and Rin Seikō (Nashi Seikō) travelled to Fuzhou, reporting to Southern Fujian Governor-General He Jing and Fujian Provincial Ding Richang about the imminent subjugation of their country. He Jing and Ding Richang jointly reported to the Qing court about Japan working to subjugate Ryukyu and proposed that China's Minister He Ruzhong take up a matter with the Japanese government.

However, the Qing government only wanted US President Ulysses S. Grant to intervene in order to stop or delay Japan's attempt to annex Ryukyu. This would make it possible for China not to confront with Japan while also dealing with Russia. Therefore, after the Qing government received the report from Fujian officials, it didn't send any troops to aid the Ryukyu Kingdom. It didn't allow Shō Tokukō and others to travel on to Beijing. On the contrary, it demanded that the Japanese delegation return to Ryukyu instead of staying on in Fujian Province. Shō Tokukō and others didn't travel on to Beijing, but they didn't want to go back to Ryukyu, so they lingered on in Fujian Province for three years.[11]

Back then, China's Minister to Japan He Ruzhang argued with Japan strongly on just grounds. On September 12 of the fourth year of the reign of Qing Emperor Guangxu (1878), He Ruzhang and Vice Minister Si Guide jointly issued a

[11]Credit: Official website of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Fujian Provincial Government of China: http://218.85.73.164:8088/pub/fjfao/ztzl/wsz/dwjw/201011/t20101125_534693.htm.

diplomatic note to Japanese Foreign Minister Munenori Terashima, stating that the Ryukyu Kingdom "has been a country since ancient times. It has been a vassal of China since the fifth year of the reign of Ming Emperor Hongwu (1372), its kings have been appointed by China, and it has been sending tribute to China, and China has granted it autonomy. This has been the case until today…. Realizing that it is a small country, the great Qing Dynasty has granted it special treatment…. During the reign of Qing Emperor Xianfeng, the Ryukyu Kingdom signed agreements with the USA, France and the Netherlands. In these agreements Ryukyu used Chinese eras, calendars and language. Ryukyu is a vassal of my dynasty, which is known to all nations in Europe and Americas. We have learned that Japan has prohibited Ryukyu from sending tribute to China, which is an unreasonable thing my government does not believe Japan will do in disregard of its friendship with China to bully a small nation. We hope that Japan will value the increasing friendship between China and Japan since they signed the Sino-Japanese Friendship Agreement. According to Article 1 of the agreement, both China and Japan would treat each other's vassals with due respect and should never invade them. Both countries should stay committed to this…. If Japan bullies Ryukyu today in violation of old rules, how will it do justice to China and other countries that have signed treaties with Ryukyu? We sincerely hope that Japan will treat Ryukyu with respect, let it remain intact as a country and a political system, and not stop it sending tribute to China, which will increase our friendship and ties and keep Japan from becoming a laughing stock for other countries."[12]

However, Japan simply ignored He Ruzhang's note. On the contrary, it argued irrationally that the note was unreasonable, demanded that China repeal the note and reached out for a yard after taking an inch. Moreover, taking advantage of Li Hongzhang being eager to "beg the United States to persuade Japan," Japan asked former American President Grant to complain to Li Hongzhang, sowing discord between him and He Ruzhang in the hope Li Hongzhang would have He Ruzhang withdraw his note. Back then, Grant wrote the Qing government, stating that a document (He Ruzhang's diplomatic note) was strongly worded and upset the Japanese; if the notice was not withdrawn, negotiations could hardly continue; if it was withdrawn, then the Japanese would be happy and would send officials to negotiate with Chinese representatives.[13]As a result, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Qing Dynasty went so far as to write back to Grant, saying, "What we have said can be totally ignored." Li Hongzhang also blamed He Ruzhang for his allegedly "being inexperienced in foreign affairs and failing to choose the right wording."[14] The Qing government was weak in its argument in the case of Ryukyu, so China's Minister to Japan He Ruzhang tried to little avail.

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[12]*Hourei Series*, no. 2, *Data about the Sovereignty over Ryukyu*, vol. 8, "The Sovereignty over Ryukyu," parts 1–2, pp. 195–196.

[13]Wang Yunsheng, *Sixty Years of Sino-Japanese Relations*, Chin. ed., Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2006, p. 176.

[14]Kong Xiangji and Yujiro Murata, *Little-Known Sino-Japanese Alliance*, Chin. ed., Chengdu: Sichuan Publishing Group, 2004, pp. 19–20.

Having learned that Ryukyu was forcibly annexed by Japan, Shō Tokukō and others who had been staying in Fuzhou made their way to Beijing in violation of the Qing government's order and asked China to send troops to Ryukyu, but to no avail. Rin Seikō even threatened to commit suicide if the Qing Dynasty didn't send forces, but he didn't win the dynasty's sympathy. In the ten years from the time when these former Ryukyu officials arrived in Fuzhou to the 11th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Guangxu (1885), in order to save Ryukyu from subjugation, Shō Tokukō and others in Fuzhou, Beijing, and other areas presented letters of petition to the Fujian Provincial Government Secretariat, China's Minister to Japan, Beiyang Minister Li Hongzhang, Prince Gong Yi Xin who was in charge of foreign affairs, Zuo Zongtang who took charge of military affairs in Fujian Province, and Southern Fujian Governor Yang Changrui. China and Japan had held negotiations on Ryukyu on many occasions for years, but the issue had remained undecided. In addition to deciding the destiny of China and Japan, the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 decided the destiny of Ryukyu.

Step 5: The Japanese Meiji government sent troops to conquer and annex Ryukyu in 1879. On March 8 of the same year, Emperor Meiji announced that "the Ryukyu han has been abolished and Shō Tai should move to Tokyo." On March 27 of that year, Michiyuki Matsuda led about 600 Japanese military police in storming into the city of Shurijo and read the notice abolishing the han in favor of a prefecture and renaming the Ryukyu han Japan's Okinawa Prefecture. On April 4, 1880, Japan completely annexed Ryukyu despite the opposition of China. On May 10 of the same year, the Qing Prince Gong in charge of foreign affairs issued to Japan a diplomatic note, stating, "Ryukyu has been a nation since ancient times and its kings have long been appointed by China. Ryukyu uses China's calendar and has been sending tribute to it for several hundred years. Every country in the world knows this…. Even China takes it as a nation…. Other countries also believe it is an independent country. Ryukyu submits itself to the rule of China and Japan; China understands this and doesn't blame it for this. This is evidence that China takes it as a nation…. Now Japan has subjugated Ryukyu and cut Ryukyu's tribute to China, and this amounts to Japan's disregard of China and other countries…. I hereby issue this note to Japan demanding that it immediately stop abolishing Ryukyu and turning it into a Japanese prefecture."[15]

However, subjected to the suppression of European and American powers, China was not in a position to send troops to rescue Ryukyu. In 1879, the Qing government was fighting a fierce war in Ili, Xinjiang, with Tsarist Russia. Japan took this opportunity to fulfill his plan for annexing Ryukyu. Without the protection of China, the Ryukyuan could not but be annexed by Japan. On May 12, 1879, the Japanese government announced in Ryukyu that the Ryukyu Kingdom had been abolished and forcibly made the King of Ryukyu a Japanese Minister and the

[15]*Hourei Series*, no. 2, *Data about the Sovereignty over Ryukyu*, vol. 8, "The Sovereignty over Ryukyu," parts 1–2, pp. 270–273.

Ryukyuans Japanese subjects. So the so-called Ryukyu han was renamed by Japan as Okinawa Prefecture.

2. *The Qing Dynasty's Beiyang Minister Li Hongzhang argued forcibly with Japanese envoy Shinichiro Takezoe*[16] *to express China's opposition to Japan's illegal annexation of the Ryukyu Kingdom.*

The Qing government had always been opposed to Japan's seizure of Ryukyu. Regarding the standing of the Ryukyu Kingdom, Li Hongzhang made it clear to Japan that, "Ili is a quite different matter from Ryukyu. The former is part of China … while the latter is a nation and is not part of China or Japan."[17] This shows China didn't want to invade and seize weak or small countries and that China wanted to keep Japan from seeking expansion and disrupting peace in East Asia. The Japanese Meiji government held two separate talks with China in order to thoroughly annex Ryukyu and take that advantage to seek the same most-favored-nation status as that Europe and the USA had with China.

On December 7, 1879, Japan sent Shinichiro Takezoe who was well-versed in Confucianism to held secret talks with Li Hongzhang. First, Takezoe denied that Ryukyu had a tributary relationship with China and stressed that Ryukyu belonged to Japan. He said, "The world doesn't have a woman with two husbands. By the same token, how can a state belong to two countries? So Ryukyu can only belong to one country. We have a plenty of evidence that Ryukyu belongs to Japan…. It is bad that Ryukyu's status has been unverified. By making Ryukyu its prefecture, Japan is giving a proper status to it so that no other countries may covet it." He also smeared the Ryukyuans for sending tribute to China since the Ming Dynasty because they "wanted to use the glory of a big nation to show off itself."

Takezoe also fooled himself in challenging Li Hongzhang: "China is opposed to Japan's action and wrote a letter to my government, causing the Japanese to condemn China. The Japanese all believe that Ryukyu legally belongs to Japan, though it illegally sends tribute to China. However, the illegal party is condemning the legal party, which is tantamount to a woman having an affair with her neighbor who claims that the woman is his and blames her husband for being unfaithful and unrighteous. Is this reasonable? That is a sheer insult to Japan."[18] Takezoe said that Ryukyu had long belonged to Japan, so "abolishing the Ryukyu han in favor of a prefecture is the right of Japan."[19]

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[16]Shinichiro Takezoe supported the coup d'état of the Independence Party of Korea headed by Kim Ok-kyun when he was Japanese minister to Korea in 1884. On December 4 of the same year, Takezoe led troops in storming the Korean imperial palace in support of the government of the Independence Party, but he was defeated by the Qing forces in Korea. This is referred to as the Incident of 1884 in Korea.

[17]"Letters to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs," *Collected Works of Li Hongzhang,* Chin. ed., vol. 10, pp. 27–30.

[18]Ibid., pp. 13–15.

[19]Ibid., pp. 32–33.

In response, Li Hongzhang refuted, "Chinese history books never say Ryukyu belongs to Japan. Since the state of Ryukyu was founded, China has been sending envoys to appoint Ryukyu kings, and the envoys didn't report Japan's ownership of Ryukyu. The previous Chinese government's note to Japan stating Ryukyu is under the rule of both China and Japan was based on Sino-Japanese friendship…." Li Hongzhang stressed, "Ryukyu has been belonging to China since ancient times; this is a common knowledge all over the world; it is not a matter only a few people talked about for a while. No one in China will recognize Ryukyu as part of Japan. In Japan's previous agreement with China, Article 1 says the states owned by China refer to Korea, Ryukyu and other countries. Back then, neither Minister Plenipotentiary Munenari Date nor Taneomi Soejima who later exchanged diplomatic notes instruments didn't make it clear to China that Ryukyu belonged to Japan. But now Japan claims that Ryukyu is part of Japan, not China. This is tantamount to swearing black is white, which is quite unconvincing."

Takezoe defended, "Did you read the affidavits of Ryukyu kings and government officials? Ryukyu belongs to Japan, which is not a question open to discussion."

Li Hongzhang responded, "I didn't know of this until I read Japan's diplomatic note to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently. Never before had this appeared in any document or mentioned by anyone. According to the Ryukyuans, Ryukyu kings and officials are forced to read the affidavits and they don't always follow that rule, though Japan keeps an eye on them. I think everything is clear about that. It is sheer nonsense this should serve as evidence that Ryukyu belongs to Japan, not China."[20]

Li Hongzhang said that Japan's annexation of Ryukyu "is a policy of tyranny based on false pretense that nobody will tolerate."[21] Li Hongzhang had every reason to say so. In fact, on June 6, 1879, when Shō Tokukō was told in Fuzhou that the Ryukyu Kingdom received the secret report about the imminent collapse of the Ryukyu Kingdom, he immediately left for the north. On July 3, he arrived in Tianjin where he met with Li Hongzhang, asking for China's support for Ryukyu. On July 23, Shō Tokukō met with Li Hongzhang again and presented him a petition and reference materials that could be used for refuting Japanese arguments. The main ideas of the materials are as follows:

(1) Ryukyu has never sent tribute to Japan.
(2) Ryukyu's the Yaeyama Islands are close to Taiwan; they are only 200 km from Taiwan.
(3) It is groundless to say that the Ryukyu King is a descendant of the Japanese. Even if that were true, Japan should not seize Ryukyuan territory just as the British were not allowed to take the land of the USA.
(4) Japan uses force to keep King Shō Nei under house arrest.
(5) Ryukyu has its own religion and gods which were not introduced from Japan.

[20]Ibid., pp. 13–15.

[21]"Letter to the Japanese Minister Shinichiro Takezoe," ibid., pp. 35–38.

(6) Ryukyu weddings and funerals follow Chinese tradition. If Japan insists that they should be traditional, that tradition comes from China.
(7) If Japan believes that Ryukyu belongs to Japan because it uses 48 katakanas, then Japan belongs to China because it uses many Chinese characters.
(8) Ryukyu uses its own language.
(9) Ryukyu is an independent country that doesn't belong to Japan. Evidence can be found in history, language, geography, social customs, and systems.[22]

Back then, in order to totally annex Ryukyu, Japan had blockaded all Ryukyu ports, preventing the Ryukyuans from reporting the situation to China. As I discussed above, Shō Tokukō was ordered to travel to China on October 25, 1876, and asked the Qing government for aid based on the Ryukyu Center in Fuzhou. In April 1879, Shō Tokukō and others had become important assassination targets of Japanese spies in China for their activities in China. When Shinichiro Takezoe met with Li Hongzhang, he tried to find out how China would respond to Ryukyu's demand for aid in order to collect firsthand information and sow discord between China and Ryukyu.

Akezoe said, "This spring a couple of presumptuous Ryukyuans (meaning Shō Tokukō and others) have been spreading rumors everywhere, calling white black and black white, in order to obtain the aid of China. If China reads their letters, it will naturally sympathize with the weak and small Ryukyu. Rather than reviewing the matter carefully, China will simply admonish Japan for tyranny…. When I arrived at Tianjin, I was told by several sources that the Ryukyu King's brother-in-law Shō Tokukō has come here to ask China for help. I don't know why that is. Shō Tokukō should know what not to do. The rumors start from the Ryukyuans—Whoever tied the knot on the bell is the one to untie it. The Ryukyuans who send tribute to China want to use the glory of a big nation to show off itself. In fact, Ryukyu is a vassal of Japan."[23]

At the same time, taking advantage of the international situation unfavorable to China in which Russia, Germany, and other countries were attempting to seize Asia, Akezoe hypocritically offered China its policy of Japan–Qing cooperation and urged Li Hongzhang not to ignore the big picture by focusing on the small region of Ryukyu. He told Li Hongzhang, "Japan and China are the only two countries in the east that have become imperial powers. We are the same race, share similar languages and are interdependent neighbors, so we need to work together to resist foreign aggression. But now our relations are being damaged by a couple of presumptuous Ryukyuans who want the shepherds to quarrel so the wolf has a winning game. That's what I worried about."[24]

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[22]Atsushi Shiitada, *The National Salvation Movement of Ryukyu: Anti-Japanese Ideology and Action*, Jpn. ed., 2011, p. 146.

[23]"Letters to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs," *Collected Works of Li Hongzhang,* Chin. ed., vol. 10, pp. 11–12.

[24]Ibid.

Li Hongzhang was keenly aware that China was faced with difficult problems both at home and abroad. He tried his best to rebut Akezoe's assertions, but he was at a loss what to do to rescue Ryukyu. He could not but ask former US President Grant to mediate to prostrate the process of Japan's occupation of Ryukyu in the hope things would change for the better. So he told Akezoe that he hoped Japan would send high-ranking officials to further negotiate the matter.

3. *Former US President Grant's mediation failed to produce the result Li Hongzhang had wanted, and Japan proposed that making the Yaeyama Islands and Miyako Islands Chinese territory in return for China granting unilateral most-favored-nation status to Japan.*

In March 1880, Akezoe and Li Hongzhang held their second secret talk with a focus on how to resolve the Ryukyu issue by giving China more islands and expanding the friendship agreement. At first Akezoe stressed the need to expand the friendship agreement and provided Li Hongzhang with the proposed amendment to the 1872 Sino-Japanese Friendship Agreement in the hope that China would agree to the amendment and grant Japan the unilateral most-favored-nation status as it had done to European and American countries. According to Article 1 of the amendment, "All the conveniences either country has provided or will provide to other peoples will be provided to each other, and they should not favor other countries more than each other…."[25] This article is apparently equal, but it was actually based on the assumption that China and Japan weren't equal nations. To be more specific, back then China signed unequal treaties with European and American countries and granted them unilateral most-favored-nation status as their semi-colony, but China was not a semi-colony of Japan. Therefore, the reason Japan delivered to China the fine words "Japan and China are the same race, share similar languages, are bosom friends, and are interdependent neighbors" was that it wanted to secure the position as a quasi-colonial power of China at the cost of Ryukyu and permanently seize most of Ryukyu islands.

In response, Li Hongzhang said, "In the letter of former American President Grant, he doesn't think Ryukyu solely belongs to Japan, so he hopes the issue will be settled through negotiation. For the benefit of East Asia, China and Japan should increase their friendship. Japan started the Ryukyu dispute, and China has been exercising restraint over the issue for the benefit of the friendship of our two countries and the East as a whole…. With the Ryukyu issue still pending solution, Japan is now trying to revise the trade agreement with China in order to contain the Chinese court…. Trade is quite different from the Ryukyu issue and must never be confused with it."[26]

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[25]*Hourei Series*, no. 2, *Data about the Sovereignty over Ryukyu*, vol. 8, "The Sovereignty over Ryukyu," parts 1–2, p. 530.

[26]"Letters to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs," *Collected Works of Li Hongzhang,* Chin. ed., vol. 10, pp. 27–32.

Earlier on August 11, 1879, regarding how to deal with the Ryukyu issue, China's Minister to Japan He Ruzhang reported to Li Hongzhang that on July 20 of the same year he met with the US Minister to Japan John Bingham and learned from him that he and Grant had agreed in the following three-part solution to the Ryukyu issue: The Ryukyu Kingdom will be restored in Okinawa Island and other parts of central Ryukyu under the sovereign; the Amami Islands in the north will belong to Japan; and the Miyako Islands and Yaeyama Islands in the south will belong to China. He Ruzhang was highly alert against Japan's intention to annex Ryukyu and its future expansion ambitions and believed that the three-part solution was feasible.

Li Hongzhang cast doubt about He Ruzhang's report and mistakenly revealed it to the Japanese secret envoy Shinichiro Takezoe during his second secret talk with him. Li Hongzhang said, "China is arguing in favor of Ryukyu in order to develop it and protect the weak and the small; China doesn't want to take its land. Japan, however, wants to seize it and give its southern islands to China, and China will definitely not take them. It is said that giving up the southern islands will be a discredit to Japan's good name; whether Japan will give the islands to China or not, what Japan does has long been a discredit to China's good name. China just wants to protect peace and friendship." He also revealed, "I've heard that the American leader (Grant) had a plan in Japan, which is not the same as yours. I have a letter as evidence."[27]

Shinichiro Takezoe was pleasantly surprised to hear that and immediately asked, "A letter? Can I have a look at it?…. I have never heard of the former US president making such remarks to the Chinese minister. I have read all the remarks my government made to the former president and the letters between them, but I haven't seen that letter. I assume that my government doesn't know that the former president made those remarks."[28]

Li Hongzhang incidentally replied, "You may not have been told about this." After Shinichiro Takezoe got to know this, he attached great importance to it and immediately reported it to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On April 19, 1880, Chinese Foreign Minister Prince Gong Yi Xin issued a diplomatic note to Japanese Foreign Minister, stating, "We are willing to have the Ryukyu issue resolved in accordance with the letter of the former US president. We want to follow his advice and protect peace and friendship. As Chinese foreign minister, that's what I want to happen." On the same day, then Japanese Foreign Minister Kaoru Inoue wrote to the US Minister to Japan Bingham and attached to the letter the translation of the intelligence Shinichiro Takezoe had obtained from Li Hongzhang for verification.

The day after Bingham received Kaoru Inoue's letter, he immediately wrote back to deny the intelligence, "I didn't offer Mr. He Ruzhang any official or my own suggestions concerning the Ryukyu issue based on the conditions or any other

[27]Ibid., pp. 35–38.

[28]Ibid.

conditions you mentioned in the translation in your letter on July 20, 1879 or any other time. Just as I said during the unofficial talks between you and me on April 12, I hope that your government will agree with China's conditions for the settlement of the issue you mentioned; that is, China will have the Ryukyu islands close to China while Japan will have the northern part of the Ryukyu Islands close to Japan."

Back then, Bingham seemed to have realized that something was going wrong. He especially said to Kaoru Inoue that regarding this matter, "if I report it to my government, it will be kept strictly confidential. I have not reported it to my government." By this Bingham implied that he wasn't sure he understood why Li Hongzhang told Japan the secret he had obtained from He Ruzhang. Probably to give himself some room for maneuver, he made this ambiguous remark in his letter: "I don't remember I made any talk about this suggestion, but I probably mentioned this solution." However, he didn't specify what the solution was.

Having learned the approach the Americans took toward the matter, Japan became determined to reject the three-part solution and began to push for the conditional realization of the two-part solution to the Ryukyu issue. In addition, it tried to sow discord between China and the USA based on Li Hongzhang's disappointment of Grant failure to mediate the matter and his suspicion of China's Minister to Japan He Ruzhang. According to the letter Shinichiro Takezoe wrote to Foreign Minister Kaoru Inoue on November 20, 1880, "When I was in office, I told Li Hongzhang that neither Grant nor the US minister to Japan had advocated the "three-part solution" and stayed almost true to the intention of the Japanese Emperor, so I was despised by Li Hongzhang as a villain who played fast and loose…."

In fact, the various suggestions Grant and the US Minister to Japan Bingham neither offered direct evidence of the three-part solution to the Ryukyu issue nor suggested that China wanted to grant Japan something similar to the most-favored-nation status European and American countries enjoyed with China in return for the acquisition of southern Ryukyu. That was what only Japan wanted. In the proposal offered by Shinichiro Takezoe during his second secret talk with Li Hongzhang, he merely mentioned that according to Grant, "The southern islands of Ryukyu are connected with Taiwan and in a key position in the eastern oceans. If they are seized by Japan, that will pose a threat to China. This is probably what Li Hongzhang is worried about."

Having not become prepared for war with China, Japan had to accept Grant's mediation in 1880. However, having occupied the Amami Islands in the north, the three-part solution to the Ryukyu issue would be no good to Japan, so it refused to recognize and accept it. While no progress was made in the talks between Shinichiro Takezoe and Li Hongzhang, the Japanese government once again placed its hope on the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs for progress with the Chinese government.

4. *In 1880, the Japanese Minister Plenipotentiary to China Tamaki Shishido circumvented Li Hongzhang to directly lobby the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Qing government. However, the negotiations had no results because the*



Fig. 5.1 Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a study of the Miyako Islands and Yaeyama Islands, 1880

Chinese were divided over the plan for giving China more islands and expanding the friendship agreement.

Since August 18, 1880, China and Japan had held eight talks on Japan's plan for sharing the islands of Ryukyu and basically reached agreement. Japan attempted to give the Yaeyama Islands and Miyako Islands to China in return for the most-favored-nation status China granted to European and American countries. During the Sino-Japanese negotiations on October 7 of the same year, the Japanese Minister Plenipotentiary to Qing China Tamaki Shishido provided "A Study of the Miyako Islands and Yaeyama Islands" and Fumihiko Otsuki's Complete Map of the Ryukyu Islands as the basis for carving up Ryukyuan territory. It may be worth noting that the Diaoyu Islands were not included (see Fig. 5.1). [29]

This fully shows that the Japanese Meiji government didn't think the Diaoyu Islands were part of Ryukyu either, less alone the so-called inherent territory of Japan. There are many records of the Diaoyu Islands in ancient Chinese documents, and they were never part of the islands of Ryukyu, so it was impossible for Japan to include the Diaoyu Islands into Ryukyu.

[29]Toshikazu Tanaka (ed.), *A Record of Ryukyu Incidents*, Jpn. ed., vol. 1, Ju Deyuan, *On the Sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands Seized by Japan*, Chin. ed., Beijing: Capital Normal University Press, vol. 1, 2001, pp. 102–104.

Li Hongzhang also affirmed this. In his memorial he categorically stated that, "Ryukyu has 36 islands, 9 of which are in the north, 11 in the middle, and 16 in the south and its total area is less than 150 square kilometers."[30] These islands didn't include the Diaoyu Islands because the Diaoyu Islands are affiliated with Taiwan, not the southern islands of Ryukyu.

At the same time, Japan offered the so-called plan for giving China more islands and expanding the friendship agreement. The idea was that provided the Qing government agreed to revise the 1872 Sino-Japanese Friendship Agreement and gave Japan all the preferential treatment it had granted to European and American countries such as "trade facilitation" and "most-favored trade status," Japan could consider giving China the Yaeyama Islands, Miyako Islands, and other parts of the Sakishima Islands while making Naha and the Ryukyu islands north of it Japanese territory, and make that serve as the boundary between China and Japan.

On October 21, 1880, Japan received the draft treaty from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to plan, the treaty was to be signed in late October, instruments of rectification would be exchanged in Beijing in December, and the Yaeyama Islands and Miyako Islands would be transferred to China in February 1881. In that case, the maritime boundary between China and Japan would be the Miyako Strait between the Miyako Islands and Okinawa Island. The real intention of Japan's plan was to seduce the Qing government into recognizing Japan's annexation of the main islands of Ryukyu and secure a status that is similar to that European and American countries enjoyed in China by revising the Japan–Qing Friendship Agreement. These harsh conditions would never be accepted by China, so the negotiations on Japan's plan for giving China more islands and expanding the friendship agreement dragged on and on without results.

Back then, Emperor Guangxu was only 10 and China's decision making was left to Empress Dowager Cixi. Policy suggestions had to be approved by Nanyang Minister Liu Kunyi and Beiyang Minister Li Hongzhang of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before they were submitted to Empress Dowager Cixi for final decision. However, as the Qing government was suffering both domestic turmoil and foreign invasion and was subjected to attack by Russia and Britain in Xinjiang and by France and Japan along the southeast coast. Under these circumstances, the Qing government originally agreed to accept Japan's plan for giving China more islands and expanding the friendship agreement, but Chinese officials were divided over how to deal with Japan. The Qing government differing views on key issues such as how to deal with Russia and Japan, whether Japan should be given the most-favored-nation status in China, and whether China could benefit from Japan's plan for giving China more islands.

On October 28, 1880, Right Chief Chen Baoche submitted a memorial to the throne, expressing opposition to Japan taking advantage of Russia's invasion of Ili to demand that the issue of Ryukyu be settled immediately; to the idea of working

[30]Wang Yanwei and Wang Liang (ed.), *Historical Data of the Qing Dynasty*, Chin. ed., Beijing: Bibliography and Document Publishing House, vol. 2, 1987, pp. 14–17.

with Russia in guarding against the Japanese; and to Japan's plan for giving China more islands and expanding the friendship agreement. According to him, "The Japanese are afraid of the Russians as they were tigers, and China cannot stop Japan coming together with Russia. Japan's friendship with China depends on China's strength. If China is stronger than Russia, Japan will offer to make friends with China; if China is weaker than Russia, then even if China has an agreement of mutual protection with Japan, Japan will inevitably join Russia when there is a conflict between China and Russia…." So Chen Baochen proposed that, "China should better use the constraint and procrastination method against Japan…. If it doesn't comply, then we should stop doing business with it to its disadvantage."[31] On November 3 of the same year, Left Chief Zhang Zhidong, however, submitted a memorial to the throne, suggesting that China should continue doing business with Japan and refrain from handling the Ryukyu issue hastily. He advocated that China should "work with Japan in resisting Russia."[32] The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked Emperor Guangxu for a solution, and the emperor consulted Li Hongzhang about the matter.

On November 1, 1880, Li Hongzhang stated in his memorial, "China's response to Japan's demand for the solution to the Ryukyu issue should be postponed because the demand involves revising the China-Japan agreement," and "the procrastination method is most advisable." By this, Li Hongzhang meant that the issue should be shelved and procrastinated to see what would happen. Li Hongzhang was diametrically opposed to revising the China–Japan agreement and being given only some of the islands of Ryukyu. His reasons for this were as follows: "In the past, China was forced to enter into peace treaties with Britain and France after it lost the armed conflicts with them and was cheated by them to suffer great losses against international public law…. When Japan sent an envoy to China demanding an agreement with China in the 10th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Tongzhi, Zeng Guofan suggested that the clause 'China will give Japan all the preferential treatment it has granted to European and American countries' should not be included. The Japanese envoy Munenari Date held repeated discussions and agreed that 'The merchants of our two countries shall not enter each other's country to transport goods for sale.' This restriction was strict. Afterward, Japan demanded to reverse the agreement several times, but I turned it down."[33]

Li Hongzhang maintained that, "In the Ming Dynasty, unemployed businessmen became pirates and worked together with Chinese hooligans, inflicting great loss on China, so China should guard against Japan." This is the main reason why Li Hongzhang turned down Shinichiro Takezoe's plan for giving China more islands and expanding the friendship agreement. After thinking twice, Li Hongzhang wrote

[31]Ibid., vol. 23, pp. 19–22.

[32]Ibid., vol. 24, pp. 1–3.

[33]Foreign affairs memorials of the Qing Dynasty's Grand Council, vol. 7757, no. 37, in *Historical Data of the Negotiations between China and Japan during the Reign of Qing Emperor Guangxu*, vol. 2, 14–17.

in his memorial, "China now has trouble with Russia and is not able to deal with Russia and Japan simultaneously. The Japanese have placed excessive demands on China. If China meets their demands, it will suffer great loss; if it turns them down, it will make one more enemy, so it is best for China to procrastinate." Li Hongzhang also held that, "The southern islands will not make a big difference," and if Taiwan "is properly managed, we can keep the southeast under control." He advocated for "relying on Russia to deter Japan" and was opposed to the idea of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that China should "work with Japan in resisting Russia."[34]

The then Qing Nanyang Minister Liu Kunyi offered this suggestion on December 6, 1880, "The Ryukyu case should be settled through negotiation immediately and China should be cautious in entering into a treaty with Japan." He was opposed to Li Hongzhang's deterrent policy, dismissing it as "useless and harmful" on the ground that the policy had to be implemented "through rhetoric or threat" and the stubborn Japan would not buy it and would make it difficult for China. Liu was opposed both to closing the door and market as part of economic sanctions on Japan and to launching an eastern expedition against Japan. He believed that unlike Korea, Vietnam and other countries that shared a land border with China, Ryukyu "is separated from China by the sea and isn't that important to China." He argued that even if China defeated Japan militarily in Ryukyu, it was likely that "Japan will seize Ryukyu again after China withdraws." According to Liu, Ryukyu hadn't really yielded to the call of China; it had yielded to the call of Japan instead. It had been subjected to Japan's exploitation and groundless imprisonment, but it had not sought China's help for that. At this stage, it was too late for China to bargain with Japan.[35]

The then Zhejiang Governor Tan Zhonglin offered this suggestion on December 17, 1880, "The Ryukyu case should be resolved immediately as China isn't in a position to fight or protect from Japan." By resolving the Ryukyu case immediately, Tan meant to accept Japan's plan for sharing the islands of Ryukyu and basically reached agreement. He held that "all of China's interests have been seized by the West," so it was advisable to let Japan have a share of them. "Entering into a treaty with Japan would not do any harm to China's commerce," Liu said, "… it is no more than to have Japanese businessmen in Chinese ports." Everything would be OK if the Ryukyu King could continue to live in the southern islands of Ryukyu. "Procrastination will only disappoint the Ryukyu people, so it would be better to yield to Japan in order to console them."[36]

The then Governor of Guangdong and Guangxi Zhang Shusheng and Guangdong Governor Yu Kuanze submitted a memorial, stating that, "We should not jump quickly to the solution of the Ryukyu case and accept all the terms of

[34]Ibid.

[35]The Beijing Palace Museum, *Historical Materials about the Negotiations between China, Japan and Korea during the Reign of Qing Emperor Guangxu*, Chin. ed., 1932, vol. 2, pp. 85–90.

[36]Ibid., pp. 49–51.

Japan." Zhang Shusheng had almost the same idea as Li Hongzhang, but he had a tougher attitude. According to Zhang, "China should have a debate with Japan based on principle…. We may not win the debate, but that's where the hope of keeping Ryukyu intact lies. Accepting the islands offered by Japan would mean the collapse of Chûzan." It would be a good idea to enter into a treaty with Japan, but only on equal terms. However, "what Japan is doing is for the sake of its own interests and goes against the intention of establishing a treaty. The Ryukyu case has nothing to do with Japan's intention to improve trade relations with China. Japan captured Ryukyu's king and seized its territory. Fearing China's condemnation, Japan offers to give two insignificant islands of Ryukyu. China has done nothing wrong to Japan, and Japan has done nothing in favor of China, so Japan is not in a position to force China to enter into a treaty with it. Taking advantage of China's crisis, Japan keeps seizing Ryukyu's territory. Instead of stopping Japan doing that, we are now doing Japan a favor. Never has any country done this before. The Ryukyu case and the establishment of a treaty cannot be treated as the same and one thing. And the reason for this is clear."[37]

No progress was made in the eight talks between China and Japan. On November 17, 1880, China notified Japan that only the Nanyang and Beiyang ministers had full power to negotiate with foreign countries and that China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs didn't have this power. As a result, Japan's offer to share Ryukyu's islands wasn't submitted to Empress Dowager Cixi for approval. On November 20, 1880, in order to get the Qing government to save the Ryukyu Kingdom, the Ryukyu official Rin Seikō (a native of Kume Island of Fujian origin) committed suicide by cutting his throat at the gate of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, leaving a poet behind which reads:

> One can't really attain both loyalty and filial piety,
>
> Though I love both my country and my parents dearly.
>
> I want to buy my country's survival with my death,
>
> Sorry to leave my parents to the care of my brothers.

Negotiations between China and Japan over Ryukyu broke down that afternoon.

Shinichiro Takezoe, Japan's consul to Tianjin, China, got angry at this. On November 20, he sent the No. 1 Special Secret Letter to Japan's Foreign Minister Kaoru Inoue, condemning "Li Hongzhang for leading the Qing government to change its mind" and offering measures for dealing with the change. These measures included forcing all Qing government ministers to resign; condemning the Qing government for practicing fraud in having lower-level officials handle the case, humiliating Japan's Minister Plenipotentiary and government, and ruining the peace talks; and making it clear that from now on the Qing government would not have a say in the case of Ryukyu.

[37]Ibid., pp. 67–68.

Afterward in 1887, China's Foreign Minister Zeng Jize warned Saburo Shiota that the Ryukyu issue had not been over. However, Japan had already seized Ryukyu and it simply ignored what the Qing government said about it. China believed that the Ryukyu issue had not been resolved between China and Japan while Japan was ready to fight a war to resolve it.

Through intelligence means, Japan found out the different views regarding Ryukyu in memorials to the Qing government, so it refused to hold more talks with China about the Ryukyu issue. In his secret message to Japan's Foreign Minister Kaoru Inoue following the breakdown of the abovementioned talks, Shinichiro Takezoe clamored, "War between the two countries is not a good thing, but giving it a second thought, we'd better fight a war because it is easier to conquer the Chinese with force than with reason." He suggested that, "although Japan is now experiencing financial difficulties and fighting a war overseas is not the best choice, what we need to fight China is armed forces…. We can take either Taiwan or Zhoushan and defend them with our army, use warships to patrol the surrounding seas to keep away Chinese ships and cut China's north-south maritime route…. This will force the Chinese government to eventually make peace with Japan…. A war with China will not be a problem…. Peace with China must be obtained through war."[38]

Takezoe was the so-called diplomat, and now he eventually appeared as a war maniac. Thereafter, Japan began to prepare for war with China from the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan in order to defeat China to become the dominant country in the East.

Japan's Foreign Minister offered two options. One was to use force to get the Qing government to sign the treaty, and the other was to take China as having agreed to stay away from the Ryukyu dispute and to announce that "Japan has indisputable rights over all Ryukyu islands." Fearing that fighting an all-out war with China too early would leave Japan vulnerable, the Japanese government adopted the second option while at the same time making preparations for war with China.

Just as I discussed above, none of the Diaoyu Islands was included in the list of islands such as the Yaeyama Islands, the Miyako Islands, and the islands affiliated with them Japan presented to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Qing government. This means Japan indirectly admitted that the Diaoyu Islands didn't belong to the Ryukyu Kingdom, but to China's Taiwan Province. The Japanese Meiji government wanted to obtain most-favored-nation status with China. In essence, it meant to obtain, without a war, the colonial privileges European countries and the USA enjoyed in China, and become China's suzerain. To this end, Japan even didn't hesitate to let China have the southern part of the Ryukyu Kingdom. Li Hongzhang, of course, found it hard to accept this scenario. So the Meiji government blamed China for the breakdown of the talks over the Ryukyu

[38]*Hourei Series*, no. 2, *Data about the Sovereignty over Ryukyu*, vol. 8, "The Sovereignty over Ryukyu," parts 1–2, pp. 891–900.

issue. Japan didn't stop at that. After annexing Ryukyu, Japan wanted to take China's Diaoyu Islands. So Japan launched the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. The Qing government lost the war and was forced to sign the humiliating Treaty of Shimonoseki in April 1895. According to the treaty, China lost its control over Taiwan for 50 years, including the Diaoyu Islands, of course.

Japan began to annex Ryukyu when Hideyoshi Toyotomi invaded the Korean Peninsula in the sixteenth century. It militarily invaded Taiwan for the first time in the nineteenth century. After using force to annex Ryukyu, Japan started its expansion toward the Diaoyu Islands. This process of historic evolution was accompanied by the fact that China was weaker than Japan. When Qing China suffered a decline, not only was it not in a position to keep its vassals such as Korea and Ryukyu from being invaded, China itself also became Japan's target of colonization. This served as the historical background of the Diaoyu Islands issue. Following the breakout of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, China left the Ryukyu case unsettled. China didn't recognize Japan's occupation of Ryukyu, nor did it try to prevent Japan from occupying the country. Following its annexation of Ryukyu, Japan continued to expand to other islands, and first of all, to the Diaoyu Islands.

5.2 Japan Was Aware of China's Sovereignty Over the Diaoyu Islands Before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895

According to Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Since 1885, the Japanese government had conducted on-the-spot surveys of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) through the good office of the Okinawa Prefectural Government and carefully determined that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) were uninhabited and had no signs of being controlled by the Qing Dynasty. On this basis, on January 14, 1895, it was decided at the Cabinet meeting to erect markers on the islands to officially incorporate them into Japanese territory. In terms of international law, this act is in accord with the method of appropriately obtaining sovereignty (the occupation principle)."[39]

However, this runs against the fact. Volumes 12 and 23 of the *Diplomatic Documents of Japan*, edited and distributed by Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in March 1952, have clear records of the process of the Meiji government seizing the Diaoyu Islands. In short, Japan stole the Diaoyu Islands through its colonial rule of Taiwan by taking advantage of its victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. It secretly decided to take the Diaoyu Islands before the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed.

[39]Official website of the Japanese Embassy in China:http://www.cn.emb-japan.go.jp/fpolicy/senkaku_3.htm.

There is reason to believe that the warlord Aritomo Yamagata of Japan's Chōshū domain was the first to get Japan to steal China's Diaoyu Islands. As the founder of the Japanese Army, he was Lieutenant General and Command of the Armies when Japan militarily invaded Taiwan for the first time. In 1878, he issued the Military Regulations in the name of the Command of the Armies, and in 1882 he drafted the Imperial Rules for Servicemen, stressing servicemen should observe absolute obedience to the Japanese Emperor. After that, he was appointed Japanese Prime Minister, President of the Privy Council, and War Minister. According to Japan's archives, in 1885 Okinawa Prefecture sent experts to conduct surveys of the Diaoyu Islands on two occasions as secretly ordered by Interior Minister Aritomo Yamagata. One was an oral survey, and the other was conducted on the seashore of the Diaoyu Islands. In August 1894 Aritomo Yamagata offered to join the expedition, so he was appointed Commanding General of the Japanese First Army and led his men to invade Korea and China's Liaodong Peninsula.

In 1885, with the support of Aritomo Yamagata, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducted relevant intelligence surveys. The investigative results were reported to Interior Minister Aritomo Yamagata in a letter by the Foreign Minister. In the following ten years up to Japan's seizure of the Diaoyu Islands in 1895, Okinawa Prefecture didn't have surveys conducted on those islands.

In fact, before the Japan government ordered the surveys of the Diaoyu Islands in 1885, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had already learned from the latest British document that Great Britain had affirmed the Diaoyu Islands were affiliated with Taiwan, China and that Chiwei Islet was the easternmost island of China. Japan didn't raise objections to this. On the contrary, Japan's surveys of the Diaoyu Islands were very secretive. The Japanese feared a leak, so secret letters were exchanged between the Interior Ministry and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the surveys. The Ministry of Foreign had a guilty conscience and kept close watch on what the Chinese media were saying to stand sentinel for the investigations. As soon as the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs noticed the report by China's *Shen Bao* newspaper on a warning on the Taiwan Island issue in September 1885, it suggested that the Interior Ministry should stop erecting markers on the Diaoyu Islands for the time being.

According to Tadayoshi Murata, honorary Professor of Yokohama National University in Japan, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs' statement that "after 1885 the government had many surveys of the Diaoyu Islands carried out by sources including the Okinawa authorities" is not true. Okinawa Prefecture conducted only one such survey.[40] Being aware of this, in order to have some room for argument Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs deliberately stated that many surveys were conducted by many means including the intelligence surveys by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, the conclusions reached by Japan's surveys are:

[40]Tadayoshi Murata, *The Origin of Japanese-Chinese Territory Issue: The Awkward Truth from Official Documents*, Jpn. ed., Tokyo: Kaden Sha, 2013, pp. 220–222.

First, Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet are uninhabited islands and have no signs of Chinese rule.
Second, these islands have been named by China and China is familiar with them.
Third, Chinese newspapers warned the Chinese government should keep a watch on Japan's intention to steal the islands north of Taiwan.
Fourth, Japan doesn't have evidence these islands belong to Japan. If Japan wants to erect markers there, it will have to negotiate with China, but time is not ripe for that.

Therefore, Japan didn't dare to occupy those islands following its surveys in 1885. Evidence is as follows:

1. *Okinawa Prefecture's first survey report*

In September of the 18th year of the Meiji Era (1885), Japan's Interior Minister Aritomo Yamagata ordered Shokikan of Okinawa Nagayoshi Mori in Tokyo to conduct surveys of the Diaoyu Islands, so Governor of Okinawa Prefecture Shiyazo Nishimura had his man Hyougo Ishizawa conduct the first survey.

On September 22, 1885, Hyougo Ishizawa prepared a survey report based on an oral account Eihou Ooshiro had of his earlier survey of the Diaoyu Islands, stating that, "Kume Aka Island is the Chiwei Islet referred to in the *Record of Messages from Chûzan*, Kuba Island is called Huangwei Islet, and Diaoyu Island is called Diaoyutai. According to Eihou Ooshiro, if they are now to be included in the new map of Ryukyu, we may not have the correct sizes of them. This is for your information."[41]

The day after receiving this survey report, Governor of Okinawa Prefecture Shiyazo Nishimura prepared Document 351 to Interior Minister Aritomo Yamagata, reporting that, "I have no objection to incorporating the islands close to the Kume, Miyako and Yaeyama islands under the jurisdiction of this prefecture into Okinawa Prefecture. However, these islands have terrains different from those of the Daito Islands (located between this prefecture and the Ogasawara Islands) we reported to you earlier, and they are undoubtedly the Diaoyutai, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet recorded in the *Record of Messages from Chûzan*. If they are, they have already been known to the Chinese ships for appointing Chûzan kings and have been named to serve as beacons for navigation to Ryukyu. We are not sure if we should erect markers during our survey of these islands as we did to the Daito Islands"[42] (see Fig. 5.2).

Also according to the report, there were only oral, not written, accounts that these islands were uninhabited islands and it was suggested that the chartered ocean

[41]*Okinawa* (quarterly), no. 56 (The Senkaku Islands [Diaoyu Islands]), 1971, pp. 114–115, in Wu Tianying, *History and Legality of the Diaoyu Islands,* enlarged Chin. ed., Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 2007, p. 150.

[42]Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Miscellaneous Matters," *Japan's Diplomatic Documents,* Jpn. ed., issued by the Japanese International United Association on December 31, 1950, vol. 18, p. 574.



Fig. 5.2 Report submitted by Governor of Okinawa Prefecture Shiyazo Nishimura to Interior Minister Aritomo Yamagata on September 22, 1885

liner *Izumo Maru,* which was bound for the Miyako Islands on the coming October, should conduct surveys of the islands on its way back. This fully shows that the Okinawa government had already realized that these islands probably belonged to China, so it was inappropriate to erect Japanese markers there as Japan had done on the Daito Islands. Back then Japan didn't think Diaoyu Islands were *terra nullius*; it just called them uninhabited islands.

As far back as on February 6, 1874, Toshimichi Ōkubo and Shigenobu Ōkuma proposed the Measures for Handling the Local Tribes of Taiwan,[43] stating that China's sovereignty didn't cover the local tribes of Taiwan, so their regions "should be treated as *terra nullius*." This created a pretext for Japan's military invasion of Taiwan. It is of particular note that when Japan tried to steal the Diaoyu Islands from 1874 to 1895, it didn't stress them as *terra nullius;* it called them uninhabited islands. It wasn't until 1933 that Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs started to call them *terra nullius* when it secretly regarded them as a case of occupation. However, even in the Basic View of Japan on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)issued on March 8, 1972, the Diaoyu Islands weren't referred to as *terra nullius*. This shows that in order to give a legal basis to its historical theft of

[43]Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *An Enlarged Edition of Japan's Diplomatic Documents in the Meiji Era,* Jpn. ed., issued by the Japanese International United Association on December 31, 1950, vol. 1, pp. 122–123.

the Diaoyu Islands, the Japanese government returned to the wrong term used by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1933.

In 1885, Aritomo Yamagata didn't want to stop at the report presented by the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture. On October 9 of the same year, he made a report to the Minister of the Left, saying that even these islands were the same islands recorded in the *Record of Messages from Chûzan*, they were merely used as navigation beacons and there were no signs of Chinese ownership. In addition, there were different names of these islands and the islands were close to the uninhabited islands under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture such as the Miyako Islands and Yaeyama Islands. So Okinawa Prefecture could erect Japan's markers there following its on-the-spot surveys (see Fig. 5.3).

2. *A survey report of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

In his No. 38 secret letter to Interior Minister Aritomo Yamagata dated October 21 of the Meiji Era (1885), the then Japanese Foreign Minister Kaoru Inoue expressed a cautious attitude, stopped short of agreeing that the Diaoyu Islands should be made part of Japan. In the letter, Inoue said, "The islands are close to the Chinese border. Compared with the Daito Islands for which surveys had been completed earlier, these islands are smaller and have Chinese names. In addition, Chinese newspapers have recently published reports of the Japanese government seizing Chinese islands close to Taiwan, have been suspicious of Japan and have


太政官上申案
沖縄縣ト清國福州ト之間ニ散在セル無人
島久米赤嶋外二島取調ノ義ニ付別紙之
通同縣令ヨリ上申ノ處右諸島ノ義ハ中
山傳信錄ニ記載セル島嶼ト同一ノ如ク其
形狀ノ實古八重山等ニ接近シ且無人ノ島
嶼ニ有之候ヘハ同縣ニ於テ實地踏査ノ上
國標取建ノ義差支無之ト御考案ノ間
至急何分ノ御詮議相成度此段相伺候也
内務卿
太政大臣殿
内務省
添此段相伺候也

Fig. 5.3 Interior Minister Aritomo Yamagata's Report to the Minister of the Left on October 9, 1885

repeatedly urged the Chinese government to pay attention to the matter. If we openly take measures such as erecting markers on the islands, we will arouse the suspicion of China. Therefore, it is now appropriate only to conduct on-the-spot surveys and make detailed reports on its port conditions as well as land products that are viable for future development. Japan's markers may be erected and development may be carried out only when conditions are ripe in the future"[44] (see Fig. 5.4).

This is China's *Shen Bao* newspaper that published a warning on the Taiwan Island issue on September 6, 1885. According to the newspaper, "Recently some Japanese people hoisted Japanese flags on the islands northeast of Taiwan. It seems the Japanese will steal the islands."[45] This was intended to warn the Chinese government of Japan's intension to expand. Although nongovernmental hoisting Japan's flags on the islands was legally meaningless, the Qing government adopted preventive measures.

Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been following China's reaction. Back then Japan's attempt to steal the Diaoyu Islands alerted Chinese media. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs was paying close attention to China's reaction to Japan's secret survey of the Diaoyu Islands. Therefore, it was clear that the abovementioned report in *Shen Bao* caught the attention of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As a result, when Japan's Interior Ministry solicited opinion on the Diaoyu Islands issue in October, Foreign Minister Kaoru Inoue probably called for caution due to the Chinese newspaper report and suggested that action should be taken only when conditions were ripe in the future.

In response to what Japan had done to the Diaoyu Islands, the Qing government announced the establishment of the Naval Ministry, elevated Taiwan Prefecture to Taiwan Province, and changed the Governor of Fujian to the Governor-General of Taiwan to strengthen the defense of Taiwan. Following *The Peking Gazette*'s report about this, then Japan's acting Minister Tanenori Shimada in China immediately sent the No. 290 cipher text to Foreign Minister Kaoru Inoue, stating that, "On October 13 *The Peking Gazette* reported about the establishment of the Naval Ministry and the appointment of the Taiwan Governor-General. These developments have been immediately reported in No. 36 Note, and this consulate has reported it as above in No. 114 Report for your information."[46]

It is precisely because of this that Foreign Minister Kaoru Inoue especially made it clear in the abovementioned letter to Interior Minister Aritomo Yamagata that the

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[44]Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Miscellaneous Matters," *Japan's Diplomatic Documents,* Jpn. ed., issued by the Japanese International United Association on December 31, 1950, vol. 18, pp. 574, 575.

[45]*Shen Bao*, lunar July 28 of the 11th year of the reign of Qing Emperor Guangxu (September 6, 1885).

[46]US Library of Congress, *Catalogue of Files of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1868–1945)*, 1954, MT5.1.9. Wu Tianhao, *The Sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895*, revised and enlarged Chin. ed., Beijing: China Democracy and Legality Press. 2013, p. 148.



Fig. 5.4 Japanese Foreign Minister Kaoru Inoue's Letter to Interior Minister Aritomo Yamagata Dated October 21, 1885

surveys of the Daito Islands and of the Diaoyu Islands should not be reported in official newspapers. This is what I want to call your attention to. This shows Japan knew that it was doing what it should not do and that it didn't dare to occupy these islands in just ways; it did it in secret. Kaoru Inoue seemed to understand better than Aritomo Yamagata that these islands belonged to China and have attached greater importance to international reaction than Yamagata did. According to the materials from Nozomu Ishii, Associate Professor of Nagasaki Junshin Catholic University,

on September 22, 1885, the Osaka-based *Ashahi Shumbun* published an editorial to refute the warning on the Taiwan Island issue cited by *Shen Bao* from Shanghai's English newspaper *Wen Hui Bao*.[47] It has been confirmed that this was sheer propaganda made by Japan to distract the public. *Shen Bao* clearly stated that some Japanese people climbed "islands northeast or Taiwan" whereas the *Ashahi Shumbun* changed it to the Miyako Islands "east of Taiwan" and accused China of being unreasonable. Needless to say, this backfired. This is because Japan's editorial indirectly admitted that if it had not been the Miyako Islands but the Diaoyu Islands northeast of Taiwan, China's position had been understandable. In fact, it was in 1873 that Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs ordered Japanese flags to be hoisted on the Miyako Islands, so no newspapers would report this as news in 1885. Back then Aritomo Yamagata believed that it was essential to conduct on-the-spot surveys and no Japanese markers should be erected unless no signs of Chinese rule were found. As a result, Okinawa Prefecture decided to conduct surveys on the ocean liner *Izumo Maru.*

3. *Okinawa Prefecture's second survey report*

On October 30 of the 18th year of the Meiji Era (1885), aboard the ocean liner *Izumo Maru* of Tokyo Hyodo Logitem Co. Ltd. and on the voyage from the Miyako Islands and Naha, Hyougo Ishizawa conducted a survey of Diaoyu Island by making a tour around it, and inspected Huangwei Islet in the distance.

On November 4, 1885, Hyougo Ishizawa submitted the survey report titled "A Survey of Uotsuri Island and Two Other Islands" to Shokikan of Okinawa Nagayoshi Mori. According to the report, "At 4 p.m. on October 29, the liner set sail from Iriomote Island and moved north. At around 4 a.m. the following morning, clouds hanged in the east and the sun had yet to rise. It was dark in the liner and waves glittered in the moon. At this moment Uotsuri Island (Diaoyu Island) stood towering several nautical miles away in front of our ship. At 8 a.m., I tried to land the island from the ship in the west in order to conduct a survey of its surroundings and inside, but it was too dangerously steep to land. Along its beach there were huge rocks here and there, and its caves were mostly soaked in seawater and you simply could not walk freely there. So I had to gradually land the island from its southwest beach and move across the whole of the island. The island is three nautical miles in circumference. It is comprised of huge rocks, and there are areca trees, banyan trees and vines here and there just like on the Daito Islands. The island is covered with the same weeds and bushes as Okinawa Island, and has several streams without much water. The land there isn't flat, so it is not arable. The island is rich in aquatic products; however, due to its terrain, the island is not viable for agriculture and fishery. Furthermore, an observation of its stones shows they are similar to those on Uchibanari Island in Iriomote Island I just feel the stones are

[47]Lin Kuan-miao in Taipei, "Did Japan Erect Its Flags to Seize Diaoyutai? A Major Discovery: A Report on the Miyako Islands in the Late Years of the Qing Dynasty," *Taiwan People News*, September 25, 2015. Nozomu Ishii, "Special Report," *Taiwan People News*, October 22, 2015.

huge. This probably shows that the island doesn't have coal or ore. If it has them, it will be a valuable island."[48]

According to Hyougo Ishizawa, "The islands are scattered between Japan and China and located in the Japan-China sea. Various kinds of drifters were found. Others and I saw drifters like ship boards and masts probably from Ryukyu boats, and sponge fishing gear (it is said they use bamboos as buoys. The strangest drifter was a sampan that was about seven meters long and 1.3 meters wide. The sampan's shape was so unique that I was so curious and asked people about it. A crew member of the ocean liner *Izumo Maru* told me that it was a Chinese boat…. Earlier had consulted Eihou Ooshiro about the island. Following the on-the-spot survey of the island, I consulted the map of the seas between Japan and Taiwan published by Britain and found the island was called Hoa-pin-su…. It is completely wrong to think that Tia u su (Diaoyu Islet) is Kume Aka Island (Chiwei Islet). Kume Aka Island is called Raleigh Rock, which is only a rock. It is also wrong to think that Pinnacle is Kuba Island. Pinnacle means top; it is the tallest rock of the six rocks of Uotsuri Island. To correct the mistakes, Uotsuri Island should be called Hoa-pin-su, Kuba Island is Tia u su, and Kume Aka Island is Raleigh Rock."[49]

However, Hyougo Ishizawa's survey of the islands were not more than an inspection tour of Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet as drawn in the map by the British warship H.M.S. *Samarang*. Just as I wrote earlier, the British map gave names to these islands in the southern Fujian dialect and has mistaken the name of Hoa-pin-su (Huaping Islet) for Tia-u-su (Diaoyu Islet), and wrongly called Chiwei Islet Kume Aka Island (Raleigh Rock). The survey report shows these islands were located along the maritime route of the China sea, there were only things left by Chinese boats on the islands, and no evidence was given of Japanese ownership of the islands. The so-called Japan-China sea was Hyougo Ishizawa's invention; there is no such a thing in the world.

At 2 p.m. on October 30, 1885, Hyougo Ishizawa left the waters around Diaoyu Island went on to Huangwei Islet for a survey. He tried to land on the island but in vain because it was getting dark and there were strong northeasterly winds. On his way back, his attempt to get close to Chiwei Islet was foiled by strong winds and high waves at night. As a matter of fact, Hyougo Ishizawa only made a rough tour of Diaoyu Island and failed to land on Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet. That is to say that before Japan stole Diaoyu Island and the islands affiliated with it, Japan had not conducted surveys on these islands. After receiving Hyougo Ishizawa's survey report on November 5, 1885, Shokikan of Okinawa Nagayoshi Mori immediately drafted No. 384 on-the-Spot Survey report on Uotsuri Island and Two Other Islands in the name of Governor of Okinawa Prefecture Shiyazo Nishimura. According to

[48]Hyougo Ishizawa, "A Survey of Two Islands Including Uotsuri Island" in Tadayoshi Murata, *The Origin of Japanese-Chinese Territory Issue: The Awkward Truth from Official Documents*, Jpn. ed., Tokyo: Kaden Sha, 2013, p. 167.

[49]Ibid.



Fig. 5.5 Results of the Survey Reported by Shiyazo Nishimura to Aritomo Yamagata on November 24, 1885

the report, "Based on the practices we had on the Daito Islands, we should move to Uotsuri Island (Diaoyu Island) and Kuba Island (Huangwei Islet) aboard a ship to erect jurisdiction markers of this prefecture."[50]

However, Governor of Okinawa Prefecture Shiyazo Nishimura remained prudent when he received the report in Tokyo and rejected the report. On November 24, Shiyazo Nishimura briefed Interior Minister Aritomo Yamagata on the results of the survey, stating that, "Establishing Japan's markers on the islands does not necessarily have nothing to do with the Qing Dynasty. How should we respond if a dispute arises? Your instructions are eagerly expected"[51] (see Fig. 5.5).

There was a reason why Shiyazo Nishimura was so prudent. In the 19th year of the Meiji Era (1886), Shiyazo Nishimura became Director of the Construction Bureau of Japan's Interior Ministry and published *Notes on the Southern Islands.* The Map of Ryukyu included in the book does not include the Diaoyu Islands and it states, "One hundred to one hundred and fifty *ri* from the Ryukyu islands, there are several islands which are confirmed as Chinese islands."[52] These were actually the Diaoyu Islands.

[50]Tadayoshi Murata, *The Origin of Japanese-Chinese Territory Issue: The Awkward Truth from Official Documents*, Jpn. ed., Tokyo: Kaden Sha, 2013, p. 170.

[51]Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Miscellaneous Matters," *Japan's Diplomatic Documents,* Jpn. ed., issued by the Japanese International United Association on December 31, 1950, vol. 18, p. 576.

[52]Ju Deyuan, *The Truth about the Diaoyu Islands,* Chin. ed., Beijing: Kunlun Press, 2006, p. 388.

According to the first survey report Governor Shiyazo Nishimura submitted the Japanese Interior Ministry, "They are no doubt the same islands recorded by *Record of Messages from Chûzan* as Diaoyutai, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet." This shows as Governor of Okinawa Prefecture, Nishimura recognized the Diaoyu Islands as Chinese territory. It is justifiable to conclude that this was why Shiyazo Nishimura took a negative attitude toward Interior Minister Aritomo Yamagata's secret order to steal the Diaoyu Islands. This could also partly explain why Shiyazo Nishimura was transferred to a job outside Okinawa Prefecture. In response, Shiyazo Nishimura wrote a book to urge the Japanese government to act properly.

On December 5, 1885, based on the reports from Japan's Foreign Minister and the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture, Interior Minister Aritomo Yamagata submitted to the Chancellor of the Realm Sanetomi Sanjō the No. 128 Secret Proposal for the Erection of Japan's Markers on Uninhabited Islands, stating, "Surveys have been conducted of the uninhabited islands between Okinawa Prefecture and Qing China's Fuzhou. For details please refer to the separate report. The governor of the prefecture proposed Japan's national markers be erected on the islands. This will involve negotiations with Qing China and the matter should be handled when conditions are ripe for both countries. We now still have to make further observations and considerations. An order should not be issued to the governor of the prefecture (for markers to be established) until after we discuss the matter with the Foreign Minister"[53] (see Fig. 5.6).

Foreign Minister Kaoru Inoue and Governor Shiyazo Nishimura's cautious attitude put a temporary brake on Aritomo Yamagata's attempt to steal the Diaoyu Islands in 1885; otherwise, the Japanese government should have ordered the occupation of these islands at that time. On the same day, Kaoru Inoue and Aritomo Yamagata jointly signed an order in red characters, which reads, "This written order is hereby issued so that no markers are erected at the moment." In the Japanese documents back then, red characters mean final decisions are issued (see Fig. 5.7).

This is enough to prove that the conclusion of Japan's secret surveys of the Diaoyu Islands before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 was that negotiations had to be held with China to establish Japanese national markers on them. If these islands were *terra nullius* or had nothing to do with China, why did the Japanese government believe it was necessary to negotiate with China about them? Why did the Japanese Interior Minister and Foreign Minister order that "no markers are erected at the moment"? If they were *terra nullius*, it would be better to occupy them immediately. The Japanese Meiji Government's decision to postpone the occupation runs counter to the claim of the current Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Diaoyu Islands were *terra nullius.*

[53]"Document on the Establishment of National Markers on the Uninhabited Islands Scattered between Okinawa Prefecture and Qing China's Fuzhou," Jpn. ed., Japan's Interior Ministry, *Collection of Documents (15th–18th Years of the Meiji Era),* vol. 4, December 5, 18th year of the Meiji Era (1885).



Fig. 5.6 Japanese Interior Minister's Secret Message to the Chancellor of the Realm, December 5, 1885

5.3 Japan Failed to Prove the Diaoyu Islands Belong to Ryukyu Before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895

Based on the abovementioned archives of the Japanese government, it is justifiable to conclude that in 1885 the Japanese government already knew that these islands were uninhabited islands, but they were not *terra nullius* and belonged to China.



Fig. 5.7 Japanese Foreign Minister and Interior Minister Decide Not to Erect National Markers, December 5, 1885

Thereafter, the newly appointed governor of Okinawa Prefecture applied several times to the Japanese government for putting the Diaoyu Islands under the jurisdiction of his prefecture, but the application had not been approved until it was clear that Japan was set to win the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. This can be partly explained by that Japan failed to find any evidence that these islands belonged to the Ryukyu Kingdom.

1. *After Governor Shiyazo Nishimura left Okinawa Prefecture, the prefecture's Shokikan Nagayoshi Mori filed an application in the name of the newly appointed governor of the prefecture to Japan's Interior Ministry for bringing the Diaoyu Islands under the jurisdiction of his prefecture.*

On January 13, 1890, the newly appointed governor of Okinawa Prefecture Kanji Maruoka filed an application to Japan's Interior Ministry for putting Diaoyu Island and other islands under the jurisdiction of the Yaeyama Islands. The application mentioned No. 384 Application filed on November 5, 1885. These two applications had the same handwriting which was believed to be that of Shokikan Nagayoshi Mori of Okinawa Prefecture (see Fig. 5.8). Nagayoshi Mori had been active on this issue and urged again the prefecture's governor to file an application.

The application filed by the governor of the Okinawa Prefecture was not addressed in the document issued by Kencho Suematsu, Director of the Prefecture Administration Bureau of the Japanese Interior Ministry to demand more

Fig. 5.8 Applications believed to be drafted by Shokikan Nagayoshi Mori of Okinawa Prefecture on behalf of Governors Shiyazo Nishimura and Kanji Maruoka, respectively

documents on the islands in question from Okinawa Prefecture. Okinawa Prefecture failed to provide the documents.

2. *Before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, Japan didn't have any evidence of the Diaoyu Islands belonging Ryukyu or Japan, nor did it claim that these islands were terra nullius. Japan was actually making secret preparations for a war against China.*

On January 27, 1892, Governor of Okinawa Prefecture Kanji Maruoka wrote letter No. A16 to Navy Minister Sukenori Kabayama, stating that because surveys had to be completed of the Diaoyu Islands and time was not yet ripe to make on-the-spot surveys of these islands, the Japanese Navy was asked to send the *Kaimon* to conduct on-the-spot surveys of the Diaoyu Islands. However, because military orders went wrong in the subsequent several months and the sea was dangerous in that season, the Navy failed to send the cruiser to conduct surveys of the waters around the Diaoyu Islands.[54]

On November 2, 1893, the newly appointed Governor of Okinawa Prefecture Narahara Shigeru once again submitted a report to Japanese Interior Minister Kaoru Inoue and Foreign Minister Munemitsu Mutsu, demanding that, in the name of promoting fishery management, the Diaoyu Islands be brought under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture and Japan's national markers be established there. The Japanese government still didn't approve the report. On April 14, 1894, in its note to the governor of Okinawa Prefecture, the Japanese Interior Ministry said, "To support the application you filed on November 2 last year for erecting markers on Kuba Island (Huangwei Islet) and Uotsuri Island (Diaoyu Island), you need to provide evidence of these islands belonging to Japan such as ancient documents and oral traditions as well as evidence of their past relationship with the Miyako Islands the Yaeyama Islands"[55] (see Fig. 5.9).

The secret survey report submitted by Governor of Okinawa Prefecture Shigeru Narahara to Kazuyuki Egi, Director of the Prefecture Administration Bureau of the Interior Ministry on May 12, 1894, concluded that, "Nothing is certain because no more on-the-spot surveys have been conducted of the islands since 1885…." It added, "There are neither ancient Japanese documents about these islands nor written or oral evidence of them belonging to Japan. The only thing relevant to Japan is that since ancient times Japanese fishermen have been crossing the sea from the Yaeyama Islands to go hunting in those islands (see Fig. 5.10).

This official Japanese evidence is enough to prove that before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, the critical date of the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, these islands definitely didn't belong to Japan or the former Ryukyu Kingdom. As a result, Japan had to do all it could to deny that the Diaoyu Islands

[54]Han-yi Shaw, Revisiting the Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands Dispute, Eng. ed., the Third International Symposium on the Diaoyutai Dispute, Taipei, September 29, 2011.

[55]Tadayoshi Murata, *The Origin of Japanese-Chinese Territory Issue: The Awkward Truth from Official Documents*, Jpn. ed., Tokyo: Kaden Sha, 2013.



Fig. 5.9 The Japanese Interior Ministry's Note to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture, Asking Him to Conducting More Surveys of the Diaoyu Islands, April 14, 1894



Fig. 5.10 A survey report Submitted by the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture to the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 12, 1894

were Chinese territory before 1895 and falsely claimed that these islands were *terra nullius* before 1885 in order to defend its occupation of these uninhabited islands of China.

However, what on earth are the facts? If the Japanese government had determined that the Diaoyu Islands were *terra nullius* following its surveys in 1885, it would be only logical for it to immediately approve the application of Okinawa Prefecture and occupy these islands; it was unnecessary for Japan to postpone its occupation of the islands for ten years until 1895 upon its victory in the war with China. Never had Japan referred to the Diaoyu Islands as *terra nullius* in the archives concerning Japan's secret surveys of these islands in 1885; the islands were referred to as uninhabited islands between Qing China's Fuzhou and the Yaeyama Islands. As everybody knows, uninhabited islands and *terra nullius* are two different concepts. The former means that nobody lives on them whereas the latter means that they don't belong to any country. It is against international law and unacceptable to occupy another country's islands as *terra nullius*.

In short, the allegation that the Diaoyu Islands were *terra nullius* before Japan's occupation was the so-called basis created for Japan's seizure of these islands in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. This will not serve to cover Japan's theft of the Diaoyu Islands; on the contrary, it makes everything clearer.

3. *The claim made by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Diaoyu Islands were terra nullius was in itself a legal concept designed to serve Japan's colonial expansion.*

According to the Japanese government, repeated surveys of the Diaoyu Islands proved that they were *terra nullius*, so Japan's occupation of them were in line with the international law occupation principle. Just as I discussed earlier, this allegation is a continuation of the wrong decision made by the Hirobumi Ito cabinet in 1895 and is based on the wrong views the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Empire of Japan in 1893, so it is groundless imperialist logic. Uninhabited islands are absolutely not the same as *terra nullius.* The information I have shows that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the first to claim following Japan's launching of the September 18th Incident in 1931 that the Japanese government's occupation of the Diaoyu Islands was based on the occupation principle.

In October 1933, the Treaty Bureau of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs listed the following case in the section "Island Occupation" in its secret document *A Collection of International Law Cases* (vol. 2): "Uotsuri Island (with the same location as Kuba Island, though ten Japanese *ri* farther) and two other islands had no signs of Chinese ownership and are close to Miyako Island, the Yaeyama Islands and other uninhabited islands of Okinawa Prefecture. Therefore, the governor of the prefecture proposed establishing national markers there. Before the proposal was presented to Chancellor of the Realm, Interior Minister Aritomo Yamagata solicited the opinion of Foreign Minister Kaoru Inoue on October 9 of the Meiji Era. Having given it a second thought, Inoue gave this reply on October 21: "The islands in question are very small islands close to China, and Chinese newspapers have

published allegations that the government of the Empire of Japan intends to occupy Chinese islands and urged the Chinese government to pay attention to the matter. Therefore Japan should not erect national markers on these islands and develop them until conditions are ripe"[56] (see Fig. 5.11).

This document deliberately tries not to repeat the content and reasons in the report Governor of Okinawa Prefecture Shiyazo Nishimura prepared on November 24, 1885, following surveys of the Diaoyu Islands. This is because the report indirectly admits that these islands were not *terra nullius* and were probably Chinese territory.

The so-called Basic View of Japan on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) issued by the Japanese government on March 8, 1972, is a continuation of the basic propositions and the so-called bases the Meiji Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Empire of Japan had in 1895 and 1933, respectively. The only difference is Japan referred to China as the Qing Dynasty in 1895 and as Shina in 1933. This means that the current Japanese position and understanding of the Diaoyu Islands issue were not only the same as those Japan had before the normalization of Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations but were also similar to those Japan had during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. This left really an abnormal problem in the normalized China–Japan relations that has yet to be solved. However, the Japanese has so far failed to face this section of history squarely; on the contrary, it has done its utmost to cover and distort it. This is why it is hard settle the Diaoyu Islands issue.

4. *In 1887 the Japanese Navy's battle-cruiser Konggo made a secret voyage to the Miyako Islands and the Yaeyama Islands probably to make maritime reconnaissance for Japan's future occupation of Taiwan.*

Today it is still stated on the official Web site of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that, "The main facts concerning the territory Japan prepared to make Japanese territory are as follows:

(1) Based on the reports submitted by Governor of Okinawa Prefecture to the Interior Minister on September 22 and November 5, 1885, respectively, Okinawa Prefecture conducted surveys of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) as ordered by the Interior Ministry. In particular, the prefecture chartered the ocean liner *Izumo Maru* from Nippon Yusento conduct patrols and surveys of these islands. The prefecture submitted survey reports to the government.
(2) According to the records made by the battle-cruiser *Konggo* in 1887, Navy Captain Kato, leader of the Surveying Group of the Japanese Navy's Waterways Department left Naha for the Sakishima Islands aboard the cruiser in June of the same year. In addition, *Japan Maritime Observation* (1894)

[56]Treaty Bureau of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *A Collection of International Law Cases (*vol. 2), Jpn. ed., published by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1933, p. 57.



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國際法先例彙輯

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島嶼先占

昭和八年十月調

外務省條約

條 25 外史

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内閣總理大臣伯爵　松方正義

内務大臣子爵　品川彌二郎

勅令第百九十號

東京府管下小笠原島南南西沖北緯二十四度零分ヨリ同二十五度三十分東經百四十一度零分ヨリ同百四十一度三十分ノ間ニ散在スル三島嶼ヲ小笠原島ノ所屬トシ其中央ニ在ルモノヲ硫黄島ト稱シ其南ニ在ルモノヲ南硫黄島其北ニ在ルモノヲ北硫黄島ト稱ス

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沖繩縣ト清國福州トノ間ニ散在スル久米赤島（久米島ヨリ未申ノ方大凡七十里ノ距離ニアリ支那國福州ヲ去ルコト約二百里）、久場島（久米島ヨリ午未ノ方大凡百里ヨリ距ヲ八重山島ノ中石垣島ニ近接セル大凡六十里餘ニ位ス）及魚釣島（方位久場島ト同一ニシテ隔十里程遠シ）ノ三島ハ別ニ支那國所屬ノ證跡見エス且ツ沖繩所轄ノ宮古、八重島等ニ接近セル無人島嶼ナルヲ以テ國標建設ニ關シ沖繩縣知事ヨリ上申アリタルヲ以テ右ノ詮議方太政大臣ヘ上申スルニ先チ明治十八年十月九日山縣内務卿ヨリ井上外務卿ヘ意見ヲ微シ來レリ外務卿ハ熟考ノ結果本島嶼カ支那國境ニ近接セルコト、竝嘗テ清國新聞紙等ニ於テ帝國政府カ當港近傍ノ支那國所屬島嶼ヲ占據セシ等ノ風説ノ掲載セラレ支那國政府ノ注意ヲ促シ居ルコト等ノ理由ニ依リ國標ノ建設島嶼ノ開拓ハ他日ノ機會ニ讓ル方然ルヘキ旨十月二十一日回答セリ依テ十二月五日内務、外務兩卿ヨリ目下建設ヲ要セサル儀ト可心得旨沖繩縣知事ヘ指令アリタリ

明治二十三年一月十三日沖繩縣知事ヨリ本件島嶼ハ從來無人島ナルヨリ別ニ所轄ヲ定メス其儘ニ差置キタル處近時水產取締ノ必要ヨリ所轄ヲ定メラレ度キ旨八重山島役所ヨリ伺出アリタルニ

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Fig. 5.11 Treaty Bureau of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *A Collection of International Law Cases* (vol. 2)

included a survey of Uotsuri Island (Diaoyu Island) based on the on-the-spot notes taken by Captain Kato."[57]

This gives rise to some questions. First, did the cruiser *Konggo* really make it to Diaoyu Island? Because Ryukyu's Sakishima Islands included the Miyako Island and the Yaeyama Islands which were more than 90 nautical miles from Diaoyu Island. Second, what on earth was the purpose of the *Konggo* when it left Naha in June 1887 for the Sakishima Islands to make patrols and surveys? If it were to make sure whether Diaoyu Island was *terra nullius*, why didn't Japan immediately announce its occupation of the island?

According to the Japanese scholar Tadayoshi Murata, it is simply not true that the *Konggo* made on-the-spot surveys of Diaoyu Island. *Japan Maritime Observation* published the records of the Sakishima Islands made by Captain Kato in 1887 and 1888. The main purpose of his voyages there was to collect the information about the depth of the water and currents for ships, and there are neither records of his landing the islands nor records of his observation of the islands from the sea. The map of the Sakishima Islands in the book doesn't include the Diaoyu Islands.[58]

Based on the China policy of Japanese Prime Minister Hirobumi Ito, the *Konggo* probably measured the maritime routes from Ryukyu to Taiwan as a preparation for Japan's large battleships to invade Taiwan. This could be related to Ito's inspection of Ryukyu aboard a battleship in November of the same year. If the *Konggo* really made it to the waters around the Diaoyu Islands in 1887, this can only prove that Japan had conducted a secret military reconnaissance of these islands before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 in order to steal them. The purpose of the reconnaissance was to determine how Diaoyu Island other northeastern islands of Taiwan were geostrategically important for the Japanese Army's attack on Taiwan from Okinawa Prefecture.

In addition, why were the results of the surveys conducted by the *Konggo* in 1887 not published until seven years later when the Sino-Japanese War broke out in July 1894? Was this also a secret preparation for Japan's war against China? In *Japan Maritime Observation* (vol. 2) which was issued in July 1894, Diaoyu Island is written as "ホアピンス島 (Hoa-pin-su)"; Huangwei Islet, "チャウス島 (Tiau-su)," and Chiwei Islet, "ラレ島 (Ralie)." Just as I mentioned above, these names were copied by the Japanese Navy from the names given by the British warship H.M.S. *Samarang* to these islands in the southern Fujian dialect in June 1845 when it surveyed the Diaoyu Islands. In the map "ホアピンス島 (Hoa-pin-su)," which is the southern Fujian dialect pronunciation of Huaping Islet, is mistaken for Diaoyu Island; and "チャウス島 (Tiau-su)" is not Huangwei Islet and it is the southern Fujian dialect's pronunciation of Diaoyu Island. This shows that back then either Japan

[57]Official website of the Japanese Embassy in China: http://www.cn.emb-japan.go.jp/fpolicy/senkaku_3.htm.

[58]Tadayoshi Murata, *A Thorough Investigation of Historical Materials: The Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands),* Jpn. ed., Tokyo: Kaden Sha, 2015, pp. 98–102.

didn't have the correct names for these islands or it deliberately confounded them. In fact, the sea directories produced by the British Navy from 1845 to 1887 and used by Japan back then already made it clear the Diaoyu Islands were the northeastern islands of Taiwan.

The abovementioned acts of Japan cannot prove that the Japanese Meiji Government's repeated surveys of Diaoyu Island and other islands were meant to carefully determine whether these islands were *terra nullius*; that can only prove that they were secret preparations for the invasion of Taiwan. If the Japanese government was sure that the Diaoyu Islands were the so-called *terra nullius*, it could immediately announce its occupation of them without having to wait for another seven years when it secretly decided to occupy them in January 1895.

It is a regret that even today the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is making invalid arguments: "The letter of the Foreign Minister in 1885 was a document on the incorporation of the islands into Japanese territory. It is true the letter wrote about the reaction of the Qing Dynasty, but the letter didn't show that the Japanese government had realized that the Qing Dynasty owned the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands). On the contrary, the letter shows that Japan was so careful and prudent in incorporating the islands into its territory while they were not owned by the Qing Dynasty. The Foreign Minister stated in the letter that he supported on-the-spot surveys of the islands. This clearly shows that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) weren't regarded as territory of the Qing Dynasty."[59]

This statement is clearly intended to defend Japanese warlords and political leaders such as Aritomo Yamagata and Hirobumi Ito, and that only backfires. If the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is correct in stating that the Meiji government incorporated the Diaoyu Islands into Japanese territory while they didn't belong to China, why did Japan have to be "careful and prudent" for about ten years? If the Diaoyu Islands were Japanese inherent territory, why surveys couldn't be conducted without the support of the Foreign Minister who was in charge of foreign affairs? Moreover the surveys were secret so that they couldn't be reported in newspapers; the surveys were simply equivalent to peering before theft taking place.

In fact, on October 13, 1885, the Empress Dowager Cixi issued two imperial edicts. One was to establish the Naval Ministry, and the other was to elevate Taiwan Prefecture to Taiwan Province, and change the governor of Fujian to the Governor-General of Taiwan.[60] The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs understood that these two measures of China were intended to prevent Japan's invasion of Taiwan, so it was definitely worried that Japan's ill-timed open occupation of the Diaoyu Islands would bring Japan into conflict with China and invite containment from other nations. Therefore Japan acted prudently. As a matter of fact, in order

[59]Official website of the Japanese Embassy in China:http://www.cn.emb-japan.go.jp/fpolicy/senkaku_3.htm.

[60]Wu Tianhao, *The Sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895*, revised and enlarged Chin. ed., Beijing: China Democracy and Legality Press. 2013, p. 147.

not to lay Japan's cards on the table when conditions were not ripe yet, Japanese Interior Minister Aritomo Yamagata and the Japanese military that were the most active in working for the occupation of the Diaoyu Islands, had to postpone the occupation.

From 1885 through 1888, Hirobumi Ito became Japan's first Prime Minister of the cabinet. In addition to ensuring that more evidence was collected to prove Ryukyu's ownership of the Diaoyu Islands, the Hirobumi Ito cabinet had information collected against China to step up arms expansion and war preparations. The reason why the Japanese government didn't approve the occupation of the Diaoyu Islands for the sake of the big picture: it didn't want to lose something small when it was not strong enough to get something big.

In 1887 the Japanese General Staff formulated the operation plans such as the Plan for Operations against the Qing Dynasty,[61] decided to complete the preparations for war against China by 1892, and made Korea, the Liaodong Peninsula, the Shandong Peninsula, the Penghu Islands, Taiwan, and the Zhoushan Islands targets of attack. At that time, Japan had already made Ryukyu a frontal position of its offensives against China. In April 1887, Army Major General Fukuhara was appointed governor of Okinawa Prefecture. In November of the same year Hirobumi Ito led the Minister of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations on an inspection tour of Ryukyu aboard a battleship. During the tour he wrote the Chinese poem "An Inspection Tour of Ryukyu," part of which reads, "The national defense policy of Japan/Is worked out with great care."[62]

5.4 How Hirobumi Ito Stole the Diaoyu Islands During the War

Aritomo Yamagata, who had been pushing hard for Japan's occupation of the Diaoyu Islands, served as Japanese Prime Minister from 1889 through 1891, continued to step up arms expansion and war preparations. Taking advantage of Korea being busy with addressing the Donghak Peasant Revolution and of the Qing Dynasty sending troops to Korea, Japan moved quickly to send its troops to land in Inchon, Korea. On July 23, 1894, Japan engineered a coup d'état in Korea, resulting in the establishment of a pro-Japanese puppet government headed by King Gojong's father Daewongun. The new government cut Korea's traditional ties with

[61]Guan Jie, Tang Gongchun, Guo Fuchun and Liu Enge (ed.), *The Complete History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895*, Chin. ed., Changchun: Jilin People's Publishing House, 2005, p. 289.

[62]Shuncho Higa, *History of Okinawa*, Okinawa: Okinawa Times, 1959. Kiyoshi Inoue, *An Analysis of the Historical Facts concerning the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)* (new edition), Jpn. ed., Disan Shyokan, 2012, p. 101. The writing first appeared in Japan's *History Studies,* February 1972 and was published by Nihon Gendai Hyoronsha in 1972. The book was translated into Chinese.

China. On July 25 of the same year, the Japanese Navy's cruiser *Naniwa* suddenly intercepted and attacked the Chinese troopship *Kowshing,* thus starting the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 without declaration of war.

Back then Hirobumi Ito served another term as Prime Minister from 1892 to 1896. In Ito administration former Prime Minister Aritomo Yamagata was appointed as the Commanding General of the Japanese First Army. He led his men in occupying Korea and attacking China and seized Fenghuang, Liaoning Province. The Japanese Second Army occupied Lüshun, China, on November 21 of the same year, launching a crazy massacre there. On December 4, Prime Minister Ito submitted to Japan's Imperial General Headquarters the Plan for Attacking Weihaiwei and Seizing Taiwan, stressing that while Japanese public opinion called for peace, China must be made to cede Taiwan. To this end, it would be better to realize military occupation.[63] It was precisely because Hirobumi Ito and Aritomo Yamagata had been coveting the Diaoyu Islands for about ten years that when Japan became set to win the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, they rushed to occupy these islands.

1. *Why did the Japanese Meiji Government rush to decide to steal the Diaoyu Islands before negotiations for the Treaty of Shimonoseki, taking advantage of its victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895?*

On December 13 of the 27th year of the Meiji Era (1894), the Japanese Army seized Weihai, Shandong Province, China. On December 15, the Japanese Interior Ministry brought up again Okinawa Prefecture's proposal for erecting Japanese markers on the Diaoyu Islands. In its No. 133 Secret Report, the Interior Ministry stated, "Not much has been found from the investigation of the geographical history of Uotsuri Island (Diaoyu Island) and Kuba Island (Huangwei Islet). The Hai-Pin-San northeast of the Yaeyama Islands and the Diaoyu Island included in No. 210 Map of the Japanese Navy's Waterways Department should be the two islands in question. According to members of the Waterways Department, it has never been determined whose islands these two islands are, but from the terrain perspective they should be regarded as part of the Okinawa Islands…" (see Fig. 5.12).

The secret report proves the following:

First, the Japanese Interior Ministry still had a very confusing concept of Diaoyu Island until shortly before Japan attempted to seize the island in the Sino-Japanese War in December 1894, and it even had the wrong geographical location of Diaoyu Island. Diaoyu Islands is in the northwest of the Yaeyama Islands, but the secret report mistakenly put it in the northeast of the islands probably because it mistook the Yaeyama Islands for Taiwan. In addition, in the No. 210 Map of the Japanese Navy's Waterways Department, Diaoyu Islet is explained in katakana in the

[63]Tsuishoka Shunpoko (ed.), *Biography of Hirobumi Ito* (vol. 2). Tadayoshi Murata, *A Thorough Investigation of Historical Materials: The Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands),* Jpn. ed., Tokyo: Kaden Sha, 2015, pp. 98–102.



Fig. 5.12 No. 133 Secret Report of the Japanese Interior Ministry, December 15, 1894

brackets as "Hai-Pin-San," meaning Diaoyu Islet and Hai-Pin-San are the same island, whereas the Interior Ministry even treated Hai-Pin-San and Diaoyu Islet as two different islands.

Second, during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, the surveys by the Interior Ministry were totally meaningless. The ministry merely decided that the ownership of these islands was "not determined" based on the oral accounts of members of the Japanese Navy's Waterways Department. The ministry believed that the terrain suggested that these islands should belong to Okinawa Prefecture, so it decided to erect Japanese markers there. Here the ministry is suspected of not telling the truth because members of the Japanese Navy's Waterways Department couldn't know better that these islands had been marked as northeastern islands of Taiwan in the Great Britain Hydrographic Dept's *The China Sea Directory* and didn't belong to the Yaeyama Islands. *The China Sea Directory* produced by the Japanese Navy and the color Map of the Coastal Provinces of the Qing Dynasty it produced in 1875 were both based on the documents of the Great Britain Hydrographic Dept. and China's maps.

When it comes to the incorporation of new territory into Japan, the Japanese Interior Ministry had a break from conventions by deciding to occupy the islands based on the oral accounts of the Japanese Navy. This in itself shows that as a matter of fact the Interior Ministry wanted to make sure if Japan was able to win the war before consulting the Foreign Ministry and referring the matter to the cabinet for a decision. On December 27, 1894, Japan's Interior Minister Yasushi Nomura



Fig. 5.13 Interior Minister Yasushi Nomura's Secret Report to Foreign Minister Munemitsu Mutsu, December 27, 1894

sent the No. 133 Secret Report to Foreign Minister Munemitsu Mutsu, stating that with regard to "the establishment of markers of jurisdiction on Kuba Island and Uotsuri Island," "conditions are now quite different from before and it is expected that the matter will be referred to a cabinet meeting for reconsideration. This is for your information only"[64] (see Fig. 5.13).

On December 30, 1894, the Qing government began to make peace with Japan through the good office of the USA. At the time Foreign Minister Munemitsu Mutsu was already drafting a report forcing the Qing government to cede Taiwan to Japan when it surrendered. On January 11, 1895, he wrote back in secret to the Interior Minister without any objection to his proposal. The report was affixed with the seal "Confidential" (see Fig. 5.14).

On January 12, 1895, Interior Minister Yasushi Nomura submitted the report on Proposing to the Cabinet Meeting on Erecting Markers, stating, "Located northwest of the Yaeyama Islands under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture, Kuba Island and Uotsuri Island have long been uninhabited islands. However, some people have attempted to engage in fisheries on the islands, and this should be banned. Therefore, the governor of the prefecture has proposed establishing markers of its

[64]Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Jurisdiction of the Yaeyama Islands and Uotsuri Island," *Japan's Diplomatic Documents,* Jpn. ed., issued by the Japanese International United Association on March 31, 1952, vol. 23, pp. 531, 532.



Fig. 5.14 Japanese Foreign Minister's Reply to the Interior Minister, January 11, 1895

jurisdiction of the islands. It is hereby hoped that at this meeting the cabinet will approve the proposal for bringing the islands under the jurisdiction of the prefecture and permit it to erect the proposed markers"[65] (see Fig. 5.15).

On January 13, 1895, following the Japan Army's seizure of Weihaiwei, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters decided to occupy Penghu. On the following day, the Hirobumi Ito Cabinet drafted the "Cabinet Decision" in secret before the war ended. On January 21, after the decision was signed, the cabinet decided to incorporate Kuba Island (Huangwei Islet) and Uotsuri Island (Diaoyu Island) into Okinawa Prefecture and establish markers there[66] (see Fig. 5.16).

This is important historic evidence. It was often mistakenly believed that the decision of the Japanese cabinet was approved on January 14, 1895. Back then, Japan neither made the matter known to the public, published it in its official newspapers, or issued an imperial decree on it nor notified China of the matter. Japan merely stole the islands on the strength of its victory in the war. The reasons why Japan stole the Diaoyu Islands before it occupied Taiwan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki are as follows:

First, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters had decided to attack and seize Taiwan, so the Diaoyu Islands could serve as a maritime base of the Japanese Navy's attack.

[65]Ibid., p. 532.
[66]Ibid.



Fig. 5.15 The Interior Minister's Report on Establishing National Markers, January 12, 1895



Fig. 5.16 Decision and Order of the Hirobumi Ito Cabinet Signed in Secret, January 21, 1895

Second, Japan was not sure whether it was able to force the Qing government to cede Taiwan and the islands affiliated with it.

Third, Japan had been coveting the Diaoyu Islands for ten years and believed that it was time for it to steal them.

2. *The Hirobumi Ito cabinet didn't meet on January 14, 1895, and on January 21 of the same year cabinet members signed the document secretly approving the theft of Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet.*

To defend its theft of China's Diaoyu Islands, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, "It is a fact that the decision made by the cabinet at a meeting wasn't made public, but not making its decisions, including ordinary ones, public was a usual practice of the cabinet. Following the decision adopted at this cabinet meeting, the Japanese government issued permits to nongovernmental sources that applied for the use of the land of the islands, and the national government and the Okinawa Prefecture government conducted on-the-spot surveys of the islands, and Japan openly exercised sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands). It is therefore clear that Japan explicitly expressed its sovereignty. In addition, according to international law, Japan was not obliged to notify other countries of its occupation of the islands."[67]

Clearly the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is lying. Japan made its occupation of Daito Island public and announced the occupation in Decree 13 in 1896. Japan also issued Decree 190 to announce the occupation of the Bonin Islands. When it comes to incorporating new territory into Japan, Japan's statement that "not making its decisions, including ordinary ones, public was a usual practice of the cabinet" is completely baseless. The Japanese cabinet made public only selected decisions; it would naturally not make known its shameful military plans for attacking China and carve up its territory. Before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 Japan made secret surveys of the Diaoyu Islands and during the war it seized these islands in secret. The entire process was a secret. For example, all the letters and reports of the Japanese government and Okinawa Prefecture concerning the surveys of the Diaoyu Islands were kept secret in order not to arouse China's opposition. Facts prove that the Japanese Meiji Government's theft of the Diaoyu Islands was part of the process of Japan's secret expansion following its annexation of the Ryukyu Kingdom, and Japan eventually succeeded in stealing the islands based on its victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895.

What needs to be pointed out is that the decision of the Japanese cabinet ordering the occupation of the Diaoyu Islands was merely a formality and it is a not fact that the Japanese cabinet met and adopted a decision on January 14, 1895. No records can be found of the specific meeting place, time and content of the meeting in Japanese archives. In fact, the secret decision was drafted on January 14, 1895, and adopted by having members of the Hirobumi Ito cabinet sign it. The signature

[67]Official website of the Japanese Embassy in China:http://www.cn.emb-japan.go.jp/fpolicy/senkaku_3.htm.

process wasn't completed until January 21 of the same year when an order was adopted to allow Okinawa Prefecture to erect markers on Kuba Island (Huangwei Islet) and Uotsuri Island (Diaoyu Island) in accordance with the decision. If a decision had been adopted at the cabinet meeting on January 14, it would not have been necessary to approve an order a week later on January 21.

According to the record made by Foreign Minister Munemitsu Mutsu of the Hirobumi Ito cabinet, who was involved in the process, in his *Kenkenroku: A Diplomatic Record of the Sino-Japanese War, 1894–1895*, he and Prime Minister Hirobumi Ito left Tokyo together for Hiroshima on January 11, 1895. On January 27, a meeting was held with the presence of the emperor at the Hiroshima General Headquarters on peace between Japan and Qing. The Hiroshima-based members of the cabinet and high-level officials of the Imperial General Headquarters participated in the meeting. This shows that on January 14, 1895, neither Hirobumi Ito nor Munemitsu Mutsu was in Tokyo; they were at Emperor Meiji's General Headquarters in Hiroshima discussing how to force China in the negotiations to cede more territory. To participate in the meeting, some members of the cabinet from outside Hiroshima made a special trip to the city. As things stood back then, in the eyes of the Hirobumi Ito cabinet, erecting markers on uninhabited islands was insignificant when compared with forcing China to cede Taiwan and other large stretches of territory, and should not be discussed at a special meeting. Therefore, the fact could be that taking advantage of members of the cabinet traveling to Hiroshima for the meeting on January 27 with the presence of the emperor, Hirobumi Ito had these members sign the January 14 decision by January 21.

One more thing needs to be pointed out is that the January 14, 1895, document members of the Hirobumi Ito cabinet signed only included Kuba Island (Huangwei Islet) and Uotsuri Island (Diaoyu Island); it didn't include Chiwei Islet or the so-called Kume Aka Island that was mentioned during the secret surveys. Chiwei Islet was China's easternmost island located where the Diaoyu Islands met with Ryukyu on the sea and was of great significance for determining the maritime boundary between China and Ryukyu.

The Japanese government stated that it owned the so-called Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) before the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed on April 17, 1895. But in fact, it was on the basis of this treaty that Japan occupied Taiwan and these islands as well. Even if the Japanese government refers to the secret decision made on January 14, 1895, as evidence, it can hardly prove that it had decided to incorporate Chiwei Islet, Nanxiao Island, and Beixiao Island into Japanese territory before the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed. Japan didn't rename Chiwei Islet Taisho Island and incorporate it into state-owned land until on January 25, 1921, 26 years after the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed. After World War II, Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet were the firing/bombing ranges of the US Navy. The secret decision made by the Japanese cabinet in January 1895 to erect markers on Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet was not implemented. It wasn't until 1969 that Ishigaki established markers on the Diaoyu Islands.

With regard to the colonial development of the Diaoyu Islands, the Japanese government didn't approve the application filed by Tatsushiro Koga on June 10,

1895, for renting the islands for development purposes until August 1896 after April 1896 when the cession of Taiwan was completed in accordance with the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Therefore it is more accurate to say this meant that Japan began to openly exercise its colonial rule rather than its sovereignty.

Occupation is an international law term designed to serve colonial expansion of territory, and according to Japan's *International Law Dictionary*, occupation can become effective based on the following conditions:

First, occupation must be carried out by a country.
Second, what is occupied must be *terra nullius* recognized by international law.
Third, the subjective condition is that the country must make a territorial claim.
The dictionary stresses that, "In order to make occupation effective, the country must make a territorial claim." A territorial claim can be made by, for example, "issuing notices to other countries."[68]
But now the abovementioned dishonesty of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has cost it its professionalism and credibility.

3. *The Hirobumi Ito took advantage of Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 to force the Qing government to sign the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki. Under the treaty Japan occupied Taiwan and the islands affiliated with it including the Diaoyu Islands for 50 years.*

On January 30, 1895, Chinese envoys Zhang Yinhuan and Shao Youlian arrived at Hiroshima where the Japanese Army was headquartered during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 for peace talks. However, Japanese Prime Minister Hirobumi Ito and Foreign Minister Munemitsu Mutsu were arrogant and refused to hold talks with the Chinese envoys on the ground they were not plenipotentiaries and got them to return to China. In the meantime, Japan never said a word of its decision to seize the Diaoyu Islands and didn't mention this to the Chinese side during the following talks for the Treaty of Shimonoseki.

On February 15, 1895, Zhang and Shao returned to Shanghai when Liugong Island had been lost and the Northern Fleet was destroyed. Emperor Guangxu had no one else to rely on for war and peace but the 73-year-old Li Hongzhang. On March 17, as the Qing government's plenipotentiary, Li Hongzhang arrived at Shimonoseki, Japan. At first he tried to ingratiate himself with Japan in his talks with Prime Minister Hirobumi Ito. In the eyes of the then Foreign Minister Munemitsu Mutsu, the reason why Li Hongzhang "didn't hide his admiration for Japan's reform and progress, kept praising Prime Minister Ito for his accomplishments, warned Japan of the differences between the East and the West, urged China and Japan to stay as brothers to fend off foreign aggression, and advocated a Sino-Japanese alliance was to quickly complete the peace talks. What he said was

[68]The Japanese Society of International Law, *International Law Dictionary,* Chin. ed., Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1985, pp. 278, 279.

nothing new to today's Eastern statesmen. He talked a lot in order to arouse sympathy and used sarcasms to hide his humiliating position as a loser…."[69]

In contract, the 55-year-old Hirobumi Ito was in a threatening manner. He started by forcing the Chinese side to allow the Japanese Army to occupy Dagu, Tianjin and Shanhaiguan, but Li Hongzhang turned him down. In fact, Ito only wanted to force China to cede Taiwan to Japan. At that time the Japanese Joint Fleet had moved across the southern end of Taiwan to the Penghu Islands and seized the batteries there. On March 24, 1895, Li Hongzhang survived an assassination attempt; he was shot in the face but it was not fatal. Japan was afraid that this would give rise to international public opinion unfavorable to Japan, Emperor Meiji, who was supervising operations in Hiroshima, expressed condolences and sent doctors to help. At this time Li Hongzhang believed that the coming negotiations would be easier, but Ito set a deadline of March 27 to April 16 for peace ceasefire talks.[70]

Beginning on April 1, the new Chinese and Japanese negotiators were Li Hongzhang's son Li Jingfang and Japanese Foreign Minister Munemitsu Mutsu. On that day the Japanese side proposed "conditions for peace" and gave the Chinese side four days to reply. One of the conditions was that China should cede to Japan "the whole of Taiwan Island and the islands affiliated with it."[71] On April 5, the Chinese representatives had to use a memorandum as their first revision to the Japanese proposal. The draft revision didn't involve all clauses; it was made to plead the Japanese to change the harsh conditions. The Japanese continued to add pressure to the Chinese, demanding the Chinese accept the draft in its entirety or raise objections to each clause.

On April 9 of the same year, the Chinese offered their second revision, asking the Japanese to concede on issues involving territorial cessions and indemnities and agreeing to cede the Liaodong Peninsula and the Penghu Islands. On April 10, the Japanese proposed an another revision to China's proposal, cutting by a little margin the part of the Liaodong Peninsula to be ceded, reducing the indemnities to 200 million Kuping taels, insisting that China should cede the whole of Taiwan and all the islands affiliated with it, and stating that no more Chinese representations would be accepted and that the treaty must be signed within a prescribed time frame.

Back then Japan had cracked China's official encryption code of telegrams, so they knew what the encoded telegrams between Li Hongzhang and the Qing court were about. Hirobumi Ito threatened Li Jingfang, "If you don't agree, and if these

[69]Munemitsu Mutsu, *Kenkenroku: A Diplomatic Record of the Sino-Japanese War, 1894–1895*, Jpn. ed., pp. 131, 132.

[70]"Letter from Prime Minister Hirobumi Ito Foreign Minister Munemitsu Mutsu, Asking the Latter to Negotiate Ceasefire," March 27, 1895, Jpn. ed., *Diplomatic Documents of Japan*, vol. 28, Document 1066.

[71]*Diplomatic Documents of Japan*, Jpn. ed., vol. 28, Document 1078.

talks fail, then I will order 60–70 troopships to send more reinforcements to China…. That would be a threat to Beijing itself."[72]

On April 10, 1895, Li Hongzhang recovered from injuries and resumed talks with Hirobumi Ito. In Japan's revised proposal, Japan demanded that China permanently cede to Japan "the whole of Taiwan and all the islands affiliated with it." Li Hongzhang was opposed to it on the strength of international practices and on the ground that the Japanese Army had not occupied Taiwan. Ito stated, "If our troops have to be in the region which is to be ceded, should Japan send the troops now to occupy it?" Ito asked, "How did China cede Siberia to Russia?" Therefore "demanding the cession of Taiwan is an appropriate requirement for peace talks." He also threatened Li Hongzhang that Japan's warships in Hiroshima could leave to attack Tianjin at any time.[73]

In response, the Qing government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed Li Hongzhang that "half of Taiwan could be ceded. Southern Taiwan should belong to Japan, while northern Taiwan is connected with Xiamen and should remain Chinese territory."[74] Ito turned all that down and proclaimed that 30 Japanese troopships had left for Dalian Bay. After it received Li Hongzhang's report, the Qing Court could not but accept Japan's conditions. April 17, China was forced to sign the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki according to which Taiwan and all the islands affiliated with it as well as the Penghu Islands were ceded to Taiwan. On June 2 of the 21st year of the reign of Qing Emperor Guangxu (1895), Li Jingfang and Sukenori Kabayama signed the Agreement on the Handover of Taiwan aboard a ship off Keelung. By "the whole of Taiwan and all the islands affiliated with it," Japan of course meant to include the Diaoyu Islands.

According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Treaty of Shimonoseki didn't specify the scope of Taiwan and the islands affiliated with it the Qing Dynasty ceded to Japan, but throughout the entire negotiations, there is no evidence that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) were included in the concept of Taiwan and the islands affiliated with it in Article 2 of the treaty. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs admitted that in 1885 before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, Japan had started preparations to officially bring these islands under the jurisdiction of the Japanese territory Okinawa Prefecture. In addition, the ministry stressed that even after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, Japan didn't treat the

[72] *Collected Works of Li Hongzhang,* Chin. ed., telegrams, vol. 20, pp. 32–33. Guan Jian et al. (ed.), *The Complete History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895*, vol. 3, War Chapter (2), Chin. ed., Jilin People's Publishing House, 2006, p. 528.

[73] *Diplomatic Documents of Japan*, Jpn. ed., vol. 28, Document no. 108; Appendix 2. Guan Jian et al. (ed.), *The Complete History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895*, vol. 3, War Chapter (2), Chin. ed., Jilin People's Publishing House, 2006, pp. 554–558.

[74] *Collected Works of Li Hongzhang,* Chin. ed., telegrams, vol. 20, p. 38. Guan Jian et al. (ed.), *The Complete History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895*, vol. 3, War Chapter (2), Chin. ed., Jilin People's Publishing House, 2006, p. 567.

Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) as a region under the jurisdiction of the ceded Taiwan Prefecture, but always as a district of Okinawa Prefecture.[75]

Nevertheless, Japan should not deny that this process was synchronized with its preparation of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. That Japan subjectively believed that it had never regarded the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) as part of Taiwan and the islands affiliated with it, which were Qing territory, cannot change the objective facts that Diaoyu Island was affiliated with Taiwan and that Diaoyu Islands were recorded in the documents and maps of the Japanese Ministry of the Navy as the northeastern islands of Taiwan from 1874 to 1894. Those in power in Japan are used to believing their subjective belief is an objective fact, which is very dangerous.

4. *The Treaty of Shimonoseki was prepared in Chinese, Japanese, and English. The main differences between the Chinese and Japanese versions are found in Article 2 on territorial cession.*

Article 2 of the Chinese version of the treaty reads, "China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and management power the following territories, together with all fortifications, arsenals, and public property thereon."[76] The Japanese version reads, "The Empire of Qing cedes to the Empire of Japan in perpetuity and sovereignty the left territories, together with all fortifications, arsenals, and public property thereon." In legal terms, the sovereignty over the left territories as mentioned in the Japanese version is quite different from the management power over the following territories. The management power referred to in the Chinese version can be read as administrative power which is diametrically different from the sovereignty referred to in the Japanese version.

According to the Chinese version, China ceded to Japan its management power, that is, administrative power in terms of international law or pure jurisdiction over Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, and no sovereignty was involved. According to international law, Article 2 of the Chinese version can be interpreted as what China ceded to Japan was its administrative power of, not sovereignty over, Taiwan and the Penghu Islands. However, it is sovereignty over the territories and there is no doubt that the Japanese version means that China ceded to Japan the sovereignty over and the administrative power of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands. The English version of the treaty is the same as the Japanese version and uses "full sovereignty," which includes both territorial sovereignty and administrative power.

Part of the regulations for concluding the Treaty of Shimonoseki reads:

"In order to prevent future misunderstandings and misinterpretations of the peace treaty signed and sealed today, the government under the emperor of the Qing

[75]Official website of the Japanese Embassy in China:http://www.cn.emb-japan.go.jp/fpolicy/senkaku_3.htm.

[76]Wang Tieya (ed.), *A Collection of Old Treaties between China and Foreign Countries*, Chin. ed., Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company; 1957, pp. 614–619.

Dynasty and the government under the emperor of the Empire of Japan have their plenipotentiaries work together to conclude the following articles:

First, both sides agree that there shall be an English version of the peace treaty signed and sealed today, and the version shall be the same as the Chinese and Japanese versions.

Second, both sides agree that in the future, if the two countries do not agree with the Chinese or Japanese version, the English version shall prevail."[77]

So it is made clear in these regulations in case of any discrepancy between the Chinese and Japanese versions, the English version shall prevail. In fact, the English version was prepared based on the Japanese version, so it is line with the interpretation of the Japanese.

5. *Under the Treaty of Shimonoseki, China was forced to cede Taiwan, leading to the opposition of Taiwan and the failure to specify the scope of the islands affiliated with Taiwan in the treaty.*

Following the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the Japanese Army killed its way into Taiwan in May 1895. The locals throughout Taiwan rose in revolt in opposition to the cession of Taiwan to Japan. Despite being ordered by the Qing government to give up Taiwan and move back to the mainland, the Qing army stationed in Taiwan under Liu Yung-fu, former General of the Black Banner Army, was reluctant to leave Taiwan. Together with the Tung Army led by Lin Chao-tung, a sixth-generation descendant of the Lin family of Wufeng in Taiwan, it put up stubborn resistance on the island. Led by Chiu Feng-chia, Taiwan gentry helped establish the Republic of Formosa with Yuching as its reign year. The republic sent a telegram to the Qing Court, stating, "The people of Taiwan will not yield to the Japan; we will stay loyal to Qing forever."[78] The republic's General Hsu Nan-ying assisted Liu Yung-fu to defend Tainan. In northern Taiwan, under the leadership of Chien Ta-shih, several guerrilla forces were formed to fight the Japanese. Many died in their resistance against the Japanese Army. As they were outnumbered, Liu Yung-fu, Lin Chao-tung, and others were ordered by the Qing government to retreat to the mainland, so their resistance eventually failed. Japan sent crack forces of more than 49,800 men with the support of 26,200 rear service personnel to attack Taiwan. Their attack left 4,624 Japanese soldiers dead and more than 32,000 others wounded. The casualties Japan suffered in its invasion of Taiwan nearly doubled those it had suffered in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895.[79]Lieutenant General Prince Kitashirakawa Yoshihisa, Commander of the Imperial Guards Division, also died of wounds sustained in the attack.

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[77]Ibid., p. 619.

[78]*Shen Bao,* June 3, 1895.

[79]Guan Jie, Tang Gongchun, Guo Fuchun, and Liu Enge (eds.), *The Complete History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895*, vol. 4, Postwar Chapter, Chin. ed., Jilin People's Publishing House, 2005, pp. 431, 432.

Against this backdrop, on June 2, 1895, Japanese Taiwan Governor-General Sukenori Kabayama and the Chinese plenipotentiary Li Jingfang met aboard a Japanese ship off Sandi'ao, Keelung, for the handover of Taiwan. Li Jingfang didn't dare to land in Taiwan and completed the handover with the protection of the Japanese Army. Kabayama stated, "After we arrived at Tamsui, we were bombarded by the Chinese. We then moved to Keelung, we were also shelled by the Chinese. We had no other alternative but to stay at Sandi'ao. It was reported that 10,000 men of the army had landed and we can take Keelung today."[80]

Li Jingfang said that he had fallen ill and confined to bed for long after he returned to China from Japan. He was afraid Taiwan would suffer from instability and the handover would not be completed for several years. He hoped that Japan would not push it too hard. During the meeting with the Japanese, He said, "I feel too dizzy to sit up for a longer time." As a matter of fact, Li Jingfang was pretending because he was afraid that Japan would demand the land in Taiwan to confirm the land public property ceded to Japan and prepare a list of them. As a result, on the afternoon of the same day, negotiations were transferred to the German steamer rented by the Chinese side. During this meeting, Li Jingfang brought up the question concerning the scope of the islands affiliated with Taiwan.

Li Jingfang asked, "Is it advisable to include in the list the names of the islands affiliated with Taiwan? The Penghu Islands are delimited by longitude and latitude in the peace treaty, but the scope of the islands affiliated with Taiwan have not been specified. This may lead to disputes over taking the islands close to Fujian Province as islands affiliated with Taiwan."

Minister-Resident Jun (Takashi) Mizuno, the Japanese representative of the talks, replied, "If the names of the islands are listed at your suggestion, some islands may be missing and others are nameless, then my government will not be able to own them. So the suggestion may not be appropriate. In addition, it is generally recognized that the islands affiliated with Taiwan are those close to Taiwan, and the Japanese government will never take islands close to Fujian as islands affiliated with Taiwan. I will report this to Governor Sukenori Kabayama when I return to my ship. Moreover, Fujian and Taiwan are separated by the Penghu Islands, so what you fear will not happen."[81] Li Jingfang eventually came to agree with it. At 8 pm that day, Li Jingfang and Sukenori Kabayama signed and affixed their respective seals on the Instrument on the Handover of Taiwan.

This shows that in the talks on the handover, consensus had been reached over how to define the islands affiliated with Taiwan, but the Japanese side didn't inform the Chinese of the decision it made in January of the same year to occupy Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet. Therefore, the Chinese could not express their attitude toward this matter. Even if the Japanese had the Chinese know of this, Li Jingfang

[80] *Collected Works of Li Hongzhang,* Chin. ed., telegrams, vol. 21, pp. 10–12.

[81] Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (JACAR), Relevant Documents and Notes of the Talks between Japanese Taiwan Japanese Taiwan Governor-General Sukenori Kabayama and Qing Dynasty's Handover Representative Li Jingfang on the Hnadover of Taiwan and Related Property.

would not have been able to raise objections. This is just like asking for the return of the buttons on the coat that has been looted. Probably because Diaoyu Island was a small uninhabited island, the Diaoyu Islands didn't appear in most of the maps of Taiwan or Ryukyu China and Japan had. This makes it difficult to figure out what happened then in the future.

Up to the eve of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, the Diaoyu Islands had belonged to the northeastern islands affiliated with Taiwan, China, not the Ryukyu Islands. This makes it clear that why not a single island affiliated with Taiwan is specified in the Treaty of Shimonoseki and the term "the whole of Taiwan Island and the islands affiliated with it" is used instead. In essence, the Diaoyu Island is included in the term. Some Japanese are unwilling to recognize this evidence and they advocate that Taiwan extended no farther than Pengjia Islet in 1895, but this is a subjective decision of them, not a legal or factual basis.

6. *The theft of the Diaoyu Islands by Hirobumi Ito cabinet was a prelude to and a preparation for Japan's military occupation of Taiwan. This indicated that Japan no longer had to think twice about invading China as it had done before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. However, Japan had to consider what trouble there would be following its public occupation of Diaoyu Island.*

From Aritomo Yamagata to Hirobumi Ito, the Meiji government had been coveting Diaoyu Islands for ten years. Nevertheless, up to May 1894, Japan had not rushed to occupy Diaoyu Islands because he had not obtained from Okinawa Prefecture the basis for doing so in order not to affect the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 Japan was about out wage. When Japan was set to win the war, the Hirobumi Ito cabinet naturally decided to seize Diaoyu Islands after waiting for a long time. These islands were of important military and strategic value because they could serve as maritime markers guiding Japanese troops from Ryukyu directly to Taiwan.

Just as I said above, on December 4, 1894, Prime Minister Hirobumi Ito submitted to Japan's Imperial General Headquarters the Plan for Attacking Weihaiwei and Seizing Taiwan. Deciding to occupy Diaoyu Islands first was therefore the first step to seize Taiwan. It is justifiable to say that even the Treaty of Shimonoseki was not signed, Japanese troops would definitely attack Taiwan just as it did Weihaiwei. This is because following the collapse of the Beiyang Navy, the Japanese Navy could do anything it liked to China at sea and Taiwan, which is across the sea from the mainland, was set to be the first to be seized from China by Japan.

In fact, to seize Taiwan, at first Japan assembled two crack units in Nakagusuku Bay southeast of the city of Okinawa in Ryukyu. One of them was the force directly under the command of the Taiwan Governor-General's office led by Commander of the Japanese Fleet and Admiral Sukenori Kabayama who later became Japan's first Governor-General of Taiwan, totaling about 12,000 men. The other was led by Lieutenant General Prince Kitashirakawa Yoshihisa, Commander of the Imperial Guards Division, and had about 15,000 men. In addition, the fourth Brigade of Japan's 2nd Division was transferred from China's Liaodong area to Taiwan. On

May 26, 1895, in order to attack Taiwan, the Imperial Guards Division first moved to Nakagusuku Bay in Ryukyu from Lüshunkou. It joined forces with the forces under the command of Sukenori Kabayama that arrived there on May 27. A decision was made that day on how Japanese troops should land fight. And all the forces were placed under the command of Prince Kitashirakawa Yoshihisa. According to Article 2 of the military order the prince gave on the same day to attack Taiwan, the division would set sail from this bay (Nakagusuku Bay, Okinawa) and get to five kilometers south of "Senkaku Island" northeast of Keelung (lat. 25° 20′N and long. 120°E) for further order. He began to move to that destination at 5:30 that afternoon.

Located northeast of the Keelung Port, the Diaoyu Islands served as a maritime marker and were on the way when the Japanese main forces moved from Nakagusuku Bay, Okinawa, to the assembly area in the waters off Keelung. Early in the morning on May 29, 1895, more than 20 Japanese warships arrived at the proposed assembly area, occupied all the important positions in their preparation for landing in Taiwan, and began their offensives against Taiwan. This shows the Diaoyu Islands were in a very important strategic position at the time.

However, the assembly area "Senkaku Island" designated by Prince Kitashirakawa Yoshihisa and was actually not Diaoyu Island. The longitude and latitude and elevation of the island they gave suggested that the so-called Senkaku Island must be Huaping Islet, the island closest to Taiwan. In some modern Western maps, Huaping Islet and Diaoyu Island were often mistaken for each other. For example, the Map of China published in Germany in 1868 and the Map of Eastern China published in England in 1897 both had Pinnacle I for Huaping Islet, which was translated by Japan as "Senkaku Island," whereas Diaoyu Island was written as Hoa-pin-su which was Huaping Islet. In the Map of Eastern China published in England, Pinnacle Is was written where Nanxiao Island and Beixiao Island should be, and was translated by Japan as Pinnacle Is. The Senkaku Island referred to by Prince Kitashirakawa Yoshihisa was probably the name provided by the Waterways Department of the Japanese Navy which had been affected by the abovementioned maps. However, it should not be neglected that to move from Nakagusuku Bay, Okinawa, to Huaping Islet close to Taiwan, Japan's Imperial Guards Division had to go through the Diaoyu Islands first.

At first, the Japanese 2nd Division attacking Keelung failed to land in Taiwan as a result of the resistance by local troops and civilians. Japan's Imperial Guards Division, however, successfully landed in a flat location that was poorly defended along the Sandiaojiaoyanliao coast. The possibility cannot be ruled out that Japan's Imperial Guards Division made use of the Diaoyu Islands as maritime markers and swiftly moved from the southeast of Okinawa to the proposed assembly area in the waters off Taiwan and launched attacks from there.

Japan's theft of the Diaoyu Islands before it forced the Qing government to cede Taiwan was a very barbarous act. Japan made its unannounced occupation of the Diaoyu Islands not because it feared China which was unable to fight back but because it was afraid that its unnegotiated occupation of another country's territory would arouse the vigilance of other powers and invite their intervention.

Japan had a reason to fear. On January 4, 1894, Tsarist Russia entered into alliance with France, putting external pressure on Japan. The USA made it clear it wasn't interested in involvement in a Sino-Japanese War. On November 21 of the same year, General Oyama Iwao led the 2nd Army of the Japanese Army in starting attacking Lüshun. On November 22, the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the USA and Japan was signed, which was to become effective with the ratification of the US Congress in February 1895. On December 11, the New York-based newspaper *The World* reported on the Lüshun massacre, arousing the diplomatic concern in the West. Back then, the US Minister to Japan demanded Japanese Foreign Minister Munemitsu Mutsu to give an explanation of the issue. Russia, France, and other European powers were concerned that following its sweeping victory in the war Japan expand its sphere of influence in East Asia whenever and wherever it pleased.

According to Japanese war history, "The winter operation policy was met with quick success, thus significantly consolidating Japan's strategic position. On the other hand, Japan was facing an increasingly dangerous diplomatic situation. Since Japan's victory in the battles at sea and over land in September, there had been signs of foreign powers intervening in Japan. In November, with no more hope for its future, the Qing Dynasty was prepared for peace talks and directly asked European and American countries for arbitration. When would this invite the active intervention of foreign powers? It was hard to tell given the developments."[82]

Against this backdrop, the Hirobumi Ito cabinet worked mainly to stop European powers intervening in the issue and the Japan–US Treaty of Commerce and Navigation being ruined, so they did their utmost to deny the Lüshun massacre of civilians. Militarily, following its victory Japan began to attack Weihaiwei in attempt to the Beiyang Navy of the Qing Dynasty before moving on to occupy Taiwan. This shows that on the one hand, Japanese troops' massacre in Lüshun rid the Hirobumi Ito cabinet of its fear of the Qing government; on the other hand, Japan must prevent the massacre from placing the country in a passive position in its confrontation with European and American powers. This is probably one of the historical reasons why with a sweeping victory in war, Japan did not openly occupy the Diaoyu Islands; it only made a secret decision to seize them.

Following the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Japan attempted to become the sole occupier of China's Liaodong Peninsula; the attempt was foiled due to the intervention of Russia, France, and Germany. According to Tadayoshi Murata, Honorary Professor of Yokohama National University, "It is a historical fact that the islands referred to by Japan as the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) actually belonged to China, not Ryukyu. Japan occupied these places in 1895; it was a sheer robbery on the strength of Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895,

[82]Hirotake Koyama, *An Outline History of Modern Japanese Military Affairs*, Jpn. ed., Tokyo: Itoshobo, 1944, pp. 307–313. Tadayoshi Murata, "The Origin of the Territorial Dispute between Japan and China: A Review of the Diaoyu Islands Issue Based on Historical Archives, a Chinese version prepared from the original Japanese by Wei Heping, et al., Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2013, p. 192.

not an open and upright act of occupation. This historical fact cannot be fabricated. It is essential to have realistic understanding and an objective and proper attitude toward analyses."[83]

In short, the Diaoyu Islands issue is absolutely not isolated. It must be viewed taking into consideration the whole process of change of the Ryukyu issue and the Taiwan question and analyzed based on both history and reality. China's historical sovereignty and valid jurisdiction over the Diaoyu Islands were suspended by the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 waged by Japan and the Treaty of Shimonoseki signed following the war. From the time when the Qing government was forced to cede Taiwan to Japan to the time when the Treaty of Shimonoseki was repealed, China could hardly lodge protests against Japan's occupation of the Diaoyu Islands, which were affiliated with Taiwan. However, this absolutely does not mean that China admitted that the Diaoyu Islands were the inherent territory of Japan or its occupation of these islands was legitimate.

5.5 Testimonies from the Descendant of an Early Developer: The Diaoyu Islands Belong to China

After Japan started its colonial rule of Taiwan in 1895, there were two persons important for Japan's colonial development of Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet. One was Tatsushiro Koga who had the leasing development right granted by the Japanese government, and the other was his partner Yakitai Izawa. So far the Japanese government has given much publicity to Koga and has not even mentioned Izawa. One of the reasons for this is that the Japanese government believes that Koga discovered and developed the Diaoyu Islands in 1884. On the basis of this, the Japanese government decided to purchase and nationalize Diaoyu Island, Nanxiao Island, and Beixiao Island from their owners authorized by the Koga family. However, Izawa, who was actually in charge of the development of the islands, is not liked by the Japanese government. His eldest daughter Maki Izawa prepared a historical testimony on January 8, 1972, not only stating that Koga as the first to discover the Diaoyu Islands was fabricated but also arguing that the Diaoyu Islands were Chinese territory that had been seized by Japan together with Taiwan during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, and that now that Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration in 1945, it should return these islands to their home China.

I conducted research on this little-known testimony of Maki Izawa on the basis of Japan's historical archives and relevant historical documents. My basic conclusion is as follows: The testimonies are true and trustworthy; the so-called Koga developing the Diaoyu Islands in 1884 was a century-old lie; following World War II Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, Chiwei Islet, and other islands must be

[83]Tadayoshi Murata, *How to Understand the Senkaku Islands/Diaoyu Islands Issue*, Jpn. ed., Tokyo: Nihon Kyoho Sha, 2004, pp. 56, 57.

returned to China in pursuit of the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration; the Japanese owner's land ownership of the Diaoyu Islands during the colonial development period had expired; and the Japanese government's attempt to purchase the islands was illegal and invalid.

5.5.1 *Content of Maki Izawa's Testimonies*

Yakitai Izawa was born in Kumamoto Prefecture, Japan. In 1891, he poached on Diaoyu Island, China's uninhabited island. Following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, he entered into a partnership with Tatsushiro Koga who had secured the free leasing and development right to that island, and organized colonial development of Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet. In 1900, Koga Village was founded on Huangwei Islet with a total of 33 inhabitants. Yakitai Izawa's eldest daughter Maki Izawa was born on Huangwei Islet in February 1901.

In the early 1970s, Maki Izawa prepared two valuable and little-known historical testimonies. One was the interview given by her to the *Gunsei* magazine of the Okinawa Prefecture News Agency on August 20, 1971, and published in the magazine's inaugural issue on August 29 of the same year under the title "Testimony of a Japanese Person Who Is Related to the 'Discovery' of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)." The other was the testimony on the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) dictated by Maki Izawa on January 8, 1972. These testimonies prove indirectly that the Diaoyu Islands indisputably belong to China. The following are the testimonies for the information of the reader.

1. *The testimony published in August 1971*

On August 29, 1971, the interview given by Maki Izawa to the *Gunsei* magazine of the Okinawa Prefecture News Agency was published in the magazine's inaugural issue. According to the interview, Yakitai Izawa discovered Huangwei Islet following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and entered into a partnership with Tatsushiro Koga for developing the island. Along with the interview a photograph of Yakitai Izawa and others was published. According to Maki Izawa, the man holding a girl (Maki Izawa's younger sister) in his arms was her father. This could be the only reminder of that time (see Fig. 5.17).[84]

The interview said:

> This is a testimony of Izawa from Nagano Prefecture.
>
> I was born on Huangwei Island of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) in the 34th year of the Meiji Era (1901).

[84]Hachiro Yamamura, "Testimony of a Japanese Person Who Is Related to the 'Discovery' of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)," *Gunsei* magazine, Okinawa Prefecture News Agency, inaugural issue, August 29, 1971.

Fig. 5.17 Yakitai Izawa (the man with a girl in his arms)

My father Yakitai Izawa was born at Shimomashikigun in Kumamoto Prefecture County, Japan and died in Hualien Port, Taiwan, at 61 in the third year of the Taisho Era (1914).

He was probably a military surgeon in the 27th and 28th years of the Meiji Era (1894 and 1895) during the Japanese-Qing War (Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895). After that he was dismissed from the military locally and lived in Naha in Okinawa Prefecture as a doctor. Soon after the end of the Japanese-Qing War, more than ten fishing boats of the Mitsui & Co. Ltd. were hit by storms at the Yaeyama Islands, and a rescue team was formed for them. My father also made the trip on a ship as a doctor. The accident took place close to the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands), but at the time nobody knew the islands were there. When my father's ship moved in the relevant waters, they found fresh algae floating toward them, so they were certain there were islands there or they were approaching islands. It wasn't long before they reached the island. They had no idea whether it was a Chinese or Japanese island, so my father made a quick return to Kyushu to report it to the government. The government said it was a Japanese island.

Later on, my uncle told me that back then the Kumamoto-based *Nichi Nichi Shinbun* published a full coverage of the event titled "Yakitai Izawa Discovers a Bird Island." In short, as the government said the island was Japan's, my father, Mr. Tatsushiro Koga and another man immediately filed an application for the development of the island. Because my father didn't have the money, the development was financed by Mr. Koga while my father was told he could do anything about the development and he was put in full charge of the undertaking. Because Koga provided the money, he nominally had the right to the island, but he was never said to have discovered the island. Mr. Koga didn't have a child of his own; he only had a stepson, who was four or five years my senior. He built a dried bonito farm on the island and hired helping hands from Tosa Prefecture.

In addition, shells and albatross feathers were collected on the island. It was said a huge natural pearl was presented from the island to Her Majesty the Queen. To present the pearl, my father spent a lot on traveling. He was rewarded 300 yen for that, but that was less than his cost. It was said that the pear was named "Dazzling in All Directions."

> Later on, I went to Naha and lived in Kume Village. I had my first three years of elementary school education in Okinawa and returned to Kumamoto at 9 in the 43rd year of the Meiji Era (1910). It wasn't long before my father's business on the island ran into difficulty, so he went to Taiwan as I said above.
>
> This photo is the only reminder of the time. Those in the middle row were from the interior of Japan. The man with a girl in his arms was my father and the girl was my younger sister. Those in the first and last rows were Okinawa people.
>
> In addition, in the photo taken in a farm with many people, the one in front of the flag post was my father and the man turning right dressed in kimono and holding a walking stick was Mr. Koga.
>
> The above was produced by me from a dictation as a testimony of a Japanese person.
>
> During the Japanese-Qing War, Okinawa fisheries were subject to massive infiltration, rule and exploitation by Mitsui and exposed to risks. At that time Izawa saw the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) that even Okinawa people didn't know and reported them to the government. A local newspaper reported that a bird island had been discovered because there were many albatrosses on the island. The government believed it was an uninhabited island, took it as a rare part of Japanese territory and allowed the people to pursue risky development there. As a Japanese citizen, my father was afraid what he discovered would lead to an international problem, so he made inquiries to the government (this is completely right). Therefore, the basis of Mr. Koga's ownership of the island was entirely falsified (see Fig. 5.18).

The above interview was little known because it was published in *Gunsei*, a short-lived journal that was launched by Okinawa left-wingers over 40 years ago with a very limited circulation. Access to the journal is difficult. More importantly, because Maki Izawa's testimony on the Diaoyu Islands issue was critical of the Japanese government's position, its voice of justice was suffocated by Japanese media. However, Maki Izawa, who had only received three years of primary school education, stepped forward to offer historical testimonies in defense of Sino-Japanese friendship when the US return of Okinawa to Japan and Japan's incorporation of the Diaoyu Islands into Okinawa led to clashes between China and Japan again before the China–Japan relations were normalized.

2. *The Testimony Maki Izawa Wrote on January 8, 1972*

On January 8, 1972, Maki Izawa had a historical testimony written in a writing brush. I have found this testimony left by the Japanese witness with a good conscience very important. The testament and her interview in August 1971 complement each other and reflect, in a sense, the historical truth. Here is the testimony she prepared on January 8, 1972:

> I was born in Koga Village, Huangwei Island of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands). My father was Yakitai Izawa. He was the business director under Tatsushiro Koga and had a dried bonito farm on the island. He also made a living by collecting albatross feathers and shells. The newspapers say that Tatsushiro Koga was the first to discover the island, but that is a big lie. That is absolutely impossible. Written records prove that my father Yakitai Izawa made a voyage to Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Island to collect aquatic products and collect albatross feathers. My father was from Kumamoto Prefecture. According to my childhood memory, it was said that contagious diseases spread in Okinawa at the time. In response, as a doctor, my father went out to the sea in search of medicinal herbs. On his

尖閣諸島「発見」に関する日本人民の証言

これは、長野県在住伊沢氏の証言のあらましである。

私は明治三十四年二月、尖閣列島、黄尾島で生れました。

私の父、伊沢弥喜太は、熊本県下益城郡河江村字住吉で生れ、大正三年六十一歳で台湾カレン港で没しました。

父は明治二十七、八年の日清戦争当時、軍医であったようで、その後、現地除隊して、沖縄県那覇市に医者として住んでいました。日清戦争のすぐあと、八重山にあった三井物産の鰹船が十数隻遭難し、それを追って、捜索隊がつくられ、父も医者として乗船してゆきました。そう難の場所が尖閣列島方面であったが、当時は、島があることは知られていませんでした。その方面に船を進めていくと、まだ緑の生々しい葉が流れてきたので、その方に島があるに違いない、あるいは島にたどりついているかも知れないというので、やがて島にたどりつきました。島は無人島でしたが、当時は、この島が清国のものとも、日本のものとも全くわからず、父は急いで九州に引き返し、政府に連絡すると、政府は、日本のものだ、というのです。その時、熊本日々新聞に、「伊沢弥喜太氏、鳥島発見」の記事が大きく出た、と、後に私が大きくなってから、叔父さんが教えてくれました。ともかく、政府が、日本のものだというので、早速開発を願い出て、父と、古賀辰四郎さんと、今一人と、三人で開発することになりました。父は資金がなかったので、資金は古賀さんが出し、事業は伊沢さんの好きなようにしてくれ、と言われ、父は経営一切をまかされた形でした。資金を古賀さんが出した関係上、島の権利は、古賀さんの名目になったのですが、古賀さんが発見した、ということは全く聞いたことがありません。古賀さんには子供がなく、一郎という養子があって、私より四つか五つ上でした。島では、鰹節工場をつくり、土佐から職人を入れて経営しました。

島では、この他、貝殻の採取とアホウ鳥の毛の採集をやっておりました。皇后陛下に、大きな天然の真珠を献上したこともありました。父は献上に行くため仕度に金がかかり、三百円もらった賞金でも、赤字であった、とのことです。その真珠は「八方ころび」と呼ばれていたとのことです。

私はその後、那覇に行き、久米村に住んで小学校三年までを、沖縄の小学校で過し、九つの時、明治四三年頃熊本に帰りました。島での父の事業は行きずまり、やがて、前記の台湾に行くわけです。

この写真は当時の唯一の記念品です。三列のうち、中央が、本土の人間で、娘を抱えているのが、私の父、娘は私の妹です。前と後は沖縄の人達です。

又、大ぜいいる工場をバックにした写真のうち、旗竿の真前にいるのが私の父で、右側に、着物、はかま、杖をついているのが古賀さんです。ここには、左側に、土佐の貧民の子供達も買われてきて並んでいます。又、水が天然の雨しかない関係上、妻帯者は住まず、女の人達もみなやもめです。

以上は、一九七一年八月二十日、本人から聞き書きしたものであるが、この、日本人民による証言は、幾つかの点を明らかにしています。

日清戦争当時、既に大規模な三井独占の沖縄漁業進出、支配、搾取があり、それが危険をおかして行われたこと、当時、沖縄でさえよく知られていなかった尖閣列島を、伊沢氏が偶然見て、政府に問いあわせたところ、地方新聞が、あほう鳥が多いところから「鳥島発見」と書いたこと、政府が、それを、無人島であるから、寄貸として日本領と言って、危険性の多い開発を人民にやらせたこと、又、人民の立場からすれば、見つけたものの、国際的な問題があるかも知れないという心配から、政府に問いあわせた（これは全く正しい）などであり、従って、古賀氏の所有名義の根拠も、全く虚構の上にたっていることが明かです。

（山村八郎記）

〈記録映画〉

燃える島近く完成

一九七〇年十二月二十日の、コザ抗暴の嵐がまき起り、それが一九七一年五月十九日の、島ぐるみのゼネストに発展していく歴史的時点をとらえて、二十六年にわたる沖縄人民の革命的闘争を総括する記録映画が、自立的映画人グループと沖縄県労協が中心となって製作され、近くその完成をみることになった。この映画は十六ミリ、白黒（一部カラー）で上映時間四十分、一本十万円（三〇〇ドル）で配給される。

娘を抱いているのが伊沢氏

Fig. 5.18 An interview of Maki Izawa in the inaugural issue of *Gunsei*, Okinawa, August 20, 1971

way to the sea he was asked to search for ships that had been hit by storms when he found algae floating on the sea that should be growing on rocks. That led him to believe that there were islands nearby and they eventually arrived at the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands). Following his return to Okinawa, my father immediately reported his findings to the

government and began to collect albatross feathers on the islands. Back then a local newspaper in Kumamoto Prefecture published the headline "Yakitai Izawa Discovers Uninhabited Islands." Following his landing on the islands, my father made a survey of them and found the skeletons dressed in Chinese costume. This shows that the Chinese had already arrived at the islands before my father landed on them. My father made the acquaintance of Koga because the latter was very rich and offered to my father that, "As you need money for your business in Okinawa, let's cooperate. What do you think?" Because Koga made the investment, the business was owned by him, though my father took care of everything. Koga also said that he allowed my father to do business there as he pleased.

Due to a lack of water on the islands, dependents were not allowed on there, but my father broke the rule to bring my mother there, so my sister and I were born there. In the application Koga filed to the government for development of the islands in the 28th year of the Meiji Era (1895) he wrote that the islands were discovered in the 17th year of the Meiji Era (1884). That date of discovery was fabricated by his lawyer; it is absolutely not a fact. When my father made another voyage to those islands in the 26th year of the Meiji Era (1893), he was caught in a typhoon and floated to Fuzhou. Back then a Chinese high-level official gave him a valuable porcelain vase. It wasn't until the 31st year of the Meiji Era (1898) that Koga joined in my father's business, so it is sheer nonsense that Koga was the first to discover the islands. My father didn't work on his business there long before he brought us on a long voyage to Taiwan. He died there. I got married in Taiwan and didn't return to Japan until after the war.

Just as I said earlier, I was born on Huangwei Island of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands). I hope I can visit it again, but I cannot make the trip due to poor health. Recently oil was discovered close to the islands, leading to a dispute between Japan and China over the region. I believe that the remains of Chinese people were already on the island when my father discovered the islands and in addition, the Japanese government knew that China had long named the islands. Later on, Japan seized them forcibly through the Japanese-Qing War (Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895) along with Taiwan and officially incorporated them into Japan in the 29th year of the Meiji Era (1896).

Japan and China should establish good relations and at this time it was wrong for Japan to make the unreasonable demand to seize the islands. When Japan was defeated in the war, it promised to return to China Taiwan and the islands it had seized from China, so the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) should naturally be returned to their home China (see Fig. 5.19).

Comparing the testimony made by Maki Izawa on January 8, 1972, and the interview she gave to the inaugural issue of *Gunsei* in August 1971, I can find that she said that her father arrived at different islands of the Diaoyu Islands twice in 1891 and 1895, respectively; it is not true that he made it to the same island on the two occasions. According to the testimony made on January 8, 1972, in 1891 Yakitai Izawa arrived at Diaoyu Island when he was searching for medicinal herbs for the treatment of the epidemic diseases in Okinawa. According to the interview given in August 1971, soon after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, her father discovered Huangwei Islet when he helped salvage Mitsui & Co. Ltd.'s ships in distress. The interview didn't specify that it was Huangwei Islet, but it was unlikely to be the small and barren Chiwei Islet or Diaoyu Island, Nanxiao Island, or Beixiao Island. This is because in 1891 Yakitai Izawa had already been to Diaoyu Island and had definitely seen the Nanxiao Island and Beixiao Island close to Diaoyu Island. From Diaoyu Island, you cannot see Huangwei Islet. This leads me to infer



Fig. 5.19 Testimony on the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) Prepared by Maki Izawa, Yakitai Izawa's first daughter on January 8, 1972

Yakitai Izawa "discovered" Huangwei Islet in 1895. According to the Okinawa-based newspaper *Yaeyama Daily*, Yakitai Izawa and "Okinawa fishermen collected aquatic products close to Uotsuri Island (Diaoyu Island) before the island became Japanese territory. Before Koga acquired ownership of the island, Yakitai Izawa had been in charge of the development of the island until in the last years of the Meiji Era he left the Yaeyama Islands for Taiwan."[85]

5.5.2 *The Archives of the Japanese Foreign Ministry and Other Evidence of Yakitai Izawa*

The above two testimonies of Maki Izawa I have acquired are favorable for proving that the Diaoyu Islands belong to China, but their authenticity and reliability must be fully studied. One piece of evidence is not enough to prove anything, so more evidence of Yakitai Izawa is needed.

At first what confused me is the Japanese name of Yakitai Izawa. Except for the original copy of his first daughter Maki Izawa's testimonies in which his Japanese name was written as 井沢弥喜太, all other Japanese documents had his name as 井沢弥喜太 or 伊沢矢喜太. However, as both 井沢 and 伊沢 are pronounced as Izawa, it is no wonder they were transliterated into different characters. However, as the historical testimonies are important, it is essential to determine whether it is 井沢 or 伊沢. At first, I only had access to the documents Japan had openly released, including the interview published in *Gunsei* in August 1971, so I concluded that it was more likely to be 伊沢弥喜太. However, I changed my mind when I realized that the Japanese names of Yakitai Izawa were the same in the

[85] *Yaeyama Daily*, Jpn. ed., January 6, 2013, Makom Kuniyoshi, "About the Koga Shop," Okinawa University Territory Institute, *The Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) and Okinawa*, Tokyo: Institute of Regional Studies of Okinawa University, Tokyo: Fuyoshobo, 2013, pp. 263–265.

relevant archives of the Japanese Foreign Ministry and Maki Izawa's testimonies; both of them were 井沢弥喜太. That solved the mystery; it is certain that 井沢弥喜太 is the real name of Yakitai Izawa. This also proves that the historical testimonies signed by his daughter Maki Izawa are authentic.

1. *The archives of the Japanese Foreign Ministry said that in 1893 Yakitai Izawa was in distress during his voyage and floated to the coastal areas of Zhejiang and Fuzhou, China, and was salvaged by the Chinese. This proved what Maki Izawa said in her testimonies was true.*

These original archives reveal the following historical facts:

In June 1893, Yakitai Izawa and two others were caught in thunderstorms during their voyage. They floated to the coastal areas of Zhejiang and Fujian when they were saved by local Chinese officials. In order to hide their poaching on China's uninhabited islands, Yakitai Izawa lied to the Chinese that when he was transporting coal from his home (Kumamoto Prefecture, Kyushu), he was hit by thunderstorms in the sea and forced to take shelter on Koba Island (an island he invented; actually it was Diaoyu Island). His destination was Taiwan, but he floated to Pingyang County, Zhejiang Province, China.

The archives of the Japanese Foreign Ministry include detailed records of the officials of China's Fuzhou Administration of Commerce presenting a note to the Japanese (No. 1 document copied on another page). An excerpt is as follows:

> According to the report of Associate Administrator Zhu Qingze from the Fuzhou coast guard, on June 18 of this year, Min'an got the approval to send troops to escort the three foreign refugees. We found out that they were Yakitai Izawa, Iwasuke Arikawa, and Ryosuke Mitsuishi from Kumamoto Prefecture, Japan. At first they set sailed on their boat carrying coal from their prefecture to the Yaeyama Islands. They were hit by storm and sought temporary shelter from Koba Island. Realizing that it was close to Taiwan, they planned to leave the island for Taiwan before finding out how to return to Japan. Unexpectedly they were hit by a tropical storm and lost their masts and sails. They eventually floated to the Gu'aotou dock in Pingyang County, Zhejiang Province. They reported to local officials for traveling documents and were asked to stay in Fudian County for a while. They got lost again and moved into the Sansha estuary in Xiapu County. With the help of local patrollers they traveled to this province and arrived at Wuhumenkou. The military sent troops to escort them to my office and they asked if we could help them repair their boat and finance their return to Japan. Officials in Min'an reported what they said was true. On hearing that, I immediately went to the port to see what happened. The boat of the refugees is only no more than seven meters long without a cabin and the mast and the rudder were made from inferior trees. The boat is designed only for transporting coal and other goods in interior seas and absolutely cannot cross vast oceans. As Japan is far from Fujian Province, even if the boat is repaired, it may not be able to return to Japan safe. During my inquiry I found that the refugees wanted nothing but support for their voyage home. Their words were sincere and their feelings were true, arousing my sympathy. This compels me to report the situation and ask what we should do with them…. I found out that in handling foreign refugees hit by storms, other countries simply refer them to the nearby consulates for repatriation. However, Japan does not have a consulate in Fujian Province, so based on established practices, I am referring them to you to leave them to the care of the Japanese consulate. Without a cabin and with a mast being made from an inferior tree, the refugees' boat is not in a position to move across the sea back to Japan and when asked,



Fig. 5.20 Note from an official of the Fuzhou Administration of Commerce to the Japanese

their owners all agreed that the boat could be sold where it was. My Administration sent people to discuss the matter with the Japanese businessman Kintai Kokura and agreed that the boat could be sold for seven silver dollars. The proceed from the selling boat has been paid to the refugees. In addition, we offered them 12 silver dollars each in subsidies, which were paid through the commerce committee to finance their travel to Zhejiang Province. In addition, we asked Associate Administrator Wang Shufan to get them to your office so that you may refer them to Japan's consulate for repatriation as a token of Chinese friendship[86] (see Fig. 5.20).

The above is an excerpt from the note the official of the Fuzhou Administration of Commerce, China, sent to the Japanese General Consulate in Shanghai along with Yakitai Izawa and two others. The excerpt gave a detailed account of how Yakitai Izawa and others were rescued on the sea. What deserves attention is the purpose of the voyage, the direction in which the boat moved, and the name of the island served as a temporary shelter provided by Yakitai Izawa and others to Chinese officials. This information shows that Yakitai Izawa and others knew only too well that Diaoyu Island was an uninhabited island of China so that they tried to lie about their poaching in the island.

[86]Japanese Foreign Ministry, "Assistance to Affected Japanese Boats and Refugees (25th–27th years of the Meiji Era), Jpn. ed., vol. 27.

In addition, according to the Chinese officials' minutes of the account given by Yakitai Izawa and others:

> Refugee Yakitai Izawa says he is 39 years old and a native of Yoshi Village, Kumamoto Prefecture in Japan. He has been in the business of selling coal with his own boat in the Yaeyama Islands for eight years. This time he first travelled 25 km to Kagoshima and from there he would travel another 185 km to the Yaeyama Islands. During his voyage he was caught in storms and sought shelter on Koba Islet. Because Taiwan is close, he planned to travel there before managing to go back to Japan. Unexpectedly he was brought by a tropical storm to Pingyang County, Zhejiang Province. The Pingyang government gave them travel documents and arranged for them to stay in Fuding County. They got lost and moved on mistakenly to Sansha in Xiapu County. They reported to the local patrollers and with the help of these patrollers, they travelled to Wuhumen, Fujian Province, where the military sent troops to escort them to the provincial government. Iwasuke Arikawa is a hired worker and Ryosuke Mitsuishi was a passenger. Yakitai Izawa vows that what he says is true and asks for assistance on his way back to Japan.
>
> Iwasuke Arikawa says he is 36 and a native of Kagoshima Prefecture in Japan. He is a hired worker of Yakitai Izawa. He was on his way to the Yaeyama Islands to transport coal when storms brought him to Fujian Province. He asks for help with his journey back home. He agrees with Yakitai Izawa's account of the story.
>
> Ryosuke Mitsuishi says that he is 36 and a native of Kagoshima Prefecture in Japan. He was a hitchhiker on Yakitai Izawa's boat on his way to the Yaeyama Islands. He floated to Fujian Province due to storms. He agrees with Yakitai Izawa's account of the story.[87]

Just as I said earlier, the historical facts demanding attention are that Yakitai Izawa wasn't traveling from his hometown Kumamoto Prefecture in the Yaeyama Islands to transport coal; he was actually shipping rice for the poachers he hired on Diaoyu Island. When he traveled from Ishigaki Island of the Yaeyama Islands, he was caught in storms and floated to the coastal areas of Zhejiang and Fujian. When they received help from local Chinese officials, they didn't tell the truth. They all agreed that they would lie to the Chinese, stating that they were traveling from their hometown Kyushu to the Yaeyama Islands to transport coal.

The reason they lied is that they knew that Diaoyu Island didn't belong to Japan and that it was an uninhabited island and they were afraid that if their illegal act was made known, they would be arrested by the Chinese. They urgently asked for help with their travel back to the Yaeyama Islands because they would be committing a crime if the workers they hired were starved to death. The testimony made by Maki Izawa on August 20, 1971, shows that when Yakitai Izawa found an uninhabited island where Diaoyu Island was, he immediately reported it to the local Kyushu government of Japan, asking whose territory that was. This shows that Yakitai Izawa was keenly aware of territorial borders. This leads me to infer that when he arrived at Diaoyu Island in 1891 and began to collect albatross feathers, he would have definitely asked the Japanese government if that island belonged to Japan. Because that happened during the period from 1885 when the Japanese government secretly ordered Okinawa Prefecture to make a survey of Diaoyu Island to 1894

[87]Ibid.

when Japan waged the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese government hadn't stolen Diaoyu Island. The Japanese government didn't stop Japanese individuals from going fishing and hunting on the island, but it knew clearly that it was China's Diaoyu Island. Japan didn't want to cause a dispute over the island before it was adequately prepared militarily. To deceive others, the Japanese government and Yakitai Izawa and other Japanese poachers might have all agreed to refer to Diaoyu Island as Koba Island.

2. *The report of Japan's General Consulate in Shanghai about the matter was different from the Chinese note, which proves that Yakitai Izawa and others were in distress when they were on their way to send rice to Koba Island (a name Japan invented for Diaoyu Island) from the Yaeyama Islands.*

According to the archives of the Japanese, on September 9, 1893, the then acting Japanese General Consul in Shanghai Gonsuke Havashi submitted a report (Document No. 130) to Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs Tadashi Hayashi, and the report was reviewed by the Japanese Foreign Minister Munemitsu Mutsu. The report was also sent as Document No. 2 on another page to the then Nagasaki Governor Shoichi Omori so that the Nagasaki Prefecture Shipping Company would help bring Yakitai Izawa and two others back home from China. The report was prepared in great detail. It is important that a comparison of the report with the records by the officials of China's Fuzhou Administration of Commerce shows that the report gave different reasons for the accidents Yakitai Izawa and others had on the sea than what the Chinese officials stated. In the Japanese report, Yakitai Izawa wasn't going to the Yaeyama Islands to do the business of transporting coal, and real reasons for him to go there were given. The report also shows that the local officials of Fujian Province, China, treated Yakitai Izawa and other Japanese refugees well and this may help people today understand the whole picture. The main part of Gonsuke Havashi's report reads as follows:

> Application to the Minister for Expressing Appreciation to the Local Officials of the Qing Dynasty for Helping Japanese People in Distress Return to Japan
>
> Yakitai Izawa
>
> 39 years of age
> No. 10, Shimomashikigun Yoshimur, Kumamoto Prefecture
>
> Iwasuke Arikawa
>
> 36 years of age
> Seki Island, Akuseki Island, Sevii Islands, Nana Island, in Kawabe District
> Ryosuke Mitsuishi
> Ibusukigunhabamoto Village, Kagoshima Prefecture
>
> About those in distress…. In addition to the note from the Fuzhou Administration of Commerce, I am now reporting to you my understanding of the accidents and the assistance for and expatriation of those in distress. One of those in distress is Yakitai Izawa. He began to live in the Yaeyama Islands in Okinawa Prefecture several years ago. He was engaged in fisheries and collected bird feathers on islands close to the Yaeyama Islands. This time, in

order to pick up the workers on Koba Island, he hired Iwasuke Arikawa and Ryosuke Mitsuishi as boatmen and had several bags of rice on his boat when he set sail from Okawa Village, Ishigaki in the Yaeyama Islands on June 4 of this year. On the very evening they set off he was caught in a storm. They floated on the sea for several days before they eventually arrived at the Gu'aotou port in Pingyang County, Zhejiang Province of the Qing Dynasty on June 12. Their sail and mast had been destroyed. They were well treated by the local Chinese officials. Their boat was repaired and had a new mast. They were given two vases and two silver dollars as food allowances. On July 15, they set sail for Fuzhou. However, they were struck by a storm on July 18 and floated to Sansha, Xiapu County in Fujian Province. There they got the help of local officials. Their boat was repaired and painted again and the Fujian Province Security Station sent a military boat to escort him. On August 26, they and the military boat traveled to Fuzhou together. On August 27 they arrived at Beijia Port. There one more military boat began to escort him. Protected by two military boats, they arrived at the port of Fuzhou on August 29 and entered the port the following day. Following their arrival in Fuzhou they were directly sent to the local Coastal Defense Office and received much help from the office during their stay in Fuzhou. In addition, they were given four silver dollars by the magistrate of Xiapu County. They were given one silver dollar by Tokuwa Firm and another silver dollar by Lushanxuan No. 3 Firm. Both companies are Japan's Rakuzendo.[88] They were given an additional three silver dollars and three sets of clothes by Rakuzendo. While they were staying there, their boat was sold for seven silver dollars. On August 30 they set sail on a steam boat and were escorted to my port in Shanghai by members of the Chinese Administration of Commerce and Administration of Merchants. In addition, just as the director of the Fuzhou Administration of Commerce said on Document 1 on another page, due to a lack of traveling expenses from Fuzhou and the port of Shanghai, those in distress were given 36 silver dollars.

When those in distress settled accounts at my consulate in Shanghai, they paid 25 silver dollars in miscellaneous expenses. In addition, they were given ten silver dollars by the permanent Japanese residents in Shanghai as charity and an additional 12 silver dollars from other volunteers. They were to be brought back to Japan by the Nagasaki Prefecture Shipping Company free of charge. Just as those in distress hoped, they were to be brought back to the Yaeyama Islands and they set sail from Shanghai on September 9. Just as the shipping company wrote on Document No. 2 on another page, a letter was written to the governor of Nagasaki, giving their account of how they brought back those in distress to Japan. As we said earlier, the three men in distress the Qing Dynasty were well treated by many local officials, including the magistrate of Pingyang County, the magistrate of Xiapu County, director of the Fujian Security Station, director of the Fujian Coastal Defense Office, and director of the Fuzhou Administration of Commerce. We hope your majesty would express your appreciation for them.

Gonsuke Havashi, acting consul-general in Shanghai

Tadashi Hayashi, under-secretary of foreign affairs in Shanghai

Postscript:

As we said earlier, those in distress took a free ride on a Nagasaki ship. That is a very difficult arrangement for a local postal shipping company[89] (see Fig. 5.21).

[88]This was a Japanese non-government institution protecting the secret Japanese spy agencies established in Hankou, Fuzhou, Shanghai and other areas in China in 1886 when Japan stepped up its spy activities in China following its military survey of the Diaoyu Islands in 1885.

[89]Japanese Foreign Ministry, "Assistance to Affected Japanese Boats and Refugees (the 25th–27th years of the Meiji Era), Jpn. ed., vol. 27.



Fig. 5.21 Report submitted by the Japanese Acting Consul-General Gonsuke Havashi in Shanghai to the Japanese Foreign Minister in September 1893

In response to the above report from Japan's General Consulate in Shanghai, in January 1894, the then Japanese Foreign Minister Munemitsu Mutsu issued an order to Enjiro Yamaza, Acting Director of the Japanese General Consulate in Shanghai, stating that appreciation should be expressed to the Qing officials for helping the Japanese in distress get back to Japan.

According to Foreign Minister Munemitsu Mutsu, it was reported that Yakitai Izawa, who lived at No. 10 Shimomashikigun Yoshi Village in Kumamoto



Fig. 5.22 Japanese Foreign Minister Munemitsu Mutsu expressing appreciation to China and China's reply in January 1894

Prefecture, and two others were forced by storms to float to the coastal areas of the Qing Dynasty when they were traveling from the Yaeyama Islands in Okinawa Prefecture to Koba Island. They were protected and taken good care of by the Magistrate of Pingyang County, the Magistrate of Xiapu County, Director of the Fujian Security Station, Director of the Fujian Coastal Defense Office, and Director of the Fuzhou Administration of Commerce of the Qing Dynasty. I appreciate that very much, and you may extend my thanks to the Qing officials.

On January 23, 1894, Chen Weizuo, the Imperial Governor in Charge of Commercial Affairs and Fujian Commander of Coastal Defense, received a thank-you note from Japan, and he wrote back to the Japanese General Consulate in Shanghai, stating, "It is the duty of local Chinese officials to help the Japanese people in distress. I thank you for your note of appreciation. The matter has been reported for approval"[90] (see Fig. 5.22).

In short, according to the interview given by Maki Izawa on August 20, 1971, Yakitai Izawa was from Shimomashikigun in Kumamoto Prefecture and died in 1914 at 61. These details are entirely consistent with the Japanese Foreign Ministry's original archives about how Yakitai Izawa was rescued when he was in distress on the sea in 1893. When Yakitai Izawa was struck by storms on the sea in June 1893, he reported he was 39, so he was 60–61 when he died in 1914.

[90]Ibid.

The above historical documents fully prove that Maki Izawa's testimonies are entirely correct. However, even today some Japanese people argue based on the above archives of the Japanese Foreign Ministry that Diaoyu Island didn't belong to China because the Koba Island Yakitai Izawa travelled to was Diaoyu Island, but the Chinese officials didn't condemn him but rescued him instead and because China didn't raise objections when Munemitsu Mutsu expressed appreciation to China, he said Yakitai Izawa traveled from the Yaeyama Islands to Koba Island, i.e., Diaoyu Island.[91] This inference does not make sense.

The reasons for this are as follows:

First, the so-called Koba Island wasn't Diaoyu Island. The island had never been marked as that in the maps of the ancient Ryukyu Kingdom and Japan's Okinawa Prefecture. The Japanese pronunciation of Koba Island was similar to that of Kuma Island, which is the Japanese name for Huangwei Islet. As I said earlier, there are two Kuba islands in the Kerama Islands in Okinawa Prefecture, namely 古巴山 and 枯巴島, and in ancient times both were pronounced Koba Island. This leads me to infer that 胡馬島 (Koba Island) was invented by the Japanese in order to deceive others. Therefore, even if the Japanese Foreign Minister mentioned Koba Island when he expressed depreciation for China, the Chinese would not know he was referring to Diaoyu Island.

Second, when Yakitai Izawa and two others were rescued by China, they lied to China that they were traveling to the Yaeyama Islands to transport coal, hiding from China the fact that they were transporting rice from the Yaeyama Islands to Diaoyu Island. Under these circumstances, the Chinese could hardly get to know that the destination of Yakitai Izawa was China's Diaoyu Island. China naturally didn't raise objections to Japan.

Third, according to the customs of the Chinese people in the coastal areas of Fujian and Zhejiang, they were obliged to rescue those in distress on the sea. Yakitai Izawa told the Chinese that they were forced to float to Koba Island for temporary shelter. Even if the Chinese realized that a Japanese boat struck by storms on the sea floated to Diaoyu Island, they would not have condemned the boat either because this had nothing to do with territorial claims.

3. *As Yakitai Izawa was in distress on the sea, he failed to get the rice to Diaoyu Island when the four hired workers on the island were on the brink of starvation.*

As I said earlier, after Yakitai Izawa and his colleagues were rescued, the report their made to the local Chinese officials was different from the one they made to the acting Consul-General of the Japanese General Consulate in Shanghai. They told the Chinese that they were traveling to the Yaeyama Islands to transport coal, whereas they told Gonsuke Havashi, acting Consul-General of the Japanese General Consulate in Shanghai, that they were actually sending rice to Koba Island. This

[91]Results of the survey commissioned by the Japanese cabinet, "Report on the Commissioned Survey of the Data about the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)," Jpn. ed., March 2016.

shows that Yakitai Izawa and his colleagues were eager to lie to the Chinese and get the assistance of the Japanese embassy in China to return to the Yaeyama Islands as soon as possible because they had in mind the hired workers who were starving.

Relating to this point, the Japanese scholar Gisuke Yomori published *Adventures to the Southern Islands* in the 27th year of the Meiji Era (1894). The book discussed Japanese people's secret development of Koba Island. On February 24, 1984, one worker from Yamaguchi Prefecture and three Ryukyu workers hired from the Yaeyama Islands brought a lawsuit against their Yamaguchi Prefecture employer from Kagoshima Prefecture. According to the plaintiff Kansuke Hanamoto, they were each paid two yen a month for their work on Koba Island after they arrived at the island from Ishigaki Island to collect albatross feathers on January 16, 1893, on the lunar calendar. Several months later, their employer shipped away several dozen bags of feathers, promising he would come back with rice. However, he never returned, leaving them starving on the uninhabited island for 12 days. Fortunately, they met seven people from Okinawa Prefecture who came to the island to collect pearl shells. It wasn't until May 12 that they returned to Okinawa Prefecture like beggars after rowing two canoes combined together for seven days and nights and promising to pay 200 yen in transport fee once rescued.[92]

Where on earth is the so-called Koba Island? As I said earlier, Koba Island sounds similar with Kuma Island, the Japanese name for Huangwei Islet. However, according to the account given by Kansuke Hanamoto, the island they worked on wasn't Huangwei Islet, but Diaoyu Island because he said, "The perimeter of Koba Island is about four kilometers, and the island has trees and freshwater. In addition, there are two small islands (probably Nanxiao Island and Beixiao Island). One of the islands is 2700–2800 m away while the other island is about 2000 m away."[93] The so-called Koba Island was never mentioned in Japanese documents before and after this event. Strange enough, it wasn't until the period from 1885 to 1894, that is, the period from Japan's first secret survey of Diaoyu Island to the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, that the Japanese government and people invented the name of Koba Island for Diaoyu Island; they even didn't use the name "Uotsuri Island" Japan used for its secret survey in 1885. The purpose of this was nothing but to cheat the Chinese and cover Japanese people's poaching on the Diaoyu Islands, uninhabited islands of China.

Then why did the poacher employer fail to send rice to the Diaoyu Island as he had promised? Is it true that the employer who should be sending rice to Koba Island was one of the two Kagoshima Prefecture colleagues of Yakitai Izawa who traveled from Ishigaki Island to Koba Island? This possibility cannot be ruled out taking into consideration the time and circumstances, though it could be someone else. Yakitai Izawa and his two colleagues set sail on June 4, but they failed to send the rice because they were hit by storms and floated to the coastal areas of Zhejiang

[92]Gisuke Yomori, *Advertures in Southern Islands,* Jpn. ed., 27th year of the Meiji Era (1894), pp. 98–100. Tadayoshi Murata, Tadayoshi Murata, *The Origin of Japanese-Chinese Territory Issue: The Awkward Truth from Official Documents*, Jpn. ed., Tokyo: Kaden Sha, 2013, p. 186.
[93]Ibid.

and Fujian. The only thing that was not the same was that one of the Kagoshima Prefecture men sharing the boat with Yakitai Izawa was called Iwasuke Arikawa, while the other was called Ryosuke Mitsuishi, whereas one of the plaintiffs was Kiemon Nagai and the other was Jinnosuke Matsumura, though both were also from Kagoshima Prefecture.[94] This shows that back then, in addition to Yakitai Izawa, other people were also hired from Kagoshima Prefecture to poach on the Diaoyu Islands.

The reasons for the above events show that Yakitai Izawa and his two colleagues lied to the Chinese because they wanted the Chinese to help them get back to Japan as soon as possible. This is because they still had in mind the hired workers were starving on Diaoyu Island and were aware that Diaoyu Island was a Chinese uninhabited island close to Taiwan.[95] They knew that the Chinese would not let them go if they realized that they poached on Chinese islands, so they all told the same lie to the Chinese.

In January 1894, the Japanese Foreign Minister Munemitsu Mutsu wrote back to the Japanese General Consulate in Shanghai, agreeing that the consulate should express appreciation for the local Chinese officials for rescuing Yakitai Izawa. At the time, there were less than six months to go before Japan launched the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. Japan was prepared in terms of military affairs, intelligence, public opinion, and foreign affairs for a war against the Qing Dynasty. Munemitsu Mutsu's reply was merely meant to catch the Chinese off guard. He of course knew that Koba Island was Diaoyu Island. Why did Japan call Diaoyu Island Koba Island? There can be only one reasonable explanation: Japan had a guilty conscience, so it invented a name for the island to distract the attention of people and keep the kindhearted local Chinese officials in the dark.

Yakitai Izawa was assisted and well treated by the local Chinese official in Fujian Province when they stayed there, but less than a year later, he took part in the Sino-Japanese War that broke out in June 1894 as a military surgeon. Following the war, as a partner of Tatsushiro Koga, Yakitai Izawa went on another mission of developing Diaoyu Island. Back then, Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet had already been brought under Japanese colonial rule, but his conscience compelled him to tell her daughter the truth about the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands.

This has led me to realize that why Yakitai Izawa and Tatsushiro Koga, both of whom had been engaged in colonial development on Diaoyu Island, had diametrically different attitudes toward the Diaoyu Islands issue and why the Japanese government had diametrically different attitude toward Izawa and Koga. This is because from the very beginning Yakitai Izawa knew that Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet were Chinese uninhabited islands. As the man hired by Koga to take charge of the development of the islands, Izawa had been rescued and treated well by Chinese officials in Zhejiang and Fujian when he was hit by storms on the sea, so

[94]Ibid., p. 185.

[95]"The Story of Those in Distress," *Nichi Nichi Shinbun*, Kyushu, October 8, 26th year of the Meiji Era (1893).

he felt grateful and sorry for the Chinese from the bottom of his heart. Koga, however, was a local boss loyal to the Japanese Meiji government, had donated money to the government for its war efforts against China and Russia, was praised by the then Japanese government as a national role model for colonial development, and was presented an award in 1909 by the then Japanese Prime Minister Taro Katsura. Disclosing these historical facts today is of great significance not only for understanding the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands but also for helping China to understand the different positions Japanese people of different social status have regarding this island.

From the perspective of international law, Izawa and others poached on China's uninhabited island, which cannot serve as the international law basis of Japan's ownership of the island. However, the historical testimonies of Maki Izawa are vital evidence as part of the above official historical documents and prove that the Diaoyu Islands really belong to China.

5.5.3 *Tatsushiro Koga's Discovery of the Diaoyu Islands in 1884: A Century-Old Lie*

As children of the witnesses, Tatsushiro Koga's son Zenji Koga and Yakitai Izawa's first daughter Maki Izawa both left historical testimonies regarding the Diaoyu Islands issue in the 1970s. The key issues that need to be clarified are whether it is a fact that Tatsushiro Koga sent people to the Diaoyu Islands for development purposes and whether Koga's lease and development of the Diaoyu Islands is part of the colonial development act in the period of Japanese colonial rule of Taiwan.

1. *It is a sheer lie that Koga discovered the Diaoyu Islands and sent people to develop them in 1884.*

Following the end of World War II, the basis of Japan's claim of sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands was the views expressed by the Ryukyu Legislative Council and the Ryukyu government when the islands were under the occupation of the US Armed Forces. For a long time, the wrong understandings therein have been transmitted and cheated many people.

First, according to the Resolution on Demanding Protection of the Territory of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) adopted by the Ryukyu Legislative Council on August 31, 1970, "The Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) originally belonged to the administrative region of Wunoborijyo, Ishigaki in the Yaeyama Islands. Before the war the city's Koga Store was engaged in logging and fisheries on the islands. Therefore, Japan's sovereignty over the islands is indisputable."[96]

[96]Tatsuo Urano, et al. (ed.), *A Collection of Data on the Research of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) Issue*, Hong Kong: Lizhi Press and Tousuishobou, 2001, p. 191.

Second, according to the statement on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) issued by the Ryukyuan government on September 1, 1970, "In the 17th year of the Meiji Era (1884), Tatsushiro Koga began his collection of albatross feathers, velvets, tortoise shells, and shellfish mainly on Uotsuri Island (Diaoyu Island) and Kuba Island (Huangwei Islet). In response, the governor of Okinawa Prefecture submitted his first report on establishing Japan's national markers on the islands to Japan's Interior Minister on September 22 of the 18th year of the Meiji Era (1885) and filed an application for sending the *Izumo Maru* for on-the-spot surveys." The statement also said that at a cabinet meeting on January 14 of the 28th year of the Meiji Era (1895), it was officially decided to bring Uotsuri Island (Diaoyu Island) and Kuba Island (Huangwei Islet) under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture and that the Japanese Emperor's Decree 13 issued on April 1 of the 29th year of the Meiji Era (1896), "Japan has finished incorporating the islands into its territory in accordance with its domestic law."[97]

Third, the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) Research Institute issued the report on the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) and Japan's Sovereignty, stating that, "Tatsushiro Koga began to engaged in fisheries and hunting on the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) in 1884."[98]

Fourth, in 1972 the Japanese Foreign Ministry Intelligence and Culture Department published the pamphlet *The Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)*, explaining that because Tatsushiro Koga, who had been engaged in fisheries on these islands, presented to the government a leasing application for state-owned land, the four islands were leased to him with a 30-year tax exemption.

Today, some Japanese still insist that it was the Japanese, not the Chinese, who had inhabited and developed on the Diaoyu Islands. They hold that as early as in 1884, that is, ten years before the Sino-Japanese War broke out, Tatsushiro Koga went to the Diaoyu Islands for explorative and development purposes, and China never raised any objections, so the Diaoyu Islands belong to Japan and weren't stolen from China through the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Based on this understanding, they are very opposed to China's claim of the islands and have come to dislike China very much. If the Japanese cannot get through these feelings, it will be difficult to improve the China–Japan relations. To get through these feelings, ironclad evidence must be provided.

However, none of the above so-called bases of the Japanese claim holds ground.

First, the so-called Tatsushiro Koga's management of the fisheries of the islands before the war refers to the Japanese people's colonial development from 1896 to 1945. This can absolutely not serve as the basis of Japan's postwar possession of sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands.

Second, the so-called Tatsushiro Koga's beginning to engage in the business of collection on Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet in 1884 is a sheer fabrication and

[97]Ibid., p. 194.

[98]Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) Research Institute, report on the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) and Japan's Sovereignty, *Quarterly Okinawa,* March 1971, no. 63.

studies have not found such a thing.[99] In fact, Japan has so far failed to provide any documental evidence that Tatsushiro Koga landed on and developed the islands in 1884 and an application was filed for establishing Japan's markers in the islands in 1885. It is a sheer fabrication that Koga landed on and developed the islands in 1884, and this lie has lasted for more than a century. In addition, the application filed by the governor of Okinawa Prefecture for erecting national markers on the islands is not true. The historical truth is that after Interior Minister Aritomo Yamagata ordered Okinawa Prefecture to make on-the-spot surveys of the Daito Islands and incorporated them into Japanese territory, he issued a secret order to the then governor of Okinawa Prefecture Shiyazo Nishimura for him to send people to make a survey of the Diaoyu Islands. However, Nishimura adopted a negative attitude and reported following surveys: "I am afraid it is one of the islands such as Diaoyutai, Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet that were recorded in the *Record of Messages from Chûzan*. If it is located in the same place as the island recorded in the book, then it had obviously been known by the Qing envoys who appointed Chûzan kings, named and established as navigation marks for their voyages to Ryukyu. That is why I doubt that we should erect national markers on the island as we did on the Daito Islands."[100] This in fact was a rejection of the order to bring the Chinese uninhabited island under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture.

Third, in Decree 13 issued in 1896, only the Yaeyama Islands were marked as part of Yaeyama District, and it didn't include the so-called Senkaku Islands or the Diaoyu Islands. There is no evidence available and there is no evidence at all for the claim that Diaoyu Island "belongs to the administrative region of Wunoborijyo, Ishigaki in the Yaeyama Islands." Moreover, according to Article 2 of Decree 13 issued in 1896, "It is up to the Interior Minister to decide whether the borders between districts and their names should be changed." Therefore, Okinawa's local officials' interpretation that Yaeyama District included the Diaoyu Islands has no legal efficacy and is even suspected of directly violating articles 1 and 2 of Decree 13.

Merely on the strength of the explanation of the governor of Okinawa Prefecture, the Japanese government is baseless to claim that the Yaeyama District specified in Decree 13 includes the Diaoyu Islands. The governor of Okinawa Prefecture was merely a local head of government and was therefore not in a position to decide and announce to the world the country's sovereignty. This is international common knowledge.

The firsthand historical testimonies I have acquired prove that long before Tatsushiro Koga arrived at the Diaoyu Islands, Yakitai Izawa, a native of Kakumoto Prefecture, had landed on, poached on, and developed the islands. The testimonies Yakitai Izawa's first daughter Maki Izawa prepared prove from the perspective of a

[99]Cf. Liu Jiangyong, "Research on the Fabrication that Tatsushiro Koga Was the First to Develop Diaoyu Island and Japan's Purchase of the Island Is Illegitimate," Chin. ed., *Journal of Tsinghua University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)*, no. 4, 2014.

[100]Japanese Foreign Ministry, *Japanese Diplomatic Documents*, Jpn. ed., vol. 18, Japan International Cooperation Association, 1950, p. 574.

nongovernment witness that before the Diaoyu Islands were "discovered" and developed by Japan, they were Chinese territory and that it is not true that Koga discovered the island in 1884.

2. *When Mikinosuke Miyajima visited Huangwei Islet in 1900, he met Yakitai Izawa but not Tatsushiro Koga*

According to Mikinosuke Miyajima's report on "Kuba Island" published in 1900: I heard about Kuba Island long ago, but so far there have been no accurate reports on on-the-spot surveys. Earlier Okinawa Prefecture sent the *Daiyumaru* for explorative purposes, but it failed to discover the island. Therefore Mikinosuke Miyajima concluded that, "This is a rare opportunity. Following consultation with Tatsushiro Koga, I first set sail toward the island. If Tatsushiro Koga really sent people to the Diaoyu Islands for explorative purposes in the 17th year of the Meiji Era (1884) and in each of the subsequent years had workers catch seafood there, then it wasn't necessary at all for him to entrust Hisashi Kuroiwa and Mikinosuke Miyajima to make explorative surveys of the islands again in 1900 and the report of the surveys would definitely mention that Koga had sent people to the islands for explorative purposes in 1884. However, nothing is said about that in their survey report.

They arrived in the waters around the islands on the afternoon of May 4, 1900. The weather was fine at the time, but they failed to find the islands. According to boatmen, the weather was so fine that the visibility was about 15 nautical miles and that showed it was not true that the island could be seen within ten nautical miles of the waters, so we had to return to Iriomote Island. We didn't arrive at Kuba Island until May 9."[101]

According to Mikinosuke Miyajima's inspection, in 1894 Hanai and three Ryukyu people hired by Nagai and Matsumura, both natives of Kagoshima Prefecture, suffered from food shortages on Koba Island. It was thanks to the help of the fishermen from Itomanmura Village in Okinawa Prefecture that they survived. The Koba Island Hanai referred to was not Huangwei Islet, but Diaoyu Island[102] (see Fig. 5.23).

Mikinosuke Miyajima also proves that according to Yakitai Izawa, who had emigrated to Huangwei Islet, since the 24th years of the Meiji Era (1891), he had been leading Ryukyu fishermen in catching seafood and hunting for albatrosses on the Diaoyu Islands. Back then, because they had only small boats and sampans available for their voyages and couldn't survive on the island long, they eventually returned to Ishigaki Island. They landed on the island again in the 26th year of the Meiji Era (1893), but they were struck by tropical storms, floated to Fuzhou and narrowly escaped the disaster. After that, in the 29th year of the Meiji Era (1896),

[101]Mikinosuke Miyajima, "*Kuba Island,*" *Jpn. ed., Journal of Geography*, 33rd year of the Meiji Era (1900), no. 11, November, pp. 547–652.

[102]Ibid., p. 651.



と皆何れも踏査實視せるにあらず

「南島探驗」（藏原惟郭著）中に明治廿六年二月廿四日鹿兒島縣人永井某、松村某に雇はれたる花本某外三名の琉球人無人島胡馬島に赴きしも食料盡き、糸滿村漁夫の來るに遭ひ、扶けられて那覇に歸り、那覇區役所に届出てたる由を載す。然れども花本等の陳述より察すれば、茲に云ふ胡馬島は黄尾島のことにあらずして、魚釣島のことなり。

又同書には、廿六年九月頃熊本縣人野田正なるもの魚釣、久場島へ向け傳馬船にて出帆せる由記しあれども、風浪の爲め目的地に至らずして歸來し、無人島探檢の實なかりしと聞けり。

現今黄尾島に移住し居る熊本縣人伊澤矢喜太の供述に依れば、同人は去明治廿四年より魚釣島並に久場島に琉球漁夫を引つれ渡航し、海產物と島上の信天翁とを採集せり。當時にありて航海は、單に刳舟又は傳馬船によりしにすぎず而して島には永く留るをなくして、石垣港に歸來せり。次て明治廿六年再び同島に渡航し、歸路颶風に遭ひ清國福州に漂着し、辛くも九死の中に一命を助かりしと云ふ。

其後明治廿九年に至り古賀辰四郎氏前記伊澤を雇入れ、付するに糸滿村漁夫十數名を以てし同島に派遣し、尚沖繩縣廳に開拓の目的を以て無人島借區の儀を出願せり。然れども、當時尖閣列島の所屬未た明ならざりしを以て、許可を得ず、引て三十年に及び、再めて公許を得て、茲に同島に事業を創むるに至れり。翌三十一年には、大坂商船會社汽船須磨丸を特に黄尾嶼へ寄航せ

Fig. 5.23 “Kuba Island,” Mikinosuke Miyajima, 1900

Tatsushiro Koga hired Yakitai Izawa to leading more than ten fishermen from Itoman Village to the island.

Throughout the survey by Mikinosuke Miyajima, he didn’t mention any records either about Tatsushiro Koga’s alleged survey of Diaoyu Island in 1884 or 1885 or about Koga’s alleged sending of people to develop the island. In addition, Tatsushiro Koga wasn’t mentioned in the report on the secret surveys conducted by Okinawa Prefecture following the order of the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1885. When Mikinosuke Miyajima and others conducted their survey on the island in 1900, it was the island’s resident Yakitai Izawa who briefed him on the

situation on the island. Back then, there were three rainwater reservoirs on Huangwei Islet, and when it suffered freshwater shortages, water could be transferred from Diaoyu Island to keep Yakitai Izawa and others surviving there. This shows that the abovementioned testimonies made by Maki Izawa were true. In addition, Mikinosuke Miyajima's article mentioned Yakitai Izawa's statements, which prove that Yakitai Izawa was struck by tropical storms and floated to the coastal areas of China when he was on another voyage to Huangwei Islet in June 1893 (May on the lunar calendar).

Mikinosuke Miyajima's record of Yakitai Izawa's statements also prove that it was a sheer lie when he told the Chinese local officials who rescued from the marine accidents in 1893 that he was traveling to the Yaeyama Islands to transport coal. Back then, sharing the same boat with Yakitai Izawa were Iwasuke Arikawa and Ryosuke Mitsuishi from Kagoshima Prefecture. Were these two men's real names of the employers Nagai and Matsumura? This still needs to be verified.

3. *The studies by Japan's island issue specialist Syouri Hiraoka prove that it is simply not true that Tatsushiro Koga developed Diaoyu Island in 1884.*

Professor Syouri Hiraoka at Shimonoseki City University in Japan is a specialist on islands. Based on his study of the epitaph of the so-called Tatsushiro Koga Monument, erected on Diaoyu Island in 1978, and the epitaph of the relevant monument, erected in Ryokuchi Park, Yashimacho, Ishigaki, in 1998, he concluded that part of them had been falsified. His reasons are as follows:

First, the curriculum vitae included in the epitaph about Tatsushiro Koga being awarded the Blue Ribbon Medal by the Japanese government in the 42nd year of the Meiji Era (1909) was not consistent with the fact. According to the curriculum vitae, Koga established his general shop in Naha at 23 in the 12th year of the Meiji Era (1879), and three years later in 1882 he had a branch in the Yaeyama Islands. However, according to *A General Survey of Ishigaki Island* which was distributed in 1909, "Koga's maritime product branch opened for business in May in the 29th year of the Meiji Era (1896) and he began to be engaged in the development of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) in the 30th year of the Meiji Era (1897)"[103] (see Fig. 5.24). Also according to the report by *Sakishima Asahi Shimbun* of January 8, 1930, the Yaeyama Islands branch didn't open for business until the 29th year of the Meiji Era (1896) and Koga didn't transfer his residence registration from Fukugo Prefecture to Okinawa Prefecture, which is different from what is specified in his curriculum vitae.[104]

This shows that in the curriculum vitae Tatsushiro Koga wrote for his application for the Blue Ribbon Medal, he artificially set the date of launch for his branch 14 years earlier than real date and set his date of development of Diaoyu Island

[103]Takuji Iwasaki, *A General Survey of Ishigaki Island*, Jpn. ed., printed by Okayama Orphan Asylum Osaka Printing and distributed on May 30 of the 42nd year of the Meiji Era (1909), p. 12.
[104]Syouri Hiraoka, *Research into People, Life and Industry of the Japanese Islands III,* Tokyo: Kaiseisha, December 2007, pp.13–47.



Fig. 5.24 Takuji Iwasaki, *A General Survey of Ishigaki Island*, 1909

12 years earlier than real date, creating two false dates. At that time, the Japanese government tolerated this, proving that Koga's falsification met the need of the government of the Empire of Japan to steal Diaoyu Island. To be more precise, through the awarding of medals, the government of the Empire of Japan used and worked with Koga in falsifying things.

Second, it is impossible for Koga to participate in the survey of Diaoyu Island in 1885. In the Application for the Lease of Official Land he filed to Yasu Nomura on June 10, 1895, Koga stated that when I was conducting patrols of the islands of Okinawa Prefecture in 1885, I found large numbers of albatrosses, known locally as "dull birds," on Kuba Island (Huangwei Islet) 90 nautical miles north the Yaeyama Islands. These patrols were actually the secret surveys of the Diaoyu Islands carried out by Hyougo Ishizawa sent by Okinawa Prefecture on the chartered ocean liner *Izumo Maru*. The record of this survey didn't include anything about Tatsushiro Koga.[105] As a private citizen, Tatsushiro Koga didn't and couldn't participate in this secret survey organized by the government of Okinawa Prefecture. According to the curriculum vitae of Tatsushiro Koga, he didn't conduct his first on-the-spot survey of Diaoyu Island until 1895.

[105]Ibid., p. 14.

Third, it is even less true that Tatsushiro Koga traveled to Diaoyu Island for explorative purposes on the business ship *Nagayasu Maru* of Osaka Merchantman Company in March 1884. This company wasn't established until May of the same year by combining several small and medium shipping companies; it hadn't yet been established by March. In addition, there wasn't such a ship as the *Nagayasu Maru* at the time because the ship was a cargo–passenger ship launched in November 1896 with a tonnage of 390. The ship sank off Korea's west coast in 1905.[106] As I said earlier, Tatsushiro Koga sent the steamboat *Nagayasu Maru* to Diaoyu Island, but he didn't travel there himself. Aboard the steamboat included Hisashi Kuroiwa, a teacher at the Okinawa Teachers' School, and Penghu Island Miyajima Kanshisuke. They made the same records in the survey report they published at the time, and these are unalterable historical facts. Therefore, Tatsushiro Koga's travel aboard the boat to Diaoyu Island in 1884 is falsified evidence.

Fourth, it is also open to doubt that beginning in 1884, Tatsushiro Koga sent people to develop Diaoyu Island every year. This is because Yakitai Izawa didn't go to Diaoyu Island to hunt for albatrosses until 1891, whereas Tatsushiro Koga had Izawa as his guide on the island in 1896. If Koga had been to Diaoyu Island seven years before, was it still necessary for him to hire Izawa as his guide?[107] In addition, the report on Okinawa Prefecture's secret survey of Diaoyu Island in 1885 said that there were no signs of people living on the island. If Koga had really been sending people to develop Diaoyu Island since 1884 as it was stated in his curriculum vitae, how could it be that there were no people on the island? Aren't these contradictory?

Fifth, Koga won prizes at the Fourth Fair of Sea Snails, Pearls and Shellfish in Okinawa Prefecture in 1895, but he didn't enter his name for the Third Fair in the prefecture in which more than 200 exhibitors participated in 1890. This is because Koga filed an application for the development of the Daito Islands to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture in December 1891 and led 31 fishermen to these islands on the steamboat *Daiyumaru* after the application was approved in March 1892. They arrived at the Daito Islands on March 22, but they failed to land on them because the winds and waves were high and the shore was full of protruding reefs and rocks. On the following day, they went around the islands again and still could not land, so they return to the port of Naha. This leads to conclude that Koga didn't know of Diaoyu Island until after he failed to develop the Daito Islands. After 1892, Koga began to cut his collection of sea snails and shifted to hunting for albatrosses.[108] Therefore, before 1890, Koga didn't participate in the development of the maritime products of the Daito Islands and Diaoyu Island; he naturally couldn't take part in the fair of maritime products.

[106]Ibid.

[107]Ibid.

[108]Ibid., p. 16.

4. *The first person the government of Okinawa Prefecture consulted for its secret survey of Diaoyu Island in 1885 was Eihou Ooshiro, and it had nothing to do with Tatsushiro Koga.*

According to the records made by Hisashi Kuroiwa and Miyajima Kanshisuke in 1900, before they went on an explorative mission on Diaoyu Island,

Eihou Ooshiro had crossed the sea to visit China several times. During the voyages, he witnessed and took notes of Huangwei Islet. In addition, Eihou Ooshiro presented a report about Diaoyu Islet, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet to the government of Okinawa Prefecture on September 14, 1885.[109] This shows that Eihou Ooshiro was the first to report the situation relating to Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet to the government of Okinawa Prefecture and this had nothing to do with Tatsushiro Koga.

Also according to the records made by Hisashi Kuroiwa and Miyajima Kanshisuke, Eihou Ooshiro said that he first sailed past Diaoyu Island in 1859 and saw these small islands with his eyes and in the subsequent years he would saw them two or three times a year during his voyages between Ryukyu and China. Once he moved close to the shore of Diaoyu Island on a sampan, he didn't dare to land fearing that it was an uninhabited island probably with unknown wild animals.[110] Then why did Eihou Ooshiro report the situation relating to these islands to the government of Okinawa Prefecture many years later in 1885?

The main reasons are as follows: In 1895, the Ryukyu Kingdom wasn't part of Japan yet and it was during the voyages from the Ryukyu Kingdom to China that he saw these islands. In 1872, the Japanese Meiji government forcibly renamed the Ryukyu Kingdom Japan's Ryukyu han, and in 1879, Japan abolished the Ryukyu han in favor of Okinawa Prefecture. During these 20 years, Japan had not extended its external colonial expansion to China's Diaoyu Islands.

However, less than six years after Japan fully annexed Ryukyu, it began to continue to expand its colonial territory. Following its seizure of the Daito Islands, Japan's next target was the Diaoyu Islands, uninhabited islands of Taiwan, China, and the Meiji government coveted these islands. In July 1885, the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs secretly ordered Okinawa Prefecture to make a survey of the uninhabited islands nearby and incorporate them into Japanese territory. On August 29 of the same year, Okinawa Prefecture sent the *Izumo* to complete the on-the-spot survey of the Daito Islands, and two days later navigation marks were erected on the islands following the order of Okinawa Prefecture of the Empire of Japan and the islands were incorporated into Japanese territory. On September 3, Okinawa Governor Shiyazo Nishimura presented to the Japanese Interior Minister the Report on the Completed Survey of the Daito Islands.[111] It is justifiable to say

[109]Hisashi Kuroiwa, "Notes on the Exploration of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)," Jpn. ed., *Journal of Geography*, 33rd year of the Meiji Era (1900), no. 8, p. 478.

[110]Tadayoshi Murata, *The Origin of Japanese-Chinese Territory Issue: The Awkward Truth from Official Documents*, Jpn. ed., Tokyo: Kaden Sha, 2013, p. 160.

[111]Ibid. p. 153.

that it was during its surveys of the uninhabited islands nearby following the order of the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs that Okinawa Prefecture obtained Eihou Ooshiro's report on Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet and submitted these findings to the ministry. And this led Interior Minister Aritomo Yamagata to secretly order Okinawa Prefecture to conduct a survey of Diaoyu Island from late September to November 1885.

What has yet to be verified is whether Eihou Ooshiro led a small advanced group to secretly make their way to the waters around Diaoyu Island when people were sent by Okinawa Prefecture in August and September 1885 to travel to the Daito Islands on the *Izumo* for explorative purposes. According to Eihou Ooshiro's report on September 14, 1885, on Diaoyu Island "there are densely growing pines, Dysoxylum excelsum Bl and other trees on the hills. Streams are found in the hills. There are big spaces to serve as docks on the shore for boats. Birds flew to our boat to contact and eat from us; they were not afraid of us. In the water close to the boat there were concentrations of sharks, mackerels, and other fish. You could simply tie a rope to the tail of a shark and pull it up."[112] These detailed descriptions cannot but be made only based on on-the-spot survey; it is not something remembered from moving past Diaoyu Island on a boat.

On September 6 of the same year, China's *Shen Bao* newspaper published an article titled "A warning on the Taiwan Island Issue," covering the Japanese landing and flying Japanese flags on Taiwan's northeastern islands and attempting to seize them. If this was true, those Japanese who landed on the island should report it to Okinawa Prefecture. By chance, on September 14 of the same year Okinawa Prefecture received only one report, the report presented by Eihou Ooshiro on the abovementioned explorative survey of Diaoyu Island. This leads to a reasonable judgment: The Japanese China's *Shen Bao* covered landing on Diaoyu Island could be Eihou Ooshiro and his colleagues. In addition, at the time the Japanese Foreign Ministry followed China's reaction and developments closely, standing sentry for the colonial explorations by the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs. This article of *Shen Bao* was obviously noticed by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This is why in October of the same year when the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs asked the opinion of the Foreign Ministry, Foreign Minister Kaoru Inoue urged caution and adopted a wait-and-see attitude.

It is worth noting that during this process, there were not any records about Tatsushiro Koga participating or providing detailed reports. This shows that it is certain that Tatsushiro Koga landed on Diaoyu Island in 1895 at the earliest, and before he did that, Yakitai Izawa had landed on the island as a poacher.

5. *Tatsushiro Koga's landing on Diaoyu Island in 1884 to develop it is a sheer fabrication, and his lease and development of Diaoyu Island with the approval of the Japanese government in 1896 was part of the colonial development during Japan's occupation of Taiwan.*

[112]Hisashi Kuroiwa, "Notes on the Exploration of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)," *Jpn. ed., Journal of Geography*, 33rd year of the Meiji Era (1900), no. 8, p. 479.



Fig. 5.25 Tatsushiro Koga's curriculum vitae till 1899 (1)

The Japanese government's claim that Tatsushiro Koga entered Diaoyu Island in 1884 to collect bird feathers and maritime products and filed an application to Okinawa Prefecture for island development is false. This can absolutely not serve as the international law basis of Japan's possession of Diaoyu Island. Using this to claim that Diaoyu Island is a private island of course is not real and legitimate.

This fallacy can be partly explained by the curriculum vitae Koga prepared for the Blue Ribbon Medal presented by the Japanese Prime Minister Taro Katsura on October 22, 1909. In the curriculum vitae Koga said, "In the 17th year of the Meiji Era (1884), I sent people to the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) for explorative purposes to find out more about the islands. Thereafter I sent workers there to collect maritime products"[113] (see Fig. 5.25).

However, except for this, so far no other evidence documents have been found of Koga sending people to land on Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet for explorative purposes. Admittedly, this curriculum vitae proves that from 1884 through 1894, he didn't file an application to Okinawa Prefecture or the Japanese government for the development of Diaoyu Island. However, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' statement that he did this has no evidence from Koga's curriculum

[113]Tatsushiro Koga, "Curriculum Vitae Till the 32nd Year of the Meiji Era (1899)," Jpn. ed., *Miscellaneous Official Documents in the 42nd Year of the Meiji Era (1909)*, Cabinet (4), vol. 4, National Archives of Japan, Archives no.: 21–13–1108.



Fig. 5.26 Tatsushiro Koga's Curriculum Vitae Till 1899 (2)

vitae, so the statement is nothing but false statement. According to the curriculum vitae, it wasn't until May 1908 that they began on an experimental basis to hire 11 children aged 7–11 from families living in poverty to land on the islands for development purposes[114] (see Fig. 5.26).

In fact, Tatsushiro Koga didn't file an application to Japanese Interior Minister Yasu Nomura for the lease of Diaoyu Island until June 10, 1895, following the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. In the application, Koga said: In the 18th year of the Meiji Era (1885) when I was conducting patrols of the islands of Okinawa Prefecture, I only found flocks of albatrosses, known locally as "dull birds," on Kuba Island (Huangwei Islet) 90 nautical miles north the Yaeyama Islands…. Earlier I had been told that Europeans and Americans viewed the feathers of "dull birds" as treasure…. If I caught them, I could export large quantities of their feathers in a year…. In the meantime I planned to lease Kuba Island (Huangwei Islet) for exporting feathers, but I knew that Kuba Island (Huangwei Islet) might not be part of Japan, so I have waited until today to realize the above dream…. However, this time we should resolutely determine the island as part of Japan so that I can realize my longstanding dream.[115]

[114]Ibid.

[115]The application Tatsushiro Koga filed on June 10 of the 28th years of the Meiji Era to then Japanese Interior Minister Yasu Nomura for the lease of Diaoyu Island, *Okinawa* quarterly, no. 63.

This application bears the seals as evidence of three others including Masamori Miyanaga, Chief of the Yaeyama Islands in Okinawa Prefecture. The application shows that Koga "discovered" these islands in the 18th year of the Meiji Era (1885), not the 17th year of the Meiji Era (1884). Let us first forget about that this record is also suspected of falsification; even this application can prove that before the Japanese government approved Koga's application for Diaoyu Island development in September 1896, Koga only had a "dream" and had not secured the permit to develop the Diaoyu Islands because it was not certain that these islands belonged to Japan.

Relevant historical materials show that the reason why the Japanese Meiji government didn't approve Koga's application was mainly because it was keenly aware that these islands had long been named by China. This is why before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, the Japanese government didn't occupy Diaoyu Islands as *terra nullius* immediately after discovering them just as it did to the Daito Islands. Even after the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed in June 1895, Koga's application wasn't immediately approved by the Japanese government.

This is because following Japanese troops' landing in Taiwan, they met stubborn resistance for more than six months. It was not until after Japan used force to bring Taiwan under control in September 1896 that the Japanese government agreed to lease Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, Nanxiao Island, and Beixiao Island to Koga for free for 30 years.

According to Koga's curriculum vitae of 1909, "In the 27th year of the Meiji Era (1894), I applied to Okinawa Prefecture for development of the islands, I was rejected on the ground that it was not certain whether these islands belonged to the empire. And then I filed an application to the ministers of the Interior and agriculture and commerce and traveled to Tokyo to report on my surveys of the islands. Yet my application was still turned down. At this time in the 27th and 28th years of the Meiji Era (1894–1895), the war ended. As an outcome of the sweeping victory for Japan, Taiwan Island became part of Japan, and the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) also belonged to our country. When this was made public in the Japanese Emperor's Decree 13 in the 29th year of the Meiji Era (1896), I immediately reported to the governor of Okinawa Prefecture about my dream of developing the islands and my application was approved in September of the same year"[116] (see Fig. 5.27).

This passage of Koga admits that the Diaoyu Islands belonging to Japan was "an outcome of the sweeping victory for Japan." That means that by means of war Japan changed the then territorial *status quo*, that is, the fact that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to China before the critical date. The reason why Tatsushiro Koga chose to file his application for leasing and developing the Diaoyu Islands on June 10, 1895, is probably because he was encouraged by the completion of the handover of

[116]Tatsushiro Koga, "Curriculum Vitae Till the 32nd Year of the Meiji Era (1899)," Jpn. ed., *Miscellaneous Official Documents in the 42nd Year of the Meiji Era (1909)*, Cabinet (4), vol. 4, National Archives of Japan, Archives no.: 21–13–1108.



Fig. 5.27 Tatsushiro Koga's curriculum vitae till 1899 (3)

Taiwan to Japan on June 2. On June 2, 1895, Japanese Emperor Meiji issued a notice to Admiral and first Japanese Taiwan Governor-General Sukenori Kabayama, ordering him to take over from the Qing government the sovereignty over Taiwan and islands affiliated with it. It was probably because Koga got to know this notice that he filed the application (see Fig. 5.28).

This curriculum vitae of Tatsushiro Koga also clearly specifies that he didn't travel to the Diaoyu Islands for explorative purposes and apply to Japanese officials for colonial development of these islands until after the end of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. The Japanese government didn't approve his application for colonial development of the Diaoyu Islands until after it seized Taiwan through the war.

According to Koga's curriculum vitae, "In the 27th year of the Meiji Era (1894) when I observed the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands), I was convinced that these islands would become part of our country and there was a pressing need for their colonial operation, so I applied to the governor of Okinawa Prefecture for their development. However, my application was rejected on the ground that it was not clear which country these islands belonged to. In the 28th year of the Meiji Era (1895), I felt it was necessary to pay a visit to the islands, so I traveled there on a small boat for an on-the-spot exploration" (see Fig. 5.29).

It is of particular note that Koga said that "it was announced in the emperor's Decree 13 in the 29th year of the Meiji Era (1896) that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) also belonged to our country." However, the decree said nothing about the



Fig. 5.28 Notice Japan's first Taiwan Governor-General Sukenori Kabayama received, June 1895

Senkaku Islands or Diaoyu Islands. The reason why Okinawa Prefecture approved Koga's lease and development application is that Japan had incorporated Taiwan and the islands affiliated with it into Japanese territory by waging the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 to force the Qing government to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki. There could be no other reasons. In fact, it wasn't until March 1897 that Koga hired 35 workers and got them to the Diaoyu Islands. Later on, he hired more child workers. Koga's account books at that time also prove that his colonial development of the Diaoyu Islands stared in 1897 (see Fig. 5.30).

This leads me to conclude that the so-called development of the Diaoyu Islands by Koga and other Japanese people was merely a shift from the poaching on



Fig. 5.29 Tatsushiro Koga's curriculum vitae till 1899 (4)



Fig. 5.30 Account books on Tatsushiro Koga's colonial development of the Diaoyu Islands, 1897–1907

China's uninhabited islands before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 to organized colonial development by Japanese people with the approval of the Japanese government during the post-1896 period of Japan's colonial rule of Taiwan.

According to Japanese information, Japan brought these islands under the jurisdiction of Romura Tonoshi on Ishigaki Island in December 1902 and numbered them geologically, namely 2392 for Uotsuri Island (Diaoyu Island), 2393 for Kuba Island (Huangwei Islet), 2390 for Nanxiao Island, and 2391 for Beixiao Island. All these islands were registered as state-owned land. Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet were under the administration of the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Nanxiao Island and Beixiao Island were under the administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Chiwei Islet was renamed Taisho Island put under the administration of the Japanese Interior Ministry on July 25, 1921.

According to Ryukyu scholars, Hyougo Ishizawa who conducted a secret survey of the Diaoyu Islands in 1885 said in his report, "These are uninhabited islands." Koga said he had sent people to the Diaoyu Islands in 1884 and 1885, but there weren't any signs of human activity there. It is strange that Tatsushiro Koga was never mentioned in the relevant records made before Japan occupied the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) in 1895. The testimony of Koga's son Zanji Koga, and the reports published by the *Ryukyu Shimpo* and *Okinawa Mainichi Shimbun* on Tatsushiro Koga's development of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) were all influenced by Tatsushiro Koga's materials submitted for the Blue Ribbon Medal and his application for the lease of official land. However, "a comparison of Hyougo Ishizawa's report and Koga's materials submitted for the Blue Ribbon Medal shows that the two sources are hardly identical…. The materials submitted for the Blue Ribbon Medal. Koga might have exaggerated his curriculum vitae he submitted in his application for the medal. His application for the lease of official land was designed to secure the islands for development purposes, so he might have exaggerated his performances too."[117] The judgment is right.

It is in September 1896 that the Japanese Meiji government approved Tatsushiro Koga's application for the 30-year lease of Diaoyu Island and other islands. This was part of the colonial development after the Treaty of Shimonoseki became effective and Japan started its colonial rule of Taiwan, and it was not the occupation of *terra nullius*. After Tatsushiro Koga died in August 1918, his son Zanji Koga continued the development. When Tatsushiro Koga's lease expired, Zanji Koga continued to rent Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, Nanxiao Island, and Beixiao Island at the yearly rate of 136.61 yen. In May and July 1932, Zanji Koga bought these islands for 2150.5 yen, with 1825 yen for Diaoyu Island, 247 yen for Huangwei Islet, 47 yen for Nanxiao Island, and 31.5 yen for Beixiao Island.[118] With that, these four islands became private islands in Japan.

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[117]The Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) Documents Compilation Committee, *A Survey Report on the Fisheries in the Waters around the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)*, Jpn. ed., a study financed by Japanese consortiums, August 31, 2010, p. 31.

[118]The Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) Research Society, "The Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) and Japan's Sovereignty," *Okinawa* (quarterly), March, 1971, no. 63.

In her interview to Yomiuri Weekly in 1996, Saya Kurihara, a member of the Kurihara family, stated that the Diaoyu Islands were discovered by 50 people including the Koga family and her father in 1897 (this probably means the year when they landed on the islands for development). Zanji Koga didn't have any children, so he decided to transfer the Diaoyu Islands to the Kurihara family. From 1973 to 1974, the Kurihara family bought these islands for 46.3 million yen (about $400,000 at the time). Members of this family only visited the islands once when they bought them, and paid annual taxes to the city government thereafter.[119] Before the Japanese government "purchased" the islands, the so-called private owners of the islands lived in Saitama Prefecture: Diaoyu Island was owned by Kuniyuki Kurihara, Huangwei Islet by Kazuko Kurihara, and Nanxiao Island and Beixiao Island by Hiroshi Kurihara. Chiwei Islet was registered to be owned by the Japanese Ministry of Finance.[120]

The above historical materials show that Tatsushiro Koga's being authorized to develop the Diaoyu Islands in September 1896 was only a colonial development act during the period of Japan's colonial rule of Taiwan and can absolutely not serve as the so-called international law basis of Japan's sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. Following Japan's surrender when it accepted the Potsdam Declaration in August 1945, all its power to carry out colonial development of Taiwan, including the Diaoyu Islands, that the Empire of Japan had stolen by force and greediness, had gone.

Since then, Japan had not had the sovereignty over the islands, so conditions were not ripe for the transfer of these islands by either the Koga family or the Kurihara family. Even when the USA handed over to Japan the so-called administrative right to these islands in 1972, it didn't recognize Japan's sovereignty over the islands. In September 2012, the Japanese government purchased the Diaoyu Islands from the Kurihara family that had secured ownership of the islands from the Koga family, thus achieving the so-called nationalization of the islands. This is tantamount to restoring the privileges of the Empire of Japan over the colonial rule of the Diaoyu Islands. The Chinese are diametrically opposed to this.

5.5.4 *Maki Izawa's Testimonies: Unquestionable and Indetestable*

The conclusion of Maki Izawa's testimonies is that back then the Japanese government was aware of that China had long named these islands, later on, Japan seized them along with Taiwan by means of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895,

[119] *Sin Chew Daily,* Hong Kong, October 13, 1996.

[120] Katsunori Nakamura, "The Japan-US Security Treaty and the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)," Cheng Chia-jui (ed.), *The Legal Status of the Diaoyutai Islands* (a collection of papers), Soochow University, Taiwan, 2004, p. 77.

and Japan should return these islands to their home China now that Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration during World War II. These testimonies hurt some people, so they raised objections to them to defend their position.

1. *No sophistry can destroy the authenticity of Maki Izawa's testimonies.*

I was the first to discuss the testimonies in China's newspaper *Global Times* on January 16, 2014. After that, I published "Research on the Fabrication that Tatsushiro Koga Was the First to Develop the Diaoyu Islands" in the fourth issue of the *Journal of Tsinghua University* (Philosophy and Social Sciences) in 2014, elaborating on this issue.

In response to my article in *Global Times,* Li Woteng published a book commenting that the memories of Maki Izawa "are often inconsistent with facts. For example, in her interview, she said that her father didn't know of Diaoyutai until 1894, but in fact he had already landed on the island in 1891. For another example, she said that he made inquiries to the government about the islands in 1894 and that the government told him that they were Japanese islands, so he and Koga discussed the matter and decided to file the application. This is quite impossible. Koga filed his first application in 1894 because the Japanese government decided to officially annex the Diaoyu Islands."[121]

However, what Li Woteng said above is inconsistent with facts and completely deviates from what Maki Izawa meant in her testimonies. According to Maki Izawa, her father asked the local government of Japan's Kyushu in 1895 about the sovereignty over the uninhabited islands he discovered, but Li Woteng changed it to 1894, creating the lie that Koga filed his first application for the development of the Diaoyu Islands in 1894.

In response to my article in the *Journal of Tsinghua University,* Nozomu Ishii, Associate Professor of Nagasaki Junshin Catholic University, stated that there were contradictory dates of Yakitai Izawa "landing on the Diaoyu Islands. According to the interview in the 46th year of the Shoa Era (1971), it was the 28th year of the Meiji Era (1895) soon after the Sino-Japanese War whereas according to the interview in the 47th year of the Shoa Era (1972), it was the 24th year of the Meiji Era (1891)."[122] The first island Yakitai Izawa "discovered" in 1891 and where albatrosses could be hunted for in the Diaoyu Islands, and the island he "discovered" and reported to the local government of Kyushu for confirmation in 1895 is Huangwei Islet. In June 1895, when he and Koga were sure that these islands belonged to Japan, they filed an application for developing them.

It is clear that Li Woteng and Nozomu Ishii thought and discussed the matter from the same position. Comparatively speaking, Nozomu Ishii was more cautious over his statement about the matter, whereas Li Woteng's challenge was more

[121]Li Woteng, *Whose Is Diaoyutai? History and Legality*, Chin. ed., Taipei: Wu-Nan Book Company Ltd., 2014, p. 208.

[122]Nozomu Ishii, "When the First Landing on Senkaku Island (Diaoyu Island) Takes Place?," *Island Studies Journal*, 2014, p. 79.

arbitrary. He is neither a witness nor a descendant of a witness, doesn't have many examples of the so-called inconsistency between Maki Izawa's testimonies and the facts, and more importantly, has no historical documents supporting his inference. In fact, there is already an answer in the testimonies to their questions: Maki Izawa's testimonies are not contradictory. I discussed this earlier, but I now elaborate on it.

According to the testimonies Maki Izawa gave in 1971 and 1972, it is clear that her father Yakitai Izawa visited the Diaoyu Islands at least four times around the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895.

The first visit was made to Diaoyu Island in 1891 to collect medicinal herbs.

The second visit to Diaoyu Island took place in 1893 when he was struck by winds and waves and floated to Taiwan where he was rescued.

The third was made by Yakitai Izawa to an uninhabited island in 1895 following the Sino-Japanese War to rescue boats struck by accidents. He reported the island to the Japanese government, asking whether it was a Japanese island.

The fourth was made to Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet from 1896 to 1910 as Yakitai Izawa was invited by Tatsushiro Koga to serve as a development supervisor.

As I said earlier, Maki Izawa's testimonies weren't targeted at a specific landing by his father, so she had different accounts. Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet are not located together; they are 27–110 km apart. At normal levels of visibility on the sea, one can see 15 km far. Therefore, it is highly probable that Yakitai Izawa reached different islands of the Diaoyu Islands over the years.

Li Woteng also holds that Maki Izawa exaggerated his father's contributions. Li said that in the early years of Diaoyutai development Koga had two supervisors. One was Yakitai Izawa and the other was Nobutaro Otaki, Koga's nephew. Nobutaro Otaki was in charge of employment, and he even drew up the map of Diaoyutai.[123] This could be a citation from Miyajima Kanshisuke's "Kuba Island" published in 1900. In addition, according to the *Ryukyu Shimpo*, compared with Yakitai Izawa, Nobutaro Otaki was a latecomer. He didn't arrive at the islands until 1898, and he returned to Kyoto to shape his English, so he didn't stay on the islands long. Nobutaro Otaki's main responsibility was to hire people and provide secretarial services on the islands. It is certain that Yakitai Izawa was the man in charge on the islands.[124] Maki Izawa's historical testimonies are so far the most authoritative and trustworthy historical evidence from the descendants of the Japanese witnesses of the Diaoyu Islands.

That being the case, Li Woteng deliberately works to play down the value and role of Maki Izawa's testimonies and insists that "I am inclined to believe that it is true Koga landed on Diaoyu Island in 1884," "I believe that Koga's landing on the

[123]Li Woteng, *Whose Is Diaoyutai? History and Legality*, Chin. ed., Taipei: Wu-Nan Book Company Ltd., 2014, p. 209.

[124]Report of the *Ryukyu Shimpo*, *Guidelines for Boarding Businessmen III*, Jpn. ed., *Ryukyu Shimpo*, October 1, 1900.

island in 1884 is trustworthy," and "whatever the case, whether Koga filed an application in 1884 does not have much to do with the history and legality of Japan's annexation of Diaoyutai."[125] However, as long as we take a look at the so-called basis of the above judgments of Li Woteng, we can immediately realize that his views are wrong and provide new counter-evidence.

First, according to Li Woteng, when Yakitai Izawa died in 1914, Maki Izawa was only 13. "At 70, the facts from her memories are highly questionable."[126] However, the principles of people's memories fading are just the opposite to what Li Woteng thinks. Older people tend to forget things, but only things that have just taken place but remember well what happened when they were around 13. For example, all people will never forget the mother tongue they developed before they were 13; older people can sing the songs they learned during their childhood better than those they have just learned; and they can remember the names of their primary school teachers but may not remember those they newly met yesterday. Maki Izawa was born in Huangwei Islet and later on she often heard the stories her father and uncle told about the island, so the testimony she made in January 8, 1972, is trustworthy. Li Woteng's conclusions are arbitrary unless he can change the way people remember things.

Second, Li Woteng believes that when Japanese people landed on islands northeast of Taiwan in September 1885, "these islands were probably the Diaoyu Islands" and "this is consistent with the date Koga landed on the islands in 1884 or 1885."[127] In fact, it is not consistent at all. Koga said that he sent people to the Diaoyu Islands for explorative purposes in 1884 and after that he sent people there for development purposes every year. This is in itself a lie, but it implies that Koga didn't land on the islands. However, Li Woteng farfetchedly links them together. Nevertheless, Li Woteng admits that when the Qing Dynasty's *Shen Bao* newspaper warned that Japanese people landed on islands northeast of Taiwan in 1885, those islands were probably the Diaoyu Islands. This is tantamount to admitting that this newspaper warned Japan's attempt to seize the Diaoyu Islands. It is on October 13 that year that the Qing government of China announced the establishment of the Naval Ministry and elevated Taiwan Prefecture to Taiwan Province. This can be partly explained by the invasion of Keelung, Taiwan, by French warships and was also targeted at the maritime threat from Japan.

Third, Li Woteng dismissed Maki Izawa's testimonies as "memories of an outsider," so "they must be handled with care as historical facts and are not very effective as legal evidence. This is because also in the 1970s, in his testimonies and recalls, Zanji Koga (Tatsushiro Koga's son) said that his father did visit the Diaoyu Islands in 1884 and file an application for their development in 1885. Zanji Koga

[125]Li Woteng, *Whose Is Diaoyutai? History and Legality*, Chin. ed., Taipei: Wu-Nan Book Company Ltd., 2014, p. 210.

[126]Ibid., p. 208.

[127]Ibid., pp. 209–210.

was born in 1893, and had come of age in 1918 when Zanji Koga died and took over his father's business. Zanji Koga's testimonies are more trustworthy than Maki Izawa's."[128]

Li Woteng didn't think Maki Izawa was a witness, stating that she was merely born in 1901 and was only told about what had happened in 1884.[129] Here, what happened or didn't happen in 1884 is quite another matter, but Li Woteng's logic was suitable for Zanji Koga because in 1884 Zanji Koga had not been born yet and he wasn't a witness either in 1891 when he was two and Yakitai Izawa started poaching on the islands. Zanji Koga could absolutely not prove as a witness that his father did land on the islands for explorative purposes in 1884, nine years before he was born. Zanji Koga never said that, and that was grafted by Li Woteng to Zanji Koga's testimony to create false evidence.

2. *Zanji Koga's recalls led to many doubts, but he admitted that there were no detailed records of his father's landing on the islands in 1884.*

Li Woteng's assumptions are not true, but it is still necessary for our readers to understand what opinions Zanji Koga (who died in June 1978) expressed concerning the Diaoyu Islands issue. This could help tell true from false. In 1972, Zanji Koga gave an interview to the Japanese monthly *Gendai*, in which he discussed the Diaoyu Islands as follows:

> Back then, it was believed in the Yaeyama Islands that Diaoyu Island and Kuba Island (Huangwei Islet) had many birds and they were very interesting islands so that young fishermen often forgot fishing when they tried to hunting for birds. My father also heard about that. He was born adventurist, so he decided to travel there for explorative purposes. That was in the 17th year of the Meiji Era (1884)…. However, there were no detailed records about his exploration."[130]

According to the archives of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, Okinawa Prefecture Governor Shiyazo Nishimura had always been cautious about making surveys of and erection Japan's national markers on the Diaoyu Islands. He sent people to conduct a secret survey of the Diaoyu Islands following the secret order of then Interior Minister Aritomo Yamagata, and that had nothing to do with Tatsushiro Koga. In addition, as the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture, even Shiyazo Nishimura wasn't certain whether these islands belonged to Japan, so how Tatsushiro Koga, an ordinary citizen, could directly file an application to the Meiji government for the development of the islands in 1885? This is not logical and goes against the common sense.

Zanji Koga also said, "In the 18th year of the Meiji Era (1885), my father applied to the Meiji Government for development of the islands, but that application wasn't processed on the ground that at the time the government was not sure which country these islands belonged to. However, after hearing what my father had to say,

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[128]Ibid., p. 209.

[129]Ibid., p. 208.

[130]Zanji Koga's interview, *Gekkan Gendai*, June 1972, p. 143.

Governor Shiyazo Nishimura was very interested and sent a boat there for a survey. The result of the survey was that they were uninhabited islands and there were no signs of people living there. After that, Shiyazo Nishimura actively applied to the government for making the islands Japanese territory."[131]

The source of the above statements is not clear. The original Japanese suggests that Zanji Koga was trying to confirm what he thought. In addition, he admitted that there were no detailed records about Tatsushiro Koga's exploration on the islands in 1884. This is tantamount to admitting that there is no evidence of the event. This is enough to prove that Li Woteng's fabrication that Tatsushiro Koga did visit the Diaoyu Islands in 1884 is merely an exaggeration and stresses that something that is uncertain is certain if it is favorable to his opinion.

On this matter, Zanji Koga's recalls are not reliable. These were probably the uncertain things his father talked about or something his father imagined to be true and were a combination of fragmented historical rumors. This is because there are no materials and records indicating that the then Okinawa Governor Shiyazo Nishimura had contacted Tatsushiro Koga; Koga's report is something that has never been heard of. In addition, Japan doesn't have any historical records to serve as evidence of Tatsushiro Koga's landing on the Diaoyu Islands in 1884, nor does it have any evidence of Koga's applying to develop the Diaoyu Islands in 1885, so there is every reason to challenge the recalls of Zanji Koga.

Based on his careful study of the relevant original historical archives, Japanese scholar Tadayoshi Murata believes that Shiyazo Nishimura, Japan's fourth Governor of Okinawa Prefecture, adopted a very prudent attitude toward the Diaoyu Islands issue. After Shiyazo Nishimura became Governor in February 1884, he realized that Okinawa people bore great resentment against Japan's violent annexation of Ryukyu and some of them fled to China. From 1882 to 1884, every year there were eight or nine boats fleeing to China. Some Ryukyu people who were engaged in trade and trying to salvage their country fled to China to seek political asylum by means of stowaway or floating on the sea in violation of the strict control regulations of Okinawa authorities. As Governor of Okinawa Prefecture, he gave top priority to giving Okinawa people assurance.[132] Therefore, Shiyazo Nishimura adopted a prudent attitude in order to avoid a dispute with China over the Diaoyu Islands issue and he didn't work actively for the occupation of the islands.

In addition, when Governor Shiyazo Nishimura sent people to make a survey of the Diaoyu Islands following the order of the Japanese Interior Ministry, he first made oral inquiries to Eiho Oshiro, who was said to have travelled past Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet during his voyages to and from China in 1859 when Ryukyu wasn't part of Japan, but not Tatsushiro Koga. This shows that what Zanji

[131]Ibid., p. 144.

[132]Tadayoshi Murata, "Chapter Six: Shiyazo Nishimura in 1885," *The Origin of Japanese-Chinese Territory Issue: The Awkward Truth from Official Documents*, Jpn. ed., Tokyo: Kaden Sha, 2013, pp. 145–276.

Koga said about his father's sending people to develop the Diaoyu Islands before 1885 is absolute not a fact.

As I said earlier, Tatsushiro Koga's first application to Interior Minister Yasushi Nomura was filed on June 10 of the 28th year of the Meiji Era (1895), that is, after Japan won the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and forced the Qing government to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki on ceding to Japan Taiwan and the islands affiliated with it. Zanji Koga also admitted, "The reason why the Meiji government announced that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) were Japanese territory… is that Japan won the Japanese-Qing War and Taiwan became Japanese territory."[133]

Zanji Koga inherited Tatsushiro Koga's colonial development of the Diaoyu Islands and later on in 1932, bought from the Japanese government Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, Nanxiao Island, and Beixiao Island. From different angles, Zanji Koga and Maki Izawa made the same testimonies, proving that Japan didn't occupy the Diaoyu Islands until after the Treaty of Shimonoseki became effective and Japan seized Taiwan. That being the case, Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Declaration in August 1945, so it must return to China all the Chinese territory it had stolen.

In addition, Makomo Kuniyoshi, a Ryukyu researcher specialized the business of the Koga family in Okinawa Prefecture, also stated that he doubted that Zanji Koga had been to the Diaoyu Islands. According to Zanji Koga's wife Hanako, Zanji Koga "isn't interested in business." According to the local newspapers of the Yaeyama Islands before World War II, back then Zanji Koga was a journalist, not the owner of Koga shops.[134] Zanji Koga never talked about his personal experience in the development of the Diaoyu Islands, so he is suspected not to be a witness as he is labeled. This shows Zanji Koga's interview on the Diaoyu Islands is hardly accurate, trustworthy, and relevant.

Evidence from all sides shows that the testimonies of Yakitai Izawa's daughter Maki Izawa are reliable, whereas the account by Tatsushiro Koga's son Zanji Koga is blurred and is suspected of falsification. The following factors have to be considered when determining whether these testimonies are true: Maki Izawa was born on Huangwei Islet in 1901, went to primary school on Kume Island, returned to her home prefecture Kumamoto Prefecture along with her father when she was nine in 1910, and later on sent to Taiwan. According to Maki Izawa, at that time Tatsushiro Koga didn't have a son of his own and only had a stepson called Yichiro, who was four or five years older than Maki Izawa.[135] As his name suggests, Zanji Koga was Tatsushiro Koga's second son who had an elder brother. If Zanji Koga was born in 1893, he was eight years older than Maki Izawa. This gives rise to contradictory ages.

In addition, Maki Izawa was an in-and-out child who grew up on Huangwei Islet, so she must remember her childhood friends well, especially the children of

[133] *Gekkan Gendai,* June 1972, pp. 142–146.

[134] Makom Kuniyoshi, "Koga Shops," Okinawa University Territory Institute (ed.), *The Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) and Okinawa*, Tokyo: Institute of Regional Studies of Okinawa University, Fuyoshobo, 2013, pp. 263–265.

[135] Okinawa Prefecture News Agency, *Gunsei*, inaugural issue, August 29, 1971.

his father's partner Tatsushiro Koga. But she didn't mention Zanji Koga at all in her recalls. Zanji Koga didn't mention his father's partner Yakitai Izawa, and it seemed he didn't know much about this kind of thing.

The possibility cannot be ruled out that Zanji Koga was the second stepson Tatsushiro Koga adopted after his first stepson Yichiro Koga died, and the second stepson was older than the first and was named Zanji Koga. This still has to be verified. If this is true, Zanji Koga really didn't know what it was like on the Diaoyu Islands before 1896. His testimonies and recalls cannot go beyond the falsified curriculum vitae Tatsushiro Koga submitted for the award in 1909, so they are not valuable as testimonies by a witness and are far less trustworthy than the historical testimonies by Maki Izawa who grew up in Huangwei Islet.

The late Japanese Diaoyu Islands researcher Shogoro Takahashi stated in 1979, "It is impossible for Ryukyu and China to have territorial disputes. Ryukyu has 36 islands. The Ryukyu officials who often travelled to and from Fuzhou naturally believed that Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, Chiwei Islet and other islands that came between Ryukyu and Fuzhou had been named by China and belonged to their suzerain China."[136] He stressed that it is wrong to say that Tatsushiro Koga or Yakitai Izawa "discovered" the Diaoyu Islands. This is because the first person to discover them was not Japanese. Before Koga and Izawa arrived at these islands, they had long been named by China and marked in the ancient Chinese and Ryukyu documents.[137] In essence, Shogoro Takahashi's opinion is consistent with the view Yakitai Izawa's first daughter Maki Izawa expressed in her historical testimonies. That is, they both held that the Diaoyu Islands Japan stole during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 were China's inherent territory and following World War II, Japan must obey the Potsdam Declaration and return the Diaoyu Islands to China.

5.6 Japan's Colonial Development of the Diaoyu Islands Was Illegal and Unsustainable

The Ryukyu government issued a document on the Territorial Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) on September 1, 1970, stating, "According to the explanation of Okinawa Governor, the Yaeyama Islands mentioned in the imperial Decree 13 included these islands, so these islands were made part of them in terms of administrative division of the Yaeyama Islands."[138] However, the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture was not titled to explain Japanese territory. The actual

[136]Shogoro Takahashi, "Notes on the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)," Jpn. ed., October 1979, in Beijing Sino-Japanese Association for the Promotion of Journalism, *The Sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands*, Chin. ed., Beijing: People's Daily Press, 2013, p. 288.

[137]Ibid., pp. 289, 290.

[138]Ryukyu government "Statement on the Territorial Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)," September 1, 1970.

occupation and predatory development of the Diaoyu Islands by the Japanese government and people both took place during Japan's colonial rule of Taiwan. The waters around the Diaoyu Islands had always been the traditional fishing ground of the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, especially the fishermen in northeastern Taiwan.

1. *After Japan stole the Diaoyu Islands, the Japanese Emperor didn't issue a decree confirming Japanese occupation, nor did the Japanese erect national markers, Japan lacked the procedures and legal basis for incorporating the islands into Japanese territory.*

Japan lied that the so-called Senkaku Islands were incorporated into Japanese territory in accordance with Emperor Meiji's Decree 13. However, the original historical text shows that this statement isn't accurate. The Japanese Emperor issued his Decree 13 in March 1896. It was designed to confirm the scope of the islands under the jurisdiction of the five districts in Okinawa Prefecture except Naha and Shuri Area. The decree mentioned the Yaeyama Islands of Yaeyama District, but it didn't mark the Diaoyu Islands or the so-called Senkaku Islands (see Fig. 5.31).

This should not be explained by that these islands were too small to be recorded or by that they were occupied too late to be included because the Daito Islands, which were occupied by Japan in the same period, were included into Shimajiri District in Okinawa Prefecture. Only the Diaoyu Islands or the so-called Senkaku Islands were not included. I don't think this was a mistake; there are reasons for this.

Regardless of Japan's subjective reasons, Japan's theft of the Diaoyu Islands and putting them under the jurisdiction of Ishigaki in the Yaeyama Islands was not only a violation of international law but was also not based on complete necessary procedures and bases from the perspective of Japanese domestic laws, and it even violated the domestic laws. Japan can hardly explain the following five things:

First, the so-called occupation of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) was not approved by Japan's Emperor Meiji in his decree in 1896. Article 1 of the decree defined the islands of the five districts of Okinawa Prefecture, but none of the Diaoyu Islands was included. In addition, it was difficult to incorporate the Diaoyu Islands into Okinawa Prefecture because there wasn't such a thing as the Senkaku Islands.

Second, according to Article 2 of Decree 13, "It is up to the Interior Minister to decide whether the borders between districts and their names should be changed" (see Fig. 5.31). Therefore, as a local official, Okinawa Governor's expanded interpretation of the Diaoyu Islands or the so-called Senkaku Islands included in the Yaeyama District the Japanese Emperor discussed in his decree did not have legal efficacy and was even suspected of violating articles 1 and 2 of the decree.

Third, when Japan conducted a survey of the Diaoyu Islands, it renamed Chiwei Islet Kume Aka Island for its vicinity to Kume Island, meaning an island affiliated with Kume Island. In Decree 13, Kume Island was put under the jurisdiction of Shimajiri District in Okinawa Prefecture (see Fig. 5.31). This leads to a

Fig. 5.31 Emperor Meiji, "Sizes of the Districts in Okinawa Prefecture," Decree 13

contradiction: On the one hand, Japan put the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands), which included Chiwei Islet, under the jurisdiction of Ishigaki in the Yaeyama Islands; on the other hand Kume Aka Island (Chiwei Islet), an island affiliated with Kume Island, was under the jurisdiction of Shimajiri District in Okinawa Prefecture. It was probably because this contradiction caused by Japan's alteration

of the names of the island could not be solved that Japanese decrees concerning Japanese territory never mentioned Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet, and on July 25, 1921, Japan renamed Chiwei Islet Taisho Island.

Fourth, on January 14, 1895, it was decided at a Japanese cabinet meeting to erect markers of territorial sovereignty on Diaoyu Island and Kuba Island (Huangwei Islet), though they were not virtually erected. After oil was discovered in the waters around the Diaoyu Islands in the late 1960s, Japanese people followed the order of the mayor of Ishigaki in establishing markers of Ishigaki of the Yaeyama Islands on Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, Nanxiao Island, Beixiao Island, and Chiwei Islet. However, so far the Japanese government has never erected any markers of national rule on the Diaoyu Islands. So far the official procedures and documents indicating that the Japanese government approved the establishment of markers of Ishigaki on these articles have not been found.

Fifth, Emperor Meiji issued Decree 169 in 1897, designating the areas to which the Tobacco Monopolized Sale Law was applicable. In the decree Diaoyu Island was renamed Uotsuri Island and appeared last in the list, though Huangwei Islet, Chiwei Islet, or the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) were not included. In the decree, the so-called Kuba Island, in terms of ranking, was actually referred to as the Kuba Island in the Kerama Islands, not the Kuba Island which was known as Huangwei Islet in China (see Fig. 5.32).

In short, the Huangwei Islet, Chiwei Islet, Nanxiao Island, and Beixiao Island that Japan occupied so far never been approved in the Japanese Emperor's decrees. Even in accordance with Japan's domestic laws, the Japanese government's occupation of the Diaoyu Islands it considered to be *terra nullius*, there was a lack of legal basis for that occupation. Of course, this does not mean if the Japanese Emperor's decree included the Diaoyu Islands, the occupation was legal.

2. *After Tatsushiro Koga was granted the right to develop the Diaoyu Islands, he had albatrosses hunted for and killed in a predatory and destructive way, seriously degrading the environment on these islands.*

Diaoyu Island, Chiwei Islet, Nanxiao Island, and Beixiao Island used to be home for large numbers of seabirds. They were a paradise for seabirds, and bird eggs could be found here and there on these islands. According to Syouri Hiraoka, a Japanese island issue specialist, back then Koga hired workers to hunt for and kill albatrosses, even young albatrosses. From 1897 to 1900, he collected 100,000 kilograms of albatross feathers. If eight albatrosses produced one kilogram of feathers on average, 800,000 albatrosses were slaughtered over the three years, or more than 730 albatrosses a day.

As a result, the number of albatrosses on Diaoyu Island decreased significantly, so Koga began to send people to hunt for other seabirds on Nanxiao Island and Beixiao Island. The processed feathers were sold to France and other European countries to serve as women's decorations. The workers worked in groups of four. They chopped the heads of captured birds off, removed their skin and stuffed with chopped paper, and sold dried products to foreign businessmen in Kobe and Yokohama.

Fig. 5.32 Emperor Meiji, Decree 169, "Designating the Areas to Which the Tobacco Monopolized Sale Law Is Applicable," 1897

Due to a drastic fall in the number of wild birds on the Diaoyu Islands, Koga bought bonito boats in 1905 and began to catch bonitoes in the waters around the Diaoyu Islands. According to a report, 5650 kg of dried bonitoes were produced in that year, and the production increased to 3.4 kg in 1906.[139] The profit therein was shared between the boat owner Goga and the fishermen at the ratio of 6 to 4. That brought Koga a good fortune. In 1907, they hunted for seabirds on the islands in a destructive way, killing 420,000 of them.[140]

[139] *Ryukyu Shimpo*, November 23, 1910. Syouri Hiraoka (ed.), *Research into People, Life and Industry of the Japanese Islands III,* 2007, p. 18.
[140] Ibid.

One of the purposes of this predatory act was to donate money to the Japanese government preparing for war. According to Japanese official documents, during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, Koga was awarded a wood cup by Okinawa Governor Shigeru Narahara for his contributions to help cover Japan's military spending and supplies. Around the Russo-Japanese War, Koga made donations to Japan's efforts to build an imperial fleet of volunteers, for which he was awarded an emblem by Prince Arisugawa Takehito in the 39th year of the Meiji Era (1906). Tatsushiro Koga died in 1918. After the free-of-charge lease and development period regarding the Diaoyu Islands expired, Zanji Koga rented these islands from 1926 to 1928. After that, he bought the islands in 1932.

According to a report, in 1907 the so-called Koga Village was established on Diaoyu Island. There were 99 households with more than 240 people living on the island at one point.[141] This report is exaggerating because according to the statistics in Okinawa Prefecture, Japan, in 1919, Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet were still regarded as uninhabited islands of Yaeyama District. It is unimaginable that Diaoyu Island, which suffered from freshwater shortages, was full of steep cliffs and covered an area of only 3.9 km^2, housed more than 200 permanent residents. Kanshisuke Miyajima wrote in 1900 that more than 20 hired workers were working on the island on a rotation basis, and there were more than 50 residents on the island. The statement that there were more than 240 permanent residents on the island is a mistake probably because that number could be the total number of workers who worked on the island.

However, no matter how many people landed on and developed the islands, these acts of colonial development during the period of Japan's colonial rule of Taiwan are not to be proud of. Today, the Japanese government are still posting online the photographs taken back then on the islands. This could at best help online surfers understand what Taiwan islands looked like during Japanese colonial development, and the photographs cannot serve as the evidence of Japan's legitimate possession of the Diaoyu Islands.

In fact, this destructive development was hardly sustainable. According to Maki Izawa, his father left the Diaoyu Islands for his home Kumamoto Prefecture due to operation difficulties in 1910. Makomo Kuniyoshi, a Ryukyu researcher specialized in the business of the Koga family in Okinawa Prefecture, also proved that following his being presented the award, Tatsushiro Koga wanted to accomplish much more, but in fact his business "fails to expand; on the contrary it is contracting" and his seabird processing industry had to be suspended.[142] Back then, in order to increase the number of hired workers on the Diaoyu Islands, employment advertisements were published in Okinawa newspapers, but few were hired. Some

[141] *Ryukyu Shimpo*, June 19, 1908.

[142] Makom Kuniyoshi, "The Modern History of Okinawa and the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)," Okinawa University Territory Institute, *The Senkaku Islands and Okinawa*, Tokyo: Institute of Regional Studies of Okinawa University, Fuyoshobo, 2013, p. 115.

children were sold to work on the islands, including children from Miyagi Prefecture, Fukushima Prefecture, and other northeastern Japan areas.[143]

3. *The waters around the Diaoyu Islands had been the traditional fishing ground of Fujian, Zhejiang, and Taiwan, China. Even during the period of Japan's colonial rule of Taiwan, the bonito fishing ground of the Diaoyu Islands was under the jurisdiction of Taiwan.*

After Japan brought Taiwan under its colonial rule through the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, at first it put the Diaoyu Islands under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture. However, the waters around the Diaoyu Islands had been the traditional fishing ground of Taiwan residents, the cost was too high to go fishing from Naha, Okinawa, which was more than 400 km away, the fishing boats of the Yaeyama Islands and the Miyako Islands were small, and it was dangerous to cross the Black Water Trench for fishing purposes. It is because of all this that after 1915, the waters around the Diaoyu Islands once again became the fishing ground of Taiwan and that was gradually recognized by the Japanese ruling authorities in Taiwan.

Proof 1 It is around 1910 that Taiwan fishermen used fishing boats driven by fuels to go fishing in the waters around the Diaoyu Islands, but that doesn't mean Taiwan fishermen had not gone fishing there before. In comparison, fishermen from the Yaeyama Islands had to cross the swift Black Water Trench to go fishing around the Diaoyu Islands, but Taiwan fishermen could go fishing there conveniently and smoothly via Pengjia Islet. In ancient times, when sailboats were used, the waters around the Diaoyu Islands were first developed as fishing ground by people from Taiwan, Fujian, and Zhejiang. According to researchers from the Institute of Regional Studies of Okinawa University, in fact no detailed information has been found about Okinawa bonito boats fishing around the Diaoyu Islands. According to *Ryukyu Shimpo* and other sources, from 1905 through 1920, there were only one to four Okinawa bonito boats fishing around the Diaoyu Islands every year. There were no such exaggerated facts as it was stated in Koga's curriculum vitae submitted in the application for an award that according to plan, there would be 20 bonito boats and 20 reef collecting boats in 1911.[144] Before the Diaoyu Islands were far, back then the people of Okinawa Prefecture didn't want to develop them as their bonito fishing ground, whereas beginning in 1915, Taiwan's bonito boats expanded the fishing ground to close to the Diaoyu Islands and were active there. According to "The Aquatic Products of Taiwan" published in Taiwan's *Riri Xinbao* newspaper in August 1915, the fishermen of Taiwan "use Keelung as their base,

[143]Ibid., p. 122.

[144]The Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) Documents Compilation Committee, *A survey report on the Fisheries in the Waters around the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)*, Jpn. ed., a study financed by Japanese consortiums, August 31, 2010, p. 47.



Fig. 5.33 Map of aquatic products in Taiwan under Japanese rule, Report by the Office of Taiwan Governor-General, 1920

expand their fishing ground northeastward to the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) and the Sakishima Islands."[145]

Proof 2 When Taiwan was just brought under Japanese colonial rule, the Diaoyu Islands were put under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture, but after the ninth year of the Taisho Era (1920), in its report on the aquatic resources of Taiwan's fishing ground, the Taiwan Governor-General Office included Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet in Taiwan's bonito fishing ground. Back then the report "The Aquatic Products of Taiwan" clearly kept Chiwei Islet away from the Yaeyama Islands, proving that the Diaoyu Islands didn't belong to the Yaeyama Islands. In the map of aquatic products in Taiwan that was worked out at that time, Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, and other islands were also part of Taiwan (see Fig. 5.33). In the 13th year of the Showa Era (1938), Nakayama Takuzo wrote *The Bonito Fisheries,* stating that the fishing ground of Taiwan "extends to the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) in the north and to the Fire Island in the south."[146] This

[145]Makom Kuniyoshi, "About the Koga Shop," Okinawa University Territory Institute, *The Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) and Okinawa*, Tokyo: Institute of Regional Studies of Okinawa University, Fuyoshobo, 2013, pp. 118–120.

[146]The Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) Documents Compilation Committee, *A Survey Report on the Fisheries in the Waters around the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)*, Jpn. ed., a study financed by Japanese consortiums, August 31, 2010, p. 53.

leads me to conclude that from 1920 through 1945 the fishing ground of the Diaoyu Islands remained under the jurisdiction of Taiwan.

The report "The Aquatic Products of Taiwan" prepared by the Breeding Bureau of the Office of Taiwan Governor-General also discussed the fishing ground of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands), stating that, "These islands are a joint term for Uotsuri Island, Huangwei Islet, Chiwei Islet, Nanxiao Island, Beixiao Island and other islands…. These are one of the most important fishing grounds for Taiwan, a big bonito-producer" (see Fig. 5.34).

According to the report "The Aquatic Products of Taiwan" in 1923, "The fishing grounds off the coast of Miyako Island, the Yaeyama Islands and Chiwei Islet and 150 nautical miles off northeastern Pengjia Island" were under the charge of the Office of Taiwan Governor-General. In the 11th year of the Taisho Era (1922), one of the achievements in fisheries was that "excluding the seas from close to Chiwei Islet and the Hateruma Island of the Yaeyama Islands to the waters around Iriomote



Fig. 5.34 Map of bonito fishing grounds, Report by the Office of Taiwan Governor-General, December 1920

Island, south and north of Tarama Island, and close to Yaesu of the Miyako Islands, the seas 50 nautical miles north of the Penghu Islands are confirmed as the bonito fishing ground."[147] According to the "Survey Report on the Offshore Waters of Taiwan" compiled by the Breeding Bureau of the Office of Taiwan Governor-General in 1924, the main fishing grounds often included Uotsuri Island (Diaoyu Island), Mekura Island, Yonaguni Island, Pengjia Islet, and the coastal waters of Suao. In these seas, 45 boats from Keelung, Taiwan, and Suao worked to catch sailfish every year, and another 18 boats from the same regions tried to catch bonitoes.[148] These add up to 63, about 16 times more than the number of Okinawa fishing boats in the waters around the Diaoyu Islands.

It is worth noting that because Japan's seizure of China's Diaoyu Islands during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 was illegal, the possession of these islands by any Japanese individuals, organizations, and local governments or the Japanese central government was illegal. Following World War II, as Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Declaration, and the Treaty of Shimonoseki was abolished, all the rights to the Diaoyu Islands the Japanese government gave to its citizens and nongovernment organizations became invalid. Therefore, there is no legality in the Japanese government's purchasing these islands from private hands; otherwise, it is tantamount to that a thief can legally possess what he stole if he gets it back from another person.

Proof 3 According to the testimony of Mitsuko Shimizu, daughter of Ryozo Fukuda, the highest Naval Commander in Taiwan during Japan's colonial rule of the region, back then the Diaoyu Islands belonged to the prefecture of Taiwan, not Okinawa Prefecture (see Fig. 5.35).

Mitsuko Shimizu, daughter of Vice Admiral Ryozo Fukuda, the highest General and Commander of the China Area Fleet, made a testimony in September 2014, stating, "My father told me, 'The Diaoyu Islands were within the defense line of the prefecture of Taiwan and were the fishing ground of Taiwan fishermen.'" She pointed out, "Oceanographically (From the perspective of the seafloor relief), they do not belong to Okinawa Prefecture, but to the prefecture of Taiwan…. Back then members of the navy believed that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) belonged to the prefecture of Taiwan; none of them believed they belonged to Okinawa Prefecture."[149]

This was posted by Muto Yasuhiro, a native of Chiba Prefecture, Japan, on his blog. He stressed, "This is a vital testimony. The prefecture of Taiwan is not the territory of Japan which was defeated in the war and accepted the Potsdam Declaration, so the claim of the Japanese government, including its Ministry of

[147]The Office of Taiwan Governor-General, "The Aquatic Products of Taiwan," II, 1920.

[148]The Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) Documents Compilation Committee, *A Survey Report on the Fisheries in the Waters around the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)*, Jpn. ed., a study financed by Japanese consortiums, August 31, 2010, pp. 52–53.

[149]Yasuhiro Takeda, Shirakaba Education Center http://blog.goo.ne.jp/shirakabatakesen/e/a7800e37d88d9afe7d05566c2e9dc74d.

Fig. 5.35 Mitsuko Shimizu relates to history, Shirakaba Education Center, September 10, 2014

Foreign Affairs, that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) belong to Okinawa Prefecture and are Japanese territory is an obvious lie. I am Japanese too, but I don't think we should expand our territory by telling lies. We should not be hostile to China; we need friendship with it."[150]

In fact, as early as back to June 1971, Ryozo Fukuda said openly that when he was a garrison officer in Taiwan, the Diaoyu Islands were under his jurisdiction.[151]

Proof 4 From the end of World War II to 1969 when oil reserves were found in the waters around the Diaoyu Islands, Taiwan fishermen still had free access to these waters for fishing purposes. According to Japanese records, in July 1968 about 20 fishing boats and 75 fishermen from Taiwan were based on Nanxiao Island and Beixiao Island and were engaged in fisheries in the waters around the Diaoyu Islands. These included the *Jinjilong 136,* the *Jinxinglong 7*, the *Xinxingfu*, the *Jintaicai*, the *Qintaifu*, and the *Jinjilong 22* from Suao, Yilan[152] (see Fig. 5.36). However, after oil was discovered, they were driven away by the Ryukyu government.

[150]Ibid.

[151]Zhou Zhonghai, *A Collection of Papers on International Law of the Sea, Chin. ed., Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press,* 2012, p. 542.

[152]The Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) Documents and Data Compilation Committee, *A Collection of Data of a High-Level Explorative Team on the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)*, II, Jpn. ed., Daiichi Printing Co., Ltd., October 14, 2007, p. 286.

Fig. 5.36 Taiwan fishing boat the *Jintaicai* operates in the waters around Beixiao Island, an Island Affiliated with Diaoyu Island

Earlier, Taiwan fishermen often landed on the islands to catch birds and collect bird eggs. They occasionally ran into Ryukyu people and enjoyed friendship.[153] Up till July 1970 when people of Taiwan wanted to travel to the Diaoyu Islands to dismantle ships that had run aground, they only had to apply for approval to land on the islands without having to secure the approval of the Ryukyu authorities first.

For example, in June 1968 with the approval of the Taiwan authorities 14 workers from Taiwan including Zhuang Tian-sheng, Liu Dong-lai, and Wang Chun-hsiao worked on the north beach of Huangwei Islet to dismantle a ship that ran aground there and built two temporary cabins[154] (see Fig. 5.37).

At the same time, people from Taiwan were also dismantling a Panama cargo ship that ran aground off Nanxiao Island. In response, the Ryukyu government telephoned the US embassy in Taipei, allowing three ships and 78 people from Taiwan to work there till October 31, 1968.[155] Back then, the Ryukyu government was not yet under the Japanese central government and didn't raise any objections to the Taiwan authorities approving the application of the people of Taiwan to land

[153]Ibid., pp. 311–312.

[154]Ibid., p. 260.

[155]Ryukyu Government Exit and Entry Administration, "Permit for People and Ships That Are Dismantling a Sunken Ship Close to Nanxiao Island of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) in Ishigaki in the Yaeyama Islands to Enter the Ryukyu Islands," August 30, 1968.

Fig. 5.37 People of Taiwan who dismantle a stranded ship that ran aground off Huangwei Islet and their cabins, 1968

on the island and work; that means tacit agreement. This is because after the US Armed Forces make Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet firing/bombing ranges in 1955, fishermen of Okinawa Prefecture stopped going fishing in the waters around the Diaoyu Islands. These waters were Taiwan's fishing ground under the control of the US Armed Forces, but China, not the USA, had sovereignty over these waters. It wasn't until July 9, 1970, that the Ryukyu government's Exit and Entry Administration erected illegal warning signs on the Diaoyu Islands and sent people to expel those from Taiwan operating on the islands. However, the Japanese still didn't know the names of these islands. They even wrote 赤尾屿, the Chinese name for Chiwei Islet, as 赤尾岐 and named several islands Taisho Island.[156]

Proof 5 So far the waters around the Diaoyu Islands have never become the important fishing ground of the Ryukyu Kingdom or Okinawa Prefecture. In the summer of 2012, Yoshitaka Nakayama, mayor of Ishigaki in Okinawa Prefecture, expressed this view during an interview with the *Seiron*, a right-wing publication under Japan's *Sankei Shimbun*.

[156]Results of the survey commissioned by the Japanese cabinet, "Report on the Commissioned Survey of the Data about the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)," Jpn. ed., March 2016.



四十四年に現地に慰霊碑を建立し慰霊祭を行いましたが、それ以来、尖閣諸島での慰霊祭は行われていません。その『慰霊祭』を開催するための上陸です。私は三点のどれをとっても上陸を許可するのに十分な理由だと思いますが、残念ながら政府からはいまだに許可が下りないのです。

それとは別に、漁業という経済活動の問題もあります。尖閣周辺は大変豊かな漁場ですが、石垣島の漁民はなかなか漁には向かいません。なぜなら尖閣諸島には簡易な港さえもない状態で、漁に出ても、天候が崩れると石垣島までの百七十キロを手ぶらで帰ってくるしかないからです。燃料高騰の折、赤字覚悟で漁に出るにはリスクが大きすぎます。先の中国漁船事件以降、一部補助金が出ていますが根本的には何も変わってはいません。尖閣諸島の実効支配のためには漁業という経済活動を行うことも有効なはずですが、現状では厳しいです。

――案の定、石原知事の尖閣諸島購入計画に、中国が反発してきました。

中山　尖閣諸島は日本固有の領土であり、その土地を個人から都や国、自治体などの公的機関が購入することに対し文句を言われる筋合いはないと考えています。

石垣市では来年三月に新空港が開港しますが国際線も誘致していて上海や香港へもオファーしています。これ

Fig. 5.38 Yoshitaka Nakayama's interview, the *Seiron* Monthly, Japan, 2012, No. 7

He stated that he was broadly in favor of and would fully cooperate with Shintaro Ishihara's Tokyodo's initiative to purchase the islands. However, when talking about the prospect of the fishermen of Ishigaki Island going fishing off the Diaoyu Islands, he said he could not do anything about the problem. What he said can serve as firsthand evidence: "There are very good fishing grounds around Senkaku Island (Diaoyu Island), but the fishermen of Ishigaki Island simply don't want to go fishing there. Why? Because the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) don't even have simple ports. If they go there for fish, they will have to return empty-handed to Ishigaki Island 170 km away if the weather goes bad. When fuel costs more, they will have to make a loss, so going fishing there is very risky. Following the incident involving Chinese fishing boats, subsidies are given to Okinawa fishermen, but that doesn't make any difference. To exercise effective rule over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands), it is of course useful to promote fisheries and other economic activities there, but the current situation is grim"[157] (see Fig. 5.38). It must be even more so in ancient times.

To sum up, either in terms of geographical and geological structure, cultural and historical identity, international law basis, or historical and present fishery

[157]Yoshitaka Nakayama, "Cooperating with Shintaro Ishihara's Initiative in Defense of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)," Jpn. ed., the *Seiron*, Japan, 2012, no. 7.

development, the Diaoyu Islands are inherent Chinese territory affiliated with Taiwan; they didn't belong to the ancient Ryukyu Kingdom and are not part of today's Okinawa Prefecture in Japan. Even when Japan exercised colonial rule in Taiwan, the natural character of the Diaoyu Islands and their natural link with Taiwan didn't and couldn't change.

4. *The above four chapters can adequately prove that before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, the Japanese Ministry of Navy and Ministry of Foreign Affairs understood and recognized the Diaoyu Islands were Chinese territory.*

As early as back to the sixteenth century, there emerged the equitable estoppel principle which holds people accountable for their words and stops them going back on and negating what they said by making contradictory statements. In 1933 in the case of Eastern Greenland Island, the principle was used to solve territorial sovereignty issues for the first time and has now become a recognized international law principle. Japan's words run counter to the fact it recognized the Diaoyu Islands as northeastern islands of Taiwan, China, before the critical date of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, so Japan has violated the equitable estoppel and its claims on the Diaoyu Islands are illegal and invalid.

This is a thick book about complicated issues. I hereby, in the form of a table, list for the reference of readers the evidence, international law principles, and documents about Japan's recognition of the Diaoyu Islands as Chinese territory before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 (see Table 5.1).

The above text including the table clearly shows the basis on which the Japanese government recognized the Diaoyu Islands as part of China before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, how it had come to that conclusion, and how Japan stole those islands during the war. On the basis of this, I have come to the conclusions as follows:

(1) Large numbers of Chinese documents prove that the Diaoyu Islands became part of Fujian Province, China, in the Ming Dynasty at the latest and were put under the jurisdiction of the prefecture of Taiwan.
(2) From 1845, when the British Navy conducted an on-the-spot survey of the Diaoyu Islands to 1894, Britain marked the Diaoyu Islands as the northeastern islands of Taiwan, China, named Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet in their respective southern Fujian dialect pronunciations, and took Chiwei Islet as the easternmost island of the Diaoyu Islands.
(3) Japanese maps had long marked the Diaoyu Islands as part of China. From 1873 to 1875 when the Japanese Navy had just been founded, it produced relevant documents and maps based on the documents and maps of China and the British Navy, marking the Diaoyu Islands as part of Taiwan, China, but not as belonging to Ryukyu or *terra nullius* with the confirmation of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
(4) The map of the Coastal Provinces of the Qing Dynasty produced by the Japanese Navy's Waterways Department in 1875 was approved by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Later on, it was also confirmed by the Japanese

Table 5.1 Evidence, international law principles, and documents about Japan's recognition of the Diaoyu Islands as Chinese territory before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895

Japanese documents and maps	Documents and maps of the British Navy	Chinese documents and maps	Relevant international law and documents
Yamada Ren, The Earth and the Universe: Asia and North America, 1810	*Voyage of H.M.S. Samarang, during the Years 1843–46*, 1848	Huang Shujing, *Record of Taiwan* based on his visit to Taiwan, 1772	Critical date
Japanese Ministry of Navy, *The Taiwan Sea Directory* based on the documents of the British Navy, 1873	Maps, *Voyage of H.M. S. Samarang, during the Years 1843–46*, 1848		Equitable estoppel principle
Japanese Ministry of Navy, *Southern Islands Sea Directory,* 1874	Great Britain, Coast of China between Formosa Island and Pi-Chi-Li Gulf, 1867		Cairo Declaration, 1943
Japanese Navy's Waterways Department, hand-map color Map of Coastal Provinces of the Qing Dynasty, 1875	Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, *The China Sea Directory* and maps, 1873	Map of the Qing Dynasty, 1863	Potsdam Declaration, 1945
Japanese Ministry of Navy, *Japan Sea Directory,* 1886		*Illustrated Sea Directory*, a translation of the British English version, 1870	Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué, 1972
Japanese Ministry of Navy, *The China Sea Directory,* 1892	British Navy, *The China Sea Directory*, 1884	Chen Shouqi, et al., *Re-edited Annals of Fujian*, 1871	Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 1978
Complete Map of Okinawa Prefecture: The Ryukyu Kingdom, 1894	Revised *The China Sea Directory,* 1894	*The China Sea Directory: A New Translation*, 1901	

Credit Chinese, Japanese, and British documents relating to this book

Army's Measurement Bureau which had monopolized the publishing of maps in Japan since 1883. As a result, consensus was formed that the Japanese government recognized the Diaoyu Islands as part of China before the critical date.

(5) In January 1895, the Japanese government secretly decided to seize China's uninhabited islands—Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet, and the decision wasn't made public.

(6) Following the Japanese government's occupation of Taiwan and the islands affiliated with it, in 1896 the Japanese government leased and later sold Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, Nanxiao Island, and Beixiao Island to Japanese citizens

for colonial development. Japan didn't occupy Chiwei Islet and register it as state-owned land until 1921 during its colonial rule of Taiwan.

(7) In August 1945, Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Declaration and surrendered, so it should obey international law in returning to China the Diaoyu Islands and other islands affiliated with Taiwan it had stolen from China.

(8) Following World War II, the USA occupied the Diaoyu Islands. In 1971, when it transferred the administrative jurisdiction over these islands, it stated that it didn't take a position regarding the sovereignty over the islands. This led China and Japan to dispute over the ownership of and jurisdiction over the Diaoyu Islands following the war.

It is a disputable fact that China has the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. Today, the dispute between China and Japan over the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands is a political, legal, and diplomatic issue and reflects their attitude toward history. In the 1970s, the two governments and their leaders reached a political understanding of, or temporary consensus over, shelving the dispute from the political and diplomatic angle. Regrettably, even today in the twenty-first century, the Japanese government still sticks to the obsolete territorial opinions and the wrong historical attitude it developed toward the Diaoyu Islands during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and its colonial rule over Taiwan. The Japanese government has not honestly fulfilled the relevant international law regulations such as the Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Declaration. It has not admitted that there exists issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved between China and Japan and that the two countries have reached consensus on shelving the dispute. It has even once again increased military spending to the disadvantage of China, misled the public in Japan, and attempted to use US political, diplomatic, and military support to restore the rule over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) Japan had following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. Most of the Japanese people are now kept in the dark. This is exactly a big barrier to improving China–Japan relations and the feelings between the two peoples, a barrier that must be gradually removed.

Chapter 6
An Interpretation and Refutation of the Japanese Government's Erroneous Views on the Diaoyu Islands

Since the Japanese government announced it would purchase the Diaoyu Islands on September 10, 2012, it has obviously stepped up its propaganda on the Diaoyu Islands issue. A systematic reflection of the Japanese government's views on these islands can be found in the question–answer section in 11 languages (simplified and traditional Chinese, Japanese, English, French, German, Korean, Arabic, Russian, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish) on the Web sites of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese embassy in China.[1] The post consists of 16 questions and 16 answers, and each question and answer is comprised of several questions and answers which repeat the same thing time and time again.

The post focuses on Japan's one-sided interpretation of the Diaoyu Islands issue. Overall, the post is void of content, and its basic views are rather arbitrary without the support of facts, deviate from facts and are quite overlapping. In order to help readers acquire a better understanding of the crux of the matter concerning the Diaoyu Islands issue, in this Chap. 1 will, on the basis of the facts and legal principles discussed in this book, interpret and refute the wrong views the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has expressed on this issue.

6.1 The International Law Basis that Japan Must Return the Diaoyu Islands to China After World War II

The allegation by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) are Japan's inherent territory is utterly baseless in terms of facts and legality. Even in the common sense of Japanese people, Okinawa Prefecture cannot be regarded as Japan's inherent territory. The Diaoyu Islands had never been part of the Ryukyu Kingdom (today's Okinawa Prefecture), so they are not Japan's inherent territory for whatever reason.

[1] http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

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J. Liu, *The Diaoyu Islands*, China Academic Library,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-8699-2_6

1. *According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) are Japan's inherent territory, not part of Taiwan that was ceded in accordance with Treaty of Shimonoseki and "there isn't a territorial issue to be resolved between China and Japan."*[2]

Comments: Even Okinawa Prefecture isn't Japan's inherent territory. Before 1879, Japan's Okinawa Prefecture was the 500-year-old Ryukyu Kingdom. Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet belong to China, but not to the ancient Ryukyu Kingdom (the predecessor of Okinawa Prefecture). Diaoyu Island was seized in secret by the Japanese Meiji government during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and put under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture. After that, it was under Japan's colonial rule for 50 years along with Taiwan following the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. According to the Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Declaration, the Chinese territory stolen by Japan before the Treaty of Shimonoseki must also be reverted to China.

The logical starting point of the dispute between China and Japan concerning the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands started in 1894 when Japan waged the war against China. As I said earlier, according to the Cairo Declaration, all the Chinese territory that was stolen by Japan must be reverted to China. This declaration didn't specify the Treaty of Shimonoseki as the time of demarcation. According to the declaration, even the Chinese territory stolen by Japan before that treaty was signed must be reverted to China. According to Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration, the Japanese government must faithfully implement the Cairo Declaration, had no right to distort the declaration, and nor did it have the right to use the Treaty of Shimonoseki as the line of demarcation to remove the Chinese territory seized before the treaty was signed from the list of territory that must be returned to China. The relevant view and subject the Japanese directly violate the Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Declaration and don't have any legal basis.

Let me discuss the matter from another point of view. If the Diaoyu Islands were not included in the islands affiliated with Taiwan as specified in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, this not only fails to prove that the Diaoyu Islands are Japanese territory but also costs Japan of the legal basis of its possession of all the rights to the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) during 1895 and 1945. The unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki had been abolished with Japan's surrender, but after all, Japan exercised 50 years of colonial rule of Taiwan and its affiliated islands—the Diaoyu Islands and the Penghu Islands—on the strength of that treaty from 1895 to 1945. If the Diaoyu Islands weren't covered in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, they would not be included in Taiwan which was under Japanese colonial rule. In that case, Japan will have to produce adequate domestic and international law evidence of its legitimate occupation of the Diaoyu Islands in 1895; otherwise, that would mean that its occupation of these islands was illegal and Japan's claim of sovereignty over them or exercise of the so-called administration of them is baseless and illegal.

[2]Ibid.

As I said earlier, even if the matter is approached from Japan's domestic law, the Japanese occupation of the Diaoyu Islands is invalid. Never before had a country seized new territory merely by a secret decision of a cabinet meeting. Compared with the Ogasawara Islands and the Daito Islands Japan acquired at the same time as the Diaoyu Islands, Japan's acquisition of the Diaoyu Islands was clearly an under-the-counter, shameful, and illegal act of stealing others' territory. Decree 13 was issued by the Japanese on March 7, 1896, and became effective on April 1; it only specified Yaeyama District as Japanese territory, but not the Diaoyu Islands or the so-called Senkaku Islands. The decree also stated that it was up to the Interior Minister to decide whether the scope and names of islands should be changed. Therefore, the governor of Okinawa had no right to interpret that the Yaeyama District included the Diaoyu Islands. When it comes to territorial issues, no civil acts have legal efficacy. From the objective perspective of China, the establishment of all kinds of illegal markers by Japan's right-wing groups on the Diaoyu Islands is only an illegal invasion of China's uninhabited islands by Japanese individuals and their extreme act to aggravate the dispute over these islands.

2. *According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "There is no doubt that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) are clearly an inherent territory of Japan, in light of historical facts and based upon international law. Indeed, the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) are under the valid control of Japan. There exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved concerning the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands). This time the Government of Japan is to acquire the ownership of the three islands of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) (Diaoyu Island, Nanxiao Island and Beixiao Island), but it does not at all mean to give rise to any problem with another country or region."*[3]

Comments: With large quantities of evidence, this book has proved that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) Japan refers to, that is, the Diaoyu Islands of China, can never be Japan's inherent territory.

The above statement of Japan is totally groundless; it is merely a repetition of the wrong view the Eisaku Sato cabinet expressed over 40 years ago. The Okinawa Prefecture Japan established forcibly in 1879 was formerly the 500-year-old Ryukyu Kingdom, but not the inherent territory of Japan. In Japan Okinawa Prefecture as the country's inherent territory is something never heard of. The Satsuma han of Japan invaded Ryukyu in 1609, forcing the Ryukyu King to succumb to Japan's Tokugawa Shogunate, but as Ryukyu enjoyed the support of the powerful Ming China, Japan didn't annex the Ryukyu Kingdom. Following the Opium War in 1840, China experienced a fall. Not only was it unable to protect its vassals but it was also reduced to a semicolony itself.

Following the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Japan began to seek expansion in its Asia neighbors, with the Ryukyu Kingdom becoming its first target. The kingdom was renamed the Ryukyu han by Japan in 1872. Later on, Japan renamed the

[3] http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

Ryukyu han Okinawa Prefecture in 1879. Till today if the Japanese from Japan's territories other than Okinawa Prefecture call the prefecture Japan's inherent territory, it is tantamount to wiping out the history of the Ryukyu Kingdom with a history of more than 500 years, which will naturally be met with opposition from the Ryukyu people. The Diaoyu Islands are China's inherent territory; they never belonged to the ancient Ryukyu Kingdom.

In fact, the history of Japan's colonial rule of Taiwan and its affiliated islands—the Diaoyu Islands—following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 came to an end in 1945 when Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration. Following World War II, the USA occupied the Ryukyu Islands for 27 years alone, during which Japan didn't have the administration of these islands, let alone sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. The Japanese government cannot find the fact and legal basis for its claim that it consistently enjoyed the sovereignty over and the administration of the Diaoyu Islands in the 77 years from 1895 to 1972.

Japan's official claim of the sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) started at the earliest with the views expressed by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on March 8, 1972. However, even the USA has not yet recognized Japan's sovereignty over those islands so far. After the USA transferred the administration of the Diaoyu Islands to Japan without authorization in 1972, it led to the dispute between China and Japan over the administration of the Diaoyu Islands when both claimed sovereignty over these islands. Realizing it was difficult to resolve the dispute over sovereignty, the two sides agreed to shelve the dispute. From then to 2010, Japanese Coast Guard vessels have kept intruding into the waters around the Diaoyu Islands, but they have not landed on the islands for administration purposes. Japanese right-wingers were stopped by Japanese police from landing on the Diaoyu Islands. The so-called Japan's "valid control" of the Diaoyu Islands is partly designed to keep Japanese right-wingers from landing on the islands in order not to invite vehement protests and make Japanese–Chinese relations deteriorate.

During talks for normalizing China–Japan relations in 1972, the Chinese government was in favor of shelving the dispute, but it never gave up its principled position and never recognized and accepted the so-called Japan's "valid control" of the waters around the Diaoyu Islands. On the contrary, the Chinese government was persistently opposed to Japan's unilateral action at the Diaoyu Islands. Soon after the ship collision in 2010 in the waters around the Diaoyu Islands, the Yoshihiko Noda cabinet announced in September 2010 the Japanese government would purchase the Diaoyu Islands to nationalize them, thus putting an end to the two governments' consensus on shelving the dispute and the state that the dispute was shelved. Following this announcement, China's Coast Guard vessels began to make routine patrols of the waters around the Diaoyu Islands. This further proves that there is no such fact that Japan effectively controls these islands.

One of the bases that the Japanese stresses that "there exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved concerning the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)" is that Japan "has valid and effective control over the islands." However, the Chinese simply view this as a rampant attitude of touting strength in lieu of reason and

legality in seizing another country's territory. The militarist logic in the imperialist period that "valid control" over a territory means ownership of that territory. In addition, the reality now shows that there is absolutely no such fact that Japan has "valid control" of the Diaoyu Islands. This means the above statement of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is sheer cheating.

6.2 The Diaoyu Islands Are not Part of Japan's Southwest Islands

1. *According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) have historically and consistently been part of the Nansei Shoto Islands which have been part of the territory of Japan. From 1885, surveys of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) had been thoroughly conducted by the Government of Japan through the agencies of Okinawa Prefecture and through other means. Through these surveys, it was confirmed that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) had been not only uninhabited but also showed no trace of having been under the control of the Qing Dynasty of China. Based on this confirmation, the Government of Japan made a Cabinet Decision on January 14, 1895, to erect markers on the islands to formally incorporate the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) into the territory of Japan. These measures were carried out in accordance with the internationally accepted means of duly acquiring territorial sovereignty under international law (occupation of terra nullius). The Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) are not part of Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores Islands (Penghu Islands) that were ceded to Japan from the Qing Dynasty in accordance with Article II of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, concluded in April 1895."*[4]

Comments: Japan's so-called Nansei Shoto Islands were under the rule of the Ryukyu Kingdom before the 1870s. They neither were Japan's inherent territory nor included the Diaoyu Islands.

The Hirobumi Ito cabinet's theft of China's Diaoyu Islands would not be covered forever. In July 1894, Japan launched the Sino-Japanese War to invade the Korean Peninsula and China's Liaodong Peninsula. As I said earlier, on January 14, 1895, when Japan was set to win the Sino-Japanese War, it could not wait to draft a cabinet decision and had the main members of the cabinet sign the decision by January 21, and secretly decided to erect markers on China's uninhabited islands Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet (known as Uotsuri Island and Kuba Island in Japan, respectively) and put them under the administration of Okinawa Prefecture. However, this decision didn't include Chiwei Islet, Nanxiao Island, Beixiao Island, and other islands of the Diaoyu Islands or specify their joint name: the so-called

[4] http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

Senkaku Islands. Japan didn't rename Chiwei Islet Taisho Island and register it as Japan's state-owned land until July 25, 1921. The Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs didn't issue a statement on Japan's sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) until March 8, 1972.

In addition, in terms of international law, Japan's theft of the Diaoyu Islands can hardly be justified by the occupation of *terra nullius*. This is because the islands were not *terra nullius* and that the occupation of *terra nullius* will not be valid until it is publicized for notification. Japan didn't meet either of these two conditions in its occupation of the Diaoyu Islands. In January 1895, the Hirobumi Ito cabinet decided to steal the Diaoyu Islands; that decision wasn't made public for long. The Japanese authorities didn't erect the so-called national markers on the islands in accordance with the decision either. Either the content of the decision or the way the Diaoyu Islands was stolen shows that the decision cannot serve as evidence of Japan's sovereignty over these islands.

Japan's theft of the Diaoyu Islands on the strength of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 was a continuation of Japan's external aggression and expansion following its annexation of the Ryukyu Kingdom in 1879. The historical materials in volumes 18 and 23 of *The Diplomatic Documents of Japan* prove that from 1885 through 1895, the Japanese government conducted only one secret on-the-spot survey of the Diaoyu Islands through the good office of Okinawa Prefecture; there is so such a thing that, as the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs alleged, Japan "conducted on-the-spot surveys of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) on several occasions." Following Okinawa Prefecture's secret survey of the Diaoyu Islands, it was further confirmed that these islands had already been named Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet and served as navigation marks. The conclusion drawn by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was that Japan should erect national markers on Diaoyu Island and other uninhabited islands and hold talks with the government of China's Qing Dynasty, though the timing for the talks was unfavorable for Japan. Therefore, the Meiji Government had to temporarily give up its occupation of these islands and began to step up its war preparation against China instead.

In 1892, Japan completed its Five-Year Arms Expansion Plan. In 1894, the Hirobumi Ito cabinet sent troops to Korea on the excuse of helping the Korean government suppress the Donghak Rebellion. In July of the same year, it attacked China's ships transporting troops to Korea and waged the sea battle of 1894 against China. The Japanese Navy won the war and the Japanese Army invaded the Liaodong Peninsula. After that, Hirobumi Ito decided to occupy the Diaoyu Islands before taking Taiwan. Back then, he didn't hold the so-called cabinet meeting but had members of the cabinet secretly complete the signing of the document dated January 14 by January 21, 1895. According to the document, Japan would incorporate Huangwei Islet and Diaoyu Island into Okinawa Prefecture. Originally Japan deemed it necessary to negotiate its intention to seize the Diaoyu Islands, but it stole the islands in this way during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895.

In the secret decision made by the Hirobumi Ito cabinet in January 1895, the Diaoyu Islands were referred to as uninhabited islands, but not as *terra nullius*.

This shows that the cabinet didn't think the islands were *terra nullius*. Back then Japan didn't make public its decision to occupy Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet, nor did it inform China of its decision. Japan simply made use of the war to forcibly seize them in secret. Three months later on April 17, 1895, Japan forced the Qing Government to sign the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki under which China ceded to Japan the whole of Taiwan Island and its affiliated islands. The Diaoyu Islands were affiliated with Taiwan. By 1945 when Japan surrendered in the war, together with Taiwan, the Diaoyu Islands had been under Japanese rule for 50 years.

Following World War II, the Japanese government promised to observe the Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Declaration, so it must return to China all the territory it seized from the Qing Government, and this territory undoubtedly included the Diaoyu Islands, affiliated islands of Taiwan. From the end of World War II to 1969 when oil reserves were discovered in the region, Japan neither erected markers on the Diaoyu Islands nor made a sovereignty claim on them. Today, Japan calls its occupation of the Diaoyu Islands three months ahead of the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki "legal occupation." This fully shows that it doesn't want to remorse its history of aggression and expansion during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 at all and tries to prove that it is "legitimate" to steal another country's territory during the war of aggression. This sophistry is extremely dangerous.

2. *According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "A resident of Okinawa Prefecture who had been engaging in activities such as fishery around the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) since around 1884 made an application for the lease of the islands, and approval was granted by the Meiji Government in 1896. After this approval, he sent workers to those islands and ran the following businesses: collecting bird feathers, manufacturing dried bonito, collecting coral, raising cattle, manufacturing canned goods and collecting mineral phosphate guano (bird manure for fuel use). The fact that the Meiji Government gave approval concerning the use of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) to an individual, who in turn was able to openly run these businesses mentioned above based on the approval, demonstrates Japan's valid control over the Islands."*[5]

Comments: The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that a resident of Japan who had engaged in activities on the Diaoyu Islands since around 1884 made an application for the lease of so-called state-owned land. This statement is equivocated and groundless.

In fact, from 1884 to 1896, Japanese residents engaged in fisheries and poached in the waters off China's uninhabited islands, but they weren't publicly recognized by the Japanese government. One of the main reasons is that the Japanese government knew these islands didn't belong to Japan and weren't under the valid

[5]http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

control of Japan. The Japanese government cannot produce the original application for the lease of state-owned land allegedly filed by the Japanese resident in 1884.

From 1896 through 1945, Japan's so-called on-the-spot surveys by the state and Okinawa Prefecture carried out during the Japanese colonial rule of Taiwan. During that period, not only the Diaoyu Islands, but the whole of Taiwan was under the "void control" of Japanese colonialists. Can Japan cite this as evidence that Taiwan was its inherent territory? Surely not.

As I said earlier, it has long been believed in Japan that Tatsushiro Koga engaged in fisheries on the Diaoyu Islands in 1884 and filed the so-called application for the lease of state-owned land in 1885. This is sheer fabrication without any facts as a basis. From September 1885 to January 1895, all the classified Japanese documents about the Diaoyu Islands referred them as uninhabited islands. This is tantamount to admitting that no one resided and developed these islands before 1895. This shows that Tatsushiro Koga was lying when he said that he explored the Diaoyu Islands in 1884 and afterward, he sent workers to collect aquatic products there every year.

It wasn't until June 10, 1895, when the Qing Government was forced to cede Taiwan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki that Koga filed an application to the Japanese Interior Minister for the lease of the Diaoyu Islands. The Japanese government didn't approve the application until after the Japanese military seized control of Taiwan in September 1896. That the Japanese government authorized its resident to develop the Diaoyu Islands following the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki was nothing more than an act of colonial development following its occupation of Taiwan.

According to Tatsushiro Koga's curriculum vitae, "At this time in the 27th and 28th years of the Meiji Era (1894–1895), the war ended. As an outcome of the sweeping victory for Japan, Taiwan Island became part of Japan, and the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) also belonged to our country… I immediately reported to the governor of Okinawa Prefecture about my dream of developing the islands and my application was approved in September of the same year (1896)."[6] This proves that by means of the war Japan changed then territorial *status quo* and the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands and that Koga used this opportunity to rent the Diaoyu Islands for development purposes. The above statement made by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that a resident of Okinawa Prefecture who had been engaging in activities such as fishery around the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) since around 1884 made an application for the lease of the islands is a sheer lie.

Obviously, Tatsushiro Koga securing the Japanese government's authorization to rent and develop the Diaoyu Islands in 1896 was nothing more than an act of colonial development during Japan's colonial rule of Taiwan. Back then, the whole of Taiwan and all its affiliated islands were under the control of Japan, but all this

[6]The application Tatsushiro Koga filed on June 10 of the 28th years of the Meiji Era to the then Japanese Interior Minister Yasu Nomura for the lease of Diaoyu Island, *Okinawa* quarterly, no. 63.

cannot serve as the international law basis of Japan's sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands.

Following Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration in August 1945, the right to colonial development it secured following its occupation of the Diaoyu Islands by force and greed was made invalid. Today, the Japanese government is seeking to purchase the Diaoyu Islands from the Kuniyuki Kurihara family that has obtained the invented ownership of the islands from the Koga family in order to, as Japan puts it, nationalize the islands. This is tantamount to attempting to restore the colonial rule privileges the Empire of Japan had to the Diaoyu Islands. This is absolutely not acceptable to the Chinese government and people.

3. *According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Intended purposes of maps and compilers of maps vary and the existence of a map in itself does not evidence the assertion of territorial sovereignty. No valid ground under international law has been shown to support that China had established sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) before Japan incorporated them into its territory in 1895."*[7]

Comments: Both maps and official documents, either from the present or the past, or either from China or foreign countries, suffice to prove from the perspective of international law that the Diaoyu Islands are the inherent territory of China. The main bases are as follows:

First, as the historical facts that serve as international law bases, the coastal defense maps of the Ming and Qing dynasties of China, the reports by China's envoys for appointing Ryukyu Kings on their work, and other ancient documents fully prove that the Diaoyu Islands are the inherent territory of China. For details, please see Chap. 2 above.

Second, from the on-the-spot survey report prepared by British battleship H.M.S. *Samarang* in 1845 to the maps and relevant documents printed by the Japanese Navy's Waterways Department in 1894, relevant maps and documents marked the Diaoyu Islands as Taiwan's northeastern islands and Chiwei Islet as the easternmost of Taiwan's northeast island chain.

Third, the authoritative document of the Ryukyu Kingdom can prove that China was the first to discover and use the Diaoyu Islands. In 1708 Ryukyu authoritative scholar Tei Junsoku wrote *A Grand Maritime Guide*, clearly stating that the Chinese were the first to discover, and use the Diaoyu Islands and the waterways to and from these islands were taught to the Ryukyu people by Ming emigrants from Fujian to Ryukyu with 36 surnames and the helmsmen of the Qing investiture ships to Ryukyu. Ten of these waterways originate in the Fujian emigrants' maritime route manual produced in the 25th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Hongwu (1392) and four were confirmed by Zheng He when he was ordered to make voyages to eastern and western oceans in the first year of the reign of Ming Emperor Yongle (1403). These waterways were taught to other Chinese and the

[7] http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

Ryukyu people and became the essential channels through which Ryukyu boatmen sailed across the sea to China for tributary purposes. Neither Ryukyu documents nor maps included the Diaoyu Islands as their territory; Ryukyu had only 36 islands. There were no so-called *terra nullius* between China and Ryukyu.

Fourth, from 1873 through 1894, the Map of the Coastal Provinces of the Qing Dynasty, *The Taiwan Sea Directory* and *The Shina Sea Directory*, produced by the Japanese Navy, all marked the Diaoyu Islands as the northeastern islands of Taiwan, China. The Japanese Meiji government's report on its secret survey of the Diaoyu Islands in 1885 not only proves that these islands were the Qing Dynasty's islands close to Taiwan but also indicates that the Japanese government knew that the islands had long been named by the Chinese and served as navigation marks for China's investiture ships to Ryukyu. Therefore, even if back then these uninhabited islands had no signs of the rule of China's Qing government, Japan must negotiate with China if it wanted to seize the islands.

In short, before 1895 the Diaoyu Islands had been the inherent territory of China, and China had no dispute with any other country over that. From 1895 through 1945, the Diaoyu Islands were at first stolen by Japan and then ceded to Japan as islands affiliated with Taiwan under the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki. In accordance with the Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Declaration which were accepted by Japan in 1945, the Diaoyu Islands must be reverted to China together with Taiwan.

6.3 Japan's Secret Survey in 1885: A Preparatory Step to Steal the Diaoyu Islands

1. *According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Japan had already undertaken preparation, from 1885, even before the Sino-Japanese War, to formally incorporate the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) into the territory of Japan while carefully ascertaining that no state including the Qing Dynasty of China had control over the Islands. Following the Cabinet Decision in January 1895, which was made before the concluding of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the Government of Japan incorporated the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) into Okinawa Prefecture and consistently treated the Islands as part of Okinawa Prefecture, not as an area under the jurisdiction of the Governor-General of Taiwan which was ceded to Japan after the Sino-Japanese War." "Although the Treaty of Shimonoseki does not clearly define the geographical limits of the island of Formosa (Taiwan) and the islands appertaining or belonging to Formosa (Taiwan) ceded to Japan by the Qing Dynasty of China, nothing in the*

negotiation history (or otherwise) supports the interpretation that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) are included in the island of Formosa (Taiwan) and the islands appertaining or belonging to it in Article 2b of the Treaty."[8]

Comments: This statement by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is baseless. It is a pseudo-proposition to suggest letting the Treaty of Shimonoseki decide whether the Diaoyu Islands should be returned to China and a trap that misleads people from their normal way of thinking.

First, as I said earlier, the Japanese version of the Cairo Declaration that the Japanese government promised to honor makes it clear that all the territories Japan seized from the people of the Qing Dynasty, that is, the Qing Government, must be returned to the Republic of China, regardless of the date of signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki.

Second, in 1885, ten years before the Sino-Japanese War, Japan confirmed that the Diaoyu Islands were uninhabited islands. Japan didn't have evidence of these islands as part of Japan. The ancient Ryukyu Kingdom didn't have any oral history as evidence that the islands belonged to Ryukyu. China, however, had named these islands and made them the maritime navigation marks for official ships. In ancient times, it wasn't strange that uninhabited islands didn't have signs of rule by any government, but this should not be taken evidence that Diaoyu Island and other islands were *terra nullius.*

Third, Japan says that beginning in 1885, it made preparations for incorporating these islands into Okinawa Prefecture. In fact, beginning in 1886, Japan implemented a military expansion plan in preparation for war. Without negotiation, Japan seized China's uninhabited islands during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. Due to the coercion of Hirobumi Ito during the negotiations for the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, Li Hongzhang had to agree that China would cede to Japan the whole of Taiwan and all islands affiliated with it. This was a joint term and none of the names of the islands affiliated with Taiwan were specified. From the point of view of the Chinese, Taiwan and all islands affiliated with it naturally included the Diaoyu Islands. If Japan didn't think they included these islands, it should have made that clear. The fact is that Japan didn't announce that the Diaoyu Islands had been incorporated into Okinawa Prefecture before talks for the Treaty of Shimonoseki began. The talks show that there is no basis of the explanation that the Diaoyu Islands were not included in the term "Taiwan and all the islands affiliated with it" in Article 2b of the treaty.

Fourth, it is sheer nonsense when the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that following the Cabinet Decision in January 1895, which was made before the conclusion of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the Government of Japan had incorporated the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) into Okinawa Prefecture. This is because back then Japan didn't have such a thing as the Senkaku Islands. It was Hisashi Kuroiwa who was the first to use the term Senkaku Islands in 1900 when he landed on the islands for explorative purposes. However, this term didn't refer to

[8] http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet; it only referred to Nanxiao Island, Beixiao Island, and other islands affiliated with Diaoyu Island. Later on, the term was expanded to mean the Diaoyu Islands and has been in use until today. Moreover, in the decision passed secretly by the Hirobumi Ito cabinet in January 1895, only Kuba Island (Huangwei Islet) and Uotsuri Island (Diaoyu Island) were mentioned; it didn't say anything about the so-called Senkaku Islands and Chiwei Islet. In fact, Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet were stolen by Japan during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, while Nanxiao Island, Beixiao Island and Chiwei Islet were annexed under the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Today, the Japanese government's so-called nationalization of the islands and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' distortion of the Diaoyu Islands issue cannot change these historical facts.

Fifth, even during Japan's colonial rule of Taiwan, the Diaoyu Islands remained the traditional fishing ground of Taiwan. One proof is that in the report "The Aquatic Products of Taiwan" prepared by the Breeding Bureau of the Japanese Office of Taiwan Governor-General in 1920 and the map of bonito fishing grounds in the report, Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet were included in the bonito fishing grounds of Taiwan while all the Ryukyu islands including Yonaguni Island were all excluded. In addition, except that Diaoyu Island was marked as Uotsuri Island, the Chinese names of Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet were used in both the report and the map of the fishing grounds.

The report "The Aquatic Products of Taiwan" mentioned the Senkaku Islands fishing ground, stating, "The Senkaku Islands are the joint name of Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, Chiwei Islet, Nanxiao Island, Beixiao Island, and other islands… They are also one of the most important oceangoing butterfish fishing grounds for Taiwan."[9]

From 1896 to 1920, the Japanese expanded fishing grounds from the waters off Keelung, Taiwan, to the Diaoyu Islands and gradually formed the bonito fishing ground that reached Chiwei Islet, 200 nautical miles from Keelung. This suffices to prove that during their rule of Taiwan, the Japanese colonial authorities confirmed the Diaoyu Islands as a traditional fishing ground of Taiwan, but not as islands of Ryukyu. It is worth noting that it wasn't until July 1921 that the Japanese government renamed Chiwei Islet Taisho Island and put it under the administration of the Japanese Interior Ministry as state-owned land. Before this Chiwei Islet was a fishing ground of Taiwan, and after this, it wasn't brought under the administration of Okinawa Prefecture or leased to Japanese residents for development purposes.

As I said earlier, at first Japan used the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 to steal Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet, and then it started to rule over Taiwan and all the islands affiliated with it, including the Diaoyu Islands, under the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Thereafter, the Japanese Office of Taiwan Governor-General began to expand the fishing grounds to the waters around the Diaoyu Islands with Keelung, Taiwan, at the center. At the same time, Japan gave Tatsushiro Koga the go-ahead

[9]The Office of Taiwan Governor-General, "The Aquatic Products of Taiwan," II, 1920.

to rent and develop the Diaoyu Islands. All this is an act of colonial development during the Japanese rule of Taiwan. Even if the Treaty of Shimonoseki didn't specify the scope of Taiwan and the islands affiliated with it that had been ceded by the Qing government to Japan, the Japanese government must return to China all the territory it stole from the Qing government under the Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Declaration.

2. *According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Government of Japan has never regarded or treated the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) as part of the island of Taiwan or islands appertaining or belonging to the island of Taiwan, which had been part of the Qing Dynasty of China. Thus, it is evident that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) could never have been part of the cession made under the Treaty of Shimonoseki." Also according to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "it was recognized in the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952 that Japan renounced all right, title and claim to Taiwan, the Pescadores (Penghu Islands) and other islands under Article 2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Against the above background, however, there was absolutely no discussion on territorial sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) in the process of negotiations for the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty. What this means is that it was considered as the rightful premise that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) were the territory of Japan from before that time."*[10]

Comments: This defense of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is sheer a lie and a repetition of the abovementioned pseudo propositions and the trap that misleads to the wrong way of thinking.

As I said earlier, *The Taiwan Sea Directory* compiled and translated by the Japanese Navy's Waterways Department in 1873, *The Nansei Shoto Islands Sea Directory* the department published in 1874, the Map of the Coastal Provinces of the Qing Dynasty produced in 1875, and *The Shina Sea Directory* published in 1890 fully prove that before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, Japan had never viewed the Diaoyu Islands as its territory but as the northeastern islands of Taiwan, China. It is of particular note that the Map of the Coastal Provinces of the Qing Dynasty produced by the Japanese Ministry of the Navy in 1875 marked the islands affiliated with Taiwan as Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet, but not as Uotsuri Island, Kuba Island, and Taisho Island Japan used later. In addition, this map was supplemented and affirmed by the officials from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

As I said earlier, the Japanese version of the Cairo Declaration stipulated that Japan must return to the Republic of China all the territories it had seized from the people of the Qing Dynasty, including those stolen before the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki and those forcibly seized thereafter. Therefore, all Chinese territory, be it stolen by Japan through the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 or the

[10] http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

Treaty of Shimonoseki, must be reverted to China under the Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Declaration.

The so-called Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952 the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs referred to was signed in Taipei on April 28, 1952, but it didn't cover the whole of China or the mainland of China under the administration of the People's Republic. When the government of the People's Republic and the government of Japan signed the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué on September 28, 1972, normalizing bilateral diplomatic relations, the so-called Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952 became invalid automatically and the Japanese government is obliged not to cite it as evidence. In addition, even under the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952, Japan must renounce its rule of the whole of Taiwan and the islands affiliated with it. This treaty didn't specify any island affiliated with Taiwan, but it doesn't mean that Japan had the right to make the Diaoyu Islands it stole from China during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 Japanese territory again.

3. *According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The foreign minister's letter in 1885 does constitute one document of the process up to the incorporation of the islands and it is true that it referred to the attitude of the Qing Dynasty. However, it is impossible to interpret it as the acknowledgement by the Government of Japan that the Qing Dynasty held the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) as its territory. Rather, the document shows how Japan proceeded with the process of incorporation carefully and cautiously on the premise that the Senkakus (Diaoyu Islands) did not belong to Qing Dynasty. The fact that the foreign minister in his letter supported an on-site survey clearly shows that Japan did not consider the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) as the territory of the Qing Dynasty."*[11]

Comments: This is a sheer denial of the facts. Facts are quite the opposite of what the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs says.

First, a secret letter from the then Japanese Foreign Minister Kaoru Inoue to Japanese Interior Minister Aritomo Yamagata is one of the convincing pieces of evidence that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Interior Minister of the alert of the Chinese and urged it not to immediately decide to seize Chinese territory—the Diaoyu Islands.

Second, in his letter, the Foreign Minister proposed secret surveys, which fully shows that back then the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was keenly aware that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to China and didn't dare to rush into action. The Japanese diplomatic archives declassified following World War II provide the following evidence:

According to the letter drafted by Foreign Minister Kaoru Inoue on October 16, 1885, and sent to Interior Minister Aritomo Yamagata on October 21, "The islands (the Diaoyu Islands as there wasn't such a thing as the Senkaku Islands yet) are also close to the Qing Dynasty. Compared with the Daito Islands for which on-the-spot

[11] http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

surveys had just been completed, these islands are small and in particular, the Qing Dynasty has names for them. In addition, recently Qing newspapers have reported about the Japanese government's plan to seize Qing islands in the vicinity of Taiwan. They are suspicious of Japan and have urged time and time again the Qing government to attend to the matter. If we publicly erect national markers or take measures, this will definitely arouse the suspicion of the Qing Dynasty. At present, we should therefore confine our action to on-the-spot surveys and prepare detailed reports on its ports, land, and products that had the potential for development. We cannot erect national markers and start development endeavors until opportunities are present."[12] The full text of the original is available and cannot be denied.

If back then Japan didn't realize that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to China, then why was it worried that publicly erecting markers of Japanese ownership would arouse the suspicion of China? On November 27, 1885, the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs drafted a decision based on the reports from Foreign Minister Kaoru Inoue and Okinawa Governor Shiyazo Nishimura. The decision included a joint proposal by the foreign minister and the interior minister for not erecting national markers. The main content of the decision was issued in two separate documents on December 5.

One was the Secret No. 128 report submitted by Interior Minister Aritomo Yamagata to the Minister of the Left. According to the report, "The results of the surveys of the uninhabited islands dotted between Okinawa Prefecture and Fuzhou of the Qing Dynasty are attached on a separate page. The application of the governor of the prefecture for the erection of national markers necessitates negotiations with the Qing Dynasty, and this should take place only when conditions are ripe for both sides. Observations still have to be made at the moment. I would consult the foreign minister over the matter before issuing an order to the prefecture."

The other was the order jointly signed by Foreign Minister Kaoru Inoue and Interior Minister Aritomo Yamagata in a red front, stating, "We hereby inform you of this in a written report for your information."

This suffices to prove that the conclusion is drawn by Japan before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 was that to erect national markers on the Diaoyu Islands, Japan had to negotiate with China. If these islands were really *terra nullius* or had nothing to do with China, then why did the Japanese government deemed it necessary to negotiate with China?

Ten years later, the reason why the Hirobumi Ito cabinet changed its mind and began to believe that Japan could seize the Diaoyu Islands without negotiations with China is that the Japanese Army won the Sino-Japanese War. In November 1894 when Japanese troops occupied Lüshun, China, they committed a massacre. On December 4 of the same year, the Hirobumi Ito cabinet proposed that the Imperial General Headquarters sent forces to occupy Taiwan. On December 27,

[12]Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Miscellaneous Matters," *Japan's Diplomatic Documents,* Jpn. ed., issued by the Japanese International United Association on December 31, 1950, vol. 18, p. 575.

Japanese Interior Minister Yasushi Nomura wrote a secret letter to Japanese Foreign Minister Munemitsu Mutsu, stating that with regard to the Diaoyu Islands, "the situation has now changed and hopefully this can be reported at a cabinet meeting for reconsideration as it is shown in the appendix." And, the foreign minister agreed. So in January 1895, the Hirobumi Ito cabinet secretly decided to put the Diaoyu Islands under the administration of Okinawa Prefecture during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895.

4. *From 1885, surveys of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) had been thoroughly made by the Government of Japan through the agencies of Okinawa Prefecture and by way of other methods. Through these surveys, it was confirmed that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) had not only been uninhabited but showed no trace of having been under the control of the Qing Dynasty of China. Based on this confirmation, the Government of Japan made a Cabinet Decision on January 14, 1895, to erect markers on the islands to formally incorporate the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) into the territory of Japan. These measures were carried out in accordance with the ways of duly acquiring territorial sovereignty under international law (occupation of terra nullius). In his letter to the foreign minister in 1885, the interior minister said to the effect that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) showed no trace of having been under the control of the Qing Dynasty."*[13]

Comments: This was the understanding of the Japanese Interior Minister Aritomo Yamagata when he issued the secret order that Okinawa Prefecture occupies the Diaoyu Islands. By this, he meant that Japan could erect markers on the islands and occupy them as long as they showed no trace of having been under the control of China.

However, then Okinawa Governor Shiyazo Nishimura and Japanese Foreign Minister Kaoru Inoue both believed that the islands showed no trace of being under control of the Qing Government, but that didn't mean they had nothing to do with China. One piece of evidence is the results of Okinawa Prefecture's first survey of the Diaoyu Islands on September 21, 1885. On September 22, Okinawa Governor Shiyazo Nishimura submitted No. 135 report to Interior Minister Aritomo Yamagata, stating, "These islands have terrains different from those of the Daito Islands (located between this prefecture and the Ogasawara Islands) we reported to you earlier, and they are undoubtedly the Diaoyutai, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet recorded in the *Record of Messages from Chûzan*. If they are, they have already been known to the Chinese ships for appointing Chûzan kings and have

[13] http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

been named to serve as beacons for navigation to Ryukyu. We are not sure if we should erect markers during our survey of these islands as we did on the Daito Islands."[14]

In addition, both the secret letter written by Foreign Minister Kaoru Inoue on October 21, 1885, and the report on the secret on-the-spot surveys prepared by Okinawa Prefecture on November 24, affirmed that the matter should involve negotiations with the Chinese government, so they had to give up the idea of immediately erecting national markers on the Diaoyu Islands. Back then not only did people from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs not land on the Diaoyu Islands to conduct surveys but those sent by Okinawa Prefecture to conduct secret surveys also merely moved around Diaoyu Island without landing on it, and they didn't carry out surveys of Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet. In addition, the joint term "Senkaku Islands" didn't exist at the time, so it is not true when the letter to the foreign monetary stated that "the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) showed no trace of having been under the control of the Qing Dynasty."

However, today the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is reiterating the arrogant and unreasonable proposition that was given up by Aritomo Yamagata in 1885 and using it as the basis of Japan's occupation of the Diaoyu Islands. Isn't this absurd?

5. *According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "key facts concerning Japan's preparations for the territorial incorporation prior to the Sino-Japanese War include: 'According to reports submitted on September 22 and November 5, 1885, by the governor of Okinawa Prefecture to the interior minister, surveys of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) were conducted by Okinawa Prefecture on the order of the Interior Ministry, including an investigation by patrol boat in late October 1885 aboard the Izumo Maru chartered from Nippon Yusen and a report was subsequently submitted to the central government.'"*[15]

Comments: The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stresses the surveys in 1885, but it fails to mention the results of the surveys and insists that the main facts and processes concerning Japan's decision to temporarily give up the idea of occupation were "Japan's preparations for the territorial incorporation." This has twisted the fact.

According to Japanese diplomatic archives, from September 22 to November 5, 1885, based on the two survey reports by Okinawa Prefecture and the survey report by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japanese government confirmed that these uninhabited islands had already been named by China as Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet, so Japan didn't dare to approve Okinawa

[14]Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Miscellaneous Matters," *Japan's Diplomatic Documents,* Jpn. ed., issued by the Japanese International United Association on December 31, 1950, vol. 18, p. 574.

[15]http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

Prefecture's application to erect markers of administration before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895.

By 1885, there had been no such thing as the joint term "Senkaku Islands." Before Japan sent people to conduct secret surveys of the Diaoyu Islands aboard the *Izumo Maru*, the map Japan produced for the surveys marked the island as Diaoyu Island, not Uotsuri Island, now the Japanese name for Diaoyu Island.

The fact is following the oral survey on September 22, 1885, on October 30 Okinawa Prefecture sent Hyougo Ishizawa to conduct on-the-spot surveys of the Diaoyu Islands aboard the *Izumo Maru.* Hyougo Ishizawa and Tsurumatsu Hayashi, captain of the *Izumo Maru,* submitted a survey report to Shokikan Nagayoshi Mori of Okinawa Prefecture, stating that it was found that the water was deep at the shores of the Diaoyu Island, the slopes were steep, there were springs and Chinese wrecked boats on the islands, and the islands might be inhabitable. The *Izumo Maru* surrounded and surveyed Huangwei Islet, and as it was getting late, it failed to survey Chiwei Islet.

On November 5, 1885, based on the survey report by Hyougo Ishizawa, Shokikan of Okinawa Nagayoshi Mori prepared an application in the name of Okinawa Governor Shiyazo Nishimura to be submitted to Interior Minister Aritomo Yamagata titled "No. 384 on-the-Spot Survey Report on Uotsuri Island and Two Other Islands." The report suggested that based on what Japan had done to the Daito Islands, the Japanese moved to Diaoyu Island and Huangwei Islet aboard a ship to erect jurisdiction markers of Okinawa Prefecture.

However, this move of intrusion was not accepted by Governor Shiyazo Nishimura. At that time, Nishimura was in Tokyo. He drafted another report on November 24 and submitted it to the interior minister, stating that "Establishing Japan's markers on the islands does not necessarily have anything to do with the Qing Dynasty. How should we respond if a dispute arises? Your instructions are eagerly expected."[16]

In the ten years before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, the Japanese government didn't have the evidence of Japan's ownership of the Diaoyu Islands and of those islands being *terra nullius*, was aware that they were uninhabited islands of China, and understood only too well that Japan's unauthorized occupation of them would give rise to a dispute with China. That was why Japan didn't seize them immediately. Today, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs says it was a fact that Japan incorporated these islands into Japanese territory, but this not only fails to prove the validity and legitimacy of its seizure of the Diaoyu Islands during the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 but also fails to prove its invalidity and illegitimacy.

6. *According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is true that the Cabinet Decision of 1895 was not made public, but it is understood that so were Cabinet*

[16]Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Miscellaneous Matters," *Japan's Diplomatic Documents,* Jpn. ed., issued by the Japanese International United Association on December 31, 1950, vol. 18, p. 576.

decisions in general at that time. After the aforementioned Cabinet Decision, Japan openly exercised its sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands), including the issuance of permits to petitions for land tenancy and field surveys by the central government and the government of Okinawa Prefecture, making it externally known that Japan had an intention to possess the sovereignty of the islands. Under international law, there is no obligation to notify other countries of a government intention to occupy terra nullius.[17]

Comments: The above statement shows that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs resorts to a disguised replacement of concepts and typical sophistry.

First, it confuses Cabinet decisions, in general, with those on the occupation of *terra nullius* that must be made public.

Second, Japan's open colonial development of the Diaoyu Islands during its colonial rule of Taiwan covers up the unlawfulness of its secret decision. According to the Japanese *International Law Dictionary,* "In order to make occupation effective, the country must make a territorial claim." A territorial claim can be made by, for example, incorporating the territory in question into its maps or issuing notices to other countries.[18] Otherwise, the so-called occupation is invalid.

As I said earlier, the occupation principle of territorial acquisition prescribed under international law is designed to help the West to acquire colonies. An important condition for occupation is that the object must be *terra nullius* that does not belong to any country. However, the Diaoyu Islands belonged to China. They were uninhabited islands, but they were not *terra nullius*. Japan's seizure of China's uninhabited islands under the occupation principle was illegal and invalid.

Second, under international law, in order to occupy *terra nullius* or the territory one discovers first in accordance with the occupation principle, a country must make a territorial claim first in an open manner. Japan made secret plans for its external aggression and expansion; so it was Japan's usual practice not to make public cabinet decisions including those, in general, but this runs against international law concerning the territorial occupation.

In addition, before Japan's secret surveys of the Diaoyu Islands, it had made public its occupation of the Ogasawara Islands and the Daito Islands. This was not true with the Diaoyu Islands. The entire process from the surveys of them and the occupation of them under a decision was completed through secret documents and was never made public thereafter. Japan made public its occupation of the Daito Islands as soon as the process was completed, showing that not all Cabinet decisions were kept secret and that Japan's deliberate attempt to cover up its occupation of the Diaoyu Islands indicates that the move was shameful and illegal.

As I said earlier, in fact, there wasn't such a thing as the so-called cabinet decision to occupy the Diaoyu Islands before the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed. The relevant document was only signed by members of the cabinet secretly

[17] http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

[18] The Japanese Society of International Law, *International Law Dictionary,* Chin. ed., Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1985, p. 279.

and was not made public. The Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed on April 17, 1895, on June 2 of the same year, the handover of government for Taiwan was completed, and on June 10, Japanese residents Tatsushiro Koga filed an application for the lease and development of the Diaoyu Islands. The Japanese government didn't approve the application until September 1896, when the Taiwan people's rebellion against the Japanese was basically quelled.

This undoubtedly proves that the Japanese resident's rent and development of the Diaoyu Islands was a way of blatant colonial development during Japan's colonial rule of Taiwan. It was a natural outcome of the Japanese government's blatant colonial rule of Taiwan and the islands affiliated with it through the Treaty of Shimonoseki following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. And this cannot be used as the basis of Japan's sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands today. In addition, it must be noted that Japan claimed that these islands were put under the administration of Okinawa Prefecture in 1885, but during the Japanese colonial rule of Taiwan, these islands were included in Taiwan by the then Taiwan Governor-General as bonito fishing grounds.

6.4 Sovereignty Over the Diaoyu Islands After World War II Was Determined in the Potsdam Declaration Rather Than the Treaty of San Francisco

1. *According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) were not included in the territory which Japan renounced under Article 2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 that legally defined the territory of Japan after World War II. Under Article 3 of the treaty, the islands were placed under the administration of the United States as part of the Nansei Shoto Islands. The Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) are included in the areas whose administrative rights were reverted to Japan in accordance with the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands that was signed in 1971."*[19]

Comments: The San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 wasn't recognized by the government of the People's Republic of China; because, it was signed without the participation of the government of the Republic of China. It is only natural that China's territorial sovereignty must not be determined by any treaty or agreement between the USA and Japan.

On September 18, 1951, the then Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai issued a statement, "The San Francisco Peace Treaty was prepared, drafted and signed

[19] http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

without the participation of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese central government deems the treaty to be illegal and invalid and therefore will absolutely not recognize it."[20]

In response to the authorized incorporation of the Diaoyu Islands into Japanese territory under the Agreement between Japan and the USA concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands (Okinawa Reversion Agreement) that was reached in 1971, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement of condemnation on December 30: This is a blatant violation of China's territorial sovereignty that the Chinese people will absolutely not tolerate. The Chinese government stated that including the Diaoyu Islands into the areas to be reverted was entirely illegal. In response to the strong opposition of the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and overseas, the US government had to state that what was to be reverted to Japan was the administration of the Diaoyu Islands, not the sovereignty over them and that the USA didn't take a position and a peaceful solution should be found between China and Japan.

In fact, Japanese official documents and international treaties from the secret Japanese cabinet decision in 1895 through the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 didn't say that the so-called Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) or Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, Chiwei Islet, Nanxiao Island, and Beixiao Island belonged to Japan. It wasn't until March 8, 1972, that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed relevant opinions, about three months later than its Chinese counterpart. The Japanese opinions were mostly false. Today, the Japanese government's position is exactly based on these wrong opinions of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs; so, it is untenable.

Moreover, Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty does not mention the Diaoyu Islands or the so-called Senkaku Islands. The article stipulates Japan will concur placing the Ryukyu Islands south of 29 degrees north latitude under the trusteeship system of the USA, but it doesn't specify other geographic coordinates. Even the reef of Okinotori which is often submerged from time to time is specified in the treaty as an area Japan will concur being placed under the trusteeship system of the USA, but the Diaoyu Island which is 362 above the sea and the islands affiliated with it are not included.

This clearly shows that the Diaoyu Islands are excluded from the Ryukyu Islands mentioned in Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. This is why it is untenable for Japan to use that treaty as the legal basis of its postwar ownership of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) and to assume that the Agreement between Japan and the USA concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands includes the Diaoyu Islands in the Ryukyu Islands. With regard to the question of Japan's postwar territorial sovereignty, the country must strictly observe the Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Declaration it promised to accept in 1945.

2. *According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "After World War II, as the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) had been placed under the administration*

[20] *People's Daily,* September 19, 1951.

of the United States as part of Nansei Shoto in accordance with Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan could not exercise direct control over the Islands until the administrative rights were reverted to Japan on May 15, 1972. However, even during this period, the Islands remained as part of the territory of Japan, and this legal status of the Islands, which was that no foreign state had rights over them, with the only exception of the administrative rights which the United States was authorized to exercise over the Islands under the San Francisco Peace Treaty, was ensured through the valid control *by the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands and the Government of the Ryukyu Islands."*[21]

Comments: Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty does not say "the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) have been placed under the administration of the USA as part of Nansei Shoto."

Even if the USA and Japan reached a tacit agreement about this, it had violated the Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Declaration and is not legally viable. Back then the USA stationed its troops in Ryukyu and Taiwan, but that does never mean it had the right to determine who should have the administrative right to them. Moreover, in fact, the USA didn't really obtain the United Nations' authorization to place the Ryukyu Islands in question under its trusteeship system; instead, it had a separate occupation and long-term postwar administration of these islands. Back then the government of the People's Republic of China was categorically opposed to the US separate "trusteeship" and or military occupation of Ryukyu.

On September 4, 1958, the government of the People's Republic of China issued the Statement on China's Territorial Sea, stressing: Taiwan and the Penghu Islands are still occupied by the USA by force, which is an illegal violation of the territory and sovereignty of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese government has the right to recover this region with proper means at an appropriate time. This region includes the Diaoyu Islands which are affiliated with Taiwan, and this was written into the Law of the People's Republic of China of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.

In 1971 the USA and Japan adopted the Japan–US Status of Forces Agreement, ensuring after the USA reverted Okinawa Prefecture, its military would be able to continue to use China's Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet as firing/bombing ranges. This is only another proof that the Eisaku Sato administration's attempt to get the USA to seize Chinese territory. Since 1978, the USA has not used these ranges and has turned down Japan's request that the USA make these islands firing/bombing ranges again. According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, even when Ryukyu was under the administration of the USA, the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) remained as part of the territory of Japan. However, this is not the case. From the end of World War II to 1972, except a few maps that were wrong with the scope of Ryukyu, the Japanese territory as specified in maps didn't include the so-called the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) at all. It wasn't until after 1972

[21] http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

when Okinawa was reverted to Japan that changes began to be made in the maps published in Japan in accordance with the position of the Eisaku Sato administration to officially include China's Diaoyu Islands in Japanese territory as the Senkaku Islands. This was condemned by the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

3. *According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Since the end of World War II, the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) were placed under the administration of the United States of America as part of the Nansei Shoto Islands in accordance with Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. With the entry into force in 1972 of the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands (the Okinawa Reversion Agreement), the administrative rights over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) were reverted to Japan. As is clearly expressed in a statement issued by Secretary of State Dulles at the San Francisco Peace Conference and in the Joint Communiqué of Japanese Prime Minister Kishi and US President Eisenhower issued on June 21, 1957, the US Government did recognize Japan's 'residual sovereignty' over the Nansei Shoto Islands."*[22]

Comments: China has always been opposed to using the San Francisco Peace Treaty to dominate the postwar international order. It is even less possible for China to determine the territorial sovereignty of China and Japan under the treaty. Even the USA recognizes Japan's "residual sovereignty" over the Nansei Shoto Islands, but these islands mainly refer to Okinawa Island, the Miyako Islands, and the Yaeyama Islands and are not said to include the Diaoyu Islands.

Both Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Agreement between Japan and the USA concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands mainly involve the Ryukyu Islands; they don't specify the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands). Japan insists that the USA recognizes Japanese residual sovereignty over the Nansei Shoto Islands, but that doesn't mean the islands include the Diaoyu Islands. By confusing the US recognition of Japanese residual sovereignty over the Nansei Shoto Islands with the inclusion of the Diaoyu Islands in these islands is merely a sophistry Japan uses for a disguised replacement of concept. So far, the USA has not recognized Japan's sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands or the so-called Senkaku Islands.

In addition, the Allied powers jointly fighting Japan forbade its member nations from signing a separate ceasefire or peace treaty with Japan, but the USA blatantly violated this agreement.

First, about 40% of the nations attending the San Francisco Peace Conference were Latin American countries that had not fought the Japanese whereas China, the Korean Peninsula, some Southeast Asian countries and the Soviet Union that had fought the Japanese didn't become involved in the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.

[22] http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

Second, the San Francisco Peace Treaty only stipulates that Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Taiwan, the Nansha Islands, and the Xisha Islands, but it does not say they should be returned to China, thus giving rise to the issue that "the sovereignty over Taiwan is undecided." This violates the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Declaration that Japan must return to China the territory Japan seized from it.

Third, the Chinese government is opposed to the US trusteeship of Ryukyu, but it doesn't think that Ryukyu includes the Diaoyu Islands. Japan's use of the San Francisco Peace Treaty as the legal basis of its postwar ownership of the Diaoyu Islands is untenable.

The USA differentiated to some extent the disputed sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands between China and Japan from the Ryukyu Islands it returned to Japan. The main expressions are that beginning in 1972, the USA reverted the administrative, legislative and judicial power to Japan while stating that it reverted to Japan only the administration of the Diaoyu Islands and hoped that peaceful solution should be found for the territorial sovereignty over these islands. The Japanese government took it for granted that the Ryukyu Islands include the Diaoyu Islands, but so far, the USA has not recognized Japan's sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands.

So far, the Japanese government has never expressed its opposition to the US position on the sovereignty issue concerning the Diaoyu Islands. On the contrary, it merely confuses territorial sovereignty with the administrative rights, simply stressing that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) "are the inherent territory of Japan both historically and internationally" and there exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved concerning these islands. This is only the unilateral explanation and cliché of Japan and is irrelevant under international law. China is diametrically opposed to the illegal US reversion to Japan of the Chinese territory of the Diaoyu Islands and is in favor of Sino-Japanese dialogue over the Diaoyu Islands issue.

4. *According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration were documents that stipulated the basic postwar settlement policy of the Allied powers. There is no evidence that shows that the Allied powers, including the Republic of China, recognized that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) were included among 'the islands appertaining to Formosa (Taiwan)' as stated in the Cairo Declaration in these declarations."*[23]

Comments: The Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Declaration were designed to urge the Japanese militarists to surrender unconditionally, define postwar Japanese territory, punish Japanese war criminals and wipe out Japanese militarism and served as the basis of postwar international law and international order. The Japanese government signed its Instrument of Surrender on September 2, 1945, promising to implement the provisions of these documents.

[23] http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

The Cairo Declaration didn't specify any island affiliated with Taiwan, but it stipulated that Japan must revert to China all the territory it had seized from China. According to the Japanese version of the declaration, all the territories Japan seized from the people of the Qing Dynasty, that is, the Qing Government, must be returned to the Republic of China, including the Diaoyu Islands Japan had stolen during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. Japan tries to take advantage of the loopholes of the Cairo Declaration and its statement is a unilateral distortion of postwar international law. The reason is very simple. The Cairo Declaration only mentioned Taiwan and the Penghu Islands and failed to specify any island affiliated with Taiwan. If the Japanese logic is right, does that mean the islands affiliated with Taiwan that were not included in the declaration cannot be proved to belong to Taiwan? Of course not.

On December 1, 1943, the Cairo Declaration was signed and issued jointly by Chiang Kai-shek from China, Roosevelt from the USA and Churchill from the UK. According to the declaration, "The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the World War I in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria (northeast China), Formosa (Taiwan), and The Pescadores (Penghu Islands) shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent."[24]

On July 26, 1945, China, the USA, and the UK issued the Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender (Potsdam Declaration) at Potsdam, Germany. According to Article 8 of the proclamation, "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we determine."[25]

The Diaoyu Islands are affiliated with Taiwan, China. They were seized by Japan secretly during the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 and were under the Japanese colonial rule for 50 years under the Treaty of Shimonoseki. These islands are exactly part of "the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese" that it must return to China under the Cairo Declaration. Taiwan was included in the declaration, and of course, the islands affiliated with it were also included. From the legal point of view, as early as August 1945, Japan's rule of the Diaoyu Islands it had stolen had come to an end. As the Japanese government accepted the Potsdam Declaration, its attempt to resume its rule of the Diaoyu Islands is not only illegal but also in nature disregards postwar international law and the basis of international order.

[24] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1943_Cairo_Declaration.

[25] http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1945/450726a.html.

5. *According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "In any event, the disposition of territories as a result of a war is ultimately settled by international agreements such as peace treaties. In the case of World War II, the San Francisco Peace Treaty legally defined the territory of Japan after the war. Neither the Cairo Declaration nor the Potsdam Declaration had the ultimate legal validity on the treatment of Japan's territory."*[26]

Comments: This is a wrong statement the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made in blatant violation of postwar international law and international law and in breach of the postwar promises Japan made to the international community. This makes people doubt the professional knowledge of diplomats of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty failed to end the hostilities before Japan and its neighbors. China, the Soviet Union, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, Burma, Malaysia, India, and Afghanistan didn't attend the San Francisco Peace Conference or sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Therefore, the signatory countries of the treaty were not in a position to represent the main Asian countries that fought against Japan; otherwise, it wouldn't have been necessary for the Japanese government to conclude a treaty of peace and friendship with China in 1978 and work for a peace treaty of the Soviet Union. Following World War II, Japan didn't have a territorial sovereignty problem with the USA; its only problem was how to keep the US military in Okinawa.

According to Japan, "In any event, the disposition of territories as a result of a war is ultimately settled by international agreements such as peace treaties." If this statement stands for itself, then the scope of the postwar territorial sovereignty of China and Japan must be ultimately settled under the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué and the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship concluded and signed by China and Japan based on international law provided exactly by the Cairo Declaration of 1943 and the Potsdam Declaration of 1945.

On August 15, 1945, the Japanese emperor issued the Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the War, stating, "We have ordered our Government to communicate to the Governments of the USA, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union that our Empire accepts the provisions of their joint declaration."[27] On September 2 of the same year, the Japanese government issued the Instrument of Surrender of Japan, promising that "We hereby undertake for the Emperor, the Japanese Government and their successors to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith."[28] Japan uses the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which China didn't participate and is opposed to, as the basis for addressing the scope of Chinese and Japanese territory. This is tantamount to blatantly opposing the relevant provisions of the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué and the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship concluded on the basis of the Cairo Declaration and

[26] http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

[27] https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Imperial_Rescript_on_Surrender.

[28] https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Japanese_Instrument_of_Surrender.

the Potsdam Declaration. This explanation of Japan not only involves the Diaoyu Islands issue but also the promise the Japanese government has made concerning a series of major principled problems between China and Japan such as the sovereignty over Taiwan.

According to Article 3 of the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué of 1972, "The Government of the People's Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration."[29] According to the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1978, "The principles enunciated in the Joint Communiqué should be strictly observed."[30] This shows that the treaty once again made it clear that following World War II Japan must observe the Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Declaration with regard to the territorial issue. Japan must faithfully observe the treaties it concluded and established laws of nations.

According to Article 98 of the Constitution of Japan, "This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the nation and no law, ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or part thereof, contrary to the provisions hereof, shall have legal force or validity. The treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be faithfully observed." Therefore, from the perspective of both international law and Japan's domestic laws, with regard to the postwar territorial issue, Japan must observe the Potsdam Declaration, the Cairo Declaration and the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Any attempt to replace these documents with the San Francisco Peace Treaty will be invalid and useless.

6. *According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "In accordance with Article 2 (b) of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan renounced territorial sovereignty over Formosa (Taiwan) and the Pescadores (Penghu Islands), which had been ceded by China after the Sino-Japanese War. However, the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) were not included in 'Formosa and the Pescadores' (Taiwan and the Penghu Islands) as stated in the treaty. It is because under Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the United States actually exercised the rights of administration on the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) as part of the Nansei Shoto Islands. They are also explicitly included in the area whose administrative rights were reverted to Japan when Okinawa was reverted to Japan in 1972."*[31]

[29] https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Joint_Communiqué_of_the_Government_of_Japan_and_the_Government_of_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China.

[30] https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China.

[31] http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

Comments: This wrong statement has been repeated by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs time and time again and must be refuted patiently. For China and other countries that have not signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the treaty is not legally binding and is absolutely invalid.

As early as June 1950, the then Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai announced that the Chinese people were determined to recover Taiwan and all other territories that belonged to China. On December 4 of the same year, Zhou Enlai issued another statement, stressing that, "Without the participation of the People's Republic of China, the preparation and drafting of a treaty of peace with Japan will be viewed by China's Central People's Government as illegal and will therefore be invalid."[32] In response to China being excluded from the draft of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, on August 15, 1951, Zhou Enlai issued a statement condemning that the treaty only stipulated that Japan must renounce all right to Taiwan and the Penghu Islands without having Japan return them to China for the purpose of making it possible for the USA to occupy Chinese territory Taiwan permanently. In response to the draft treaty deliberately stipulating that Japan must renounce all its right to Nanwei Island and the Xisha Islands without having Japan return them to China, Zhou Enlai stated that the inviolable sovereignty of China over these islands would not be in any way affected. He expressed opposition to the trusteeship the USA obtained to the Ryukyu Islands and other territories under the draft treaty.[33]

On the basis of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan tries to separate the Diaoyu Islands from Taiwan and incorporate them into Okinawa. This statement of Japan is a sophistry for using the San Francisco Peace Treaty to steal China's Diaoyu Islands again after World War II. Nevertheless, Article 3 of that treaty makes it easy to understand this legal explanation of Japan is so absurd and farfetched.

Article 3 reads, "Japan will concur in any proposal of the USA to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the USA as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29 degrees north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island, and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the USA will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters."[34]

The above article says nothing about the so-called Senkaku Islands or the Diaoyu Islands. According to the article, Nansei Shoto includes the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands. The Daito Islands were not islands of the ancient Ryukyu

[32]"Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai's Statement on the Treaty of Peace with Japan," Chin. ed., *People's Daily,* November 5, 1950.

[33]Statement of Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai on the United States-British Draft Peace Treaty with Japan and the San Francisco Conference, Chin. ed., *People's Daily*, August 19, 1951.

[34]http://www.taiwandocuments.org/sanfrancisco01.htm.

Kingdom but were incorporated by the Japanese Meiji Government into Okinawa Prefecture as *terra nullius* in 1885. Therefore, geographically the Ryukyu Islands can hardly include the Daito Islands and this was specifically explained in the article. And the Diaoyu Islands stolen by Japan in 1895 were not included in this article.

The problem is that whether the Ryukyu Islands can be explained to include the Diaoyu Islands? This was not discussed at the San Francisco Peace Conference, so it cannot be questioned by other nations. The Ryukyu Islands usually referred to the 36 Ryukyu Islands before Japan forcibly annexed the country, but not cover all the territories under the administration after Japan stole the Diaoyu Islands in 1895. Therefore, the above statement made by Japan that the so-called Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) are part of the Nansei Shoto Islands runs counter to the fact and law.

7. *According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "When the San Francisco Peace Treaty was concluded, the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) were left as territory of Japan. However, none of the major Allied powers concerned—the United States, the United Kingdom, France and China (the People's Republic of China and the Taiwan authorities)—raised objections. Rather, in a People's Daily article headlined "Battle of People in Ryukyu Islands against US Occupation," dated January 8, 1953, China criticized the United States for occupying the Ryukyu Islands which were not decided in either the Cairo Declaration or the Potsdam Declaration to be put under trusteeship, against the will of the local people. The article stated that the Ryukyu Islands comprised of seven groups of islands, including the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands), which recognizes that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) were part of the Ryukyu Islands. Although China was not a signatory to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan signed the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty with the Republic of China (Taiwan), which Japan then recognized as the government of China. The Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty approved that Japan had renounced all right, title and claim to Taiwan, the Pescadores (Penghu Islands),* etc.*, in accordance with Article 2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, but during the process of negotiations for this treaty, the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands), whose status as Japanese territory was left untouched, were never taken up for discussion. What this means is that it was considered to be the rightful premise that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) were the territory of Japan from before that time."*[35]

Comments: The government of the People's Republic of China was always opposed to the so-called Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty concluded by the Taiwan authorities and Japan in 1952. That treaty was not applicable to China's mainland and became invalid in September 1972. However, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has just told lies on the basis of old ones.

[35]http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

The first lie is: "When the San Francisco Peace Treaty was concluded, the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) were left as territory of Japan." This is merely a political illusion of some Japanese people; it is never a fact. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs doesn't have any proof for this, so it confuses the concept of the Ryukyu Islands mentioned in Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty with the concept of the Diaoyu Islands in another attempt to resort to the deceptive sophistry for disguised displacement of concepts.

The second lie is: "None of the major Allied powers concerned—the USA, the UK, France, and China (the People's Republic of China and the Taiwan authorities)—raised objections." This is because it is not a fact that when the San Francisco Peace Treaty was concluded, the Diaoyu Islands were left as territory of Japan. Back then the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands was not even discussed at the conference. No wonder none raised objections. In addition, China was barred from the San Francisco Peace Conference and didn't participate in the drafting of the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951. In 1950, China proposed that Japan return to China the Diaoyu Islands including Chiwei Islet, and it didn't have the opportunity to express this view at the San Francisco Peace Conference. China categorically stated that whatever the content, the treaty would be illegal and invalid and China would never accept it. That being the case, why should China raise objections against anything that was not involved in the negotiations for the treaty?

Having already established diplomatic ties with the People's Republic of China in 1972, Japan is still using the so-called Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty that has been rescinded for more than 40 years and the negotiation process for that treaty as the proof of Japan's sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. This in itself a violation of the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué and the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Moreover, the San Francisco Peace Treaty didn't involve the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands or the so-called Senkaku Islands, so the Japanese government cannot prove anything with the void Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, no matter whether the Taiwan authorities and Japan had recognized the San Francisco Peace Treaty during their negotiations for their peace treaty.

After all, even the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty didn't say anything recognizing the Diaoyu Islands as Japanese territory. The San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 confirmed the Ryukyu Islands as under the trusteeship or rule of the USA, so when the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty was concluded in 1952, Japanese territory didn't include the Ryukyu Islands. As the Diaoyu Islands weren't part of the Ryukyu Islands, they were not involved in the negotiations concerning the peace treaty between the Taiwan authorities and Japan. This is why the Taiwan authorities still stress today that the Diaoyutai Islands must be returned to China along with Taiwan in accordance with the Chinese National Government's Declaration of War against Japan of 1941, the Cairo Declaration of 1943, the Potsdam Declaration of 1945, and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender.

8. *According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "As a result of a survey conducted in the autumn of 1968 by an agency of the United Nations that indicated the possibility of the existence of petroleum resources in the East*

China Sea, attention was focused on the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands). It was only in the 1970s that the Chinese government and the authorities in Taiwan began to make their own assertions. Prior to that, they had never objected the fact that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) were included in the area that was placed under the administration of the United States in accordance with Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The Chinese government has never clearly explained why it did not lodge objections to this fact."[36]

Comments: The Diaoyu Islands have been China's inherent territory since the Ming Dynasty, were put under the administration of Taiwan during the Qing Dynasty, and were subject to the colonial rule of Japan along with Taiwan from 1895 through 1945. However, from 1945 when Japan surrendered through 1970, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs didn't claim sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. Most of the maps published in Japan during that period didn't mark the Diaoyu Islands as Japanese territory. Before 1969, Taiwan fishermen had free access to the Diaoyu Islands for fishing purposes and could even dismantle boats and set up temporary sheds on the islands with the approval of the Taiwan authorities.

In June 1967, Japanese and US researchers published the research report "Stratigraphy and Petroleum Prospects of Korea Strait and the East China Sea." In November 1968, the Coordinating Committee for Geo-science Programs in East and Southeast Asia (CCOP) funded some geologists' geophysical explorations of the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea. The results were published in the name of the Emery Report. According to the report, the continental shelf between Taiwan and Japan was probably one of the areas with the richest petroleum resources in the world and it was suggested that Japan, the USA, the Republic of Korea and the Taiwan authorities cooperate in their development in 1971.

These activities were serious interventions in China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests and naturally met strong opposition from China. In its editorial, the official *People's Daily* newspaper stated, "Taiwan and the islands affiliated with it, including Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, Chiwei Islet, Nanxiao Island, and Beixiao Island are sacred territory of China. The waters around these islands and the submarine resources in nearby neritic waters all belong to China and are protected against the depredations of other countries. Only the People's Republic of China has the right to explore and develop the submarine resources in these regions."[37]

To foil the Japanese Eisaku Sato cabinet's attempt to incorporate these islands and water into Japanese territory, the editorial noted, "Just like Taiwan, islands such as Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, Chiwei Islet, Nanxiao Island, and Beixiao Island have been Chinese territory since ancient times. This is a historical fact that cannot

[36] http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

[37] "Never Allow US and Japanese Reactionaries to Look China's Submarine Resources," Chin. ed., *People's Daily,* December 29, 1970.

be altered. The Japanese reactionaries will never succeed in their attempt to seize China's sacred territory with whatever excuse or by whatever tricks."[38]

I must state again that according to Article 3 of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan will concur in the US trusteeship of Nansei Shoto south of 29 degrees north latitude, but these islands do not include the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands). From the very beginning, the government of the People's Republic of China negated the treaty in its entirety, so it didn't have to raise objections against what was not in the treaty. Since the 1950s the Chinese government had been diametrically opposed to the US occupation of Ryukyu and the US military presence in Taiwan. In 1958, the Chinese government issued a statement on its territorial waters, announcing that Taiwan and its nearby islands belonged to China.

9. *According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The treatment of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) after the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty was public knowledge internationally, and the People's Republic of China can in no way claim that it did not know this at the time. In fact, an article dated January 8, 1953, in the People's Daily, which is an organ of the Communist Party of China, under the headline "Battle of People in Ryukyu Islands against US Occupation," explicitly included the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) among the Ryukyu Islands, which were under the administration of the United States. Subsequently, the People's Republic of China did not make any objections until the 1970s to the fact that the area placed under the US administration in accordance with Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty included the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands). China has not explained at all why it did not object."*[39]

Comments: This is a wrong view that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It seems that they simply disregard the fact that Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty didn't mention the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) at all, and have no knowledge or deliberately dismiss the Chinese government's position against that treaty.

On December 5, 1950, Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai issued a statement, noting that the People's Republic of China must be involved in the preparation, drafting, and signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. After the draft of the treaty was promulgated in July 1951, Zhou Enlai issued another statement on behalf of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China on August 15: "Without the participation of the People's Republic of China, the preparation and drafting of a treaty of peace with Japan will be viewed by China's Central People's Government as illegal and will therefore be invalid." After Japan, the USA, and other countries signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty on September 8 of the same year, Zhou Enlai issued another statement reiterating the position of the Chinese government.

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[38]Ibid.

[39]http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

The Chinese government had always been opposed to the US trusteeship of Ryukyu and the US military presence in Taiwan and had never recognized the US delimitation of the borders of Ryukyu under its trusteeship or administration. There were absolutely no legal provisions and facts supporting the allegation that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) were placed under the administration of the USA under Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. After all, China had negated that treaty in its entirety. In December 1953, the USA expanded the scope of the Ryukyu Islands under its trusteeship without authorization to include the Chinese territory Diaoyu Islands. This had no legal basis and met strong opposition from China.

Following World War II, China and Japan started their dispute over the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands in the early 1970s. This was because, in the late 1960s, US and Japanese scholars explored petroleum and gas resources in the waters around the Diaoyu Islands without authorization, and on June 17, 1971, the USA and Japan signed the Okinawa Reversion Agreement under which the Diaoyu Islands were arbitrarily made the territory to be returned. In response to the USA's attempt to return the Diaoyu Islands to Japan in private, on September 30, 1970, the "Parliament of Taiwan Province" made the motion to safeguard the sovereignty over Diaoyutai. On May 18, 1971, *People's Daily* published an article to expose and condemn the Eisaku Sato government for its tricks to annex China's Diaoyu Islands. On December 30 of the same year, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement confirming the Diaoyu Islands as China's inherent territory. Back then the Chinese nationals including students launched a Defend Diaoyu Islands Movement in the USA.

So in October 1971, the US government stated, "[A] return of administrative rights over those islands to Japan, from which the rights were received, can in no way prejudice any underlying claims. The USA cannot add to the legal rights Japan possessed before it transferred administration of the islands to us, no can the USA, by giving back what it received, diminish the rights of other claimants. … any conflicting claims to the islands are a matter for resolution by the parties concerned."[40]

In November of the same year, the US State Department issued a statement when approving the Okinawa Reversion Agreement, noting that with regard to islands whose sovereignty was disputed, "the sole source of rights of the USA in this regard derives from the Peace Treaty under which the USA merely received rights of administration, not sovereignty. Thus, US action in transferring its rights of administration to Japan does not constitute a transfer of underlying sovereignty (which the USA does not have), nor can it affect the underlying claims of any of the disputants." This position of the US government and Congress has not changed so far.

[40]Proquest Congressional Hearings Digital Collection, Okinawa reversion treaty: hearings 1971, p. 91.

This shows that in legal terms the USA has never agreed to Japan's claim on the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. No international treaties and agreements, including the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Okinawa Reversion Agreement, stipulate that Japan has the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. The administrative rights to the islands the USA obtained from Japan back then can only be Japan's rights to exercise the colonial rule of the Diaoyu Islands from 1895 to 1945. The USA reverted these administrative rights to Japan without authorization, which is tantamount to recognizing Japan's rights to exercise the colonial rule of these islands. This runs counter to the relevant provisions of the Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Declaration and is therefore illegal. Today, the US government is safeguarding Japan's administrative rights to these islands, promising that this is applicable to Article 5 of the US–Japan Security Treaty. This, in essence, means the USA-Japan alliance is working to maintain Japan's right to exercise the colonial rule of the Diaoyu Islands and on this basis to keep the US military's firing/bombing ranges in Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet. This is a serious violation of China's territorial sovereignty and is naturally opposed by all the Chinese people including those on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

10. *According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Japan's acquisition of sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) has nothing to do with World War II. The San Francisco Peace Treaty and related treaties, which legally defined Japan's territory after World War II, did so on the premise that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) were part of Japanese territory. Before the decision was made based on the San Francisco Peace Treaty, neither China nor Taiwan had claimed sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)."*[41]

Comments: China's Diaoyu Islands were stolen by Japan through a secret cabinet decision during the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 and were included in the stolen territory Japan must return to China in accordance with the 1943 Cairo Declaration. The San Francisco Peace Treaty signed on September 8, 1951, cannot serve as the legal basis for determining the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands as it didn't mention these islands at all.

The Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Declaration stipulated that Japan must give up all the territories it had seized from other countries. These territories clearly include Taiwan and the Penghu Islands seized from China following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and are absolutely not limited to those territories Japan occupied through aggression and expansion during World War II.

There is no evidence that Japan's postwar territorial sovereignty was handled based on the premise that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) were taken as Japanese territory in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The above unilateral interpretation wasn't even recognized by the USA. In 1971, the US government and Congress both held that the USA didn't take a position regarding the territorial

[41] http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

sovereignty over these islands and that the issue should be solved through dialogue and consultation between China and Japan. So far, the USA has not recognized the Diaoyu Islands as part of Japan and it was even more unlikely that the USA concluded the San Francisco Peace Treaty under the premise of the Diaoyu Islands being Japanese territory.

Historical facts are very clear. From the early years of the Ming Dynasty in the 1370s, China had begun to own the Diaoyu Islands and included them in the scope of its maritime defense. More than 520 years later, Japan stole the Diaoyu Islands through the Sino-Japanese War in the late nineteenth century and began its 50 colonial rule of them along with Taiwan on the strength of the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki. Following World War II, both the then National Government of China and the government of the People's Republic of China established in 1949 held that the Diaoyu Islands should be returned to China along with Taiwan. The territory of Ryukyu was limited only to the 36 islands as recorded by the Qing investiture envoy Zhang Xueli and others.

11. *According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "As the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) began to draw attention following an academic survey in the fall of 1968 which indicated the possibility of the existence of petroleum resources in the East China Sea, the Chinese government and Taiwan authorities began to make their own assertions about territorial sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) in the 1970s. Before this, the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) were placed under the administration of the United States in accordance with Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. China has never expressed any objections to this or explained why it has not expressed objections."*[42]

Comments: This statement of Japan isn't based on facts and Japan was simply judging others by itself. As I said earlier, the Diaoyu Islands had been Chinese territory before 1895, which is indisputable and was affirmed by the mapping institutions of the Ministry of the Navy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of War of Japan after 1875.

Japan secretly seized the Diaoyu Islands during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, so it was impossible for China to express any objections to the seizure it didn't know. On April 17, 1895, Japan forced the Qing government to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki, under which China ceded to Japan the whole of Taiwan and the islands affiliated with it. This was a joint term without specifying the names of the islands affiliated and undoubtedly included the Diaoyu Islands. For example, if one's watermelon is seized, how could he demand that one of its seed should be returned?

In 1945 Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration and promised to return Taiwan to China. At the same time, the Ryukyu Islands were occupied by the US military. However, the Diaoyu Islands were affiliated with Taiwan, not part of the Ryukyu

[42] http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

Islands. From 1945 through 1972, the entire Ryukyu Islands weren't under the jurisdiction of Japan, let alone the Diaoyu Islands. Back then, China–Japan relations had not been normalized, and there were no diplomatic relations between China's mainland and Japan. Therefore, during these more than 20 years, it was unnecessary for China to lodge presentations to Japan regarding the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands and it was impossible to do that. However, that doesn't mean that China began to make its own assertions about territorial sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands in 1970 when petroleum resources were discovered there.

Soon after the People's Republic of China was founded, the Chinese Foreign Ministry received the Draft Proposals for China's Territorial Claims in Its Peace Treaty with Japan on May 15, 1950. One of the proposals was to incorporate the Yaeyama Islands and Miyako Islands into Taiwan and recover them based on the proposal made by Japan in 1879 for making them part of China in return for its approval of Japan's annexation of Ryukyu. Another proposal was to, based on the records of Qing investiture envoy Zhang Xueli and others, define Ryukyu as 36 islands not including the Diaoyu Islands and incorporate into Taiwan and recover the "Senkaku Islands" (the name which was used by Japan in the introduction to Ryukyu and referred but Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, Nanxiao Island, and Beixiao Island) and Chiwei Islet which were close to Taiwan (see Fig. 6.1). These propositions were basically the same as those of the Chinese National Government soon after World War II ended.



Fig. 6.1 Draft proposals for China's territorial claims in its peace treaty with Japan, May 15, 1950

In these Proposals, the name of the "Yaeyama Islands (Senkaku Islands)" was used only in the introduction to Ryukyu under Japanese rule in the 1930s. This doesn't indicate China's recognition of the Diaoyu Islands as part of Okinawa at all.

This was indirectly proved to be true because in the Draft's section "A. Introduction," Japan's foreign trade in the 1930 s was also discussed. It is very clear from the content, demand, and context of the Draft, the Draft suggested that the Chinese government draft a plan for demarcating postwar Japanese territory based the country's territory on the eve of World War II. The suggestion included incorporating the Diaoyu Islands west of Chiwei Islet into Taiwan and having them return to China. The geographical position of the Diaoyu Islands referred to in the Draft was actually true during Japanese colonial rule of Taiwan and the name "Senkaku Islands" used in the Draft was a joint term used to refer to the Diaoyu Islands at the time, and all this absolutely doesn't mean the Chinese government recognized the Diaoyu Islands as part of Ryukyu or Japan. Similar things also appeared in the Cairo Declaration in December 1943. In the declaration, the term "Manchuria" was used to refer to northeast China that was under the control of Japan at the time, but this absolutely didn't mean that the governments of China, the USA and the UK recognized that northeast China was the state of Manchukuo. The full text of the Draft shows that those who drafted this document had clearly understood that the Diaoyu Islands didn't belong to Ryukyu and proposed considering to incorporate them into Taiwan again when Japan's territory was re-demarcated following World War II.

The Draft also said that research must be conducted on whether the Yaeyama Islands should be incorporated into Taiwan. This is because in 1879 China was opposed to the Japanese Meiji Government's renaming the Ryukyu han Okinawa Prefecture. Back then the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed sharing the territory of Ryukyu with China by letting China have the Yaeyama Islands and Miyako Islands and Japan have Naha and the Ryukyu territory north of Naha. China was opposed to Japan's idea of annexing Ryukyu, but it was too weak to stop Japan. This matter remained unresolved because the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 broke out.

It is because of this that those who drafted this document proposed conducting research on whether the Yaeyama Islands and Miyako Islands should be incorporated into Taiwan when Japan's territory was re-demarcated following World War II. However, this proposal wasn't carried out because the USA seized Japan alone and placed Okinawa Prefecture under its administration and China was split by the Taiwan Strait. It is worth noting that those who drafted the document especially stressed that research must also be made on making Chiwei Islet part of Taiwan. This exactly shows that back then the Chinese had realized that Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet didn't belong to Ryukyu, weren't part of the Yaeyama Islands and Miyako Islands and must be incorporated into Taiwan.

Those drafted the document clearly realized that the Diaoyu Islands, including Chiwei Islet, didn't belong to Ryukyu at all and should be incorporated into Taiwan and returned to China when re-demarcating Japan's territory following World War II. It is by no accident that in less than a year following the founding of the

People's Republic of China, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs received this Draft proposing Chiwei Islet be incorporated into Taiwan. In fact, this view was basically the same as the one the Kuomintang government had soon after World War II ended. The same is true when the name of the "Senkaku Islands" (Diaoyu Islands) was used following Japan's example soon after World War II came to an end.

It seems that the relevant employees of the Chinese government drafted this document mainly on the basis of the fundamental stand adopted by the government of the Republic of China on behalf of China. From the perspective of international law, the change of governments in China couldn't affect the country's stand on its territorial borders. Therefore, it is only natural that when it came to the postwar territory of Japan, the government of the People's Republic of China could inherit or agree with the stand the government of the Republic of China had on the territorial issue of Taiwan. Moreover, when the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration was issued in 1943 and 1945, respectively, the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang had formed a national united front against Japan and shared the same positions on relevant issues.

In 1946, in the Solutions for the Ryukyu Issue, the Ministry of National Defense of China's National Government and the country's delegation in Japan raised the China–Ryukyu border issue. The section on this issue had two parts. One was the Japan–Ryukyu border issue, and the other was the China–Ryukyu border issue. The part on the China–Ryukyu issue dealt with the Diaoyu Islands as follows:

A. The focus of the issue is whether the Yaeyama Islands and Miyako Islands should be incorporated into Ryukyu. The Chinese side offers the following suggestions: When China and Japan negotiated about the Ryukyu issue from 1878 through 1880, thanks to the mediation of US President Ulysses S. Grant, Japan proposed that those islands be annexed to China. The islands are in southern Ryukyu and close to China, and it is appropriate for them to become part of China. We therefore suggest that these islands be made Chinese territory.
B. If the Yaeyama Islands and Miyako Islands cannot be made Chinese territory, to whom the Senkaku Islands (located between 123°E and 124°E and between 25°N and 28°N) are given to deserves attention. In the history of Ryukyu, these islands were not recorded as Ryukyu territory. Detailed maps of Japan (for example, the Latest Map of Japanese Prefectures and Place Names issued on the 10th day of the first month of the 12th year of the Shoa Era) included the islands, but they were not included in the list of Ryukyu place names, and the islands are very close to Taiwan. Although these islands are now part of the Allies-occupied territory, it is disputable whether they are part of Ryukyu (see Fig. 6.2).

As a result, the hostilities between China's mainland and Taiwan as well as the confrontation between the USA and the Soviet Union, neither side of the Taiwan Strait attended the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951. This made it



Fig. 6.2 Document of the ministry of defense of China's national government, 1946

impossible for China to express the above-mentioned proposition at the conference. At the same time, the government of the People's Republic of China had always deemed it is being barred from that conference as illegal and invalid. This fully shows that the Chinese government was keenly aware soon after World War II ended that the Diaoyu Islands should be returned to China as islands affiliated with Taiwan and that it isn't true that the Chinese government didn't make its own assertions about territorial sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands until after a survey indicated the possibility of the existence of petroleum resources in the East China Sea in 1968.

During the Eisaku Sato administration in 1969, Japan began to covet the petroleum resources in the waters around China's Diaoyu Islands. It was only reasonable for China to strongly condemn this and express its position on its sovereignty over these islands.

12. *According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Recently, in an attempt to justify its own assertion, China abruptly began to argue about 'the outcomes of World War II' as if Japan was distorting the international framework after World War II. It is Chinese actions, however, that pose a grave challenge to the postwar international order by objecting the decisions based on the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the very international framework that decided the outcomes of World War II concerning Japan."*[43]

[43]http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

Comments: The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs makes the San Francisco Peace Treaty an international framework for handling postwar Japanese issues. This actually is meant to implement the policies the Japanese government had before the China–Japan relations were normalized and does direct harm to these relations.

The government of the People's Republic of China has been consistent in its proposition that the Cairo Declaration of 1943 and the Potsdam Declaration of 1945 must be followed in the postwar international order and the demarcation of Japanese territory. As early as June 28, 1950, the then Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai announced, "The fact that Taiwan belongs to China will never change. This was not only a fact in the past but also the fact following the issue of the Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Declaration and the surrender of Japan." Zhou noted that China "will definitely recover Taiwan and all other territories that belong to China."[44] According to the Potsdam Declaration, preparations for a postwar treaty of peace with Japan must be made by the countries that signed Japan's Instrument of Surrender. The Chinese government had always held that a treaty of peace with Japan must be concluded on the basis of the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration, and other international agreements.

However, following a postwar Cold War policy, the US government went back on the promise it had made in the Potsdam Declaration and other international agreements and excluded the government of the People's Republic of China from the San Francisco Peace Conference. Therefore, China has been diametrically opposed to the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The treaty wasn't signed by the Soviet Union (now Russia), the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, India, Thailand, Mongolia, and Myanmar either, so the treaty is absolutely not "the very international framework that decided the outcomes of World War II concerning Japan."

Article 2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty only says that Japan renounces sovereignty over Taiwan, but it doesn't stipulate that Taiwan shall be returned to China in accordance with the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Declaration. This led to the view that the sovereignty over Taiwan is unsettled. As a result, the Taiwan question became the main obstacle to normalizing the diplomatic relations between China and Japan. At the very beginning of negotiations for normalizing these relations, Japan tried to achieve its intentions based on the San Francisco Peace Treaty, but China was strongly opposed to that. Eventually, Japan agreed to include the following statement concerning the sovereignty over Taiwan in the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué in 1972: "The Government of the People's Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the People's Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration."[45]

[44]Zhou Enlai, "Statement on the Peace Treaty with Japan," December 4, 1950.

[45]http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/China-Japan-Relations/2013-09/25/content_16993227.htm.

According to Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration, Japan must carry out the terms of the Cairo Declaration and return to China all the territories it had seized from it. There can be no doubt that Taiwan and all the islands affiliated with it, be they annexed to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki or seized secretly earlier by the Japanese government must be returned to China in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Declaration. Any words or actions that attempt to change the postwar international order and the legal and political foundations of the bilateral relations on the strength of the treaties and agreements concluded by Japan and the USA or their military strength will fail and become very dangerous if they are allowed to continue.

Now in the Q&A posted by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on its Web site, Japan not only totally ignores the promise it has made in the Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué but also states in a threatening manner that Chinese objections to the decisions based on the San Francisco Peace Treaty "pose a grave challenge to the postwar international order." This is probably a mistake made by young Japanese diplomats who shoot off their mouth and Japan has the wrong education in this field. If this view is shared throughout the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Japanese government, then it means that the Japanese government has rolled its China policy back to the time before the bilateral relations were normalized and even to the wrong position Japan had before 1945. This will do serious harm to the very mutual trust of the two countries and lead to the deterioration of the bilateral political relations. The Japanese don't seem to understand at all that the Japanese Instrument of Surrender stipulated on September 2, 1945, that the successors of the Japanese government must carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith.

By making a one-sided interpretation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan not only wants to find the so-called legal basis of its reoccupation of the Diaoyu Islands but also means to negate and overturn the Potsdam Declaration and the Cairo Declaration that govern postwar Japanese territory as well as the Japanese Instrument of Surrender the Japanese government representatives signed on September 2, 1945, and thoroughly disrupt the postwar international order. This means that it is increasingly possible that Japan is working to turn back the wheel of history.

As I said earlier, Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty doesn't include the so-called Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands). The United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands issued Proclamation No. 27 (Geographic Boundaries of the Ryukyu Islands) on December 25, 1953, expanding the territory under its trusteeship without authorization to include China's Diaoyu Islands. This didn't have a legal basis and was illegal and invalid.

In fact, it is Japan, which was short of petroleum resources and heavily relied on petroleum imports for economic development, not China, that began to attempt to seize the Diaoyu Islands again after the possibility of the existence of petroleum resources in the East China Sea was indicated. The Chinese mainland had long discovered the world-class super oilfield of Daqing in September 1959, and the oilfield produced 10 tons of oil in 1960. During his lifetime Zhou Enlai believed

that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to China, but he didn't want to the situation got worse as the USA and Japan fought with Taiwan for the petroleum resources in relevant waters. It is groundless and illogical to claim that China didn't begin to make its own assertions about territorial sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands until after petroleum resources were discovered there and China claimed sovereignty over these islands only for the purpose of securing their petroleum resources.

6.5 The Japanese Foreign Ministry's Excuses for the Diaoyu Islands Are Groundless

1. *According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The attitude to easily attribute the difference of opinions to the past war is an act of evasion from the essence of the issue. We view that such attitude is not just unconvincing, but it is also very counterproductive. In fact, the Chinese side, in the Japan–China Joint Statement signed in May 2008 by the leaders of Japan and China, expressed its positive evaluation of Japan's consistent pursuit of the path of a peaceful country and Japan's contribution to the peace and stability of the world through peaceful means over more than 60 years since World War II." "China can never deny the justifiable claim of Japan, which has spent half a century after the war as a peace-loving country, by just arguing about 'the outcomes of World War II' nor justify its own assertion concerning the Senkaku Island."*[46]

Comments: Japan taking a path of peaceful development following World War II is one thing, and its historical aggression, expansion, and seizure of its neighbor's territory are quite another. Failure to heed historical lessons and reckless pursuit of so-called national interests will do good either to Japan or to its neighbors.

Affirming the path of a peaceful country Japan has pursued doesn't mean admitting that it was legal for Japan to steal Chinese territory during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, and it cannot make Japan's claim of sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands legitimate. The sovereignty over these islands involve evidence from historical facts and legality, so it is crucial to acquire a full and necessary understanding of Japanese history of aggression and expansion Japan around the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. A correct understanding and attitude toward history make it possible to correctly deal with reality. Learning from history and looking to the future is very constructive. Ignoring, negating, and glorifying Japan's history of aggression against China from 1895 to 1945 is destructive, not constructive.

When Yasuo Fukuda was in power in 2008, China and Japan signed a new joint communiqué in which China affirmed and praised the path of peaceful development

[46] http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

Japan had pursued following World War II. However, since Shinzo Abe came to power again in 2012, Japan has been viewing China as its archrival by modifying its arms export principles, lifting the ban on collective self-defense right and deliberating on revising the postwar Constitution. It has become increasingly like that Japan will use its military forces overseas and has significantly increased its diplomatic checks and military deterrence against China. Following World War II, Japan got involved in the South China Sea dispute for the first time, trying its utmost to sow discord between China and members of the ASEAN and working to sell arms to these countries at the expense of China. One explanation of this is that Japan wants to gain the strategic upper hand over China with regard to the Diaoyu Islands and the East China Sea.

Japan coveting the Diaoyu Islands has again become one of the causes of its arms expansion and war preparations against China. This was also the case ten years before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894. Japan's state-model in favor of peaceful development is being seriously disturbed by its political Right deviation. In particular, after the Shinzo Abe administration forcibly passed the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets, it forcibly adopted laws addressing the issue of national security at the National Diet in order to lift the ban on Japan's collective self-defense and worked to break free from Japan's postwar Constitution. This naturally put Japan's neighbors on high alert and met the strong opposition from the peace-loving Japanese people.

2. *According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "In connection with the application of Article 5 of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America (the Japan–US Security Treaty), the US government has made it clear that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) have been under the administration of the Government of Japan since their reversion to Japan as part of the Okinawa reversion in 1972 and that the Japan–US Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands)."*[47]

Comments: The Chinese government has been consistent in its opposition to any word and action of Japan and the USA in violation of China's sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, including the view that Article 5 of the Japan–US Security Treaty applies to the Diaoyu Islands.

One of the purposes of the Japanese government is to work with the US militarily against China and strengthen military deterrence to help it achieve valid control of the Diaoyu Islands. Advocating that Article 5 of the Japan–US Security Treaty applies to the Diaoyu Islands is an illegal action of power, and the Guidelines for Japan–US Defense Cooperation revised based on this is more dangerous.

In 1960, the Kishi Nobusake cabinet held talks with the USA and revised the Japan–US Security Treaty in disregard of the opposition of the Japanese people. Article 5 of the treaty stipulates that when the territories under the administration of

[47] http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

Japan are attacked, Japan and the USA will act to meet the common danger in accordance with their respective constitutions. The territories referred to in the article are not regions but territorial land. For example, the title of Chap. 2 of the Japanese version of the San Francisco Peace Treaty is "Region" which does not include the Diaoyu Islands.

So far, the USA has not recognized Japan's sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, so these islands are not Japan's territory as it doesn't have sovereignty over them. Therefore, from the legal perspective, the Diaoyu Islands are not suitable to be called "the territories under the administration of Japan" as stipulated in Article 5 and the Japan–US Security Treaty is not applicable to these islands. Back then the USA gave Japan the administration of the Diaoyu Islands without authorization, which constituted an interference with China's territorial sovereignty. Today, the USA views these islands whose sovereignty it believes is unsettled as the territories under the administration of Japan and offers military protection of them, which constitutes a more serious violation of China's territorial sovereignty.

In 2014 and 2015, Prime Minister Abe urged twice American President Obama to admit that the Diaoyu Islands were under the rule of Japan and therefore Article 5 of the Japan–US Security Treaty was applicable to them. One of the purposes of this is to encourage the USA to give up its original ambiguous and neutral attitude of not taking a position on the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands and indirectly recognize that the islands belong to Japan. All this will not change the fact that the Diaoyu Islands are part of Chinese territory and their legal status as such.

3. *According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "As for Kuba Island (Huangwei Islet) and Taisho Island (Chiwei Islet), the Government of Japan has offered them to the United States since 1972 as facilities/districts in Japan under the Japan–US Status of Forces Agreement."*[48] *"From the 1950s onward, the US military used some of the Senkaku Islands/the Diaoyu Islands (Taisho Island/Chiwei Islet and Kuba Island/Huangwei Islet) as firing/bombing ranges while the islands were under the administration of the United States, but there is no record of China ever having protested it during that period."*[49]

Comments: Following World War II, the USA occupied Ryukyu, stationed its troops in Taiwan, and established firing and bombing ranges, respectively, on Huangwei Islet in 1955 and on Chiwei Islet in 1956. In response, the government of the People's Republic of China issued a statement on territorial waters on September 4, 1958, which is applicable to Taiwan and the surrounding islands. The statement noted that all foreign airplanes and military vessels shall not enter China's territorial waters and airspace over them without the permission of the government the People's Republic of China. The statement pointed out that Taiwan and the Penghu Islands were currently under the armed occupation of the USA, which was an illegal act that violated the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the People's

[48] http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

[49] http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

Republic of China and that the Chinese government had the right to take all appropriate measures to recover these territories at an appropriate time. These territories of course included the Diaoyu Islands.

In 1972, the USA reverted Okinawa to Japan and made Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet as bases not to be returned. In fact, since June 1978, the USA has stopped firing and bombing exercises on Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet. So far, the USA has not expressed its willingness to return these islands to Japan. The Japanese government also deems it necessary to continue leaving these firing/bombing ranges at the disposal of the US military. This is a staggering intervention in China's territorial sovereignty and is also a move made by Japan to hold US troops hostages in its confrontation with China. China is utterly opposed to this.

The two sides of the Taiwan Strait shared basically the same stance on the issue of the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, though they adopted different attitudes toward the US military presence on Taiwan. The government of the People's Republic of China had always been opposed to the USA stationing its troops in Taiwan and making Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet its firing and bombing ranges. It was stated in the editorial of the *People's Daily* on May 18, 1971, "The US imperialists have firing ranges on China's Diaoyu Islands and other islands and include these military facilities on their military maps. This is evidence of their aggression against China and can absolutely not change the ironclad fact that the Diaoyu Islands are part of Chinese territory."[50] The Taiwan authorities supported the USA in stationing its troops in Taiwan and establishing firing and bombing ranges on the Diaoyu Islands, provided it viewed the islands were affiliated with Taiwan and were not Japanese territory.

4. *According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Since fishermen from Taiwan frequently intruded into territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) and made unlawful landing thereon, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan sent a Note Verbale to Ambassador of the United States of America to Japan on August 3, 1968, requesting the US Government to take necessary steps to control and regulate the intruders and to prevent any recurrence of intrusions. The US side replied that expulsion of intruders and other measures had been taken." "A secret intelligence report produced by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1971, which was approved for release in 2007, stated that 'the Senkakus (Diaoyu Islands) are commonly considered as part of the large Ryukyu Island chain,' and that 'the Japanese claim to sovereignty over the Senkakus (Diaoyu Islands) is strong, and the burden of proof of ownership would seem to fall on the Chinese.'"*[51]

Comments: From the time when World War II came to an end to 1968, fishermen of Taiwan had free access to the waters around the Diaoyu Islands for fishing

[50]"The Reactionary Eisaku Sato Government Plays a New Trick in an Attempt to Seize the Diaoyu Islands," Chin. ed., *People's Daily*, May 18, 1971.

[51]http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

purposes and Japan didn't raise objections. Japanese fishing boats stopped fishing operations in these waters in 1955 and the waters had become an important fishing ground where Taiwan's fishermen were very active. It wasn't until August 1968 that Japan suggested that the USA bar the people of Taiwan from fishing in these waters. This was directly related to the Japanese attempt to work with the USA in exploring the petroleum resources around the waters of the Diaoyu Islands. All this was a preparation made by Japan to seize China's Diaoyu Islands on the strength of the USA.

Following the founding of the People's Republic of China, the USA was hostile to China and entered into an alliance with Japan. The secret intelligence report produced by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1971 didn't specify who commonly considers the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) as a part of the large Ryukyu Island chain. Definitely, only Japan does that; the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and the international community do not. Except Japan, no other countries have been heard saying that "the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) have been part of the large Ryukyu Island chain since ancient times." This judgment of the Central Intelligence Agency hasn't even been used by the US government when deciding the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. Japan's use this biased intelligence analysis made by the US intelligence agency in disregard of facts as the basis for its sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands shows that Japan really has no other basis.

After all, the America intelligence officers who jumped to that conclusion had not learned a lot about ancient Chinese documents serving as evidence of the Diaoyu Islands as part of China and ancient Japanese diplomatic and historical archives. Therefore, they could hardly find out the truth concerning the sovereignty over these islands. Depending only on Japan's rhetoric, they came to the wrong conclusion. Larry A. Niksch, Specialist in Asian Affairs with the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, wrote *Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute: The U.S. Legal Relations* in 1996, stating that the Japanese emperor issued a decree on January 14, 1895, claiming that the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) belonged to Japan. This statement has at least two mistakes. One is that there isn't such a thing as the decree the emperor issued on January 14, 1895. Second, Decree 13 on the Establishment of the Okinawa Prefecture that was promulgated on March 7, 1896, and became effective on April 1 of the same year didn't include the Diaoyu Islands or the Senkaku Islands at all or mention them because the term "Senkaku Islands" had not been coined yet.

So far, the US government has made its policy choices to pursue its pragmatic diplomatic strategic interests and cater to its ideological tastes. Over these long years, the exchange of the information on the Diaoyu Islands between the USA and Japan has been more frequent than that between China and the USA. The Japanese government and the scholars it hires create lies to facilitate its seizure of the Diaoyu Islands, which easily misleads US analysts. However, any analysis that is not based on facts has no legal basis at all.

5. *According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with regards to the Yoshihiko Noda cabinet's decision that the Government of Japan would*

purchase the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands), "the Government of Japan has been explaining to the Chinese government from a broad perspective that the recent ownership transfer was aimed at maintaining and managing the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) peacefully and stably on a long-term basis and that the transfer is nothing more than returning the ownership from a private citizen to the Government, with which the ownership rested until 1932. The Government of Japan, as a country sharing responsibility for the peace and stability of East Asia, will continue to call upon the Chinese side to behave calmly without losing sight of the overall relationship between the two countries."[52]

Comments: In 2012, Shintaro Ishihara, a representative of the Japanese Right Wing, incited the Japanese public into making donations for the purchase of the Diaoyu Islands, thus stirring up trouble. The Yoshihiko Noda cabinet not only failed to stop this action but also announced that the government would purchase the islands, leading to a drastic worsening of China–Japan relations. This is more like doing serious harm to the bilateral relations than approaching the matter from a broad perspective.

In order to get China to accept the fast of Japan's purchase of the islands, Japan created deceptive explanations. One of these is that the purchase of islands was aimed at the Japanese government's maintaining and managing the islands peacefully and stable on a long-term basis. In fact, this is actually an international law catchphrase, an important part of the principle of acquisitive prescription under which a country occupies the territory of another country or disputed territory. However, the principle is very simple: how can China's inherent territory be maintained and managed by the Japanese government peacefully and stable on a long-term basis. The Yoshihiko Noda cabinet's purchase of the islands led China to make patrols of the waters around the Diaoyu Islands regular, thus foiling Japan's attempt to seize the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands under the principle of acquisitive prescription.

The Japanese statement that the transfer of ownership "is nothing more than returning the ownership from a private citizen to the Government, with which the ownership rested until 1932" can hardly hide the important historical fact: In 1895, Japan stole the Diaoyu Islands during the Sino-Japanese War and began to exercise colonial rule of Taiwan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Following that, the Japanese government let the Diaoyu Islands to Tatsushiro Koga for colonial development in September 1896 and sold the islands to Koga's son Zanji Koga at low prices for continued colonial development. However, both the Japanese government's right to rule the Diaoyu Islands in 1895 and the private ownership of them acquired in 1932 are based on Japan's war of aggression and colonial rule. Therefore, after Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration and announced its surrender in 1945, it must return to China all the territories seized from China since the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. From the international law perspective, the privileges Japan enjoyed in the Diaoyu Islands and the basis it had for its

[52]http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

occupation of them during its colonial rule of Taiwan have all been scrapped. The purpose of Japan's purchase of the islands in 2012 was to, by completing the so-called formalities for the transfer of ownership, restore Japan's rights and interests it enjoyed during its colonial rule of Taiwan. This inevitably aroused the strong opposition of China and led to its effective countermeasures.

The Japanese government has a guilty conscience and cannot do anything about China's measures for protecting its sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. While "continuing to call upon the Chinese side to behave calmly without losing sight of the overall relationship between the two countries," the Japanese government stubbornly sticks to its position of not holding dialogue with China about the sovereignty dispute about the Diaoyu Islands. In addition, Japan has done more to view China as its arch military rival and formulated the defense plan and military program against the "China threat" to step up its military deployments aimed at China. Japan obviously targeted China when it lifted the ban on collective defense, revised the three principles of arms exports, helped amend the Guidelines for Japan–US Defense Cooperation and formulated new security laws.

Since 2012 Sino-Japanese trade relations have been seriously hurt and bilateral relations have entered a vicious cycle of "both political and economic confrontation." All this was caused by the Japanese government's wrong decision to purchase the islands and its refusal to hold talks with China about the existing dispute over territorial sovereignty. The Japanese government is to blame. This inevitably led the Diaoyu Islands issue to spin out of the track of bilateral diplomatic consultation and control and plunged the two countries in the vicious cycle of confrontation in terms of popular sentiment, on-the-spot law enforcement and military security.

6. *According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "None of the arguments that the Chinese government or Taiwanese authorities have presented as historical, geographic or geological grounds is valid evidence under international law to support the Chinese assertion of its territorial sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands). Under international law, for example, the discovery of an island or geographical proximity alone does not evidence the assertion of territorial sovereignty. Recently, China has been asserting that it has historically owned the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) (meaning that it has not been terra nullius) based on many historical documents and maps existing in China. However, the contents of these documents, are completely insufficient as evidence to support China's assertion when those original documents are examined."*[53]

Comments: These statements do not deny the authenticity and validity of China's historical documents and maps; they merely subjectively maintain that they "are completely insufficient" as evidence to support China's assertion,

[53]http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.

However, the Japanese do not explain why they "are completely insufficient." If that means the evidence China has had so far is insufficient, the country can of course produce more evidence. Any way China's evidence is quite sufficient while Japan does not have any historical documents and maps proving that Japan was the first to discover and own the Diaoyu Islands.

From the international law perspective, a key piece of evidence of the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands in which country was the first to discover, name, use, and administer them and islands affiliated with them. According to the discovery and occupation principle of the ancient traditional international law prevailing in Europe in the fifteenth century, discovering known territory is a sufficient legal right to claim territorial sovereignty. Valid occupation doesn't necessarily mean establishing administration institutions on the newly discovered territory or settling people down there. With regard to uninhabited islands hard to settle down, conducting patrols regularly or only when necessary will do, and the world of international law in Japan also agrees to this.[54]

In the Sui Dynasty (581–618), China sent people to Ryukyu via Diaoyu Island (known as Gaohua Islet at the time) and incorporated the Diaoyu Islands into its scope of coastal defense in the Ming Dynasty (1358–1644). According to the history of Ming China, in 1373 and 1374 Ming Emperor Taizu had Zhang He and Wu Zhen lead vessels on patrols of the Fujian Sea and drive Japanese pirates to the Ryukyu Sea. This opened the maritime tributary route between China and Japan and established China's right to administer the security of the maritime route to and from the Diaoyu Islands.

The Map of Coastal Islands, included in the *Illustrations on Defense against Japanese Pirates* written in 1561 by Zheng Ruozeng and Hu Zongxian, noted Ming generals who fought Japanese pirates, and the Fujian Coastal Islands Map for Coastal Defense (2) in the military treatise *National Defense* written by Mao Yuanyi in 1621 marked Diaoyu Islet, Huangwei Island, and Chi Islet as Chinese territory and viewed them as the maritime frontline for fighting Japanese pirates in Zhejiang and Fujian.

If Japan doesn't think that ancient Chinese documents can prove that the Diaoyu Islands belong to China, then it should have a closer look at how these islands were recorded in relevant Japanese maps and documents from the time when the Japanese Ministry of the Navy was founded to 1894 when the Sino-Japanese War broke out. Just as I wrote in Chap. 4 above, in the Map of Coastal Provinces of the Qing Dynasty produced by the Japanese Navy's Waterways Department in 1875 based on the maps and documents of the British Navy and China's Map of the Qing Dynasty, Diaoyu Islet, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet were included in Chinese territory as northeastern islands of Taiwan and this was approved by the Japanese

[54]The Japanese Society of International Law, *International Law Dictionary,* Chin. ed., Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1985, pp. 278–279.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All the waterways annals published by the Japanese Ministry of the Navy also included the Diaoyu Islands as northeastern islands of Taiwan. In addition, following its on-the-spot survey of the Diaoyu Islands in 1845, the British Navy has always affirmed them as the northeastern islands of Taiwan, China and named them in their southern Fujian dialect pronunciations. All this undoubtedly is effective evidence that the Diaoyu Islands were Chinese inherent territory, but not terra nullius, before they were stolen by Japan in 1895.

Chapter 7
Refutation of Japan's Challenges and the Future of the China–Japan Relations

In April 2015, the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology announced that beginning in 2016 all junior and senior high-school books must reflect the Japanese government position that "the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) are Japan's inherent territory." This shows that the Japanese government has stepped up its efforts to strengthen the guidance of the Japanese people over the Diaoyu Islands issue. However, taking the islands Japan stole from China during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 as "Japan's inherent territory" will not have long-term negative effect on the future China–Japan relations; on the contrary, that will have very serious negative effect on fostering moral character in Japan. This will inevitably keep the Chinese from promoting bilateral friendship while shelving the Diaoyu Islands issue.

7.1 China Has Never Recognized the Diaoyu Islands as Part of Japan

The position of the Japanese government and some Japanese scholars on the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands and their basis for their proposition totally disregard basic historical facts. In addition, there are some deceptive views that China once recognized the Diaoyu Islands as part of the Empire of Japan.

1. *According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "There is a description of "the Senkaku Islands, Yaeyama District, Okinawa Prefecture, Empire of Japan" in the letter of appreciation dated May 1920 sent from then consul of the Republic of China in Nagasaki concerning the distress which involved Chinese fishermen from Fujian Province around the Senkaku Islands."*[1]

[1] http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html

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
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中華民國八年冬福建省惠安縣漁民
郭合順等三十一人遭風遇難飄泊至
日本帝國沖繩縣八重山郡尖閣列島
內和洋島承
日本帝國八重山郡石垣村雇玉代勢
孫伴君熱心救護使得生還故國洵屬
救災恤鄰當仁不讓深堪感佩特贈斯
狀以表謝忱

中華民國駐長崎領事馮冕

中華民國九年五月 二十 日

Fig. 7.1 So-called letter of appreciation from Feng Mian, Consul of the Republic of China in Nagasaki, to Japan, 1920

This kind of evidence Japan produced from the period of its colonial rule of Taiwan is meaningless in itself and this only shows that Japan really cannot find any other evidence. This "letter of appreciation" was presented by Feng Mian, consul of the Republic of China in Nagasaki, to a villager at Ishigaki Village, Yaeyama District in the Empire of Japan, on May 20 in the ninth year of the Republic of China (1920). Part of the letter reads, "In the winter of the eighth year of the Republic of China (1919), 31 fishermen including Guo Heshun from Hui'an County, Fujian Province were lost due to the stormy wind and were washed ashore on the Wayo Island of the Senkaku Islands, Yaeyama District, Okinawa Prefecture in the Empire of Japan in the eighth year of the Republic of China" (see Fig. 7.1). As a result, Japan believes that this is "the most convincing evidence of China's recognition of the Senkaku Islands as Japanese territory."

However, no matter whether this letter is authentic or not, an analysis of historical facts will lead to the conclusion that it cannot prove the point. This is because Japan had seized China's Taiwan Province in 1895 through the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki and stolen the Diaoyu Islands, which were affiliated with Taiwan, approximately three months earlier and the Diaoyu Islands and this remained so until 1945 when Japan surrendered following its defeat in the war. The letter only represented the understanding of some Chinese when Taiwan and the Diaoyu Islands were under the control of Japan and cannot serve as evidence of

the Diaoyu Islands as Japan's inherent territory. This kind of so-called evidence derived from the period of Japanese rule of Taiwan cannot prove the point.

Moreover, there isn't such a thing as Wayo Island, because neither China nor Japan had referred to Diaoyu Island as Wayo Island. Japan renamed China's Diaoyu Island "Uotsuri Island," "Hai-Pin-San," and "Koba Island," but it never named it "Wayo Island." According to my investigation, this mistake could have originated from a report and letter written by then Okinawa Prefecture Governor Sosuke Kawagoe. He used "Hai-Pin-San" in his letter to the Japanese Interior Minister on January 21, 1920, but he used "Wayo Island" instead in his letters to the Secretary of Trade of the Japanese Foreign Minister and the Japanese Interior Minister dated February 17 and March 20 of the same year, respectively. I reckon that because the Okinawa Prefecture governor didn't really know much about Diaoyu Island or did it for other purposes, he first wrote Diaoyu Island as Hai-Pin-San and later changed to Wayo Island.

2. *On January 8, 1953, the People's Daily stated "the Ryukyu Islands consist of seven groups of islands including the Senkaku Islands." The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs exaggerated this to mean that the Chinese government recognized the Diaoyu Islands as the "Senkaku Islands."*

This wrongly translated article cannot represent the position of the Chinese government. I have found out that appearing in the *People's Daily* on January 8, 1953, this anonymous article is titled "The People of the Ryukyu Islands Struggle against the US Occupation" and is a translation of Japanese and English information. The article not only mistakenly says that the Ryukyu Islands include the Senkaku Islands but also mistakes as part of the Ryukyu Islands the Tokara Islands and the Osumi Islands of the Satsunan Islands in Kagoshima Prefecture.

These mistakes made by the newspaper have indeed led to the misunderstanding of the readers, but they don't represent the position and view of the Chinese government or the *People's Daily*. This article mentioned the US' military base at Kadena (嘉手纳) three times. The Japanese name Kadena was transliterated as "Kataina (卡台那)" by the media in Taiwan from an American media report. The *People's Daily* article used this transliteration (see Fig. 7.2). As the article used the place names of Okinawa Prefecture transliterated by American media reports, it is natural that it could make mistakes concerning the scope of the Ryukyu Islands by using the Japanese definition.

This was confirmed to be true by the 90-year-old Meng Xianmo in 2012. Liu Shuiming, a senior reporter at the International Department of the *People's Daily*, paid a visit to Mr. Meng in 2012. He found out the fact and stated that the article made serious mistakes with the facts. Meng Xianmo became a reporter at the *People's Daily* in May 1950, was made the chief of the newspaper's International Information Section in 1953 and was in charge of collecting and reporting relevant information. He recalled that the *People's Daily* didn't subscribe Japanese newspapers and its main sources of information from Japan was Japan's radio The Voice of Japan, English and Russian newspapers and periodicals, and newspapers from



琉球人民不得不挺身起來用各種方式展開反對美國佔領者的鬥爭。最初，爲飢餓所迫的琉球人民，開始奪取美軍物資，後來逐漸發展爲公開襲擊美軍並大量奪取軍用物資。據日本報紙消息：前年一月沖繩島嘉手納機場航空隊的太巴斯（譯音）兵營就被奪去了九十七件軍火物資。去年一月二十一日，嘉手納機場航空隊第十八號火藥庫又丟失了火藥七噸半。島上美軍的軍火倉庫，經常「無故」爆炸。例如一九四八年八月，在沖繩島附近的一個小島上，美軍的軍火庫就爆炸了一天一夜，把美軍儲藏在該島的軍火全部炸毀。去年從台灣傳出的美國新聞電訊中，曾透露琉球人民游擊隊和美國佔領軍展開了激烈鬥爭，琉球人民且曾潛入沖繩島的卡台那（譯音）機場中將機場破壞。

被迫爲美軍工作的琉球工人不斷地進行罷工、怠工以反抗美軍的奴役。去年六月，沖繩島建築美國軍事工程的琉球工人，不顧美軍的禁令，舉行了要求提高工資的鬥爭，得到了全島工人的支持。七

Fig. 7.2 "Information," *People's Daily*, January 8, 1953

Hong Kong and Taiwan. Therefore, Meng Xianmo was certain that the *People's Daily* article was a translation or compilation work.[2] The translation and compilation mistakes of the article absolutely do not represent the position of the Chinese government and are meaningless in law.

The common knowledge about journalism suggests that not all article carried by newspapers represent the position of the government. There are no such newspapers in the world, and the *People's Daily,* the most authoritative Party newspaper in China, is no exception. This is because a newspaper can publish different levels of contents as follows:

First, government documents, statements, and leaders' speeches that represent the country's government position and views.
Second, editorials that represent the newspaper's views as well as the views the political party or organization the newspaper is affiliated with.

[2]Beijing China-Japan Journalism Promote Council (ed.), *The Sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands,* Chin. ed., Beijing: People's Daily Press, p. 28.

Third, signed articles that mainly represent the authors' views, not the views of the government or the newspaper.
Fourth, reports by the newspaper's reporters that represent the newspaper's journalist and editing competence and do not represent the views of the government or the newspaper.
Fifth, articles concerning the background of the main reports of the newspaper only represent the professional competence of the newspaper's personnel in charge of information work and do not represent the views of the newspaper.

All this knowledge concerning journalism is of critical importance to determine from the international law perspective the value of this *People's Daily* article as legal evidence.

3. *One piece of evidence of the Japanese government is the World Atlas Collection China, published in 1958 and reprinted in 1960, that "treated the Diaoyu Islands as part of Okinawa Prefecture."*

This is an overgeneralization that cannot hold ground. It must be made clear that on its title page, the *World Atlas Collections* published by the China Cartographic Publishing House in 1958 and 1960 have notes which read, "Parts of China's borders were produced based on the map of the *Shen Bao* newspaper before the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression broke out in 1937" (1958) and "Parts of China's borders were produced based on the *Shen Bao* newspaper before 1946 when China's War of Liberation broke out" (1960) (see Fig. 7.3).

Fig. 7.3 *World Atlas Collection*, published in China in 1960

Fig. 7.4 Map of Japan in the *World Atlas by Countries,* published by the China Cartographic Publishing House in 1953

The Shanghai-based *Shen Bao* newspaper had a long history. It exposed Japan's attempt to seize the Diaoyu Islands, part of the northeastern islands of Taiwan, in September 1885. Japan took over the newspaper when the Japanese troops seized Shanghai. The maps published by the newspaper before the breakout of the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression were about the territory of Japan during its colonial rule of Taiwan from 1895 to 1945. It is natural that the 1956 edition of the world atlas excluded Taiwan from the territory of Japan because it was a postwar publication.

The notes in the *World Atlas Collections* published by the China Cartographic Publishing House in 1958 and 1960 prove that the map producers had their own position on part of China's borders with other countries. Therefore, parts of these maps were cited from the maps produced before the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949 or before the War of Resistance against broke out in 1937, and obviously cannot represent the position of the government of the People's Republic of China.

It must be emphatically pointed out that before this event, the Ryukyu Islands were not included in the map of Japan in the *World Atlas by Countries,* published by the China Cartographic Publishing House in 1953 (see Fig. 7.4). This reflects the international community's understanding of the postwar Japanese territory.

It must be also noted that in the *World Atlas by Countries* published the China Cartographic Publishing House in 1956, the Diaoyu Islands or the so-called Senkaku Islands were not included in Japanese territory. In the atlas, the Diaoyu

Fig. 7.5 Map of Japan in the *World Atlas by Countries,* published by the China Cartographic Publishing House in 1956

Islands were deliberately excluded from the scope of the Ryukyu Islands. A note on the reverse of the atlas cover reads, "China's border in this atlas was produced based on the Map of the People's Republic of China published by the China Cartographic Publishing House" (see Fig. 7.5).

Published before the 1958 and 1960 editions of the maps, this *World Atlas by Countries* published in 1956 shows that as early as 1956 China had realized that the Diaoyu Islands were not included in the map of Japan or Okinawa Prefecture. Therefore, Japan should not judge the Chinese government's position on the Diaoyu Islands based on the 1958 or 1960 edition of the *World Atlas Collection.*

4. *The map produced by a member of the Japanese House of Representatives backfired to prove that the Diaoyu Islands belong to China.*

Yoshiaki Harada, member of the Japanese House of Representatives and Chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party International Intelligence Committee, submitted in March 2015, a map of China published by the China National Administration of Surveying and Mapping in 1969. The official Web site of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs posted the map on March 16 of the same year, stressing that the term "Senkaku Islands" was used in the map. However, this map can only prove that the Diaoyu Islands are Chinese territory and that incorporated into Fujian and Taiwan Provinces, China, Chiwei Islet is the easternmost island of Taiwan, China.

In fact, there was nothing new to the map discovered by Yoshiaki Harada and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs posted the atlas too late. The atlas had long been posted online by others, though mostly in details to prove that China recognized the Japanese terms "Senkaku Islands" and "Uotsuri Island" and stress that China "recognizes these islands as part of Japan." However, you can't see the wood for the trees. The conclusion drawn from the wrong names of some single islands can only backfire.

This atlas, which had remained a "secret" for more than 40 years, was produced by the Institute of Mapping of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1965 and published by China's National Administration of Mapping and Surveying in 1969. On page 18 of the atlas is the map of Fujian and Taiwan Provinces. The Diaoyu Islands extend beyond the map edge and are marked as part of Taiwan Province, China (see Figs. 7.6 and 7.7). This fully shows that the Diaoyu Islands belong to China and that Japan falsely claimed that before 1971 China had not realized the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands.

On March 18, 2015, Hong Lei, a spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stressed at a regular press conference that first, the map of 1969 proved that the Diaoyu Islands were part of China and to be more specific, they were part of Taiwan Province, and second, it reflected the historical facts that Japan invaded and occupied Taiwan and stole the Diaoyu Islands. Hong Lei was referring to the map of Fujian and Taiwan Provinces in the *Atlas of the People's Republic of China by Provinces*. In order to give a complete coverage to the areas under the jurisdiction



Fig. 7.6 *Atlas of the People's Republic of China by Provinces,* Produced in 1965 and Published in 1969 (in details) with some wrong island names and including the Diaoyu Islands



Fig. 7.7 *Atlas of the People's Republic of China by Provinces*, published in 1969, Lets the Diaoyu Islands extend beyond the map edge and marks them as part of Taiwan Province

of these provinces, northern Fujian, southern Taiwan and the Diaoyu Islands and the nearby waters extend beyond the map borders. This strongly proves that the Diaoyu Islands are part of China.

Hong Lei stated that China was the first to discover the Diaoyu Islands, had the long valid administration of them and included the Diaoyu Islands as Chinese territory in many of the maps of the Ming and Qing maps. Shortly before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, the term Diaoyu Islands was widely used in Western maps and clearly marked them as part of China. Following the war, Japan exercised long colonial rule of Taiwan including its affiliated islands, and because of this changes were made in the name of the Diaoyu Islands in maps. Following the end of World War II, the Diaoyu Islands were returned to China under relevant international law documents. The Japanese colonial rule and its reflection in the maps can absolutely change the fact that the Diaoyu Islands belong to China.[3]

Yoshiaki Harada simply dismissed the statement or explanation of the spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or probably he had no knowledge of them at all. On March 24 of the same year, Yoshiaki Harada displayed this atlas at a Japanese reporters' club again and explained his wrong view to reporters from Japan and elsewhere. However, this backfired when Harada was challenged by a

[3]On March 18, 2015, Hong Lei, a spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, met the press: see http://henan.china.com.cn/news/2015/0319/195771.shtml.

reporter with the Chinese official Xinhua News Agency. By producing this atlas of China, Japanese politicians and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan not only failed to make other countries acquire a better understanding of its stance but also made it possible for people to clearly realize that the Diaoyu Islands, including Chiwei Islet, were marked as part of Chinese territory in the 1969 map of Taiwan Province, China. The map shows that the Diaoyu Islands undoubtedly belong to China.

Nevertheless, taking the atlas as the evidence, Yoshiaki Harada prepared the written statement addressed to Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Wang Jiarui, the then Minister of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, on June 3, 2015, condemning Chinese public service vessels for "intruding into Japanese territorial waters" and demanding they immediately stop that action. Harada also said that he would bring the atlas to China and use it to communicate widely with China and the international community.

In late October of the same year, Harada and I had a meeting in Beijing. I made the following explanations about his views and atlas.

First, produced in 1965 and printed in 1969, this atlas is really there. In the complete map of Fujian and Taiwan Provinces, the Diaoyu Islands and islands affiliated with them extend beyond the edge as part of Taiwan Province. This is sufficient to prove that China affirmed that the Diaoyu Islands were islands affiliated with Taiwan in 1965 at the latest.

Second, because the atlas is labeled "confidential," it has not been made public. This time Mr. Harada made the atlas public, objectively making it possible for China to publicly cite the atlas as evidence that the Diaoyu Islands belong to China. That's what I should thank him for.

Third, the atlas is not without flaws. For example, the terms "Senkaku Islands" and "Uotsuri Island" were used in the atlas, but this was wrong due to the influence of Japan's 50-year colonial rule of Taiwan.

Fourth, Japan enlarged the map in details online so that the border of the map cannot be seen extend beyond, so Japan is suspected of misleading the public.

Mr. Harada said that Japan had been exercising "stable rule" of the islands following 1895 and asked me why China hadn't made its own assertions until the possibility of the existence of petroleum resources in the East China Sea was indicated in 1971. I told him that the Diaoyu Islands had been part of China since ancient times. The so-called "stable rule" was something during the period of Japanese colonial rule of Taiwan from 1895 when Japan stole China's Diaoyu Islands to 1945. Back then China's Taiwan and all the islands affiliated with it had been ceded to Japan. On the part of China, when its coat was looted, it could not ask to keep the buttons. In August 1945, Japan was defeated in the war and accepted the Potsdam Declaration, so it must return to China Taiwan including the Diaoyu Islands. From 1945 to 1972, Okinawa Prefecture was under the exclusive occupation of the USA and was not under the rule of Japan, and the People's Republic of China had kept lodging protests and making presentations with the USA, demanding the US military withdraw from Taiwan and Ryukyu. As the USA left the administration of the Diaoyu Islands to Japan without authorization when it

returned Okinawa to Japan, there has been a Diaoyu Islands dispute between China and Japan since 1971. China and Japan once shelved this sensitive question in order to develop bilateral relations.

After the Yoshihiko Noda cabinet decided to "buy" the Diaoyu Islands in 2012, China began to send its public service vessels for regular law enforcement patrols in its territorial waters around the Diaoyu Islands, so the so-called Japanese "stable rule" is not simply there. Japan should stop blaming the Chinese public service vessels for "intruding into Japanese territorial waters," which is a serious mislead of the Japanese public. If the Chinese government and media blamed Japan Coast Guard vessels for "intruding into Chinese territorial waters," it can be imagined how that would affect bilateral relations. The two sides should conduct dialogue about the Diaoyu Islands issue; they should not confront each other over that issue: confrontation leads nowhere.

When Mr. Harada produced the British map, I told him that there were similarities between the map and the one published by Germany in 1872. However, the line extending northwest between the Yaeyama Islands and Taiwan does not represent the border but probably represents an ordinary sea lane. In the map Diaoyu Island is written in the southern Fujian dialect pronunciation and has the same color as Taiwan. In the 1882 edition of the map, even the Yaeyama Islands and the Miyako Islands are yellow, the same color as Taiwan has and quite different from dark green, the color for Okinawa islands. Ancient or modern European and American maps didn't use Japan-invented names for the Diaoyu Islands such as Uotsuri Island and Kuba Island; they all used the southern Fujian dialect pronunciations of these islands. All this shows that in the eyes of the Westerners, the Diaoyu Islands are part of China. I stated that the views the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed on March 8, 1972, over the Diaoyu Islands issue, didn't have any historical or legal basis and were utterly wrong. No evidence Japan produced held ground.

Following a thorough face-to-face conversation, Mr. Harada didn't challenge my explanations. Before we said good-bye, Harada said that Japanese and Chinese scholars should hold in-depth discussions of the sovereignty over these islands with the participation of experts and scholars from a third country such as the USA. I agreed to this idea and hoped that could happen soon.

This debate with Mr. Harada made me realize that if China and Japan didn't conduct thoroughgoing exchanges over the Diaoyu Islands issue like this, misunderstanding would not only affect feelings of the two peoples and do serious harm to the friendship built between them over the years but also might lead to conflict and even war. In this sense, high-quality cultural and people-to-people exchanges and public diplomacy between China and Japan should not avoid this issue and should be strengthened. This should ensure that reasonable dialogue replaces suspicion and confrontation.

The reality we must face is that the fact and evidence of the Diaoyu Islands as part of China are there and there are quite many relevant research results, but Japan has its own position and views, so it is necessary to make a thorough investigation and respond to the issue directly. It is worth particular attention that many of the

views the Japanese government and some Japanese scholars have repeated over and over again are full of deliberately fabricated lies and resort to sophistry characterized by disguised replacement of concepts. In order to prove that these islands belong to Japan, they do their utmost to negate and distort the significance of Chinese historical materials, defend the position of the Japanese government from the so-called international law perspective, and step up their propaganda. This is a challenge to China and presents Chinese scholars with a very good opportunity for further studies on the Diaoyu Islands issue. With regard to the wrong views of Japan, every important historical event must be investigated carefully, analyses must be made to prove they are wrong, a complete chain of evidence, including circumstantial evidence, must be formed, and explanations must be made from the international law perspective.

It must be admitted though that some records Qing China made concerning the sovereignty over Taiwan were wrong, thus affecting to some degree the records about the sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. Following World War II, some maps and materials in China on both sides of the Taiwan Strait were influenced by the maps produced during Japanese colonial rule of Taiwan and wrongly copied the island names and records used by Japan before 1945. These mistakes must be corrected and cannot be understood to represent the position of the Chinese government.

7.2 Japan Discredits China's Evidence but Fails to Prove the Diaoyu Islands Are Part of Japan's Inherent Territory

As Japan does not have any historical or legal evidence of the Diaoyu Islands being part of Japan before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, it has to resort to the tactics of downplaying and defaming the historical and legal evidence in favor of China's sovereignty and swearing black is white. During recent years, Japan has been seeking evidence and breakthroughs in favor of its claim from the loopholes in the documents and maps. In this section, I will refute the common wrong views of Japan.

1. *Some Japanese mistakenly believe that China had not raised objections in the 76 years following Japan's occupation of the Diaoyu Islands in 1895 and that it didn't suddenly make territorial claims over these islands until 1971 when petroleum was discovered there.*[4]

[4]Shigeyoshi Ozaki, "Why the Senkaku Islands Are Part of Japan: Historical and Legal Basis," Jpn. ed., *WEDGE,* January 2013.

I must first clarify that there is no such a fact that Japan has occupied the Diaoyu Islands for 76 years and that it was Japan that didn't stress its ownership of the Diaoyu Islands until 1971 when petroleum was discovered there.

The 76 years are divided into two stages. One is the first 50 years since 1895 when along with Taiwan, the Diaoyu Islands were under the colonial rule of Japan. China's Qing government was forced to sign the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki under which Taiwan and the islands affiliated with it were ceded to Japan. This made it impossible for China to raise objections. The stage is the 26 years from 1945 to 1971 during which the Diaoyu Islands were actually under the control of the USA which stationed troops in Taiwan and the Ryukyu Islands and were not occupied by Japan. At that stage, the government of the People's Republic of China repeatedly demanded that the USA withdraw from Taiwan and Ryukyu. The following facts are undeniable:

First, during the 50 years when Japan occupied Taiwan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, Taiwan and the islands affiliated with it were under Japan's colonial rule. During this special historical stage, China was not in a position even to raise objections to Japan concerning the sovereignty over Taiwan, so how could it raise objections to Japan's theft of the uninhabited Diaoyu Islands? If Japan asks today why China didn't raise objections to Japan's occupation of Taiwan in the 50 years since 1895, this will sound strange to those who understand this section of history. Will this enable Japan to announce that Taiwan is part of Japan, not China? Surely not.

Second, following World War II, the USA stationed its troops in Taiwan and occupied Ryukyu. The government of the People's Republic of China voiced opposition to this time and time again, demanding the USA withdraw its troops. As I said earlier, in May 1950 when the Chinese government was about to take part in talks about a peace treaty with Japan, it was proposed in the draft plan for peace talks that the Diaoyu Islands, including Chiwei Islet, be incorporated into Taiwan and returned to China and the scope of Okinawa be limited to the 36 Ryukyu Islands.[5] However, as China was barred from the San Francisco Peace Conference, this proposition was not officially voiced at the conference, but this suffices to prove that China affirmed that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to China. Afterward, Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai issued three statements in 1950 and 1951 in opposition to the US administration of Ryukyu and stating that the peace treaty without the participation of China was illegal and invalid. At the same time, the Chinese government demanded that the USA withdraw its troops from Okinawa and China's Taiwan and was opposed to the US military making islands affiliated with Diaoyu Island firing and bombing ranges.

Third, in the postwar years from 1945 to 1969, Japan no longer viewed the Diaoyu Islands as Japanese islands and it even regarded the Ryukyu Islands as part of the USA which had the right of administration to these islands. For example, in

[5]"Draft Proposals for China's Territorial Claims in Its Peace Treaty with Japan," Chin. ed., May 15, 1950, pp. 74, 75.

July 1967, the Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato responded at the National Diet of Japan to the question of the people of Taiwan residing in the Diaoyu Islands, "Japan does not have the right of administration to Okinawa… direct dialogue could be held with Taiwan if necessary, but it is only appropriate that the issue is raised by the one who has the right of administration (the USA)."[6]

Fourth, in the early 1970s, the Chinese government strongly condemned on several occasions Japan and the USA for infringing upon China's sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. In November 1970, Japan attempted to work with the Republic of Korea and Taiwan authorities in energy and resource development in the waters around the Diaoyu Islands. In response, China's *People's Daily* carried a Xinhua News Agency article strongly condemning the move on December 4 of the same year. On December 29 that year, the *People's Daily* published a commendatory, stating that, "Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, Chiwei Islet, Nanxiao Island, Beixiao Island, and other islands have been Chinese territory along with Taiwan since ancient times." On June 17, 1971, Japan and the USA signed the Okinawa Reversion Agreement, incorporating the Diaoyu Islands into the scope of territory to be returned to Japan without authorization. On December 30 of the same year, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs solemnly stated, "Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, Chiwei Islet, Nanxiao Island, Beixiao Island, and other islands are affiliated with Taiwan. Along with Taiwan, they have been an inseparable part of Chinese territory since ancient times. It is totally illegal for the US and Japanese governments to include China's Diaoyu Islands and other islands in the territory to be returned to Japan."[7] It wasn't until three months later on March 8, 1972, that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued its basic view on the Diaoyu Islands.

In summary, it is not true that Japan occupied the Diaoyu Islands for 76 years; that is a false concept. In the first 50 years of Japanese colonial rule of Taiwan, Japan owned the Diaoyu Islands and carried out colonial development there, but in these 50 years, the Chinese people used their actions including the rebellions in Taiwan and the War of Resistance on China's mainland to say "No" to Japanese colonial rule. In the 26 years following the end of World War II, China naturally didn't raise objections to Japan because even the Ryukyu Islands weren't under Japanese rule. However, when, Japan and the USA signed the Okinawa Reversion Agreement in 1971, incorporating the Diaoyu Islands into the scope of territory to be returned to Japan without authorization, the Chinese government naturally expressed its solemn position against these countries trying to undermine China's sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands.

2. *Some Japanese maintain that from the end of World War II to 1971, Chinese maps didn't mark the Diaoyu Islands as Chinese territory. This is not true. In fact, it is worth attention whether during this period Japanese maps marked these islands as Japanese territory.*

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[6]Minutes of a Meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives of Japan, Jpn. ed., No. 17, July 12, 1967.

[7]The *People's Daily*, December 30, 1972.

China has many ancient historical documents and maps as evidence of the Diaoyu Islands as part of China. Japan cannot negate this, so it focuses on collecting relevant postwar maps in a vain attempt to prove that China didn't view the Diaoyu Islands as Chinese territory before 1971.

In 2013, a Beijing-based reporter with Japan's Jiji Press collected the maps of the world, China and Taiwan Province China published from 1949 when the People's Republic of China was founded to 1972. He stated based on these maps that in the Taiwan Province section of complete maps of China, the Diaoyu Islands weren't marked as Chinese territory, which was inconsistent with China's claim that the Diaoyu Islands "have been affiliated with Taiwan since ancient times." The reporter added that the maps published by China had July 1971 as the divide when it came to the national borderline between Yonaguni Island in Okinawa Prefecture, Japan, and Taiwan, China. According to him, in order to indicate its claim of the Diaoyu Islands as part of Chinese territory, China changed the angle from which the line was drawn to make it tilt further south from lat. 25° N as if the Diaoyu Islands were included in Taiwan Province. The reporter said, "China's maps published before 1971 didn't mark the Diaoyu Islands as Chinese territory."[8]

According to Maritime Professor Yoshihiko Yamada at Tokai University, "The maps distributed in China before July 1971 did not mark the Diaoyu Islands as Chinese territory, which shows that China wasn't aware of them as Chinese territory. Maps indicate a country's claim and awareness of its territory and territorial waters. Even if it is a small island, if a country is aware of it as its territory, it should mark it as so…. Maps tell us when China began to have territorial claims over the Diaoyu Islands. It didn't have those claims and add records of the islands as Chinese territory until 1971."[9]

What Yamada said above is not true. My explanation of this is as follows: Many official documents and maps of the Ming and Qing dynasties recorded Diaoyu Islet, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet as Chinese territory. From 1895 to 1945, Taiwan and all the islands affiliated with it were reduced to Japan's colonies as a result of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, and these included the Diaoyu Islands. From the end of World War II to 1971, some maps published in China not only failed to record the Diaoyu Islands as Chinese territory but also did not include some uninhabited islands of China. The main reasons were that following the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, China was separated by the Taiwan Strait; following World War II the Ryukyu Islands were under the occupation and administration of the USA and were not part of Japan; and after World War II China–Japan relations were not normalized and bilateral maritime border was not demarcated. The maps of Japan published in China from the 1950s to the 1960s didn't include Okinawa and most of them marked "the Northern Territories" for

[8]Jiji Press article titled "The Chinese Government's Proposition Was Contradictory: It Took the Diaoyu Islands as Part of Okinawa and Did Not Claim They Were Chinese Territory" at http://www.jiji.com/jc/zc?k=201312/2013122900037&g=pol.

[9]Jiji Press article titled "The Senkaku Islands in the Eyes of Those with Insight" at http://www.jiji.com/jc/zc?k=201312/2013122900058&g=pol.

which Japan claimed sovereignty as Soviet territory. Therefore, it would be inappropriate for China to cite the maps of Japan published in a certain period of time as evidence for determining the scope of today's Japanese territory.

The reason why the Diaoyu Islands were missing in maps of Taiwan Province, China was under the influence of the 50 years of Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan, and the direct reproduction of the maps of Japan before World War II. For example, in January 1965, the Taiwan-based China Defense Research Institute and China Institute of Geography co-published a world atlas. Volume One (East Asian Countries) of the atlas referred to the Diaoyu Islands as the Senkaku Gunto and wrote Diaoyu Island as Uotsuri Island, Huangwei Islet as Kuba Island, and Chiwei Islet as Taisho Island. These mistakes were made due to the influence of Japan's colonial rule of Taiwan. However, it cannot be ignored that Taiwan authorities maintain that the whole of the Ryukyu Islands belong to China, so the Diaoyu Islands are naturally part of China.[10] I believe that the mistakes in the maps published by China's mainland and Taiwan must be faced squarely and carefully corrected.

Nevertheless, the Japanese argument still does not stand. As I said earlier, the *Atlas of the People's Republic of China by Provinces* was produced by the Institute of Mapping of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1965 and published by China's National Administration of Mapping and Surveying in 1969. On page 18 of the atlas, the map of Fujian and Taiwan Provinces clearly marks the Diaoyu Islands as part of Taiwan Province, China. However, as the map had remained a "secret" for more than 40 years, it is understandable that some Japanese didn't know its existence. In short, the map fully shows that before 1969, the map of Taiwan Province published by China marked the Diaoyu Islands as part of China by letting them extend beyond the map edge. Therefore, the Japanese statement that China had not become aware of its sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands until 1971 is completely false.

I have found out that after Japan began its colonial rule of Taiwan in 1895, probably because the Diaoyu Islands were uninhabited and insignificant, they were not included in either the Taiwan section or the Ryukyu Islands section in many maps of Japan. This was very common. After Japan's colonial rule of Taiwan began, it had a very low level of awareness of the Diaoyu Islands as Japanese territory and it didn't began to record Chiwei Islet as Japanese territory until 1921.

In fact, except for the 50 years of Japanese colonial rule of Taiwan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki following the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, it had never had the so-called "stable and continuous" occupation of the Diaoyu Islands either before or after that period. The indisputable fact is that Japan met the resistance of the people of Taiwan during its occupation of the region. Following World War II, Japan didn't begin to include the Senkaku Islands until 1970. Therefore, the above

[10]Lin Chin-ching, "The Diaoyutai Islands Issue from the International Law Perspective," Cheng Chia-jui (ed.), *The Legal Status of the Diaoyutai Islands (*a collection of papers), Chin. ed., 2004 edition, Soochow University, Taiwan, pp. 180–181.

challenges Japan had for China and the logic behind them can well be applied back to Japan. It was not right at all for Japan to argue that the Diaoyu Islands belonged to Japan based on the fact that neither side of the Taiwan Strait marked the Diaoyu Islands as Chinese territory in their maps of Taiwan in 1945 through 1971.

The Complete Map of Ryukyu published by Japan in April 1958 mistakenly viewed China's Diaoyu Islands as the Senkaku Islands and made them part of the Ryukyu Islands, but the map used the Chinese names for Huangwei Islet and Chiwei Islet. The map was wrong not only because it extended the Ryukyu Islands to include the Diaoyu Islands but also because it included in Ryukyu the Tokara Islands and the Amami Islands of Japan's Kagoshima Prefecture, so it is not a reliable map.

Founded in 1869, the Geospatial Information Authority of Japan is the country's government institution in charge of mapping and surveying of Japan's territory under the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. The maps produced by this authority represent the national position of Japan. Among the maps it issued, those of 1930, 1962, and 1973 recorded the "Senkaku Islands" and "Uotsuri Island." The map of 1930 was produced during Japan's colonial rule of Taiwan and had been made invalid following World War II, so it should not be cited as evidence. The map of 1973 included revisions Japan made after the Diaoyu Islands dispute arose between China and Japan, so it is not good evidence either. Then what needs to be done is how to appraise and evaluate the map of 1962 (see Fig. 7.8).

This map includes Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, Nanxiao Island, Beixiao Island, and other islands. However, a closer look at the magnified version of the map shows it has failures and mistakes.

(1) The note of the map says that it is a provisional map urgently revised based on the map of the tenth year of the Taisho Era (1921) and other materials, but not a map revised based on Japan's official surveying. The Chiwei Islet and Huangwei Islet were obviously added to the map afterward.
(2) Uotsuri Island, the title of the map, is actually the Chinese name for the island adapted to make it grammatically right in Japanese. However, the map still uses the Chinese name for Huangwei Islet; it is not written as Kuba Island. Taisho Island appears in brackets to explain Chiwei Islet. All this shows that back then map producers preferred to the Chinese names for these islands and were not used to their Japanese names.
(3) Only if the title of the map is 尖閣諸島 (a term for the Senkaku Islands usually used by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs) or 尖閣列島a term for the Senkaku Islands usually used by the Japanese media) can it represent all the islands included in the map. However, the title of the map is Uotsuri Island and the term "尖閣群島" (which is not the official term the Japanese government has for the Senkaku Islands) appears in the map. Moreover, the map mistakenly has Huangwei Islet in the east of Diaoyu Island, and the Chiwei Islet in the southeast of Diaoyu Island. All these are notable mistakes.
(4) The map has Ishigaki close to Diaoyu Island, Huangwei Islet, and Chiwei Islet, which runs counter the way maps are usually produced in Japan. This has never



Fig. 7.8 Provisional map of Uotsuri Island issued by the Geospatial Information Authority of Japan in 1962

been seen in other officially published maps in Japan, and these are suspected to have been added later deliberately to indicate Ishigaki's administration. However, this is meaningless in terms of international law and appears only superfluous and foolish.

It is worth attention that the Map of the Nansei Shoto Islands in the "Kyushu" Part in Volume VII of the *Geography of Japan* distributed with the approval of the Geospatial Information Authority of Japan (Document 878) and published by Iwanami Shoten, Publishers on April 4, 1961, does not include the Diaoyu Islands. This shows that after World War II the map producer of the Japanese government had given up the prewar position to seize China's Diaoyu Islands. However, the following issue is worth studying: why did the Geospatial Information Authority of Japan urgently revise the map in 1962? The main reasons are as follows:

First, the Convention on the Continental Shelf was adopted at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea on April 26, 1958, under which the adjacent country has the right to develop continental shelf resources to a depth of 200 m.

This aroused Japan's interest in the continental shelf of the Diaoyu Islands. This may have also led to the serious mistakes in the above-mentioned Complete Map of Ryukyu which was published by Japan in April 1958.
Second, after Japan and the USA revised their security treaty in January 1961, the US government began to discuss the reversion of Okinawa. On March 19, 1962, President John F. Kennedy issued a statement recognizing Ryukyu as part of Japan and said, "I recognize the Ryukyus to be a part of the Japanese homeland and look forward to the day when the security interests of the Free World will permit their restoration to full Japanese sovereignty."[11] This was the first time an American president publicly stated that the USA would return Okinawa to Japan. This resulted in Japan's preparation to seize the Diaoyu Islands again when Okinawa was returned.

These are probably the reasons why the Geospatial Information Authority of Japan urgently revised the map. The revised edition of the map was filled with mistakes and was only provisional; it was not an officially published map. After Japan participated in the exploration of the petroleum resources in the waters around the Diaoyu Islands without authorization in 1969, Japan's Kodansha Ltd. published *The Cultural Geography of Japan 17* in 1970. The map of Okinawa Prefecture in this book began to include the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands). However, it wasn't until the USA returned the Diaoyu Islands to Japan in 1972 that the Geospatial Information Authority of Japan made it a rule that all future relevant maps published in Japan must follow the example of the Map of Japan published in 1977 in marking the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands) as part of the Nansei Shoto Islands.[12] These maps cannot prove that the Diaoyu Islands are Japanese territory. On the contrary, they once again reveal the fact that since the 1970s, the Japanese government has illegally infringed upon China's territorial sovereignty in the name of producing maps.

From 1945 to 1972, the maps examined and approved by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology did not record the Diaoyu Islands or the Diaoyu Islands as part of Japan. For example, the Higher Map of Japan examined and approved by that ministry in 1965 did not record the Diaoyu Islands as Japanese territory. In addition, the map had the borderline between the Iriomote Island of the Yaeyama Islands and Taiwan Province, China and didn't mark the waters around the Diaoyu Islands as Japanese territory. This was common in the maps of Japan before 1971. When this map was appeared in 1972, it had been revised considerably. It was not only expanded to increase the Senkaku Islands but also extended the original borderline northward by more than twice to unnaturally include the Diaoyu Islands as Japan territory (see Fig. 7.9).

[11]The Department of States, "American Foreign Policy: Current Documents. 1962," New York, 1971, pp. 1032–1033.

[12]Ju Deyuan, *The Truth about the Diaoyu Islands,* Chin. ed., Beijing: Kunlun Press, 2006, p. 348.



Fig. 7.9 1965 and 1972 versions of the Higher Map of Japan

To sum up, the maps of the Nansei Shoto Islands of Japan didn't include the Senkaku Islands or the Diaoyu Islands from the end of World War II and 1970. Even if Japan stresses that based on Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Diaoyu Islands are within the scope of the Nansei Shoto Islands, there is no evidence supporting this in the maps Japan officially published.